

Evaluating Dutch Aid Efforts in Support of  
Sustainable Urban Development (1991 - 2004)

**Report of a  
Field Study - South Africa**

by David Sogge,  
with Jacqui Boulle and Debbie Newton

15 August 2007

*The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*



# Contents

Abbreviations . . . . .	4
<b>Summary . . . . .</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1. Introduction to the Field Study . . . . .</b>	<b>11</b>
1.1 Background	
1.2 Purposes	
1.3 Methods	
<b>2. Urban Problems, Policies and Actors . . . . .</b>	<b>14</b>
2.1 Key Problems and their Drivers	
2.2 Urban Policy and Practice	
2.3 Actors and their Capacities	
2.4 Donors	
<b>3. Project Appraisals . . . . .</b>	<b>27</b>
3.1 Echelon I, II and III . . . . .	27
3.1.1 Urban Sector Network	
3.1.2 Planact	
3.1.3 Safer Cities	
3.1.4 Social Housing	
3.1.5 Triple Trust	
3.1.6 Resource Action Group	
3.1.7 Centre for Education and Enterprise Development (CEED)	
3.1.8 Sibikwa	
3.1.9 Southern African Association of Youth Clubs (SAAYC)	
3.2 Echelon IV . . . . .	89
3.2.1 Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention and Training (ADAPT)	
3.2.2 Centre for Opportunity Development (COD)	
3.2.3 Grassroots Adult Education and Training Trust	
<b>4. Summary of Findings . . . . .</b>	<b>105</b>
4.1 Introduction	
4.2 Projects in Echelons I, II and III . . . . .	105
4.2.1 Efficiency	
4.2.2 Effectiveness	
4.2.3 Relevance	
4.2.4 Sustainability	
4.2.5 Impact	
4.2.6 Conclusion - Echelons I, II and III	
4.3 Projects in Echelon IV . . . . .	113
4.3.1 Relevance	
4.3.2 Sustainability	
4.3.3 Impact	
4.3.4 Conclusion - Echelon IV	

**5. Conclusions . . . . . 116**

- 5.1 Relevance of Policy Prescriptions
- 5.2 Relevance of Policy as Practiced
- 5.3 Lessons

**Appendixes . . . . . 121**

- A Terms of Reference
- B Persons Contacted
- C Documentation
- D Questions for Field Study - South Africa
- E Terms of Reference for Research Assistants, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape

## Abbreviations

ADAPT	Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention and Training
BESG	Built Environment Support Group
BESP	Business Establishment Sustainability Programme
BMT	business management training
CASE	Community Agency for Social Enquiry
CBM	community-based maintenance
CDE	Centre for Development and Enterprise
CEED	Centre for Education and Enterprise Development
COD	Centre for Opportunity Development
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSO	civil society organisation
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EC	European Commission
ECD	early childhood development
EU	European Union
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy
ICPC	International Centre for Prevention of Crime
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
JASA	Junior Achievement South Africa
LED	local economic development
MFA	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NQF	National Qualifications Framework
PHP	Peoples Housing Process
RAG	Resource Action Group
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACECD	South African Congress for Early Childhood Development
SAAYC	Southern African Association of Youth Clubs
SAHPF	South African Homeless People's Federation
SCPS	Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy
SETA	Sector Education Training Authority
SHF	Social Housing Foundation
SMME	Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises
UMP	Urban Management Programme
UNCHS	UN Centre on Human Settlements (UN-Habitat)
USN	Urban Sector Network
UYF	Umsobomvu Youth Fund
WHA	Wattville/Tamboville Housing Association

## Summary

The findings in the following pages stem from a review of aid from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in pursuit of urban poverty reduction in South Africa. In the period 1991-2004, Dutch MFA aid for that purpose totalled about € 8.6 million.

The MFA's Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) commissioned this review as one of four country studies. In the period January-February 2007 a Dutch-South African team gathered information on twelve project clusters selected by the IOB for closer assessment. The IOB had categorized them into four echelons depending on their degree of association with Dutch urban anti-poverty policy and corresponding funding channels. Building on results of a prior desk study carried out by the IOB, this field study evaluates the relevance of the policies pursued and the degree to which aid helped meet urban anti-poverty goals.

### *Context*

The centre of gravity of South Africa's poverty problem continues shifting to urban areas. Here, unemployment, under-employment, crime, poor housing and inadequate services have spread since the political changeover in 1994, despite efforts by the new government. Driving these trends are worsening inequalities, urban inefficiencies stemming from sprawl and fragmentation, and global flows of money, goods and people.

Responses to these problems have been many and diverse, and not always coherent. Macro-economic policies discourage the creation of jobs for low- and unskilled people, and therefore fail to address the heart of the poverty problem. Those policies also encourage capital outflows that far exceed aid inflows. Well-positioned economic interest groups decisively influence the pace and direction of policy, although the poor and non-poor in major metropolises have sometimes organised to assert their claims and advance their interests. Government formulated urban policies on three fronts: (1) spatial restructuring; (2) socio-economic development to improve housing, services and the climate for enterprise; and (3) institutional restructuring of urban governance. Foreign donors have provided relatively modest amounts of money, but have helped introduce ideas. Those few donors prioritising urban issues have focused on local governance (including civil society), small enterprise, housing, basic services and anti-crime measures.

### *Appraisal of Dutch-supported Activities*

Efficiency levels of projects in the three core echelons of nine activity clusters tended to be fair-to-poor as many organisations faced internal and external turbulence, manifested in such things as high staff turnover. Projects with limited geographic scope and well-defined target groups tended to show higher levels of efficiency.

Effectiveness was, on average, fair. But performance varied widely across the sampled projects. Some project holders routinely met their objectives while others did not. Effects of most projects were, as intended, predominantly *non-material*; that is, they generated knowledge and skills, connections, informed public debate, organisational strengths and institutional development. Performance differed by level *within* project holders' organisations. Central secretariats of networks tended to struggle to meet objectives more than did the organisations making up those networks. Apart from internal management capacities, effectiveness often depended on factors beyond the project holders' immediate control, such as the scope and cohesiveness of the community or social category addressed. Because poor urban settlements increasingly lack social cohesion, community-centred projects had to struggle to achieve effectiveness. One youth training

project was routinely effective in its (small) field of performing arts, but other youth-focused activities to promote after-school leisure and learning (in Echelons II and III) showed uneven and usually only modest effectiveness.

Relevance of projects for the urban poor showed diverse patterns. Most professional non-profit service organisations (in Echelon I) showed good levels of responsiveness to local needs and potentials for building pre-conditions for citizen participation, and for contributing to local governance. Limiting their relevance, however, was a subtle displacement of their objectives, whereby they became mere public service contracting agents, and uncritical associates of the ruling party. Expert informants to this study question the relevance for South Africa of the social housing model promoted by the Netherlands. Projects (in Echelons II and III) aiming to turn unemployed youth into successful entrepreneurs showed even lower degrees of relevance to poverty alleviation.

While most of the urban service grantees showed professional competence and exercised influence over public policy, they commonly operated with little critical autonomy from authorities answerable to the ruling party. Dutch grants in this field were evidently relevant to official government policy. But there is little evidence of interest in or engagement with agents of citizen action autonomous of government and the ruling party, such as the movement of shackdwellers. Hence there were evidently limits to Dutch official aid's relevance for governance, that is, for the creation of ample civic space for organisations of residents to gain capacities and to advance their agendas in negotiating ways forward with local authorities.

Somewhat less consistently relevant were activities in respect to the policy category "habitat". Housing was evidently a main concern. Dutch grants for Planact and other USN affiliates were relevant to public and professional debates about official approaches to urban housing and infrastructural services. In the consistent promotion of the social housing model, Dutch grantmaking evidently helped speed its official adoption. But the relevance of the Social Housing model for sustainable anti-poverty action is a matter of dispute. Its primary target groups are not the urban poor; hence that model's relevance for Dutch policy is low. Meanwhile land access, a matter of strategic importance in the urban habitat and livelihood problematic, might have been expected to receive more attention than the one grant (to Planact) that devoted attention to it.

In respect to social services (such as for youth), after-school educational and recreational activities supported by Dutch grants were *relevant*, but hardly *commensurate* with the problems. Evidence about the Durban project on crime prevention supports a similar conclusion. Meanwhile, Dutch policies were insufficiently well-framed to capture other opportunities. A case in point is South Africa's system of social protection: cash transfers for poor pensioners and families with dependent children. Although the system does not cover the hard core of the poor, and provides only austere benefits, it constitutes by far the largest, most effective and efficient anti-poverty instrument in the country today. Yet this study could find no evidence of Dutch interest in this system of social protection.

In respect to work and income, the relevance of activities was not high. Prevailing grow-the-young-entrepreneur strategies show little relevance to Dutch anti-poverty goals in that they usually fail to generate sustainable jobs. However the Dutch contribution to the community-based maintenance (CBM) model of job creation pivoting on community services appeared highly relevant in that it helps address two fundamental poverty problems: the scarcity of decent employment and the scarcity of public services for decent living environments.

In the cases of two of the three projects *outside* the core echelons of projects influenced or supported under terms of the Dutch Spearhead Programme to Combat Urban Poverty, relatively high degrees of anti-poverty relevance were found. Relevance was especially marked in an organisation fighting violence against women and girls in a Johannesburg township, but was also apparent in a project promoting early childhood education centres in poor settlements in greater Cape Town.

Sustainability prospects are, with some exceptions, not strong. Many project holders set in motion benefit streams that met users' interests and needs, such as for training; they therefore enjoyed recognition by local beneficiaries. Those organisations with the best prospects of sustaining themselves tend to express clear ideas about who they want to serve and what strategies they need to pursue. Yet most struggled to sustain themselves as organisations and institutions. A number of them have simply not survived.

The extent of project holders' recognition and authority among public sector agencies and policy-makers varied widely. National and local government bodies sought policy input from, and developed contractual partnerships with Planact and other members of the Urban Services Network. Government has accepted the social housing model, but advances have been slow and uneven. The main recipient of Dutch support, a parastatal agency, has faced severe internal challenges. Youth promotion projects got most of their national recognition from participants and staff of kindred organisations in the sector. Their profile is low, and unlike USN affiliates they showed little capacity to develop innovations or advocate policy change through focused campaigns.

Better prospects of sustaining benefit flows were observed in the work of several professional urban service non-profits (Echelon I). They paid attention to the production and use of knowledge and generated innovative models of anti-poverty action with potentials for scaling-up. The programme for training youth in performing arts has become more sustainable because it insisted on high professional standards. That approach won it official accreditation and subsidies from government. However most project holders lacked incentives and means to operate as knowledge-based organisations or effectively to scale up relevant and professionally-gearred models. They show poor prospects of sustainability.

In terms of sustainable capacities, flows of benefits consisted chiefly of skills, knowledge and motivation. These accrued mainly to *individuals*. Both personal and social gains are detectable as a result of Planact and some USN affiliate field innovations, training and support to local government officials and to local community activists. Professional skills in community theatre, provided by Sibikwa, represent another case, although the numbers of individuals are far smaller than in the case of USN affiliates. Benefits accruing to former participants in enterprise promotion projects appear to be much lower and less sustainable.

Impact was difficult to verify. Where detectable, it was uneven. Impacts by the urban service organisations (in Echelon I) registered by way of improved capacities among individuals and organisations in governance, which have helped steer and to a modest degree improve the material dimensions of habitat. In their innovations in public goods and services, urban service organisations have also had a detectable, though as yet not widespread, impact. Several local governments created decent jobs through expanded services in waste removal and other problems in their environments -- measures directly attributable to a Dutch-supported project. In material terms, a score of low-income urban communities now have access to community halls and other facilities for recreation and learning, most of them brought about thanks to stronger capacities in both the civil and public sectors for planning and promotion of public goods. Advocacy for integrated urban development, with a redistributive intent as per the slogan 'one city, one tax base',



contributed to South Africa's adoption of the 'megacity' model of governance, though this has yet to lead to strong versions of pro-poor redistribution.

In the other two Echelon I projects, focused on crime prevention and social housing, no clear evidence of impact could be detected.

In the Echelon II and III project clusters, little if any impact for the poor could be detected from small enterprise promotion projects, although benefits accrued to a limited number of intermediary stakeholders, namely project holder staff. There has been detectable, if modest, institutional impact in the consolidation of a viable training institution for young low-income people in performing arts. In no other case were similar institutional impacts in vocational education detectable. Fragmentary evidence of job success among ex-trainees suggested the possibility that income and work prospects have stabilized for a modest number, but in the absence of systematic tracer studies, firm conclusions about impacts for participants could not be made.

Positive impacts were detectable for two non-core (Echelon IV) projects, one focused on violence against women, the other on early child education. The other Echelon IV project, focused on youth entrepreneurship showed little relevance or sustainability, and had no detectable institutional impact or impact among ex-participants. In this respect it was no different from similar projects in Echelons II and III,

### ***Relevance of Dutch Policy: Prescriptions***

Dutch *policy prescriptions* of the early 1990s were broadly relevant to South Africa. It is difficult to dispute the relevance of the problem statement on urban poverty appearing in *A World of Difference* where it calls attention to:

- needs for (decent) employment and broadly-based purchasing power;
- constraints on job creation where economic policies respond chiefly to global forces that reduce the demand for low-skilled labour;
- macro-economic policies that spread and deepen conditions of urban poverty;
- in badly-serviced zones on the urban periphery, settlement schemes that lower access to jobs and markets for residents, thus offering no solutions for the urban poor.

Among well-focused and realistic Dutch policy prescriptions were those emphasising jobs, public services and governance. Implied were stronger public sector entities, NGOs and community- or membership-based organisations promoting public action by the poor themselves.

However, some policy prescriptions were not free of misplaced assumptions and ambiguities. For example, their emphasis on the potentials of the informal economy was largely misplaced, since South Africa's structural conditions, political rules and traditions influencing commerce, crafts and the labour market have severely limited the anti-poverty potentials of the informal economy. Its future importance is also in doubt, as the South African government has vowed to reduce and eventually eliminate what it terms the 'second economy'. Ambiguities arose where policy documents called attention to the poor outcomes of small enterprise promotion programmes, yet advocated no major departures from approaches prevailing in those unsuccessful programmes.

Relevance of policy was diminished where it did not draw attention to opportunities available in a sophisticated setting like South Africa's. The country's constitutional system affords means for citizens to advance socio-economic rights, including rights to social assistance. Social protection programmes put cash in the hands of about one-quarter of the

population every month, thus preventing total destitution of a large part of South Africa's poor. A labour-intensive public works programme is also emerging as an effective way of reducing poverty. Yet Dutch policy statements took virtually no notice of these anti-poverty measures.

### *Relevance of Dutch Policy: Practice*

Grant-making *practice* was significantly, but not entirely congruent with anti-poverty policy. Congruence was greatest where grants went to organisations providing technical services for poor communities, training and support for local governments and policy advocacy. Dutch support for those organisations was relatively intense and consistent. Here grant-making practice was, in the main, relevant.

Grants were deployed across a range of activities and levels. Many activities aimed to build knowledge, skills and other capacities; some focused on delivery of services according to pre-set plans; others emphasized testing innovative models of anti-poverty action; yet others aimed to promote policy dialogue, in some cases based on research.

In terms of priority social categories, the grant making focus was somewhat diffuse. Choices of grantee and activity were only partially or indirectly targeted on the poor. Among social categories targeted, the best-represented were township residents and youth; yet a number of others, from local government officials to shack dwellers to non-poor consumers of rented accommodation, also figured among target groups. In support of core (Echelons I, II and III) grantees, no consistent pattern of attention to women and to gender issues could be detected. However activities of two non-core (Echelon IV) project holders were relevant for women and girls in poor townships.

In short, Dutch aid supported a variety of strategic approaches at several levels across a number of terrains, prioritizing a variety of social categories. Concerted approaches were more the exception than the rule.

Some of the loose congruence with anti-poverty aims stemmed from project designs insufficiently attentive to issues of *how* objectives would be achieved; a number of activities showed disjunctures between policy purposes and the institutional preconditions to realize them in practice.

Where income and job creation objectives were pursued, grant-making practice did not follow any of the alternative paths prescribed by Dutch policy. Those alternatives included attention to improved macro environments to boost the demand for labour, improved socio-economic rights of informal economy workers and labour-intensive public employment. Practices adopted toward youth entrepreneurship/micro-enterprise were, in the main, inconsistent with available knowledge about prevailing outcomes in this sector, including knowledge noted in major Dutch policy statements (for example, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1990: 184, 186). Meanwhile, opportunities to pursue wide-scope, high-impact approaches to job creation exist in South Africa. But these have lacked strong backing for research, testing and promotion. In terms of Dutch policy, these were missed opportunities.

Nevertheless the urban service nonprofits (Planact and most of the others in the Urban Sector Network) routinely promoted many Dutch policy ambitions. Especially in the early and mid-1990s those organisations often had positive (pro-poor) impacts on South Africa's stock of knowledge, its pool of policy specialists and practitioners, its policy debates, local and national negotiations and its leadership capacities at community levels. Also among their important achievements, realised particularly in the period 2000-2005, have been

innovative models of anti-poverty action, such as in public sector job creation, governance, planning processes, housing finance and technical aspects of construction. These might be termed policy experiments. On terrains of innovation and knowledge-creation -- terrains emphasised in Dutch policy -- Dutch grant-making to professional urban service organisations yielded good results.

Yet some feasible terrains of intervention advocated in Dutch policy were, in practice, seldom pursued. Historically, two of South Africa's most powerful civil/political assets have often enabled the poor to gain leverage over urban poverty and governance: *One*, robust traditions of public action and "voice" pursued by membership-based organisations, and *Two*, robust traditions of judicial activism, today further empowered by a progressive Constitution and statutory agencies to promote its core purposes. Given proven potentials of these socio-political assets to advance pro-poor agendas, their neglect in the practical execution of Dutch policy suggests the probability that important opportunities were missed.

Among pointers emerging from this study are:

1. *The success of micro-level pursuits is strongly conditioned by macro-level policies.*  
Anti-poverty objectives became particularly difficult in South Africa's post-changeover transition, which witnessed severe capital flight and increasing unemployment -- conditions which macro-economic and other national policies did nothing to address.
2. *Knowledge-based approaches can yield better results.*  
Patterns of effectiveness and sustainability arose where project holders attached high value to knowledge -- whether in extracting lessons from their activities for their own use or in generating knowledge and models for use by others. Effectiveness and sustainability were almost never observed where project holders saw their tasks chiefly those of delivering services according standard formulas, with little investment in knowledge.
3. *Approaches to job creation need radical re-thinking.*  
Conventional small enterprise promotion efforts are not resolving the crucial and urgent problem of unemployment. Alternatives are being researched and piloted; more could be explored and promoted.
4. *Spaces for effective participation by organisations of the urban poor merit reinforcement.*  
More vigorous efforts should be possible to help widen and protect the political space in which civil organisations can act autonomously of the ruling party and its local authorities. In such improved circumstances, citizen may more effectively pursue their interests in local and national governance.

# 1. Introduction to the Field Study

## 1.1 Background

From time to time the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) carries out assessments of Dutch cooperation policy. Dutch aid efforts in support of Sustainable Urban Development (referred to initially as Combating Urban Poverty) had not previously been evaluated. Hence the IOB's decision to carry out a retrospective evaluation of MFA policy in this sector as pursued in the period 1991 - 2004.

The IOB selected South Africa as a country case alongside those of Ethiopia, Nicaragua and the Philippines. In the South African case from 1991 to 2004, Dutch official aid guided by policies to combat urban poverty totalled € 8.6 million -- an amount less than that disbursed in the other three countries, particularly Ethiopia. Yet compared with the Ethiopian case, South Africa has a higher proportion of projects directly aligned with and financed by the MFA's Spearhead Programme on Combating Urban Poverty.

As stated in *Urban Poverty Alleviation* (DGIS 1994), Dutch policy aimed to improve living standards by way of improved income, shelter (including access to land), basic public services (including policing and crime prevention), urban government and institutional development (including public-private partnerships, citizen participation and stronger NGOs to represent citizen interests). It further intended to promote integrated, holistic strategies of urban development. As manifested in South Africa, urban anti-poverty policy put an emphasis on youth, with the explicit intention of combating and preventing youth criminality and unemployment.

Policy implementation took the form of grant-making, which was managed at the level of the Netherlands Embassy in Pretoria. Helping steer policy in practice were routine consultations between the Embassy and The Hague, chiefly with the Urban Development Department of the MFA's Directorate-General for International Cooperation.

The IOB put this field study in motion in November 2006 when it approached the authors of this report, soliciting from them a Plan of Approach. On the basis of that Plan, the IOB commissioned the authors to undertake the present study.

## 1.2 Purposes

Details regarding Dutch policy to reduce urban poverty, and regarding the evaluation's overall purposes and methods appear in the Terms of Reference (Appendix A). The main issues for examination are the degree to which Dutch aid in South Africa helped meet anti-poverty goals, and the relevance of the strategic choices in pursuit of the goals. Main questions addressed are: Were activities and strategies relevant to combating urban poverty? How effective were the projects in reaching their anti-poverty objectives? How efficient? What was their impact, and how sustainable were the results?

## 1.3 Methods

*Phase One* In early January 2007 the main author, David Sogge, and his associate evaluators in South Africa, Jacqui Boule and Debbie Newton, reviewed project documents prepared by IOB staff in 2006 on the basis of a desk study that analysed documents copied from the Ministry's project archives, especially those of the Netherlands Embassy in Pretoria. That desk study yielded, among other things, a score on main themes of the evaluation. In many cases it was possible to assign an "ex ante" score based on

stated project objectives and sometimes an “ex post” score based on an assessment of the written performance record in the Ministry’s archives. As appropriate, these are referred to in the diagrams appearing in Chapter 3 of this report, where the “fieldwork’ score of the evaluators is always given.

The field study focused on the IOB’s selection of 12 grants or clusters of grants from a total set of 45 project clusters. All cases concerned grants that had ended by or before 2005. In no case were projects selected from among project holders continuing to receive Dutch grants as of 2007. The grants at issue are those made to non-governmental and multi-lateral agencies. Dutch official aid by way of the South African government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme Fund for activities managed by government ministries, such as the Phola Park Housing Project, were *not* among the 45 clusters from which IOB selected the projects studied here.

Before, during and after the period under review, *other* Dutch public monies reached many urban projects in South Africa. Those were channeled by way of four Dutch co-financing agencies Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Novib, and by way of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, VNG, as allocated by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, VROM. This study does not consider these other Dutch aid streams. There is thus a distinct possibility that, in cases where several Dutch donors were involved, as was commonly the case for the urban professional service NGOs, the importance of aid from the Netherlands was greater than that suggested in this report.

The following table gives the number of project holder clusters and financial commitments according to echelon, as categorized by the IOB:

	Project clusters selected	Clusters as a proportion of all in the echelon	Total grant commitments for projects selected	Echelon coverage (% of all grant commitments)
Echelon I	4	80 %	€ 1.654.045	90 %
Echelon II	1	100 %	€ 196.398	100 %
Echelon III	4	57%	€ 745.145	66 %
Echelon IV	3	16 %	€ 460.036	16 %

In preparation for field work, the main author and his South African associates prepared a list of key questions/issues (see Appendix D). These issue lists were used broadly to guide interviews and to draw information from documentation. The issues in focus were the projects’:

- systems of objectives - quality of strategy;
- effectiveness - extent and quality of performance according to objectives;
- efficiency - performance according to time and budget plans;
- sustainability - continuation of streams of benefits beyond the end of the Dutch grant, according to four main dimensions:
  - institutional and organisational outcomes;
  - formal recognition and authority;
  - interest and benefits for users;
  - development of knowledge and capacity;
- impact - changes in priority social group circumstances & capacities; shifts in official policy and practices relative to urban poverty reduction;
- relevance of policy and policy choices - chiefly related to main themes of habitat, social services, urban governance, work and income, integrated urban development and cross-cutting themes of gender, vulnerable groups, respect for cultural diversity, and research.

The evaluators scheduled interviews and contracted one research assistant each in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg. To guide the assistants, special Terms of Reference and specific questions were prepared (Appendix E). In the case of one grantee with both a central office and affiliated project holders, the Urban Sector Network, the evaluators adjusted their research methods, as explained in detail in section 3.1.1.1.

Also in this phase, the evaluators reviewed recent compilations and critical overviews of South African policies and social trends in respect to urban poverty issues, especially employment, habitat, youth and crime, and to trends in governance and public debates that bear on those issues, including public action influenced by membership-based organisations and NGOs. They also reviewed data and assessments of foreign aid for South Africa. Some of that documentation is listed in Appendix C.

*Phase Two* In the period 28 January - 13 February, Sogge carried out field work in South Africa, concentrating on the Johannesburg and Durban/Pietermaritzburg areas; Boulle and Newton carried out interviews in the Cape Town chiefly in the month of February, as did all three research assistants, Ms. Jabu Ntuli in Durban/Pietermaritzburg, Dr. Raji Matshediso in Gauteng, and Ms. Patricia Zweig in Cape Town. The work of these three broadened the reach of the study to include intermediary and end beneficiaries. The research assistants helped trace people formerly involved in projects; that was not easy given that in some cases ten or more years had elapsed since informants had been involved with Dutch-supported activities. Guided by a set of key questions regarding outcomes (Appendix E), the research assistants interviewed people at community level, thereafter providing summaries and analyses for the chief researchers.

Informants included persons currently or formerly associated with the project holder, and beneficiaries of project activities, both intermediate and 'ultimate' or community-based beneficiaries. In a number of cases, such people proved difficult to trace or to contact. The evaluators also contacted persons regarded as expert in sectors pertinent to project activities, both in government and in non-governmental agencies. A list of all those contacted appears in Appendix B.

Interviews yielded substantial information on the recent past and today's state of affairs, thus illuminating mid- to long-term outcomes. Many interviews also brought to the surface information about the not-so-recent past (that is, from the 1990s), thus illuminating advances, setbacks and processes at work during the lifespans of projects. Documentation of past activities was uneven; systematic information on effects and outcomes was scarce or of poor quality. Field work yielded fewer documents than expected. The closure of several project holders, failures to save paper or electronic archives on moving offices, and computer theft has radically reduced the written record about many activities.

Compensating for those gaps, at least in regard to nine of the twelve project clusters, were reports of external evaluations. In several cases other comments written by outside observers (such as Dutch journalists publishing via a Rotterdam-based architectural platform) filled out the picture. A list of documents (only those cited in the text) appears in Appendix C. During February, the leadership of the overall evaluation, Hans Slot of the IOB and Marc Lammerink of FMD Consultants, made supervisory visits to South Africa; Slot to Johannesburg and Cape Town, Lammerink to Cape Town.

On 16 March, Sogge submitted a first draft of this report, which integrates appraisal texts written by Boulle and Newton of four activity clusters based in Cape Town. Drafts were revised on the basis of comments in interaction with the leadership of the overall evaluation.

## 2. Urban Problems, Policies and Actors

Thirteen years after the formal end of apartheid, poverty and inequality continue to be reproduced in South Africa's cities. Sustainable urban development remains an elusive goal. This chapter sketches some major problems and their drivers. It discusses policies and policy options, as well as the roles of national and foreign actors, especially official donors, in addressing them. It may therefore serve as a point of reference in assessing the relevance of Dutch aid, the topic addressed in Chapters 4 and 5.

### 2.1 Key Problems and their Drivers

Poverty's centre of gravity used to be in rural areas, but in past decades it has migrated *en masse* to cities as de-agrarianisation and industrialisation advanced. The pace of urbanisation has accelerated: from 1970 to 1990 urban populations grew by 2.5 percent a year; from 1990 to 2005 by 2.8 percent a year. As of 2005, about three in every five South Africans lived in cities. In small towns and rural areas, millions more depend on remitted wages earned in urban areas. Poverty in cities has spread and deepened. As of 2005, some 5.8 million people in South Africa's 21 major urban areas lived below poverty line of about €44 per month, with many millions more perched precariously just above that level.

Driving poverty have been several factors that accumulate and reinforce one another: apartheid social engineering and its disempowering outcomes; vulnerability to shocks such as criminal violence and ill health; lack of assets, skills and social connections that provide access to decent work; and economic flows operating at global levels. All four interact with great intensity in urban areas, reproducing and expanding poverty there.

Major manifestations of urban poverty are:

*Unemployment.* In 2005 some nine million people, about 40 percent of the national workforce, lacked employment; in 1993 South Africa's jobless rate had been about 30 percent. Today, most potential workers are being shut out completely; as of 2005, about two-thirds of the unemployed had never had a job. The country's 21 major urban areas are home to 44 percent of all the unemployed.

*Under-employment.* In 2003, almost a third of employed South Africans earned less than the statutory minimum wage for domestic workers. This "working poor" segment of the labour force is steadily growing, both in the formal and informal economies. About one employed person in five works in the informal economy. For most people that is a last resort, a precarious dead end. A large survey of the self-employed in 60 poor communities found that only one person in eight said he/she earned enough to live on.

*Precarious habitat.* In 2003 there were 2.1 million shack dwellings in South Africa, up from 1.5 million in 1996. This 'informal hypergrowth' is projected to result in 2.4 million shack dwellings by 2008. In greater Johannesburg from 1996 to 2001, the number of households without formal shelter grew from 156.000 to 212.000; in Durban it grew from 140.000 to 150.000. In 1993, Cape Town counted 24.000 shacks; in 2001 there were 143.000.

*Inadequate services.* While many urban (and rural) households saw post-apartheid gains in electricity connections and (mobile) telephones, the supply of basic water, sanitation and waste removal services fell short of rapidly-rising need. From 1996 to 2001 the number of households lacking on-site water supply increased 59 percent in greater Johannesburg, 79 percent in Cape Town and 28 percent in Durban.

*Crime.* Insecurity is high, especially in cities and towns, where poor people are main victims. In 2003, some 58 percent of South Africans did not feel safe at night. Crime has declined slightly since the 1990s. In the period September 2002 - August 2003, about 23 per cent of South Africans were victims of crime, down from about 25 per cent in 1998. Yet the incidence of violent crime is among the highest in the world. Measures to curb it absorb vast resources, private and public. Foreign and domestic business interests successfully practice corruption, most worryingly among senior political figures.

Today the essential socio-economic structure of South African cities remains little changed from the original apartheid template. However, black people with means to do so have fled apartheid-era townships to settle where they can. Class segregation, sprawl, informalisation, insecurity and social fragmentation continue. In these ways South African cities increasingly resemble those of Brazil and other Latin American countries.

Among factors reproducing and driving these trends are:

*Inequality:* At apartheid's end in 1994, South Africa was one of the world's most unequal societies. Since then, its inequality has worsened. From 1996 to 2004, the gini index of income inequality rose from around 0.60 to 0.65<sup>1</sup>. A lucky few among African and Coloured people have enjoyed rapid upward social mobility. Class difference has largely displaced racial difference as the basis of inequality. Shifts in social power are reconfiguring political power. Public and private choices affecting housing, transportation, services and other aspects of urban life reflect the priorities of the better-off, new and old. Yet as inequality grows, it puts downward pressure on economic growth, intensifying joblessness and thus adding to social tensions and instability. All these dynamics are present in today's South Africa, with particular intensity in cities.

*Inefficiency.* South African cities were designed to separate blacks from whites and to conform to 20<sup>th</sup> century planning axioms that favoured the automobile and low-density housing. As a result, cities are hugely inefficient. For the household economies of poor people, most of whom live in peripheral areas, far from jobs, markets and major public facilities, these inefficiencies are crippling.

*Global flows:* South Africa's economy has become more outwardly-oriented. Around 1999, external trade began to account for more than half its GDP. A rising Rand and lowered tariffs have led to factory closures and job losses, especially for those with few skills, many of them women. Policy elites had promised more jobs thanks to foreign direct investment. The reality has been different. Foreign investment has generated few jobs for average workers. South Africa is today deeply entangled in the global "casino economy". Massive amounts of global "hot" money flow in and out of the country's currency trading market, which has become the largest in the non-Western world. Such flows push up the exchange value of the Rand, with negative consequences for many exports.

Capital flight over the period 1980-2000 was substantial, averaging nearly seven per cent of annual GDP. As the country liberalised after 1994, that financial haemorrhage increased. In 2000 South Africa lost an estimated \$13 billion to capital flight -- about 20 times what it received in foreign aid in that year (Mohammed and Finnoff 2005).

South Africa has become a major entrepot for global drug traffic, radically expanding the power of the criminal underworld in the metropolis. South African cities have also become magnets for foreign (largely African) workers and traders. These and other flows, including images that create needs and drive consumerism, are pervasive. They stimulate

---

<sup>1</sup> Other research, cited in Seekings & Nattrass 2005, suggests a rise in the gini index from 0.65 in 1995 to around 0.70 in 2000. These indices reflect incomes before taxes and transfers; social assistance transfers have reduced inequalities somewhat. However, widespread under-reporting by the rich means that income differences are in fact greater than survey results would suggest.



narrowly-based and short-term economic dynamics, but also increase volatility and risks in the economy, particularly for the poor in cities.

## 2.2 Urban Policy and Practice

This sub-section reviews directions that South African public policy pertinent to urban poverty has taken since the early 1990s. It also looks at main actors driving or seeking to drive those policies, including foreign donors. Evidence of Dutch official aid's alignment with or influence on South African policy is discussed chiefly in Chapter 4, which summarises findings from Chapter 3, in which grants and their outcomes are appraised.

In the several years prior to formal democracy in 1994, representatives of South African interest blocs began revising rules and institutions that affect cities. Those negotiations resulted in the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the party's policy programme in the run-up to the first democratic elections. A social democratic agenda, the RDP implied mildly redistributive fiscal measures, mainly to expand public infrastructure and services to meet basic needs. It advocated "people-driven process" rather than a providential state tasked with "the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry".

With the advent of formal democracy, South Africa's new Constitution became the benchmark for many policies. Its Bill of Rights set the tone of political debate and gave rise to a stream of legislation to promote socio-economic rights. This new system of rights and institutions to promote them is a political outcome of world class. Politicians and a political movement gave it momentum. But sustaining it is a network of energetic and highly trained legal professionals -- some of them based in legal activist NGOs, others in public interest law firms, and yet others in university law faculties. They gave that constitutional system its form and detailed content. Legal practitioners and activists have demonstrated its potentials for advancing a wide range of human rights.

In 1996 the government abruptly sidelined the RDP. Taking its place was the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, an orthodox macro-economic agenda to liberalize foreign trade, reduce protection for formal economy workers, privatize state enterprises and to cut the national budget deficit without raising taxes. GEAR's architects claimed that it would give investors confidence because they were seeking low costs, and GEAR would hold their costs down. Subsequent research has shown that most investors were seeking not so much lower costs as buoyant *markets* (and qualified workers) -- things that government spending curbs and low and unequal consumer purchasing power did nothing to promote. According to a number of mainstream economists, this strategy reduced economic growth. The UNDP has twice issued a *South Africa Human Development Report*. Both reports question GEAR's premises and impact. The more recent report states: "Rising unemployment, income inequality, low investment and other issues make it increasingly apparent that government needs to review GEAR." (UNDP 2004:65)

Unemployment among the less skilled - the chief driver of poverty - has therefore continued to grow to catastrophic levels. A comprehensive strategy to reduce poverty was never formulated. However, the new government inherited a viable public system of social protection serving old age pensioners, disabled workers and children in poor households. Despite GEAR's emphasis on cutting public expenditure, these cash pay-out programmes were miraculously spared from extinction, perhaps because they were austere and do not target the unemployed, who form the heart of the poverty problem. Since the late 1990s they have evolved into a social safety net of increasing scope. Every month those programmes put cash in the hands of at least one-quarter of the population, thus preventing total destitution among a large proportion of South Africa's poor. Many millions of eligible people have not yet taken up their entitlements. But despite their incomplete

coverage and austere benefits, these public assistance programmes are still by far the most extensive, effective and efficient anti-poverty and anti-inequality mechanisms at work in South Africa today.

It was in moments of rising popular expectations and cross-currents of austerity that new laws, policies and institutions meant to steer urban development were launched. Municipal and national leaders faced mandates not only to deliver but also to de-racialise, remodel and re-fit the implementing agencies, many of which had not changed since the apartheid era. Government agencies at all levels were strongly encouraged to contract out tasks to consulting firms and, cautiously, to nonprofit organisations.

New conceptions of city problems and solutions began to guide urban policy. Emphasis fell increasingly on holistic, integrated perspectives. For example, talk of “habitat” replaced talk of “housing”. South African policy-makers had thus anticipated new approaches ratified globally in the 1996 UN-Habitat II Conference in Istanbul. Dutch official grantmaking was intended to give these trends further momentum. In a few cases, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Dutch aid helped South African organisations pioneer certain small-scale policy innovations. Also detectable is the World Bank’s policy influence, particularly to make cities competitive in global markets by lowering costs (taxes, energy prices, &c.) to business.

South Africa’s Urban Development Strategy of 1995, re-emergent in 1997 as the Urban Development Framework, advocated the following (as outlined in Smit 2004):

- *Spatial restructuring*: talk of a ‘compact city’ to reduce sprawl and talk of an ‘integrated city’ to end apartheid’s segregation and fragmented control;
- *Social and economic development*: talk of a global ‘competitive city’; and talk, juxtaposed with talk of competitiveness, of an ‘equitable city’. Investment in housing and public infrastructure for ‘habitable and safe communities’ is emphasized. Further, talk of local economic development (LED) has two main thrusts: the formal and informal economies, the latter intended to fight poverty.
- *Institutional restructuring*: talk of an ‘efficient city’, a ‘smart city’ and an ‘inclusive city’, the last related to an ambition to create over-arching metropolitan governments that would allow cross-subsidization from richer zones to poorer and that would clarify roles and coordinate functions of different components and levels of government, including ‘engagement between the newly elected local governments and civil society’.

A major thrust has been to decentralize responsibilities for delivery and some revenue-raising to provincial and municipal government. White papers in 1997 (Transformation of the Public Service) 2000 (Municipal Partnerships) and 2001 (Framework for Delivering Public Services) introduced private sector roles in governance. Municipal Service Partnerships are the chief formula. These are meant chiefly to promote Public-Private Partnerships, although public-community arrangements are not ruled out. In the late 1990s, talk of ‘developmental local government’ also emerged. There were ambitions to make local authorities key drivers in infrastructure investment, urban integration, LED designed expressly to combat poverty.

In 2000 the government introduced its Municipal Systems Act mandating every municipality to make an annual Integrated Development Plan (IDP) along five dimensions: “sustainable services”, “social and economic development”, “accountable government”, “community involvement (partnerships)” and a “safe and healthy environment”.

Recent years have seen other important policy statements. In 2004 the Department of Housing issued its paper, *Breaking New Ground in Housing Delivery*, which among other

things puts renewed an emphasis on upgrading slums and informal settlements and on social housing for more stable social strata. The government does not welcome the informal economy. A recently-announced strategy supplementing GEAR, the Accelerated and Shared Growth - South Africa (ASGISA), aims to “eliminate the second economy” by providing more government contracts and loans for small contractors. It proposes a renewed focus on youth and women through training, a national youth service and the revival of a neglected pro-poor jobs scheme launched in the mid-1990s, the Expanded Public Works Programme.

To what extent have such policy utterances been put into practice, and anti-poverty goals brought closer to achievement? A decade after the transition began, South Africans began hearing claims and counter-claims about promise and performance. The authorities could rightly point to impressive delivery on many fronts, and to opinion surveys showing rising satisfaction of citizens, including the urban poor, with expanded social services, electricity and water - even if one in eight households have had their water shut off at least once because they could not or would not pay the rates.

### 2.3 Actors and their Capacities

Detectable in this mix of policy intentions and governance procedures are the influences of several domestic interest blocs: local and international business, black civic associations, white residents and property owner groupings and urban professionals in the non-profit and consulting sectors. Competing blocs exist within government itself. Urban strategy-making has thus been full of cross-currents. There has come a cascade of policy initiatives on housing, land rights (mainly affecting rural areas) the prevention of land invasions and the promotion of small and medium enterprise. There have been major efforts to improve municipal management and finance. These national measures have been supplemented and occasionally even superseded by local initiatives in some municipalities.

#### *National Government*

Beyond the Presidency, the heart of state power affecting cities is with the National Treasury (ministry of finance) and the Reserve Bank. They crucially shape financial parameters for the main national, provincial and local government branches, as well as the tax and services climate for private economic actors, both domestic and foreign. Complementing them is the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). It steers policies that also shape urban development, namely Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME), Black Economic Empowerment, Industrial Development Zones, and the regulation of electricity, water and other public goods. Taken together, the Treasury, Reserve Bank and DTI possess significant authority and strong capacities, including the “best and brightest” staff.

The Departments of Housing and of Provincial and Local Government have mandates of great importance for urban development. The Departments of Social Development (responsible for social assistance and with youth initiatives) and of Safety and Security (including the SA Police Service) are tasked with services vital to urban life. Performance of these departments is rising, but can be uneven. Despite its massive delivery efforts, the Department of Housing has often been unable to spend all monies allocated to it. National budgets, especially since 2000, have shifted steadily toward social welfare, social infrastructure and security, and away from defence, agriculture and mining.

At a time when the average African school leaver has almost no hope of getting a decent job, initiatives to improve the future for youth have faced stiff headwinds. Government agencies tasked with youth affairs are not the strongest; policy has drifted on

from year to year; even the ruling party's Youth League is in disarray. One of South Africa's leading researchers concluded, "every major youth-centred initiative since 1990 has collapsed" (Everatt 2001: 4). In response, the government has also tried to promote youth entrepreneurship. The public treasury and foreign donors have supported Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprise programmes on a broad scale, despite continuing poor results (Rogerson, 2004). Recently, however, there have been signs of positive change, including public measures to build skills and create jobs. In 2005 a National Youth Service emerged; today that agency employs well over 12 thousand young people, many of them in home-based health care.

### *Provincial and Local Government*

A strong version of the policy talk about "developmental local government" has failed to materialize. However, national mandates to decentralize service delivery and planning have put to the test most agencies of provincial and local government, and special programmes, such as for urban renewal of inner city housing or shack settlements. These efforts have suffered delays and setbacks, mainly due to uneven and weak staff capacities and to municipal and local-level political struggles.

Many municipalities have tried to promote public participation to steer investments in public goods and even to call public agencies to account. But such efforts face strong headwinds. The political system as practiced by the ANC (and not uncommon in other political movements as well) is anything but participatory and "bottom up". An informant to this study described the ruling party's approach as follows:

It's all about control, authority and discipline. The patronage and clientalist dimension is today ascendant, without question, especially at local government levels. People get on the party electoral list at the whim of provincial executive, that's clear. What we need is to rebuild a democratic culture in the ANC. If that doesn't happen, if the leadership core doesn't shift, we're in real trouble. Participation and responsiveness and democracy -- those things have been drained out of the ANC.

Such observations set question-marks next to claims of democratizing results of "good governance" initiatives, including those reviewed in these pages.

### *Community-Based Organisations*

South African traditions of public action through membership-based organisations constitute an important anti-poverty asset. In the 1980s, trade unionists, township and shack settlement residents built on earlier traditions of activism in their vigorous campaigns of resistance to apartheid. Many of these crystallized into associations of residents, often known as "civics". With some exceptions, they were aligned with the ANC-led coalition of movements. By the late 1990s most of these efforts had collapsed or been assimilated into local ANC structures. Yet at the same time new organisations began springing up, most of them autonomous of the ruling party and resistant to state measures such as privatization of public services, rate hikes and evictions. Their campaigns tend to be episodic, however, and their capacities uneven.

One grassroots movement, operating from townships in major municipalities, sought to promote deals with the authorities for housing and services for the poor. It has largely avoided the common approach of protest and claim-making toward government. Rather, its strategy was first to build power by organizing residents around collective assets and knowledge of their communities, and thereafter negotiating with the authorities from

positions of strength. Pioneering that approach was the South African Homeless People's Federation (SAHPF), in alliance with a service NGO, People's Dialogue. Having gained the attention of national housing authorities, that alliance gave rise around 1998 to a national government initiative, the Peoples Housing Process (PHP) which provides a cash subsidy for self-built housing meeting basic standards. The SAHPF-People's Dialogue alliance collapsed after 2001, but its basic strategy has today been revived and expressed in a new movement, the Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP). That organisation's capacities are still modest, but it has begun to leverage solid commitments for poor communities from the Department of Housing.

### *Nonprofit Service and Advocacy Organisations*

In the mid-1980s informal groupings of planners, architects, social scientists and activists began creating organisations to serve emerging initiatives in townships and other low-income settlements. Despite differences in setting and approach, these professional non-profit bodies developed a roughly common vision of their work, largely in alignment with the ANC-inspired movement for democracy and non-racialism. By the late 1980s they had formed an informal association, the Urban Sector Network. This grouping (whose efforts as a formal organisation are appraised in this report in Chapter 3) was inspired by visions of integrated, equitable urban development, responsive to needs of the poor - thus not unrelated to perspectives emerging through the UN-Habitat.

Prominent among nonprofits pursuing a different vision was the Urban Foundation, a research and advocacy organisation established in 1977 in the wake of the Soweto uprising by a leading South African corporation with Afrikaner roots (*Transvaal Broderbond*). Reorganized in 1995 as the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE), this policy activist centre has long had strong capacities, high-level connections and powerful political backing. At critical moments in the 1990s it effectively promoted urban development policies opposed to those of the USN organisations and urban social movements. Given its success, the CDE today generally backs government policy, exemplified in GEAR and its emphasis on the private for-profit sector and government roles to create enabling conditions for it to prosper.

### *Private Sector*

As expressed by the Urban Foundation and its successor the CDE, business interests have been decisive in setting the pace and direction of urban policy *as actually performed*. Referring to official policy's *realpolitik*, a South African urban specialist writes:

The net result of decision-making driven by increased emphasis on economic growth and the financial pressures faced by municipalities has been that 'with the demise of apartheid, State policy has been a much less vital component in South African urban policy and market forces have become more influential... market forces are increasingly the dominant force behind urban processes' (Smit, 2004: 2376).

The market forces referred to are those of large, formal business concerns, not small enterprise. Many observers call attention to the uneven, and generally sluggish rates of licit small enterprise creation in South Africa, which lacks strong traditions of entrepreneurship<sup>2</sup>. Meanwhile, the stream of people entering "survivalist" activities continues to rise.

---

<sup>2</sup> See annual reports by the University of Cape Town Business School's worldwide entrepreneurship monitoring effort. Starting entrepreneurs are far less well represented in the working-age population in South Africa than in countries such as Uganda, Venezuela and Chile. Trend lines of

## 2.4 Donors

In material terms, foreign aid in South Africa has been a negligible factor. In the 1990s it accounted for slightly more than one percent of the national budget; today it accounts for well below half of one percent. Yet in terms of ideas, debates, models and the promotion of non-governmental organisations, foreign aid has been influential.

Two streams of foreign funding began well before the change of government. Both helped usher in democracy. These were: Swedish aid to the ANC-led movement to end apartheid (US\$400 million from 1970 to 1993) and EC aid to a broad spectrum of civil society organisations through its Special Programme for Victims of Apartheid (ECU 830 million from 1986 to 1997). The latter was decisive in starting and sustaining the Urban Sector Network (USN) family of urban-focused nonprofit service organisations, other urban activist NGOs and many of their community- and member-based organisations. After 1992, in the programme's second phase, the EC stopped disbursing funds directly to existing civil society bodies; instead it channelled them through large special-purpose management units created at the behest of the EC. A final evaluation showed that the EC Programme's responsiveness, efficiency and effectiveness were much higher in the first phase than in the second (SPM Consultants 1996).

Central government ministries were the channel of choice for most donors, led by the EC, though many adopted a multi-channel approach, allocating to central and to provincial and local government and to NGOs. As of 1998 the US was allocating only about half its aid to government. It channelled the other half through nonprofit and the business sectors, making extensive use of US consulting firms.


After 1994, official flows roughly doubled from pre-transition levels. In volume the chief donors were the EC, followed by the US, though in aggregate financial terms European governments were the predominant force. The following table shows official ODA to South Africa according to main donors.

---

entrepreneurship in South Africa, at least from 2001 to 2006, are downward. See Global Entrepreneurship Monitor reports at: <http://www.gemconsortium.org/>

## ODA for South Africa in millions of US \$ of 2004

source: <http://stats.oecd.org>



Multilateral agencies have usually played minor financial roles. But their influence over policy has been substantial. The IMF made its only post-apartheid loan (to cover apartheid era debt) on the basis of a 1993 letter of intent drawn up after the ANC had accepted IMF fiscal guidelines. Multilateral agency impact has also been considerable in specific sectors, including urban policy. In 1991 the World Bank began an extended series of advisory missions focused on the urban sector. The Bank's only loan in that sector came in 2002 when it provided US\$15 million to improve municipal financial management capacities. Much larger have been loans from the European Development Bank, chiefly for large infrastructural systems such as electricity transmission and (privatised) water supply.

Among multilateral agencies, the World Bank has been by far the most important source of strategic policy advice. Up to 2002, the World Bank had run, at its own expense, at least 29 technical assistance projects, most of them aimed at top levels of South Africa's decision-making strata. Government policy makers, including the Finance Minister, have regularly been involved in World Bank consultative exercises. An independent review of aid to South Africa concludes:

[W]hat the Bank has achieved is the crafting of the broader donor framework through knowledge provision rather than loans. In other words, whereas in other African countries the ODA agenda has been set by structural adjustment loans of the Bank, in South Africa, in the absence of such loans, it has been set by the Bank's intellectual engagement with policy-makers (IODSA 2002:69).

United Nations agencies accounted for only about 2,5 percent of all ODA in the period 1994-2005. More than half of that ODA consisted of UNHCR refugee care and anti-AIDS efforts via the Global Fund on Aids, TB and Malaria. The UNDP involved itself across a range of activities, a number of them focused on local government and some on housing. As of 2002, the UNDP was one of the few agencies to have pulled out of the SMME sector completely. Outcomes of interventions by the UNDP have been largely intangible, as it provided aid almost entirely in the form of technical assistance.

In development sectors, UN agencies have devoted most of their attention and resources to general policy matters and to rural areas. But they did not neglect urban problems entirely. UN Habitat promoted or jointly managed several programmes held by national or municipal government bodies. The main UN Habitat programmes have been in support of :

- the South African Housing Department's "People's Housing Process" (1996-2004);
- the then Department of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development's Local Government Transformation Programme (1999-2004) whose chief focus was on small towns in peripheral provinces;
- the "Cities without Slums" programme of the World Bank's Cities Alliance (launched in 1999 in Berlin with former president Nelson Mandela at the kick-off ceremony);
- the Johannesburg City Assistance Support Programme (later termed the City Development Strategy), a planning support component of the UN-Habitat's Urban Management Programme, begun on a worldwide basis in 1986; and
- the Safer Cities programme, begun in Johannesburg and Cape Town in 1997 and in Durban in 1999 (discussed in section 3.1.3 of this report).

Central government ministries have been the channels of choice for most donors. The EC led this preference. However many donors adopted a multi-level approach, allocating funds to NGOs as well as to government at various levels. By 1998 the United States was allocating only half its ODA to government, the rest going to nonprofit and business sectors; USAID is known for its intensive employment of American consulting firms.

As no donors made use of a single category indicating "urban development" to describe their aid, some proxy categories may serve to suggest the relatively modest priority they have given to urban issues. In the period 1994-98, "housing" accounted for about 8 percent of overall ODA from the major donors. Far larger was spending on "education" (35 percent) and "governance and democracy" (16 percent), while important amounts also went to "business development" (12 percent) and "health" (11 percent).

Projects in support of provincial and local government, mainly in training and improved systems, were important targets of support by the US, UK, the World Bank, Sweden and Norway. DfID put priority on Local Economic Development (LED) and Integrated Development Planning (IDP). USAID emphasized service delivery, finance and public-private partnerships. The EC supported service delivery pilot projects. Danish official aid through the 1990s showed tightly-focused and consistent effort in two fields: environmental issues and the nexus of the criminal justice system with an emphasis on youth and combating violence against women.

Donor programming went through three phases: First, before 1996, a focus on practical experiments with civil society bodies; Second, from 1996 to 1999, attempts to influence policy directly, helping government branches formulate white papers and green papers on various governance topics; Third, after 1999, a shift toward implementation and capacity-building for local government. In the second and third phases, most aid took the form of "technical assistance" -- that is, consultant advisors.

A South African evaluation of ODA for "governance" concludes that 'the greatest impact in the sector has been derived through accessing knowledge and international "best practice"'. However, this report calls attention to mixed feelings among South Africans about foreign consulting services. Some feel that 'the job can often better be done by South Africans who have local know-how and understanding'. In other sectors such as vocational skill-building and infrastructure, South Africans have sometimes found technical assistance difficult to absorb, costly and distracting in that it was not always focused on priority matters. The report singles out the Netherlands for *not* having provided technical



assistance as a main form of aid. That was exceptional, but the report notes that DfID, as of 2002, was reconsidering its earlier enthusiasm for technical assistance (IODSA 2002:65-68).

According to reviews of ODA prepared for the South African Treasury in 2002, donor activities in water, sanitation and other infrastructure have gone mainly to small towns and rural areas. In the category “housing” German aid focused chiefly on rural housing, while that from the EC, Sweden and Switzerland went to urban areas. For example, EC aid went to Cato Manor in Durban and Swiss aid went to peripheral zones of smaller cities such as Port Elizabeth.

Swedish aid to urban development and housing began around 1997 and was confined to three smaller municipalities. Swedish projects were fairly distant from local residents, as they pivoted on Swedish technical assistance to local governments to improve planning systems and techniques. They improved municipal planning methods but, according to evaluators in 2005, were not “overly successful in building sustainable skills and capacity in the three municipalities” (Topham and others 2005). Norwegian aid for urban issues appears to have been concentrated on construction or rehabilitation of co-operative housing in inner cities, and on social housing, most of it in Gauteng.

Donor interest in the SMME sector has been intense. Most major bilateral agencies and the EC began promoting it from an early hour. Their spending was massive. From 1994 to 1999, donors committed the equivalent of €240 million for SMME projects, mainly to cultivate young, starting entrepreneurs but also to assist existing entrepreneurs. These projects have been overwhelmingly ‘supply led’ and were funded with little attention paid to results. Of approximately ten thousand small enterprise promotion efforts run by business-based and non-governmental agencies in South Africa, only a tiny handful has been subject to rigorous assessment of their effectiveness and impact.

This systematic ignorance about SMME promotion was reduced somewhat in 2001 when the South African government commissioned an evaluation covering 160 SMME support projects held by NGOs and some parastatal agencies. That study conveys a picture of conceptual confusion and mediocre performance. SMME projects had few anti-poverty effects. A number of them ended up supporting the advanced small business sector rather than the large ‘survivalist’ realm where the poor are found. But many projects failed to meet even less ambitious objectives. Despite lack of monitoring by donors or project holders, the study assembled sufficient evidence to conclude that ‘the growth impact in the SMME sector has been limited, especially given the amount of finance invested in the sector... the SMME sector via person centred development has failed to generate meaningful sustainable employment’ (Karungu and others 2002:41). At the time of that evaluation, some donors were ‘fleeing forward’ with yet another approach to SMME promotion, while others were looking for an exit from the sector altogether.

The domain of SMMEs may not be the only sector of donor inattention to results. A government-commissioned assessment revealed widespread mediocrity in donor monitoring and evaluation practice in South Africa (IODSA 1999).

Aid to civil society organisations (CSOs) in South Africa has been a topic of some attention and debate. Around 2001 the role of aid for CSOs as vehicles of democratization was the subject of a major research project by the leadership of a well-regarded South African policy research institute, the Centre for Policy Studies. That project did not study urban CSOs as such. Yet its key conclusions, summarized in the following quotation, are relevant to this evaluation of Dutch support for the urban sector:

[D]espite the rhetoric of citizen engagement offered by some governmental donors, the evidence is overwhelming that CSOs receive support from most official donors only to the extent that the South African government believes their actions are consistent with its goals. This is largely sufficient to rule out a significant role by any of these donors in building South African democracy - indeed, it could be argued that the effect is to ensure that they are, if anything, an obstacle to democratization (Reitzes and Friedman, 2001: 29).

Among main findings supporting these conclusions were: official donor preferences for CSO-government partnerships, exemplified in public contracting of NGOs, donor support to only those organisations with government (implicit) approval, and donor avoidance of grassroots organisations. The authors considered Dutch official approaches to the funding of South African CSOs, with no distinction made between rural and urban-based. They detected in Dutch support 'an approach which appears to assume that disagreement between the government and CSOs, which democrats might see as the stuff of democracy, is dysfunctional to the health of the system in South Africa' (Reitzes & Friedman 2001: 27).

Yet the Centre for Policy Studies authors note exceptions to this pattern. They acknowledge that some membership-based and grassroots organisations have received foreign aid, particularly from non-official donors and solidarity organisations abroad. Some of those CSOs retain their autonomy and promote critical stances toward South African government policies. But the authors' main argument is that donor talk of democracy notwithstanding, the effect of official donor practice is 'to endorse a strongly held view among many influential figures in government that CSOs ought to abandon or mute their role as articulators of citizen concerns in order to assist the government agenda' (Reitzes and Friedman, 2001: 29).

Such findings about foreign funding for civil society organisations are consistent with those of other South African researchers who seek to explain the lack of progress in creating genuinely integrated cities and a robust, autonomous civil society. The South African urban poverty specialist Edgar Pieterse holds that difficulties can be traced to a 'consensus politics' approach:

Most of the key government policies dealing with the pursuit of integrated urban development are premised on a *consensual model* of politics. Echoing the discursive repertoires of international policy frameworks of the United Nations (UNCHS... UNDP...) and the World Bank (...), the South African government tends to promote conceptions of urban sustainability ... which assume that diverse stakeholders will be able to find agreement .... [A]s long as the inevitable contradictions between competing interests and classes are not acknowledged and actively catered for in the political conception of urban policies, they will be limited in their impact (Pieterse 2004: 86).

Pieterse does not single out Dutch policies toward urban development, but he clearly underscores the general donor endorsement of the consensual assumptions he is criticising.

A more nuanced judgement seems possible, however, if a wider range of funding from the Netherlands is taken into account. Some Dutch funds have reached more autonomous bodies in South Africa's urban civil society. For example, the grantee portfolio of the Dutch co-financing agency Cordaid includes membership-based, grassroots groups, such as of shackdwellers. That is, *some* funding from the Netherlands -- *funding not considered in this report* -- constitutes an exception to the pattern noted by the Centre for Policy Studies. That is because those *non-official* foreign funds reach civil society organisations with certain degrees of autonomy from the South African government and the ruling party.

Nevertheless it is clear that a great deal of Dutch aid for urban South Africa -- including aid *not* administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and thus *not considered in this report* -- has gone to South African statutory bodies and civil society bodies working in alliance with government efforts, mainly at local levels. This would include funding and non-funding assistance via the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) as analysed by the IOB (IOB 2004). Grants administered by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs appear to have been routinely approved with an eye to a criterion of congruence with South African government policy. That is, most Dutch government aid flows for the urban sector appear to be consistent with the research findings of the Centre for Policy Studies.

To conclude, it is important to recall South Africa's possession of two powerful civil/political assets relevant to urban poverty reduction: *One*, robust traditions of public action and "voice" pursued by membership-based organisations, and *Two*, robust traditions of judicial activism, today further empowered by a progressive Constitution and statutory agencies designed expressly to advance its core purposes. Given the proven political potentials of both -- especially when used in combination -- to advance pro-poor agendas, the relative neglect of these two key assets by most official donors, and many non-governmental ones as well, is noteworthy. That neglect constitutes a large realm of missed opportunities for the reduction of poverty in cities, and beyond.

### 3. Project Appraisals

This chapter presents appraisals of the 12 project/activity clusters selected by the IOB for close study.

#### 3.1 Echelons I, II and III

This section presents appraisals of nine project clusters categorized by the IOB on the basis of their having been fully or partially supported under terms of the MFA's Spearhead Programme on Urban Combating Urban Poverty. The first four clusters considered are in Echelon I, followed by one in Echelon II and four in Echelon III.

##### 3.1.1 Urban Sector Network

<i>Grantee: Urban Sector Network (USN)</i>		
<i>Projects:</i>	<i>USN Phase I (ZA008401) August 1996 - December 1997</i>	<i>€ 90.756</i>
	<i>USN Phase II (ZA008404) August 1997 - December 1999</i>	<i>€ 136.284</i>
	<i>USN Phase III (ZA008405) June 1999 - May 2000</i>	<i>€ 84.563</i>
	<i>USN Phase IIIb (ZA008406) June 2000 - May 2002</i>	<i>€ 273.997</i>
	<i>USN Housing Generator (ZA008403) January - December 1997</i>	<i>€ 16.082</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>		
<i><u>USN Phases:</u> Contribute to development of a socially just and ecologically sustainable urban environment through projects in housing, services and local governance, through research and advocacy regarding policy options in urban development, and through reinforcement of the USN central office.</i>		
<i><u>Housing Generator:</u> Develop innovative, qualitative and affordable urban and housing proposals through a process of investigation, research, workshops, conferences, a design competition and possible implementation, undertaken by South African and Dutch interest groups, in co-operation with communities, municipalities, government and developers.</i>		
<i>Location: country-wide</i>		
<i>Echelon: Echelon I</i>		

##### 3.1.1.1 Introduction

The USN emerged in the late 1980s at the initiative of six urban service organisations active on terrains of housing, services and social movements in various metropolitan areas. Until 1995 the network operated informally, without special resources or central coordination. Member organisations used their own resources to create and share professional knowledge; they commissioned research, such as on fundraising and other means of building their capacity, for mutual benefit. Despite differences in setting and approach, they developed a roughly common vision of their work, largely aligned with the ANC-inspired movement for democracy and non-racialism.

In February 1995 the organisations (their numbers having risen to eight) made their network formal. They agreed to pursue joint programmes and to set up a full-time secretariat with paid staff. Driving this decision was the European Union, whose proposal to formalize the network confronted the urban service organisations with a powerful incentive: greater financial security. It is far from certain that the organisations would have formalised and centralised the USN without that incentive. The EU, for its part, faced imperatives to expedite and lower costs of its work by spending substantial amounts through one channel rather than distributing smaller amounts to affiliates individually, which had been the case through 1994.

USN objectives were to enhance the work of its members by facilitating/ commissioning research and joint advocacy efforts, promoting skill and policy interchange among affiliates, and, crucially, channelling funds to affiliates for a proportion their overhead and programming costs. To obtain the EU grant, the USN formulated a proposal, *Making Human Settlements Work*, with three sub-programmes involving most but not all affiliates: Habitable Environments (access to land, housing and related services), Good Governance (local government training, research, community development) and Local Economic Development. The fourth component was the USN's central office, whose tasks were networking, policy development, research, marketing and fundraising.

The EU grant for 1995-1999 was €5,9 million; for 2000-2003 it was €4,5 million. Dutch official bilateral contributions were thus modest, accounting for less than 10 percent of overall USN budgets. However throughout the 1990s all four Dutch co-financing agencies provided substantial funding to most of the USN affiliates.

Dutch official aid to the USN began 18 months after its founding. The first two grants (1996-1999) covered all USN direct delivery sub-programmes and central office management. Thereafter (1999-2002) grant purposes shifted toward strengthening the USN central office's services for affiliates and its management systems. Importantly, objectives in this latter period showed sharpened attention, at affiliate level, to developing 'a range of replicable models and programmes that offer quality choice, incorporate community development principles and are sustainable' that 'will be promoted to improve the policy environment.' This policy focus of Dutch aid to the USN continued with a final grant (2003-2005). It maintained the support to the USN's central functions, while confining the rest to a good governance programme and replication of the Community-Based Maintenance (CBM) programme, a policy model pioneered by one of the USN affiliates.

The 'Housing Generator' project, a joint venture of the Rotterdam Academy of Architecture and Urban Planning and the USN, aimed to develop models of 'innovative, qualitative and affordable urban and housing through a process of investigation, research, workshops, conferences, a design competition and possible implementation, undertaken by South African and Dutch interest groups, in co-operation with local communities, municipalities, government and developers'.

The USN no longer exists as a formal network. In 2005 its Board decided to terminate it, agreeing that 'the present form of the organisation is not appropriate to the purposes ... for which the organisation was set up'.

*Note on this study's approach to USN:* The field study approached the USN cluster of grants at central and affiliate levels. At *central* levels the field study focused on activities of the Johannesburg-based USN office, including joint working efforts of the affiliates as convened by that office. The field study took as its *affiliate*-level case the Built Environment Support Group (BESG), a USN founding member. This choice was chiefly for practical reasons. BESG operates in the greater Durban municipality, the location of two other project holders in this field study, CEED and Safer Cities. BESG also managed the Housing Generator project, which the IOB had selected for closer assessment in the present study. The USN's functions were also taken into account in field study's assessment of Planact, a USN affiliate and recipient of Dutch official support both directly and via the USN channel (see section 3.1.2). The field study also cross-checked activities by way of contacts with staff of USN affiliates in the municipalities of Port Elizabeth (Urban Services Group) and Cape Town (Development Action Group).

The following findings rely on contact with 17 persons formerly or currently associated with the USN affiliates or its central office, five persons in communities ('intended

beneficiaries') where USN affiliate activities took place, and six persons with close knowledge of USN as academics, grant-makers or experts in South African urban sector issues. The findings also rely on documents ranging from general evaluation reports on USN (at central and affiliate levels) to retrospective reflections on USN's work. Documentation by the USN itself is rather fragmentary, as many of its interim and final reports were lost after its closure in 2005.

### 3.1.1.2 Efficiency

At the level of *affiliates*, efficiency levels in broad terms varied among USN members; on average, affiliate efficiency was fair-to-good.

At the level of *central* USN activities, efficiency was, in broad terms, poor-to-fair.

Overall, the USN had difficulty spending monies it received. By the end of its second EU grant period (1999-2002) it had managed to spend only half of the €4.5 million provided by the EU for that period. By contrast, the USN *overspent* the aggregate of its first two Dutch grants (1996-1999) by 3 percent, and its following Dutch grants (1999-2002) by 15 percent. Hence to the extent that Dutch-supported activities can be distinguished from the much larger EU activities, efficiency levels in crude throughput of funds were good.

A 2003 summative evaluation of the USN detected, mainly in regard to affiliate output, 'very high levels of efficiency' (Napier and others 2003: 15). While such *broad* assessments of efficiency may be plausibly made, more precise conclusions about input-output efficiency are not possible. For example, statements of costs per participant of training workshops could not be found. In 2003, an assessment of USN management, which sought evidence of time sheets by which staff performance could be related to project activities, concluded: 'It is very difficult to relate inputs to outputs and to establish what was achieved and how cost-effective it has been' (Bean 2003:10).

#### *USN central office*

In the period under review the central office evidently managed to facilitate routine consultative meetings among affiliates in order to guide USN general affairs, steer the three main programmes and develop new initiatives. On other fronts it was less efficient. Output of policy papers and materials to influence public debate was strong in the period 1995-1997. In the period 2000-2002 it fell below expectations; for example, the central office produced five policy papers rather than the targeted nine; it produced eight promotional materials rather than the targeted twelve.

The most persistent efficiency problems were detected at central levels, where management problems cropped up early and kept on recurring. In 1998, the EC Court of Auditors found that the USN 'had neither internal rules nor adequate resources and was unable to monitor the programme components regularly.' (EC Court of Auditors, 1998). An internal report by the Network Office, covering its performance in the period 1998-2002 observed that only 19 out of 43 performance targets (44 percent) were achieved - and those were mainly targets of only minor importance (Bean 2005, 5). Following that assessment, financial chaos ensued at central levels; accounts from this period took a couple of years to disentangle.

Staff turnover affected performance. Internal turbulence and external opportunities, especially in the public sector, explain most staff departures. The organisation lost not only the experience of departing staff, but also time and momentum as incumbent staff had to introduce and supervise new staff. Crucial central office tasks, such as for fundraising, were under-staffed or neglected for extended periods. Central office

management in the years 2001-2002 showed some improvement, but this proved to be merely temporary. A new Executive Director more than doubled central office overhead costs by hiring several new senior staff and renting larger premises. In short, central office management was uneven, but the general line was downward.

A major source of inefficiency, according to many observers including the EC Court of Auditors and evaluators of EC 'Decentralised Cooperation', was the USN's chief donor, the European Commission. Its failures to pay out on time forced several affiliates take out expensive bank overdrafts or to suspend activities altogether. Burdensome EC reporting requirements (five reports per year, an obligatory 48-item budget, etc.) and inflexible negotiating procedures led to massive demands on USN staff time at affiliate and especially at USN central office levels (Dammers and others 1998: A20-22). At the EC Pretoria office, management of USN grant portfolio suffered from staff discontinuities. Yet as the EC Court of Auditor's report observes -- confirming the views of key informants to this study -- the overburdened USN set-up was created at the behest of the EC itself.

### *USN Affiliates*

In respect to targeted delivery of *material* improvements, some USN affiliates fell short of targets they had set for themselves. Taking USN affiliate performance all together, that is, combining strong with weak performers, the following examples may suffice to show this. In the period 1995-1997 affiliates completed only 24 percent of projected housing units. In the period 2000-2002, for 25 "housing consolidation" interventions, affiliates completed 30 percent of projected units; for 51 "social housing" interventions, they completed 61 percent; for 20 projected "community-based facilities" (multi-purpose centres, etc.) affiliates completed 65 percent. More impressive was affiliate performance for 44 "site and service" interventions, where they completed 81 percent of projected housing units.

The data cited below are drawn from a formal external evaluation of the USN (Napier and others 2003), which drew on USN internal monitoring reports.

Table 3A. USN affiliate delivery performance to plans 2000-2002

Social category	Target number	Achieved number	Achieved/ targeted
<b>Local Governance</b>			
Councillors trained in local governance issues	1122	3506	312 %
Officials trained in local governance issues	340	519	153 %
Local organisation staff trained	598	1158	194 %
Organisations/Councils receiving training	115	530	461 %
<b>Habitable Environments</b>			
Town planning/architecture/social surveys done	56	344	614 %
Participants in training courses	1978	5509	279 %
Organisations receiving organisational dev support	158	235	149 %
Organisations receiving technical advice	83	143	172 %
<b>Local Economic Development / Livelihoods</b>			
Participants in business training workshops	530	550	104 %
Organisations mobilized to participate	57	26	46 %
Small enterprises getting technical aid	154	118	77 %
Councillors & community represent. trained	717	582	81 %

Source: Napier and others 2003, Appendix D.

Usually much stronger was USN affiliate delivery of *non-material* improvements through training, organisational development services and other “software” for local actors. Initially, performance fell short. In the period 1995-1997 for example, some 3763 local councillors (75 percent of the targeted 5000 councillors) underwent USN-supported training courses (Steeman 1997). Five years later, in the period 2000-2002, USN affiliates regularly surpassed their projected performance in local governance and ‘habitable environments’. Examples of USN targets and effects in this non-material objectives appear in the following table.

Table 3B USN affiliate knowledge-based performance to plans 2000-2002

	Target number	Achieved number	Achieved/targeted
<b>Local Governance</b>			
Municipalities analysed	33	109	330 %
Pilot Models assessed	28	12	43 %
Pilot models applied	24	15	63 %
Policy research papers submitted	15	26	173 %
<b>Habitable Environments</b>			
Research/surveys carried out	37	100	270 %
Policy/lobby papers completed	31	40	129 %
<b>Local Economic Development / Livelihoods</b>			
Research papers completed	22	18	82 %
Policy/lobby papers completed	13	10	77 %

Source: Napier and others 2003, Appendix D.

The Housing Generator project was already several years underway and activities were reaching a crescendo when Dutch grant was made in late 1996. Managed by a USN affiliate, those funds were rapidly put to use. For relatively little money, the project leveraged considerable resources, mainly hundreds of urban professionals’ working days for research, planning, debate and public dissemination of fresh ideas.

### 3.1.1.3 Effectiveness

Effectiveness at *central* office level was poor-to-fair. Effectiveness at *affiliate* level is estimated to have been fair-to-good.

Judging USN effectiveness by its own documented standards is not easy because so few results are stated in concrete terms. However several points stand out from summative evaluations, project documents and interviews with informants to this study:

Achievement of Central office ambitions, such as to promote national debate, were uneven and generally failed to meet affiliates’ expectations. At affiliate levels, more projected effects were detectable. Informants to this study said that training of persons in local government, despite the difficulties (many beginning councillors have only rudimentary notions of procedural rules and municipal budgeting for example) was among the more effective realms of USN work.

Being rather small organisations, USN affiliates could not deliver material or non-material benefits on a large scale. Taken as a whole, South Africa’s NGOs were thought to be engaged in no more than 3 percent of all housing delivery in South Africa. USN affiliate effectiveness is thus found more commonly on terrains of innovation through research, policy proposals and pilot projects.



The Housing Generator project was a good example of how innovation may be promoted. It sparked a broad number of research and consultative efforts bringing together urban professionals, academics and residents' groups. The competition drew forth 148 housing plans for three low-income communities: Cato Manor (Durban), Wattville (Johannesburg) and Duncan Village (East London).

Pursuit of policy-model objectives advanced, particularly after 1998. Three other affiliate initiatives, all supported by Dutch aid channelled through USN, illustrate these policy-focused, knowledge-based innovation efforts:

#### *Good Governance Indicators project*

Begun in 2001, this initiative aims to create a database on governance practices at municipal level throughout South Africa and to expand the use of good governance indicators as a tool for public monitoring and assessment of governance. Carried out as a partnership between six USN affiliates and a number of municipalities, its effects include circulation and discussion of surveys, testing of indicator relevance and validity, and training of local government actors in the system.

#### *Community-Based Maintenance and Environmental Management Partnership (CBM)*

In 1998, the Durban-based Built Environment Support Group (BESG) began a public services experiment in a low-income settlement on the periphery of Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, a municipality whose poor population has exploded since the early 1990s. Designed as a three-way partnership between Municipal authorities, community-based organisations and USN affiliates, the CBM model was effective in managing waste removal and other services *and* in meeting (modestly) needs for low-skilled jobs. Making it sustainable were public revenues earmarked for basic maintenance services -- a basic and universal mandate of local authorities. The arrangement lowered municipal costs and achieved other efficiencies. Other USN affiliates have replicated this promising model in peripheral settlements elsewhere, such as the Urban Services Group's initiative in Makana Municipality of Grahamstown. As of 2007, that municipality continues to finance the CBM system, which is popular and evidently sustainable.

As of mid-2005, feasibility studies, negotiations or small pilot projects for nine other CBM initiatives were underway in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Gauteng provinces. Most showed considerable promise. However, termination of the Dutch grant to the USN brought most of these to a premature end. Their prospects were also frustrated by new rules favouring municipal partnerships with commercial agents. Where such arrangements have displaced the CBM model (as in KwaZulu-Natal), services have worsened, jobs for local people have evaporated and allegations of corruption linking councillors and commercial firms have surfaced.


#### *East London Housing Management Cooperative (ELHMC)*

This small community-based organisation, set up in the late 1990s with help from USN affiliate Afesis-Corplan, represents a pioneering effort to apply principles of social housing for low income households (that is, households whose income does not exceed R1500 per month). Using only local small contractors, and the government-subsidized Peoples Housing Process, the ELHMC has built over 200 houses for members. It has demonstrated that poor social strata, for whom social housing is not an option, can create viable housing projects on a cooperative basis. In the period 1998-2001, Afesis-Corplan received a direct Dutch grant (not included in this evaluation's sample) while at the same time benefiting from Dutch aid channelled through the USN. Hence the ELHMC merits mention as an outcome of funding within this study's sample.

### 3.1.1.4 Relevance

At the level of *affiliates*, USN-supported activities at practical levels were commonly relevant to South African actors on terrains of urban development and governance.

Evidence supporting that conclusion is noted in this section. Relevance stems chiefly from affiliates' ways of understanding and focusing on needs of priority social categories suffering various degrees of poverty. A number of USN affiliates developed methods to address low-income residents with special needs, such as households living with HIV-AIDS or headed by single women with many dependents.



Relevance to the poor became ambiguous where USN lost its focus on developing viable policy models and coherent visions, and moved instead toward instrumental roles in sub-contracting according to terms specified under government delivery systems. A second, and often parallel trap was to ally itself too closely with agencies of the ruling party whose politics were mainly of top-down patronage instead of bottom-up participation. These operating styles tended to override earlier principles of engagement with local clients on the basis of expressed need, according to consultative and participatory norms.

At the level of the *central USN office*, activities were not uniformly relevant to USN affiliates or their priority groups. As a vehicle to improve affiliates' mid-term financial security by way of joint appeals to funders and joint tendering for contracts, the USN central office was relevant to affiliates most of the time. Joint funding arrangements had the effect of binding affiliates to programmes that some were in fact not wholly committed to, thus diminishing "ownership" and accountability. As means to forge and articulate joint and authoritative standpoints on urban issues, the central functions of the USN were of uneven relevance to affiliates and their constituents. This study found further evidence consistent with findings four years earlier, in an evaluation of the USN:


The unclear articulation of the USN's vision and strategy, as well as the failure of the USN management to streamline participatory structures [focus groups, information-sharing opportunities and training] of the network has, in some cases, caused the affiliates to start looking to other networks (Napier and others 2003:21)

The popularity and progress of certain initiatives and sub-programmes supported by the Dutch grants indicates considerable relevance for certain actors in South Africa. These include:

- Demand for affiliate engagement in the national "Peoples Housing Process (PHP)". Although originating outside the USN family of organisations, this government-backed programme to increase decent housing for low-income people also reflected the


thinking and practice of USN affiliates. It mobilized efforts by most of them from its beginning in 1998. Concrete examples of USN affiliate relevance to the PHP have been documented (USN 2004, for example);

- Demand for affiliate engagement in government-promoted Integrated Development Planning (IDP) processes, which, in optimal circumstances, allowed representatives of poor communities to identify and articulate their priorities toward higher authorities;
- Strong demand for the services of five affiliates in training local councillors and other local-level officials in the elements of local governance.




Though relevant for public authorities, these activities were not without controversy. Many USN actors saw them as tipping the balance toward public sector contracting, and consequent loss of USN autonomy from the state and thus loss of liberty to criticize public policy. One observer, linking the sub-contracting mode with fragmentation and loss of integrated vision, stated that the USN ‘couldn’t capture the entirety of the urban problematic. That is the biggest failure’. Creation of a central office might have been expected to address the need for a strong, common vision, but this did not occur.

The Housing Generator project was relevant to urban professionals and policy-makers as a stimulus for fresh ideas and debate at a time of fluidity in South African public policy. Going by the Cato Manor case, however, the competition’s terms of reference were probably not sufficiently realistic in that they failed to take South African financial and political constraints fully into account.



The Urban Sector Network’s purposes were consistent with Dutch urban policy, especially in the categories of habitat and governance. Several affiliates paid close attention to innovative efforts to promote work and income, both through the creation of jobs and the lowering of costs to low-income people. USN affiliate strategies have been,

almost without exception, guided by principles of residents' participation in decisions affecting their lives.



### 3.1.1.5 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating for USN Central Office: 1 (negligible)

Rating for affiliates: 2 (moderate)

The USN's central institutional arrangements proved unviable. Various observers, including the USN's Board, called attention to several debilitating factors:

- An overburdened, weak central structure that could not consistently balance a complex and shifting set of responsibilities in (a) managing programmes (b) mounting advocacy efforts, (c) promoting horizontal learning, (d) creating and maintaining agreement within the network on content and administrative issues, and crucially (d) managing finance, including relationships with donors.
- Growing diversity of circumstances and approaches among affiliates;
- Discontinuities in central and affiliate management, especially due to leadership turnover.

These factors were largely, but not entirely due to weaknesses and setbacks internal to the USN. Some emerged through interplay with external factors, not least of them being discontinuities in donor preferences and management.

Several USN affiliates closed along the way: Umzamo (Cape Town) in 1999; CCLS (Durban) in 2001, and COPE (Johannesburg) in 2004. In early 2007 the Urban Services Group (Port Elizabeth) announced that it was closing due to lack of funding. Thus as of mid-2007, five ex-affiliates were still be at work, albeit on more modest scales than in the period of the EU and Dutch grants. Most are continuing to respond to users old and new. An informal network survives to some extent, as some organisations stay routinely in touch with other ex-affiliates.

The Housing Generator project was not meant to continue beyond 1998. However on an informal basis a number of urban planners and architects, including those of the Rotterdam Academy, maintained active contact after the project ended.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating for USN Central Office: 2 (moderate)

Rating for affiliates: 3 (considerable)

Public authorities recognized the USN as a valid and at times important source of policy perspectives. Particularly in the years 1992-1997, when national policies were being framed, representatives of the USN got respectful attention from the authorities and other professionals, chiefly thanks to the affiliates' command of facts and arguments, their longstanding sympathies with progressive elements of the ruling party and their practical engagement at the levels of provinces, municipalities and low-income communities. For some government branches the USN family of organisations remained important partners in translating policy into practice. A statement by the Department of Housing suggests the USN's importance to that agency and to a progressive stream in housing policy: 'The number of active NGOs in the housing sector has declined dramatically in recent years. The Urban Sector Network was dissolved in 2005 and many of its former affiliates have since disbanded. This has eroded institutional capacity in the housing sector and weakens housing delivery by reducing capacity for advocacy and community consultation' (SA Dept of Housing 2006).

The grounding of the USN's authority was chiefly in knowledge and practice generated by affiliates, sometimes in partnership with some others. While the USN was sometimes the vessel, the content was a product of the affiliates.

The Housing Generator project drew much public attention in South Africa, the Netherlands and elsewhere. Visual materials of winning entries were displayed throughout South Africa and later in Istanbul at the 1996 Habitat II Conference and numerous other international conferences. Because the winning design for Cato Manor was deemed highly relevant to that community's future, staff of the Cato Manor Development Agency, in consultation with community groups, worked out many of the details of that design in the years that followed.

#### *Users' interest and benefits*

Rating for USN Office: 1 (negligible)  
Rating for affiliates: 3 (considerable)

USN affiliates helped set in motion a number of initiatives with prospects of generating benefit streams well into the future. These include:

- subsidized housing constructed through the Peoples Housing Process;
- rehabilitated houses, especially in the inner city, some of which operate according to norms of social housing, including cooperative management;
- community facilities, such as multi-purpose halls, for which residents share some maintenance responsibilities;
- access to the Kuyasa Fund, a source of micro loans for housing in the Cape Town area, developed in the late 1990s by the USN affiliate DAG on the basis of USN funding;
- elementary capacities in procedures and practices among local councillors, on which many have been enabled to build further competence in local governance.

In terms of jobs, livelihoods and employability, benefit flows were weak and largely unsustainable. For example in the period 2000-2002, the USN managed support efforts for 54 small and micro enterprises; six months after the support ended, only 10 of these enterprises showed any dynamism. Benefits were, however, generally better for staff and other close associates of USN affiliates. Many gained professional experience and know-how, thus improving making them more employable in the public sector, consultancies and non-profits.

Plans for Cato Manor from the Housing Generator project were elaborated, but in the end never concretized. Around 2003 land allocated for the initiative became a source of contention among local business and ANC political elites, neither of which had much interest in housing for poor people. That struggle, and the extinction of the Cato Manor Development Agency, effectively ended all prospects of translating Housing Generator-derived plans into concrete outcomes.

### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating for USN Central Office: 1 (negligible)  
Rating for affiliates: 3 (considerable)

Of the various kinds of knowledge and skill transmitted through USN programming, that oriented toward local governance show fair to good prospects of generating streams of benefits into the future. Those benefits probably include:

- basic tasks performed satisfactorily by local councillors;
- access to means whereby local councillors, and other actors at local government levels, can maintain or improve knowledge (such as through handbooks and training materials created with help from USN affiliates);
- access to means whereby knowledge and skill can be transmitted to incoming councillors and other actors, thanks to trainers and training materials created with USN affiliate help;
- local relevance and “ownership” of plans and infrastructure derived from processes reflecting USN norms of consultation, conciliation and participation;

Regarding the Housing Generator project, informants and documentation suggest that the project was, for a number of years, an important stimulus for research and exploration of policy options on the part of many scores of South African students and professionals.

Overall sustainability score for USN central office: 5 (nil)  
Overall sustainability score for affiliates: 11 (substantial)

#### 3.1.1.6 Impact

Evidence of USN impact on poverty and governance is fragmentary and anecdotal, given the USN’s neglect of systematic impact monitoring and analysis.

In the absence of baselines there are no reliable means of measuring the USN’s contributions to local-level government or material development. Rigorous study might reveal impact in improved performance by local councillors and other local-level officials, but it is not possible to demonstrate that. A further plausible impact, also impossible to demonstrate in the absence of rigorous study, might be in the quality and relevance of local plans (such as the IDPs) for poorer residents in many municipalities.

USN affiliates also contributed to material improvements in many poor settlements. Yet relative to governmental or self-built results, this material contribution (delivery of housing and community infrastructure, sustainable livelihood) has been modest. Greater impacts are however detectable in the advance of pro-poor policy models capable of widespread replication. There is evidence of USN affiliate influence on national housing policy statements and, to some extent, actual practice. Affiliates like COPE helped pioneer workable models of social housing in the inner city. The CBM model has spread, though its further impact has been blocked by the growth of business influence, and accompanying corruption, over municipal contracting practice. The Good Governance Indicators project triggered creation of the Good Governance Learning Network, an

association of NGOs and specialists from South Africa and abroad seeking to promote transparent and responsive local governance.

The Housing Generator project generated no houses in South Africa; but that was not its immediate purpose. Its impact registered in fresh ideas about housing in low-income settlements, both in South Africa and abroad. One ex-participant noted that 'because of the Dutch involvement (in the form of organisation, financing, a publication and the involvement of the chief government architect Wytze Patijn) it had more impact than nationally organised competitions that addressed the same issues' (Mensink 2006). An informant to this study, a senior urban specialist who was on hand when the Housing Generator competition took place, and observed the progress (and eventual demise) of a winning design for an important low-income settlement in Durban, said:

There are moments in urban development and politics where you have an opportunity to create something different, when there is policy fluidity and a bit of space to think differently. At that point, with the right brief and some international allure you might be able to generate something different. Competitions open up the discourse of the elite. Increasingly you have a system where ... competitions throw in things for people to think outside the standard model.

The Housing Generator project therefore met an important purpose, that of innovation. Asked about the project's ultimate impact, one of the participants said, 'It changed some people's thinking with respect to housing and it filtered through to the policy makers in South Africa' (Mensink 2006). However the non-achievement of concrete housing in the Durban case illustrates the validity of conclusions (such as those appearing in section 2.3 of this report) that private commercial interests usually override anti-poverty interests in today's South Africa.

### 3.1.2 Planact

<i>Grantee:</i>	<i>Planact</i>	
<i>Projects:</i>	<i>a) Research and Development Department (ZA91024) April 1991 - April 1993</i>	<i>€ 383,583</i>
	<i>b) Land and Housing Programme Phase I (ZA006501) July 1995 - June 1996</i>	<i>€ 93,323</i>
	<i>Land and Housing Programme Phase II (ZA006502) February 1997 - December 1998</i>	<i>€ 73,673</i>
	<i>c) Urban Community Development Programme (ZA006503) January 1999 - December 1999</i>	<i>€ 35,721</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	<i>a) increase the structural capacity to give advice to community based organisations;</i>	
	<i>b) develop policy options on land and housing; build capacity of community organisations and delivery systems which enable community generated development;</i>	
	<i>c) stimulate and strengthen the involvement and participation of previously marginalised communities in the creation of habitable environments and sustainable neighbourhoods.</i>	
<i>Location:</i>	<i>Gauteng (some national scope for policy advocacy and training)</i>	
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon I</i>	

#### 3.1.2.1 Introduction

In 1985, a group of Johannesburg-based urban planners, architects and political scientists established Planact as a voluntary service organisation. They aligned it with wider political efforts to transform the apartheid order in urban settings, chiefly in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereniging (PWV) conurbation, later to become Gauteng Province. Its founding purpose was “to promote integrated, community driven development to ensure an equitable distribution of resources and a democratic and sustainable urban environment”. Main strategies centred at first on provision of advice, contacts and technical support regarding housing and basic urban services to groups of residents in formal black townships and informal settlements, and to membership-based organisations such as trade unions. As the transition to formal democracy approached, its strategies focused additionally on research and advice to shape policy proposals and negotiating stances by an ANC-led alliance of organisations.

Planact mobilized foreign donor support and domestic talent, building on funding by the EU Special Programme for South Africa, channelled from 1986 to 1994 via the Southern Africa Committee of the Netherlands. By 1993, with a staff of 47 plus occasional specialists, Planact had become one of South Africa’s larger non-profit service organisations.

In the post-apartheid period, Planact developed strategies in three main clusters: (1) local urban governance, (2) community-based housing and basic services projects and (3) policy research and advocacy around land, unified urban finance and other strategic issues. Capacity-building activities under the first cluster focused increasingly on relationships, including fee-for-service contracts, with public authorities under favourable political conditions.

Planact’s community-based work took place in conflicted, unstable circumstances. It often lacked reliable political backing and resources, being largely dependent on foreign funding. Achieving coherence between its on-the-ground activities and its policy advocacy



strategies was thus not easy. Additional dilemmas arose from Planact's longstanding alliances with formal "civics" -- community activist groupings allied with the ruling party, the ANC, at local and provincial levels. As many leaders of these organisations were recruited "upward" into positions of authority, top-down patronage systems replaced bottom-up mobilization. That often left poorer residents without real "voice".

Planact's Research and Development Department, the object of the first Dutch subsidy in the period 1991-1993, was meant to underpin all of the organisation's strategies, especially its policy advocacy. The main aims of this work were to enable Planact:

- to respond to the increase in the number of requests from CBOs for Planact's services;
- to develop generally applicable concepts, models, and policy alternatives;
- to establish a resource centre & database.

Dutch grants in the following period, 1995-1999, went chiefly toward community-based work. Here the main aims were:

- to develop policy options regarding land, upgrading informal settlements and low-income housing;
- to improve the capacity of community-based organisations;
- to design and build institutions which enable access by communities to development resources for development;
- to call attention to gender dimensions of housing development.

Dutch grants for Planact in the period 2000-2002 (via the Urban Sector Network) were chiefly for local urban governance. Beyond the objectives pursued in the period 1995-1999, the main aims were to improve capacities of local-level governance including integrated development planning, local level finance, administrative and service delivery and local economic development initiatives meeting needs of the urban poor.

Therefore Dutch aid supported all of Planact's three main strategies, albeit at different historical moments. The Netherlands was the only donor to support the Research and Development Department in its first years. For the Land and Housing programme 1997-1998, Dutch official aid accounted for about half and for the Urban Community Development Programme in 1999 about one-quarter of project costs. Meanwhile Planact's overhead costs and other programmes were met by other donors, including Dutch cofinancing and solidarity organisations.

Planact's annual reports are available, but most of its narrative reports on the Dutch grants were apparently lost when it moved its offices and when it consigned most of its records to Wits University. A search of the Planact archives at the Wits University Library yielded nothing of specific relevance to the Dutch-supported projects.

### 3.1.2.2 Efficiency

In its use of the Dutch grant for the Research & Development Department, Planact's efficiency was good. It carried out all major activities planned and spent about 92 percent of the amount budgeted. Planact underwent two restructuring processes in this period. The second of these, in 1993, led to a reconfiguration of Department activities into several thematic programmes whose output and accountability were better aligned with client needs, suggesting efficiency gains. Overall, Planact's research work drew in new clients, funds and short-term staff, suggesting that the Dutch subsidy "leveraged" substantial additional resources and thus raised returns to the investment.

Turbulence and management difficulties in the period 1995-1999 lowered Planact's efficiency to fair. A financial crisis and recruitment into the public sector reduced staff

numbers to less than a third of what they had been in 1993. General managers came and went. There came a series of improvements in financial and personnel management. Planact's scope of operations extended well beyond Gauteng Province, probably lowering efficiency. Outside the organisation, urban development politics and policy were turbulent. There were strong pressures on Planact to align its work with official bodies and gain fee-for-service contracts with them.

For the community development programme, adjusting to these factors hindered performance, and contributed to underspending of about 14 percent. During this period, however, Planact developed its fee-for-service strategy. That helped stabilize its financial position, though at the cost of shifting its strategies toward public service contracting. As almost all interim and final reports for this period have been lost, precise accounting of Planact's conversion of its resources into activities is not possible.

Planact's final report on its local government programme could not be found. However an overall assessment of the USN carried out in 2003, which includes specifics on each affiliate, notes that Planact spent about 97 percent of its overall governance budget in the period 2000-2002. That assessment rated Planact's management and leadership as "excellent" while rating its organisation and strategic planning as "average". That is consistent with an efficiency score in the range of acceptable-to-good.

### 3.1.2.3 Effectiveness

Overall, Planact's effectiveness was fair to good.

The Research and Development Department produced many research reports to underpin community development, local government and policy advocacy strategies. As a cornerstone of Planact's capacity to generate facts and arguments, its effects were both direct (to other Planact departments and to clients) and indirect (in the media and political sphere, for example). Policy papers, public presentations and staff participation in consultative platforms meant that Planact's output reached a wide range of professionals, activists and key new public officials.


In the mid-1990s Planact continued to produce and disseminate policy options in national debates on housing, local government and land policies. Its community development programming moved ahead, despite internal and external turbulence, in building community organisations and routines of participation -- pre-conditions for wider material and social improvements in housing and services. In the period 1996-1998 it achieved many intended effects in the main locales: Alexandra (participatory and social housing), Diepsloot (community development forum), Vosman (informal settlement), Mohlakeng (hostels-to-homes project), Mamelodi (development planning and introduction of social housing idea), Muldersdrift (negotiating land and housing options); Wattville/Tamboville (Housing Association, community centre, &c.), and Voslorus (informal settlement).

Planact's policy effectiveness showed discontinuities. Despite early forward motion, mid- to longer-term effects were blunted or reversed in a number of settlements marked by conflict (Diepsloot, Muldersdrift) corruption (Mohlakeng hostels, Wattville) or large-scale government renewal efforts (Alexandra, Diepsloot). From 1995 to around 2002, Planact made few efforts to document, analyze and disseminate its experiences at community level, thereby missing opportunities to affect knowledge and dialogue among urban professionals, activists and policy-makers.

Effects of local government programming in 2000-2002, which were built on at least six years of prior Planact work, were strong both in terms of the scale of routine training and advice to local councils but also in production of means to multiply skills and knowledge (e.g. creation of numerous training materials) and to promote improvements in local government management.

### 3.1.2.4 Relevance


Planact strategies were usually relevant to needs of key South African actors and to Dutch anti-poverty policies. They focused consistently on urban zones, both the inner cores and outer peripheries. They addressed fundamental issues of urban life in cross-sectoral perspectives. Various informants to this study emphasized Planact staff efforts to engage poorer and marginalized residents as active agents steering their own political and developmental processes. At the same time Planact strategies were relevant to decision-making and decision-makers at higher levels.




An indicator of Planact's relevance in South Africa was the stream of requests for its advice and support. On the one hand, various municipal and national policy forums (on such matters as local government, housing and land) asked for Planact's input. On the other, membership-based organisations, especially of poor residents in townships and informal settlements solicited its technical advice and support in making wider connections.

The Research and Development Department met tests of relevance because it enabled timely and professional responses to needs for information and analysis expressed by Planact field staff, community organisations, media, other urban professionals and NGOs and especially by those tasked with framing policy in the Gauteng metropolitan area and sometimes nationally.

Community-level programmes in the period 1995-2000 were relevant insofar as they responded to residents' appeals for technical advice, training and contacts. Planact usually carried out semi-formal needs assessments before intervening. But Planact was not always able to prevent turbulence in communities caused by the (prospect of) insertion of resources into resource-scarce environments.




Problems of coherence and relevance arose where socio-political tensions (such as between white and black residents' groups, between social strata in black settlements, between political rivals, or between opportunistic individuals and the public) overshadowed development action for and by the poor. Planact lacked a consistent stance on fundamental issues of *who* its local partners were -- that is, which social categories and organisational vehicles -- and why it chose to work with them. Factors beyond Planact's control -- political shifts, turbulence and non-transparency within community-based organisations and discussion forums - made it difficult to retain a consistent focus on the grassroots. But Planact's own lack of clarity contributed to the vulnerability of its programmes to those whose main motivations were not necessarily poverty reduction or participatory governance.



Governance programming in the period 2000-2002 and beyond met tests of relevance more consistently. Demand for Planact training services, training materials and general advice about local government capacity-building was strong and the target groups addressed were clearly defined.

Attention to gender issues was far from automatic in Planact, certainly in its early years. With the founding of an internal working group on gender in 1994, and the emergence of female leadership, the situation improved. Beneficiaries contacted for this study recalled no specific emphasis by Planact on gender equity or on particular needs of disabled people.

Planact's strategies appear consistent in large measure with Dutch policy. They drove concerted, innovative action in main areas of Dutch interest (habitat, urban governance, integrated city development and increasing attention to work and income) with strong emphasis on organisation and 'voice' by poor urban residents.



### 3.1.2.5 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

As of early 2007 Planact is still operating. Its staff (about 12) is smaller and its profile lower than in the early 1990s. Yet it remains an important actor for a number of low-income townships and settlements in Gauteng, as well as for professionals in community development and capacity-building for governance. Its Board consists of active professionals and academics in urban issues. Income from public service contracting today accounts for about as much income as from foreign donors.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

In 1993 Planact formalized its internal structure and its juridical status as a not-for-profit association under Section 21 of South Africa's Companies Act.

During and after South Africa's political transition, political leaderships and public authorities at national and municipal levels routinely turned to Planact for policy advice. In the early and mid-1990s Planact staff were routinely asked to take part in key national consultative bodies tasked with hammering out new policies for housing and local government, and in negotiations in many public forums developing new city-wide plans and policies at municipal levels. As the demand for its presence and services by residents' organisations and community forums surpassed its capacities, Planact often had to turn away requests for its input.

A striking and widely-noted indicator of Planact's professional authority and commitment to transforming public policy is the large number - perhaps a couple of dozen - of former staff members appointed to influential positions *on urban issues* in the public sector at municipal levels, provincial, national and international levels.

#### *Users' interest and benefits*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

Planact remains active on the housing, participatory planning and organisational development fronts in at least a half-dozen low-income settlements in Gauteng. Key benefits with fair to good prospects of continuing to flow include: stronger organisations

of residents; improved access to public subsidies, especially for housing (subsidies that have risen in response to pressure by organized residents); infrastructure for community services (crèche, activities hall, &c), and houses. A survey in 2004 of 50 randomly-selected residents of 250 self-built (“People’s Housing Process”) houses in the East Rand informal settlement of Voslorus indicated high rates of resident satisfaction, particularly with Planact-supported planning processes.

For local-level public authorities, Planact’s interventions on terrains of local governance have yielded knowledge and skills, but also systems (such as the registration/numbering of shacks) that can improve public governance. Some of these benefits flow beyond Gauteng province.

Despite an early and strong emphasis on gender, driven in part by the Research and Development work (thus with Dutch backing), benefits have not made themselves felt among women and girls on a consistent basis across all Planact activities.

### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

At community levels, Planact activities have evidently improved knowledge and skills in: organisation-building and leadership; creating and maintaining connections with public service bodies and with organisations in other settlements; negotiations, especially with public authorities; citizen rights, such as protection against unlawful evictions; construction methods; environmental improvement, such as the use of ‘grey water’ and energy/warmth efficiencies. At local government levels, hundreds of local councillors - many of them local activists with low and uneven formal education - have gained basic knowledge of public sector governance and skills enabling them to contribute.

Planact continues to generate research studies, chiefly through contracts from third parties, on terrains of local governance, planning, housing, land and conflict management. It has also initiated various studies of its own interventions, including a major reflective exercise in 2006 looking back on its twenty years of work. Such studies help sustain and deepen understanding of and debate about professional practice in urban development both in South Africa and abroad.

Overall sustainability score: 11 (substantial)

#### 3.1.2.6 Impact

Planact’s Research & Development Programme had important impacts within the organisation but also in public policy forums in which it was asked for input. That programme created a crucial pre-condition for technical and analytical engagement with community clients, policy-makers and other actors on urban terrains.

Planact’s community-focused work had important short-term positive impacts (such as in shifting the local balance of forces toward residents) in most settlements where it engaged. However over the longer term, patterns of discontinuity arose; some initiatives suffered setbacks, sometimes leading to their complete termination. The possibility of negative impacts (the teasing-out of pre-existing tensions where Planact incautiously helped insert resources into resource-scarce environments) cannot be ruled out in a couple of cases.

Planact's local level governance work has evidently led to long-term improvement in knowledge and skill levels among elected and appointed local government actors. Several informants hold the view that this high-level leadership has helped pave the way for recent official policy shifts favouring improved living conditions. However, there are no ironclad guarantee that these progressive ideas will be fully put to work on behalf of residents "from the bottom up", rather than on behalf of outside authorities "from the top down". Forceful citizen activism will be needed to keep those ideas alive. Yet there is no consistent evidence of such public action and local-level democratising trends. Indeed many seasoned observers, such as the informant quoted in regard to provincial and local government in section 2.3 of this report, see local political authorities more commonly closing off than opening up spaces for citizen "voice".

At upper governmental and corporate levels where urban policies are influenced, the picture is mixed. Policies reflecting the progressive ideas promoted from an early hour by Planact, such as the "one-city-one-tax-base" of the early period, have become public policy in a formal sense, but their practical implementation remains uneven and weak. Yet there is evidence -- chiefly through *individuals* in the public sector, consulting services and academia -- that numerous ideas associated with Planact (bottom-up, client-led planning, "compact cities", social housing, affordable services, &c.) are still alive.

However those ideas faced especially strong headwinds from the mid-1990s onward. Those headwinds include technicist/ consultant-driven planning, bet-on-the-strong, "competitive cities" development models and clientalist politics. There are a few fragmentary indications -- such as the language used in the housing policy promulgated in 2004 -- that ideas associated with Planact may have gained some traction, but their actual effects on practice have yet to be widely and convincingly demonstrated.

### 3.1.3 Safer Cities

<i>Grantee:</i>	<i>UNCHS (UN Habitat) and International Centre for Prevention of Crime (ICPC) in collaboration with Durban Metropolitan Council</i>	
<i>Project:</i>	<i>Safer Cities Programme - Durban (ZA012001) December 1998 - December 2002</i> € 149.346	
<i>Objective:</i>	<i>Reduction of crime and causes of crime in the city through a multi-sectoral and partnership approach coordinated by the local authorities.</i>	
<i>Location:</i>	<i>Durban (extending into the larger eThekweni Municipality)</i>	
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon I</i>	

#### 3.1.3.1 Introduction

In 1995, in preparation for the Habitat II Conference (Istanbul 1996), various United Nations agencies introduced the Safer Cities idea to South African policy-makers. UN-Habitat selected Johannesburg as a demonstration city for its Urban Management Programme (UMP), under which a Safer Cities project was initiated. Subsequently, the UMP negotiated official collaboration in Safer Cities projects in Cape Town and in Durban.

In contrast to the Johannesburg case, Durban's Safer City project was embedded - at least formally - in the city's government. The project's leadership could draw on broadly favourable South African policy statements about safety and security as well as on national guidelines that emphasized local design, responsibilities and control for crime prevention.

The project pursued objectives in three main clusters:

- effective policing: including enforcement, information-gathering and community education;
- social crime prevention: attention to victims and to behaviour and employment of potential perpetrators, especially youth;
- environmental design: promotion of safer public spaces and by-laws governing the built environment.

Technical assistance from UN-Habitat and ICPC and interchange among Safer City or similar projects in South Africa and abroad, were intended to reinforce the project.

According to UN-Habitat, the Netherlands was the project's chief and only bilateral funder; the proportion of costs met by UN-Habitat and the Municipality of Durban could not be determined with the information available.

The absence of progress and final reports on this project are more than compensated by a thorough end-of-project evaluation (Comninos 2003). In respect to the period 1998-2002 the following paragraphs rely on that report.

#### 3.1.3.2 Efficiency

The project's efficiency was poor-to-fair. Episodes of action and forward motion were followed by periods of semi-paralysis. The project spent 102 percent of the Dutch grant even though less than half of planned activities were carried out. Contributing to these inefficiencies were: discontinuities in leadership made worse by reorganisation within municipal government; shifting of project responsibility from one department to another; re-shuffling of the steering committee; unclear job descriptions and lines of accountability; lack of clarity on tasks among non-governmental partners and who carried



what tasks; and continual under-staffing relative to the long and complex list of objectives set for the project.

Attention to project performance was inconsistent. UN-Habitat staff undertook regular supervision missions, but the project never developed mechanisms by which it could routinely monitor its performance. In 2003 UN-Habitat commissioned an end-of-project evaluation.

#### 3.1.3.3 Effectiveness

The project's effectiveness was poor. The end-of-project evaluation revealed failure to meet most outcome objectives.

##### *Improved Policing:*

Mechanisms to coordinate police forces (Metropolitan and SA Police Services- SAPS) functioned routinely; cooperation between steering committee/metro authorities and police forces was uneven and generally inadequate; Community Policing Forums failed to crystallize or did not function; partnerships with business developed only minimally; police in Safer Cities idea/methods was not achieved; adjustment of by-laws to reflect Safer City concept, followed by enforcement, were not achieved; community education was not achieved (except that a publication, *Making South African Safe*, was distributed); a planned monitoring system was not established; development of crime information system was not achieved; a reduction in police corruption was not achieved via the project, as projected activities were evidently not carried out.

##### *Social Crime Prevention:*


Victims support initiatives were not carried out, or once set up they did not function; plans to curb drug & alcohol abuse were not carried out (with the exception of some work, with others already active, to combat "sleazy hotels"); a street children shelter and inter-organisational forum on street children was set in motion and working satisfactorily, but no other objectives for street children were achieved; safer school environment efforts collapsed or were never carried out; training courses for youth were not achieved; sport fields and recreation effort were carried out in one pilot area with satisfactory results; promotion of job-creating enterprises was not achieved.

##### *Environmental Design:*


In respect to all objectives to promote interest and active involvement of municipal agencies, and their coordination around principles and methods of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), none were achieved; revision of by-laws in accordance with CPTED was not achieved; improved information collection and sharing systems were not achieved (with the exception of GIS mapping of metropolitan areas); CPTED methods along transport routes were not achieved; a sub-project to improve safety in the KwaMashu township (a Presidential Project) was carried out, but degree of achievement could not be ascertained ; promotion of the CPTED in the separately-managed Urban Improvement Precincts programme was largely achieved.

#### 3.1.3.4 Relevance


In broad terms the project's overall purpose was relevant to residents of Durban. However its operational measures did not fit well with municipal institutional arrangements and capacities.



Preventing crime is of obvious importance, as rates of crime in the 1990s had reached alarming proportions. At the end that decade three out of every five Durban residents saw the crime situation as bad and getting worse. Business people and public authorities developed initiatives to curb crime in commercial and some residential areas. Crime prevention based on local-level measures became an important element of national government policy; hence the government's acceptance of the UN-Habitat's proposal for Safer City projects, despite the fact that the model had originated in Europe.



Preceding the project was local-level research, including a survey of crime victimization. Yet the project lacked an analysis of the crime problematic specific to Durban and to the institutional machinery into which UN-Habitat wanted to insert the project. For example, livelihood and job creation were among project sub-objectives, yet specification was lacking and little or no consultation had taken place with any of the (very many) existing local job- and livelihood promotion initiatives.




Fieldwork revealed far less project engagement on the fronts of social services, habitat and urban governance than suggested in project documentation available for the desk study. Its foremost relevance was in respect to urban governance, but fieldwork found only modest evidence of this.

While the model's principles are relevant for the safety of women and girls, project practice regarding gender was weak. The end-of-project evaluation recommended Gender Safety Audits as a means of focusing attention on this evidently neglected dimension.

In short, the project's relevance was constrained by a design that was overburdened with objectives. It was not robust enough to overcome turbulence, capacity shortcomings and resistance within and among public sector agencies. Designs for its implementation were inadequate. In some cases the objectives duplicated purposes already being pursued by other agencies or projects.

Safer Cities' purposes were consistent with Dutch urban policy intentions regarding security and crime prevention.



### 3.1.3.5 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

Responsibility for implementation came to rest with the Emergency Services Unit of the Municipality's Department of Health, Safety and Social Services. Formal responsibilities for supervision lay with a steering committee composed of councillors, officials, senior police officials and representatives of Business Against Crime, a private sector initiative.

The end evaluation found that the project suffered from serious under-staffing as well as from discontinuous and uneven management support within the Municipality. Supervisory visits by UN-Habitat representatives took place regularly, as contractually stipulated. When internal management and backing for the project showed signs of weakening (due in part to municipal reorganisation) UN-Habitat intervention intensified. That threatened to displace local 'ownership' of the project and gave rise to tensions. Capacity-building opportunities provided by UN-Habitat (particularly study tours abroad) were welcomed, but outside technical assistance failed to show significant contributions to organisational capacities either during the project or after it ended in early 2003.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

In principle, the Safer Cities project was fully integrated with public sector policies and programmes. Project approval came from the National Secretariat for Safety and Security, a policy advisory body to the Minister of Safety and Security. During its lifespan the project leadership had powers to consult and persuade but few powers to direct or initiate. Many planned project activities, from police coordination to environmental design to area management (such as Durban's Warwick Junction informal market zone) attached themselves to initiatives already underway, led by other agencies.

After the project ended, the new Municipal Council of the eThekweni Municipality (formerly Durban Municipality Area) developed a mandatory five-year Integrated Development Plan which includes a Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy. On paper, that strategy is based in large part on the Safer Cities model, but puts much greater emphasis on area-based consultation and management.

Today the Safer Cities model faces political headwinds. Public order and safety measures emphasizing community consultation and social prevention (which were among the most advanced in South Africa) suffered reversals in 2005 when Municipal leadership shifted towards "zero-tolerance" policing methods, including displays of force by special armed units patrolling informal markets. Thus Safer City principles may have had official endorsement, but their application in practice is by no means guaranteed.

#### *Users' Interest and Benefits*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

During the project's lifespan, benefits for Durban residents were confined largely to improved sport and recreation facilities for youth, and care of street children in one zone. Among project staff and others closely associated with the project, benefits included paid employment by the project and opportunities to learn about crime prevention. Otherwise tangible benefits were scarce. Many informants to the 2003 evaluation regarded the project as largely a publicity exercise.

After the project ended, some activities promoted through the new Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy (SCPS) appear to have advanced. Informants told of improvements in certain zones, notably KwaMashu and Cato Manor, where there is wider awareness in “problematic schools” about crime along roadways and about handguns. Informants involved in area-based management of the programme report investments in street lighting, sports and recreation facilities for youth, and especially increased consultation through local safety forums and other means of interchange among police, community workers and residents.

The benefits are real, but many are attributable to other initiatives beyond, and preceding the SCPS. Informants long active on the terrain of public order in Durban observed that a number of claimed accomplishments (such as improvement of public safety in informal markets, or improvement of environmental design) are in fact results of older and separate initiatives managed by other municipal bodies and civil organisations.

### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

Public knowledge of main Safer City concepts is still not widespread in Durban, in part because the project itself was never widely known. Nevertheless some positive signs are detectable. Informants suggest that in Cato Manor and KwaMashu, there is improved community awareness of certain dimensions of crime and how to prevent it. Knowledge of crime prevention approaches has evidently grown among Durban’s Area-Based Management staff and probably more widely, such as among police, teachers in “problematic schools” and social workers. Hence there is some fragmentary evidence of user group access to improved knowledge.

The quality of concepts behind the Durban Safer Cities project is evidently considered valid by international experts. In Durban, the municipal government has officially subscribed to those concepts. Yet that government has shown reluctance, if not outright disinterest, in applying them in practice. That gap -- or lag -- between policy and practice has been widely observed elsewhere in South Africa, whose 1996 national crime strategy anticipated many Safer City principles. There seems to be no unequivocal commitment to renewing and extending knowledge of this model. This suggests that more thinking, testing and evaluating is required before the Safer City model may be regarded as the best available.

Overall sustainability score: 8 (modest)

#### 3.1.3.6 Impact

The project influenced official statements of public policy, namely the city’s *Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy*. But its on-the-ground impact has been modest. Crime continues to plague Durban’s citizens, especially those living in low-income settlements. Along with unemployment, crime remains at the top of public concerns. Yet overall public perceptions of crime in Durban have become a little less pessimistic; in 2005 only two out of five residents thought crime was worsening, whereas in 1999 three out of five took that pessimistic stance (O’Leary 2007). On the other hand, a mere 13 percent of persons polled in Durban in 2005 were satisfied with government handling of crime -- marginally below the national average of 16 percent satisfied (SA Cities Network 2006: 3-27).

Initiatives analogous to Safer Cities have met a similar fate. A 2002 study found little success among crime prevention efforts in South Africa. In terms highly relevant to the Safer Cities Durban experience, that study concluded:

*The points above highlight a wide disjuncture between policy and practice, a disjuncture that is attributable to the general failure of policy to take into account the actual requirements for its implementation.*

*The gap between the policy and the requirements for its implementation has been compounded by the adoption of policy models from the developed West, with little, if any, assessment of the feasibility of these models in the South African context (Pelser & Louw 2002: 137).*

### 3.1.4 Social Housing

*Grantee: Nationale Woningraad (NWR) on behalf of Wattville Concerned Residents Association / Planact*

*Project: Wattville/Tamboville Housing Association  
(ZA 006901) August 1996 - March 1997 € 163.363*

*Objective: Setting up community-based housing association for the provision of community-controlled housing, to serve as a model for others*

*Location: Benoni, East Rand, Gauteng Province*

*Grantee: Social Housing Foundation (SHF)*

*Project: Social Housing Foundation  
(ZA006903) September 1999- March 2000 € 168.189*

*Objective: Contribute to capacity-building in the social housing sector*

*Location: nation-wide*

*Echelon: Echelon I*

#### 3.1.4.1 Introduction

Social housing, as officially defined in South Africa, is 'a housing option for low-to-medium income persons that is provided by housing institutions, and that excludes immediate individual ownership'. The proposition that social housing offers a viable response to needs of certain near-poor and non-poor social strata connects the two (otherwise completely separate) projects considered here.

The Wattville/Tamboville Housing Association (WHA) grew out of community-based organisations forged in the 1980s by black residents trying to advance their rights to decent housing and services in a municipality on the periphery of Johannesburg previously controlled by whites. Planact, a USN affiliate which had advised residents' groups in their negotiations, had promoted the idea of social housing guiding the creation of the WHA.

Main purposes of the Wattville (WHA) project were:

- To establish a sustainable community based housing association;
- To provide and maintain decent, affordable and community controlled housing;
- To provide a model for establishing and managing similar social housing institutions in South Africa.

The Social Housing Foundation (SHF) was set up in 1997 as a parastatal service company by the National Housing Finance Corporation, a parastatal bank. The government tasked the SHF with promotion of the social housing sector through policy development, research, training, advice and technical support. It was also expected to develop international networks including those with donors. Having long promoted the social housing idea in South Africa, foreign donor agencies and professional housing bodies offered the SHF support from the outset. The Dutch influence was particularly intense; the SHF received a substantial flow of policy models, technical assistance, study tours and finance from the Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) and the Netherlands Federation of Housing Corporations (Aedes).

Main purposes of the SHF project were:

- To build capacity in the social housing sector in all provinces where social housing associations have been formed, so that new housing institutions can be sustained by trained and qualified expertise;
- To create a substantial amount of rental housing units for low income housing.

Dutch funding has been predominant in social housing, including these projects. About two-thirds of the WHA project were met by an official Dutch grant; the other third by the NWR. In the case of the SHF capacity building project 1999-2000 Dutch funding from various sources was substantial, exceeded only by that of the South African government.

Documentary evidence about these projects is fragmentary. No final reports could be found for either, despite requests to the project holders.

#### 3.1.4.2 Efficiency

Efficiency in the WHA project was apparently poor.

Before the Dutch grant, the WHA had ambitious plans: medium-density houses for 1128 households in six locations. By the end of 1995, following necessary surveys, plans and contracting of local builders, some 42 houses had been built for the WHA.

Not long after the grant period began in 1996, project leadership suspended most planned activities. Project holders proposed a major revisions and a reallocation of remaining parts of the grant. The Dutch Ministry declined the request. Project holders nevertheless absorbed 72 percent of the grant; the remaining 28 percent was not paid out and subsequently cancelled. The cause of the disruption and grant termination was local political turbulence, manifested in rivalries between two community leaders and their respective followers.

Efficiency in the SHF project appears to have been fair.

It overspent its budget by 56 percent. That may have been due to further expenditure covered by a budget upgrade; however no evidence to confirm that hypothesis, or any other explanation, could be found. The project's training activities were carried out within the project timeframe but not according to plan. Of the four training efforts supported, evidence could be found for only two; both were carried out satisfactorily. Of 20 men and women projected to be trained as social housing trainers 15 went through a three-week course. In another training effort, 23 women were trained in leadership and management in social housing. Evidence from other sources suggests that training has tended to be among tasks areas where SHF showed some proficiency.

Overall, the SHF's internal environment has not generated high levels of efficiency. Frequent restructuring, staff turnover and other kinds of internal turbulence have constrained output relative to resources applied.

#### 3.1.4.3 Effectiveness

WHA Effectiveness was poor.

Documentation is not available, but informants to this study indicate that the project failed to meet its overall objectives, particularly to create a model for social housing.




SHF Effectiveness of this training project appears to have been fair.

According to an internal review of one training course, participants claimed to have gained “a good grasp of the concept of Social Housing, the requirements and the business structure”. A seasoned informant to the study said that SHF training efforts (perhaps including those supported by the Dutch grant) had “raised the consciousness about social housing. But these were mainly about delivering information” being less successful in providing trainees with tangible skills. Otherwise no evidence could be found to back those claim of competence in practice. However one evaluation report indicates that the *advisees* -- that is, untrained persons trying to set up social housing initiatives as advised by SHF -- commonly knew more than the SHF *advisors* (Martin 2004: 14). Hence there are serious question-marks about the positive effects of SNF training.

#### 3.1.4.4 Relevance


Informants to this study question the relevance of the social housing model pursued in these projects.

Although the concept of social housing was completely new to them, residents of Wattville/Tamboville had been consulted about the project, and had expressed enthusiasm for it. However the social housing element never crystallized; one informant described it as “not really a social housing project at all” but rather a general housing support effort. Resulting houses were not relevant for the poorest since costs of construction and of bank loans made them unaffordable.



As the concept was new to South Africa, training in social housing principles and practices was a clearly relevant activity for advancing the concept. Absence of experienced people and shallow pools from which prospective trainees could be drawn, have been serious constraints for social housing from the outset. Efforts to train trainers (one of the four sub-projects) appears to have been particularly relevant. One of the training projects admitted only women, an indication of attention to gender equity at management levels in social housing institutions.

However the relevance of the SHF’s broader strategies is open to question. Most of the informants to this study see the SHF’s approach as inappropriate. In their view, that approach was to define the model, define the capacity needs and then deliver advice from the top down. One informant held that such approaches could even be prejudicial, as they prevented social housing institutions from demonstrating responsibility and initiative. It appears that the chief point of relevance and added value of the SHF -- promoting the *social* dimension of social housing -- is not there. Such findings during fieldwork account for lower scoring than those assigned on the basis of written reports found in project dossiers.



An official study of Municipal International Cooperation by the Netherlands found that social housing was the main thrust of Dutch city-to-city aid in South Africa. Yet that kind of aid was seldom relevant for strengthening local government, as social housing was not a priority, nor an area of competence, of South African municipalities (IOB 2004: 130-1).

Consistent with these observations is the further criticism, heard from several expert informants, that SHF's approach was largely oriented toward large-scale social housing institutions, such as in the Netherlands, where institutions are well-established and manage a thousand or more units are common. Such an orientation is inappropriate to South Africa, where social housing institutions are an emergent form and, on average, many times smaller than in Europe. A factor detectable in both these shortcomings, according to several informants, has been the influence of European support bodies.


Relevance is also a matter of priority uses of public resources in a context of growing poverty. Currently, most social housing activities receive public subsidies either through direct state investment or through non-recovery of rental payments owed to public authorities. Given that those public resources might be otherwise deployed to meet needs of lower-income people, those subsidies' anti-poverty relevance is in question. Relevance may also be measured by coverage. In South Africa, social housing's scale is very modest. As of 2003, about 60 social housing institutions together managed about 25000 housing units -- thus accounting for less than 1.5 percent of South Africa's housing stock, and meeting even less of its overall needs.

The overall relevance of social housing for South Africa's poor is therefore an issue of debate. It is widely seen as unaffordable to the very poor, that is, to households which would be eligible for a full government building subsidy because their monthly income is no more than about €150. The negative experience of Wattville illustrates the limits of the social housing model, not its potentials.

Official policy statements suggest that households with monthly incomes below €150 may in special circumstances be targeted for social housing. However in current conditions, front-end investment and monthly operating costs put most social housing units well out of reach of the poor. They are appropriate mainly for households with monthly incomes above €350 and attractive for those with incomes up to €750. However one pilot social housing effort, managed by the USN affiliate in East London, Afesis Corplan, included poor residents.

A more realistic and significant potential anti-poverty outcome may be the brake that social housing can put on "downward raiding" -- the widespread practice by near-poor

and non-poor of buying or renting houses intended for the poor. Furthermore, this kind of rental accommodation can often provide better housing locations -- close to where livelihoods can be pursued -- than new but isolated housing on the urban periphery.



3.1.4.5 Sustainability

*Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Wattville/Tamboville Rating: 1 (negligible)  
 Social Housing Foundation Rating: 1 (negligible)

The WHA no longer exists. Registered as a Section 21 not-for-profit company in August 1994, by 1997 it had been closed down, its assets transferred to the Greater Benoni City Council. The chief obstacle was an irresolvable conflict between rival leadership factions, exacerbated by charges of corruption.

The SHF shows serious institutional weaknesses. Informants to this study (several of whom referred to external evaluations with highly critical conclusions) paint a picture of a largely dysfunctional organisation. Exemplifying internal weaknesses have been: high turnover of staff, repeated internal restructuring, recurrent ad hoc use of (expensive) external consultants, ‘a culture of non-delivery’.

The financial sustainability of social housing institutions has been questioned. A senior South African housing expert argues that continuing financial losses (covered by taxpayers) and poor management are due chiefly to social housing institutions having been shielded from the discipline of market forces (Hunter 2006).

*Formal Recognition and Authority*

Wattville/Tamboville Rating: 1 (negligible)  
 Social Housing Foundation Rating: 3 (considerable)

At the outset in 1995-96 the WHA social housing initiative received public attention and official approbation. In August 1996 the then Minister of Housing visited Wattville; despite some critical remarks about details of house designs, she evidently drew inspiration from Wattville and moved ahead to promote social housing as an important component of government housing policy.

The SHF, as a body established by government with Parliamentary approval and with a considerable profile abroad, has enjoyed substantial formal recognition.

*Users’ interest and benefits*

Wattville/Tamboville Rating: 1 (negligible)  
Social Housing Foundation Rating: 2 (moderate)

Users of the 42 houses built in the Wattville area have benefited from the low-cost shelter they enjoy thanks to the WHA project.

An ex-participant in a SHF training programme, now a senior social housing manager, indicated that the training had helped him learn about recruitment of people, funding mobilization and management, but had not helped him construct cooperative and smooth management structures. This informant was also satisfied with the evaluative follow-up visits to his organisation by SHF.

#### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Wattville/Tamboville Rating: 1 (negligible)  
Social Housing Foundation Rating: 2 (moderate)

The Wattville experience added to knowledge among professionals of the risks present where resources are inserted into a resource-scarce environment. Otherwise, the project added no relevant knowledge of social housing as a model.

The extent to which knowledge transmitted in the SHF training programme has been sustained is not known with any certainty. However training materials and methods in those courses have contributed to the SHF's capacities to continue offering satisfactory training services.

Overall sustainability score Wattville/Tamboville: 4 (nil)  
Overall sustainability score Social Housing Foundation: 8 (modest)

#### 3.1.4.6 Impact

Social housing has moved up on South Africa's public agenda. The government's current housing policy, expressed in its 2004 *Breaking New Ground*, put forward intentions to develop the sector. A *Social Housing Bill* was gazetted in November 2006; Parliament is expected to approve it in 2007. Thus despite the setbacks to local-level experiments, and weaknesses of its chief public agency, social housing has clearly advanced into the front ranks of national housing policy. Plausibly, the WHA project helped bring the social housing model to the attention of South African government officials. The SHF has evidently contributed to a policy impact, despite its 'culture of non-delivery' that set limits to its material impact on the ground.

In the absence of tracer studies of trainees, and of any system to connect with former trainees, this study could not ascertain impacts of the specific SHF project in question here.

### 3.1.5 Triple Trust

<i>Grantee:</i>	<i>Triple Trust Organisation</i>	
<i>Project:</i>	<i>Triple Trust Organisation</i> <i>(ZA003102) September 1993 - August 1994</i>	<i>€ 75.605</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	<i>enable unemployed people to set up income generating micro enterprises.</i>	
<i>Location:</i>	<i>Cape Town</i>	
<i>Echelon</i>	<i>Echelon II</i>	
<i>Project:</i>	<i>Young Starting Entrepreneurs Programme</i> <i>(ZA003110) June 1999 - March 2000</i>	<i>€ 120.793</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	<i>contribute to the fights against youth unemployment by empowering unemployed and out-of-school youth with training, mentoring, savings mobilization and facilitation of financial support that will enable them to start up their own small business.</i>	
<i>Locations:</i>	<i>Western and Eastern Cape</i>	
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon III</i>	

#### 3.1.5.1 Introduction

Formed in 1988, Triple Trust aimed to address the unemployment crisis in South Africa using a three pronged approach - training, financing and marketing. Each activity was provided by a separate trust, hence the name triple trust. Over time two additional entities were set up. At the time of the Dutch funding, Triple Trust Organisation (TTO) consisted of five non-profit organisations registered under the Section 21 South African Companies Act collectively employing 75 people.

The first Dutch grant was provided in 1993 for training 144 trainees, staff development and the development of trader training. Several other grants were provided over the years. One of these, a grant for training young entrepreneurs in the Western and Eastern Cape, is also included in this review. Dutch aid accounted for only modest proportions -- 8 percent in 1993-1994 and 11 percent in 1999-2000 -- of TTO's very sizable budgets, which were supported by private enterprises as well as official donors.

The main activities of the first grant were:

- Development of courses using the competency based modular training method
- Provision of 17 eight-week skills training courses in the greater Cape Town area
- Business training
- Mentoring service provision of ex-trainees
- Mini-loans provision of ex-trainees
- Support for Africa Trading Co-operative Trust which sells raw materials and buys finished products
- Free advice services for ex-trainees
- Training 1300 (144 with Dutch funding)
- Trader training
- Capacity building among TTO black staff.

The main activities of the second grant were:

- Provision of training in business introduction, start-ups, market awareness and money management of unemployed youth
- Research, evaluation and ongoing development of TTO's job creation programme

- Delivery of business introduction courses (135 one-week courses to 1013 people of which the Dutch funded 100 youth in the Eastern Cape)
- Business action planning training (52 three-week courses for 468 people of which Dutch funded 30 youth in the Western Cape)
- Skills training (601 courses for 3857 people of which RNE to fund 240 youth from the Eastern Cape and 100 from the Western Cape)
- Training the trainers course (13 courses for 102 trainers)
- Advice services to 4066 people utilizing the Cape Town Small Business Centre

A pioneer in its field, TTO was one of the early enterprise development support organisations, making it a key player as the skills training industry grew in South Africa. With fundraising success came a focus on numbers of trainers and cost per trainer without adequate attention being paid to the usefulness of the training as a tool for facilitating economic empowerment and creating sustainable enterprises.

In 2001 the organisation underwent a seminal external evaluation, on the back of an internal impact assessment of the training. This forced TTO to rethink its strategy and programmes.

In 2002 TTO adopted a new strategy focusing on making markets work for the poor through market facilitation and support. Today it has 13 staff and is part of a global network of NGOs focusing on making markets work for the poor. All are involved in market facilitation as a tool for economic empowerment and entrepreneurship development.

### 3.1.5.2 Efficiency

Overall, TTO's efficiency was fair.

It spent 93 percent of the first grant on the allocated activities with the balance being absorbed into core funding. TTO trained 107 trainees in sewing (46), knitting (20) and leatherwork (41). This is 26percent less than the planned 144 beneficiaries due to increased per unit cost of training. The specialized trader training course was not developed in the funding period as indicated in the proposal. It was developed two years later with the input of German competency based methodology. With the focus on numbers and costs much of the support services noted in the proposal but not directly funded were not delivered. As one trainee interviewed commented; *"TTO sent consultants to check on our progress for a very short while only."*

Forty-one of the 75 staff working for the organisation in 1993/4 received some form of staff development by attending seminars, courses and workshops related to areas either of weakness or of potential career growth. Seventeen of these staff trainees were funded by the Dutch.

A small portion of the budget was allocated to the trading division (responsible for selling goods produced) and to the mini-loans division to provide loans to people who have completed the training. Dutch funding was to support a portion of the total number of trainees targeted as reflected in the following table:

Table 3C TTO performance to plans 1993 - 1994

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>percent</i>
Business introductory training	1013	1000	99 %
Business action plan	468	385	82 %
Skills training	3857	3186	83 %
Training of trainers	102	45	44 %

Small business centre consultations	4066	2915	72 %
TTO club members	40	223	7 %
Trainees saving	611	411	67 %
Graduates linked to formal financial institutions	100	None	0 %

As with the first grant the focus was on the training with good results in trainee numbers. The performance in the support areas was less efficient resulting in a train and go approach rather than the planned holistic service. In addition, the specific focus on youth did not result in any models for youth empowerment outside of the TTO standard service.

### 3.1.5.3 Effectiveness

Overall effectiveness during the period under review was poor.

The organisation was not very successful in achieving economic empowerment of its targeted beneficiaries. External evaluators (Allanic and others 2001) noted that the selection of sewing, knotting and leatherwork was not based on market research into potential demand for products and did not offer the potential of growing beyond survivalist businesses. *“Most sewing and leather projects showed no evidence of sustainability or capacity to generate real grassroots income-generation opportunities other than for community trainers, and closure of projects probably reflects growing disenfranchisement.”* The actual training materials received a poor evaluation. *“Business training manuals and courses appear to be in urgent need of major revision to make them relevant to microenterprise realities.”*

This was confirmed in 2007 interviews with trainees who claimed they had learnt the trade but not business skills from TTO. In addition, the evaluation noted that training in a vacuum does not lead to the development of sustainable small scale economic activities. The same criticism can be levelled against the urban programme.


Impact studies conducted suggest that trainees valued the training; *“TTO is like a sun that rises to bring light and warmth to people who have been in darkness.”* However, as the external evaluation noted this appreciation was often based on the potential resources the training connected trainees to rather than about the skills transferred or their new economic success. A quote extracted from an early internal trainee impact study confirms this; *“on the course you just make a few things.. but you realize that decides those things there are a lot of things you can make .... I think if everyone believes that these things can influence their future when they leave here, then they can make a success of it”.*

TTO provided training, although the usefulness of the training is questioned. It provided a market for goods through its warehouse which purchased goods but had limited success developing new markets. The TTO club provided a network to trainees and limited access to support services. Access to credit via its micro-loans programme was available in theory but few of the trainees interviewed had managed to secure a loan. In addition, no links for formal credit institutions were forged.


A couple of years after the last Dutch grant, the organisation changed its strategy. Beneficiary interviews suggest the new strategy is more effective. This will need to be tested when the organisation commissions its next external evaluation.

### 3.1.5.4 Relevance

With official unemployed levels in the 1993 - 2001 period ranging between 19.5 percent and 24 percent respectively ([www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)) and unofficial levels recorded as being more than double this, the lack of income was and remains one of the major challenges in South Africa. In urban areas the problem is exacerbated as people live away from their family networks and any subsistence farming opportunities. Other urban programmes such as the housing programme are continuously undermined as new home owners are unable to meet service charges and sell off the asset to offset debts forcing them back into shacks.



Consequently, inclusion of a work and income component in grant making is appropriate in terms of the South African context and the Dutch urban policy. At the time of the initial grant to TTO there were few models that linked training to marketing and financial support. TTO's mentoring service was probably one of the more interesting models, but it was not consistently applied. TTO focused largely on training, but with very limited results. If based on today's activities, the following chart would register a greater degree of attention to marketing and much less to training.




There is no evidence to suggest that training people in business skills alone is a relevant intervention. The external evaluation concludes that it is tantamount to *“training for frustration.”*

The specific focus on youth in the second grant was in line with the nationwide focus on youth, led by the President. Seventy one percent of the unemployed are under 35 and 59 percent of these have never worked in their lives. Interventions to change this experience are both needed and relevant. However unless they result in tangible



opportunities for income generation the problem will not be addressed. The TTO model did not result in sustainable economic opportunities or an improved quality of life for trainees.

TTO targeted unemployed people, a vulnerable group in South African society. Within this they did not further target sub-groups outside of youth. No attention was paid to cultural or religious issues. Finally, the project conducted very limited research at the time of the funding (more recently there has been a focus on market research) limiting the sharing of its lessons.



### 3.1.5.5 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

Nineteen years since it was established, TTO still exists with a functioning Board and experienced management. Today the organisation is a lot smaller and focuses almost exclusively on market facilitation. TTO no longer does generic training. The training it does provide is demand-led and is chiefly related to the marketing process, for example training in reading financial statements. Any other training tasks are contracted out to specialists.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

TTO is registered as a Section 21 not-for-profit company. It is part of a new network focused on making markets work for the poor. Outside of this network its influence and authority is limited. It is not involved in any of the many government initiatives around enterprise development, where many of the mistakes that TTO made are being repeated. TTO staff indicated that officials with whom they had built relationships and exposed to the “markets work” approach had then left the public sector in frustration.

The bulk of the staff that have left TTO have set up their own businesses either as entrepreneurs or SMME support service providers.

#### *Users' interest and benefits*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

Those TTO clients trained in 1993/4 who were interviewed noted that they had learnt about the trade (leatherwork) from TTO but had not learnt any business skills. Some like Mr Mvoto persisted with their business, but most did not. The success of the few cannot be attributed to TTO but rather to the specific individuals' entrepreneurial skills and determination. However the TTO training was a stepping stone for this group of people.

Two trainees interviewed spoke of their recent success with the Cape Craft and Design Institute which had "truly empowered" them and attributed their ability to enter this programme to their TTO training and artist talents. They had introduced a range of new products and markets to leatherworkers, for example beaded shoes.

In its new model TTO works with people who are already entrepreneurs focused on growing their businesses through increasing markets. One example is ShopNet which offers bulk buying services to Spaza shops and does market research into consumer spending patterns to assist them expand their product range. TTO staff point to the dramatic increase in turnover and members of ShopNet as a sign of its success. This was borne out by one interviewee, Mr Mvoto who asked to join based on his neighbour's success. He still runs his leatherwork on the side. He is very excited about the new venture and ShopNet.

The bulk of the training in the period under review was given to women. In its new programme the gender split varies based on the business. The ShopNet project is 65 percent female while the Eastern Cape Red Meat project is 90 percent male.

### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

TTO has demonstrated an ability to learn from its mistakes and access new knowledge and networks to improve its work. While staff spoke to transferring the knowledge to beneficiary groups with the transfer of entities to members it is unclear whether adequate capacity is being built for this transfer to take place.

Most trainees interviewed felt the training was rudimentary and unless personally enhanced would not result in business success.

Overall sustainability rating: 8 (modest)

If we regard the role of NGOs as laboratories to test new approaches and to provide models that can be scaled up TTO sustainability can be regarded as modest. Unless the organisation increases its networks and advocacy the knowledge generated and lessons learnt will not be transferred or embedded in the new initiatives absorbing the bulk of public and private sector resources.

#### 3.1.5.6 Impact

TTO's impact has been limited. The organisation is not a major player in SMME development and support networks. Its staff are today dismissive toward the models being used by most initiatives. Advocacy to change this does not seem to be high on their agenda.

It is not clear what the fate of most TTO trainees has been. However the few located and interviewed had all managed to use TTO's training as a stepping stone to more interesting and sustainable options. In the main it is technical not business skills that have been the most relevant for trainees' careers.

TTO recognised its weaknesses and changed its focus. It appears that its new strategy may be more successful. The TTO is also part of a larger network adopting the approach, both in South Africa and globally. Hopefully this collective muscle will indirectly enhance their impact on policy and programme development.

### 3.1.6 Resource Action Group

<b>Grantee:</b>	<i>Resource Action Group (RAG)</i>		
<b>Project:</b>	<i>Resource Action Group Operation Hope, phase II</i>		
	<i>(ZA007129) April 1998 - June 2001</i>		<i>€ 62,075</i>
	<i>(ZA007129b) April 1998 - June 2001</i>		<i>€ 73,465</i>
<b>Objectives:</b>	<i>Contribute to addressing the problem of crime and social degeneration prevalent amongst youth in the Cape Flats by training unemployed youth in skills that facilitate their entry into the world of work. Enable RAG to improve and expand its youth network, to work towards greater financial sustainability and to build capacity in other youth focused organisations.</i>		
<b>Location:</b>	<i>Western Cape, Cape Flats, Nooitgedacht and Gatesville</i>		
<b>Echelon:</b>	<i>Echelon III</i>		

#### 3.1.6.1 Introduction

Driven by his passion to change the lives of marginalised youth, the founder, Frank Julie, established Resource Action Group in 1993. In its inception it was a shared resource centre and network linked to the Western Cape Society for Alternative Structures. Soon after launching the mother body collapsed and RAG developed a life of its own.

RAG strategy was based on the founding groups' understanding of their local community. Research for RAG by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry cited the hopelessness amongst many youth who believe they will never find employment and the results of a series of focus groups held with young people. All pointed to the need for employment related skills training and confidence building.

In response RAG launched its Operation Hope Programme which combined computer, administration and life skills training. In its report to the Dutch embassy, RAG states that the life skills component of the training was its biggest drawing card. In addition it provided a resource centre and social club for trainees. During the period under review, RAG's main activities were:

- 9 Operation Hope programmes (48 trainees per programme)
- Training in business, computer literacy, administrative and life skills
- Tracking of ex-trainees
- Rental of office space
- Purchase of a printing press
- Production of 4 issues of Youth Express
- Capacity building of other youth focused NGOs
- Purchase of training equipment and a car
- More detailed tracking of ex-trainees from 1997-9
- Gender courses for RAG staff

Initially focused on youth in the low-income coloured settlement Bishop Lavis, RAG expanded the service youth across the city with its move the Grassroots in Athlone in 2001. This enabled it to increase its capacity to 220 trainees per programme.

The first contact with the Netherlands' aid programme happened in 1997. At this point only a small grant was available which RAG turned down as it would have required a shift in focus. A year later the organisation became a grant recipient. In 2000 the

Netherlands provided a second supplementary grant to enable RAG to improve and expand its institutional capacity and work.

#### 3.1.6.2 Efficiency

RAG efficiency in the period under review was good.

According to the desk study RAG slightly overspent its budgeted grant. It delivered all nine of the Operational Hope training programmes. Its trainees (442 people trained in the period Oct 2000 - March 2001) exceeded the number targeted (432). All the training included computer, administrative and life skills modules. In the funding period RAG experimented with training in book keeping and office skills. Although the training was very successful it was too costly to sustain. The tracking system planned was never developed.

In the upgrade proposal funding was provided for the periodical *Youth Express*, which RAG proceeded to produce and distribute. It also purchased various equipment according to plan, and carried out a gender course for staff. It commissioned a tracking study that provided information on ex-trainees in the period 1997-98. However the on-going tracking systems were not developed and information on past trainees outside of the specific study was sketchy and largely accessed through networks rather than records.

#### 3.1.6.3 Effectiveness

The overall effectiveness is rated as fair.

RAG was very effective at raising trainees' confidence and facilitating short-term employment. The initial target for placing students in work was 65 percent although in reality only 50 percent secured employment or further academic opportunities. This was facilitated by participation in the RAG club which provided a social and business network to students and the work place opportunities offered at RAG to volunteer.


Gender awareness remains a key theme in RAG and has demonstrably impacted on staff and trainees. In 2003 about 70 percent of its trainees were young women. A *Gender Audit* of Dutch-supported youth projects notes that RAG was the only organisation with a fulltime staff member devoted to gender. However the report notes that RAG's laundry project, which recruited only women, ran the risk of reinforcing gender stereotypes (Gender Links Associates 2001: 8). Beyond the laundry, several projects established by youth for youth were initiated, namely the *Youth Express* newsletter and various other small businesses. Since 2003 all have closed down. This suggests limited expertise in business skills. Also the planned *Youth Voices* book was never completed. It is unclear what has become of the assets from these businesses.

RAG provided training which enabled 50 percent of trainees to secure work or further educational opportunities; it created a social network through the RAG club providing on-going social capital to participants and it assisted trainees market themselves though providing access to computers to do CVs, information sessions and its media programme.


#### 3.1.6.4 Relevance

All interviewees recounted the relevance of the project for the Bishop Lavis community. Young people were involved in designing the programme and running it. It was a resource and integral to the community. As one interviewee commented; "*Part of RAG's*

success was its community network which added real value in respect of placement and job opportunities.” Once the project moved (2001) its scope broadened but its relevance evidently declined. As the chair of the Board recounted recently, a trainee said that he had never heard of RAG despite residing just 100 meters away.




With 69 percent of its population under 35 (about a quarter of these being between the ages of 15 and 35) and life expectancy dropping, South Africa cannot afford not to work with its youth. Given the very high rate of unemployment amongst youth and their lack of anything useful to do after leaving school, a focus on youth and skills development and employment is clearly relevant to the South African context. However this is not enough. With the rising levels of violence it is essential that youth interventions are holistic programmes with large life skills components. Fieldwork confirmed prior research in project dossiers showing major emphasis on education, but did not confirm claims of relevance for security or health.



Theoretically there is little doubt that giving young people hope and employment will reduce the attraction of gangsterism; however no evidence could be found to demonstrate this had occurred with RAG. In fact some people interviewed suggested that those people that found their way to RAG were likely to have already made a choice against gangsterism.

RAG staff wrote prolifically on youth issues but actual research was limited. There was no explicit focus on religious or cultural issues.



### 3.1.6.5 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 2 (Modest) - 1 (Nil)

While the institution was strong during the period of Dutch funding, much of this strength was based on the leadership of the then Executive Director. Without this leadership RAG weakened. The organisation still exists today but is a shadow of its former self with just eight staff, many only part-time. It still offers training in computers although as stated earlier the courses have not been adequately updated. RAG is not yet accredited as a training organisation in terms of South Africa's adult training regime, although it is in the process of gaining that accreditation. The evaluation team struggled to secure meetings with the Director and previous Director who is now a Board member. Those indications of internal difficulties were confirmed in the team's meeting with the Chair of the Board who noted that the organisation is facing a financial and leadership crisis.

The RAG model of fees for courses presents the means to sustainability. At the time of the Dutch grant, fees were paid by 90 percent of participants. However maintaining this payment level was always challenging and it did drop as low as 75 percent. Student fees raised 30 percent of the operating costs. In 2006 this had been increased to over 50 percent as students have been charged higher fees.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 2 (Modest)

RAG is a section 21 not for profit company. It is well respected by ex-trainees as reflected in its on-going volunteer support and the long-term relationships the organisation has sustained with ex-trainees. It is also recognised by private sector organisations as a recruitment pool with several nascent agencies using RAG trainees to launch their services.

RAG played a limited role in the broader youth network and was generally regarded as "*the poor cousin*". However it did inspire people in the community. The creation of RAG's Kimberly programme was an example of the impact of this inspiration. Started through the reconnection of old school friends, RAG and more particularly its founding Director helped give birth to offices in Kimberly and the Southern Cape and offered mentoring support to both.

### *Users' interest and benefits*

Rating: 3 (substantial)

RAG provided considerable benefit to users, many of them unemployment young people unsure about their future. RAG provided them with a network, a sense of belonging, some hard skills and a chance to gain work experience. Most of the trainees volunteered at RAG after finishing the course. Ex-trainees spoke of the warmth, closeness and community spirit at RAG. Almost all the volunteers said they would like to retain a link with RAG and if they had time they would offer it to RAG. It is for this community-mindedness and spirit that people value RAG most. Not only did the programme service mainly women it also raised awareness of gender issues and HIV-AIDS through the RAG club and information sessions. Walking into the offices today one is still struck by the plethora of literature on women abuse and related issues.

<b><i>Trainee status post training</i></b>
--------------------------------------------

30% temporarily jobs
15% permanent jobs
50% unemployed
5% study further

### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 2 (modest)

The organisation tried to play a major role in building the capacity and knowledge base of its users. Technically RAG was at the cutting edge offering computer training to many people who had never touched a computer. However it is not clear whether the staff and training courses had retained their relevance; some informants felt that it was no longer current given the technology advances. In addition, trainees in the administration or computer fields rated the training as poor in the tracking study commissioned with Dutch funding.

Within the youth sector RAG was a major player proving the model for similar centres in other areas started by ex-trainees, friends and other NGOs. On leaving RAG most of its staff moved into other NGOs or private sector employment.

Overall the sustainability of the organisation is rated (score: 8.5) as modest.

#### 3.1.6.6 Impact

RAG's impact on individual trainees has been considerable. It provided an organisational base for young people in Bishop Lavis and surrounding areas. Studies conducted on the challenges facing youth point to the need to give young people a place of respect as valued members of the community. RAG did this with its array of local projects and opportunities for trainees to give back to the community as volunteers. Although RAG attempted to broaden its impact beyond Bishop Lavis, the programme was largely focused on the Coloured community. This is the largest community most affected by gangsterism. It accounts for 43 percent of the unemployed; the African community in the Western Cape accounts for 14 percent of the total population and 53 percent of the unemployed ([www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)).

No studies were conducted on RAG's impact on levels of gang activity in the area. Some interviews suggested RAG may have had such an impact when it was still located in Bishop Lavis but this had dropped with the move to Athlone. In its programmes, RAG tackled issues of gender relations and abuse but programmes around drug use, authority and power were limited.



RAG had a successful marketing arm which enabled it to raise issues affecting young people scaling up its impact well beyond its actual size. Nationally RAG had limited impact, being part of the Youth Development Network but not a major player in it. Relative to the resources invested, RAG's impact has been limited, geographically and socially.

### 3.1.7 Centre for Education and Enterprise Development (CEED)

<b>Grantee:</b>	<i>Centre for Education and Enterprise Development (CEED)</i>	
<b>Project:</b>	<i>Durban South Career Centre: Youth Enterprise Education (ZA003105) October 1997 - September 2000</i>	<i>€ 239.853</i>
<b>Objectives:</b>	<i>To develop capacity of out-of-school youth for self-employment through training and support through to possible establishment of sustainable micro-enterprises.</i>	
<b>Location:</b>	<i>Durban, rural areas of Port Shepstone and Empangeni</i>	
<b>Echelon:</b>	<i>Echelon III</i>	

#### 3.1.7.1 Introduction

Founded in 1978 in an “Indian” suburb of Durban, this organisation evolved in the 1980s from a keep-teenagers-off-the-streets youth club into a career guidance centre providing bursaries, training and youth entrepreneurship promotion. Later in the 1990s its orientation changed further. It expanded into rural areas, opened several small town branch offices; shifted the Durban headquarters and Business College to the city centre; and it launched new strategies, including ‘business incubator’ and micro-lending programmes. Financial turnover grew as it acquired more foreign donors and South African government contracts for training services. Around 2002 its main public sector contractor became a parastatal agency, the Umsobomvu Youth Fund. By 2005 Umsobomvu accounted for about two-thirds of CEED’s income and had helped align it with other enterprise-promotion agencies in KwaZulu-Natal.

Main activities of the 1997-2000 Youth Enterprise Education project were to :

- select and support 900 trainees basic business skills
- select and support 200 trainees with hard technical skills
- counsel trainees about business ideas
- provide Business Management Training (BMT) for select groups (max. 20)
- provide Business Incubator support for those finishing BMT
- provide follow-up services and loans for starting micro-enterprises
- facilitate the PondoCrop project in southern KwaZulu-Natal rural areas.

This project (later called the Youth Economic Empowerment Programme) had a budget of about €750.000, of which the Dutch contributed about 28 percent. After 2000, Dutch official funding to CEED continued through the Youth Development Network, a South African NGO established with Dutch official assistance.

CEED no longer exists. In the last quarter of 2005, confronted with severe financial difficulties, its leadership decided to close the organisation. As of February 2007, all of the organisation’s remaining assets and records were in the hands of a firm of liquidators tasked with preparing of repayment of outstanding debts, including a substantial amount to the South African tax authorities.

#### 3.1.7.2 Efficiency

Overall, CEED’s efficiency was moderate to low.

CEED overspent its grant by about 3 percent. Spending was very different from that budgeted; for example, core training and support activities absorbed only 12 percent of

actual, as against 39 percent of planned expenditure, while physical upgrading and equipment (driven by the opening of new offices) absorbed 32 percent of actual, as against 7 percent of planned expenditure. This suggests weak planning.

Subsequent to the period 1997-2000, further signs of management inefficiency and instability appeared. These included:

- a highly centralized and closed style of management by the Director;
- poor planning; the Director set objectives (such as to launch new courses) without consulting others and without thinking through logistical details and accompanying costs;
- routine purchase of unnecessarily expensive goods and services;
- widespread staff dissatisfaction with contractual conditions, and very high turnover of staff (in 2004, about 9 out of 10 staff had worked in CEED for less than two years), implying high costs in staff recruitment and orientation;
- poor planning of funding flows and fundraising; failure to anticipate simultaneous ending of a number of grants precipitated CEED's closure.

In the period 1997-2000, CEED processed some 1406 persons (38 percent male, 62 percent female) or about 469 per year through its basic enterprise training; that was 56 percent more than anticipated in its funding proposal. These flows of trainees are noteworthy in light of the underspending on "training and support costs". In the following years (2001-2004) the flow of basic enterprise trainees increased to about 771 per year (31 percent male, 69 percent female). As anticipated, it developed its "business incubator" centre by refitting the organisation's former suburban headquarters. It disbursed funds, as planned, to PondoCROP, a rural development organisation.

On the other hand, CEED placed only one-quarter of the 200 projected trainees in specialized centres to acquire "hard skills"; in the period 2001-2004 trainee numbers declined further. Physical structures for an "Incubator Park" for entrepreneurs were created, but apparently not used in the period under review. Other planned activities, such as micro loans for advanced trainees, and "after care" for starting entrepreneurs, did not materialize in the scale anticipated. There is no clear evidence that a "train the trainer" programme targeting 10 persons was in fact carried out.

### 3.1.7.3 Effectiveness

CEED's effectiveness was fair.

Without adequate data about ex-participants it is not possible to reach full conclusions about effects. It is clear that at the end of the period under review, few successful enterprises had emerged. Five years later, the existence of CEED-related enterprise was detected. A Youth Development Network report in 2005 suggests that of some 225 small enterprises associated with CEED, at least half "have been successful in the programme." A 2004 evaluation found 11 ex-participants, all involved in enterprises, and with positive views of CEED. Yet in the absence of a system to track ex-clients, it is not clear whether these cases represented the average, or were exceptional cases.

Relative to the very large budget for the project in question, and for the cost of programmes pursued thereafter, overall outcomes of CEED are not impressive.


### 3.1.7.4 Relevance

Given severe and rising joblessness in Durban and surrounding areas, well-designed efforts to boost employment are clearly warranted. In pursuit of their dream of a decent job, or at least a livelihood through self-employment, many hundreds of young people enrolled in CEED programmes every year -- some of them paying a modest fee. Public sector bodies tasked with promoting employment and employability contracted CEED from the mid-1990s onward. CEED was oriented toward market demands like these, thus satisfying important tests of relevance.

However CEED's relevance to the problem of urban joblessness is open to serious question. There is little evidence that programmes like CEED's reduce youth joblessness in the mid to long run.

Basic assumptions underpinning the approach of CEED, and many other similar efforts, also cast doubt on the adequacy of the design. A main assumption is that training of (young) jobless people to become entrepreneurs will ultimately generate jobs. A local consultant with more than ten years fulltime experience in the SMME sector in KwaZulu-Natal described that assumption as "absurd". According to this informant, however, programmes that enable *existing* mature entrepreneurs to reach specific markets or to gain contracts with larger enterprises, might in some cases be valid and relevant.

During the period under review, the scope of CEED activities widened to include small towns and rural areas, including areas of tourism potential. Data about persons reached through CEED's Youth Advisory Centres in 2004 show that 37 percent were in rural areas, 44 percent peri-urban zones and 18 percent in urban areas. CEED's relevance for *urban* poverty was therefore only partial.




Apart from its main effort in enterprise training and coaching, CEED did offer some "life skills" and HIV-AIDS education, thus adding a social service dimension to its activities. Fieldwork revealed student and staff dissatisfaction, however, rendering a lower score on the "education" dimension than that given by the desk study. Fieldwork found no evidence to support claims of relevance to security and the reduction of crime.


CEED's management paid increasing attention to gender equity, helping promote (young) women on its staff. In 2003 it drafted a gender policy. It also recorded genders of its students. No such data could be found about its youth enterprise trainees and clients, although these did include some women as well as men. The 2001 Gender Audit of Dutch-supported youth programmes does not mention CEED explicitly.

CEED's work appears to have been consistent with broad Dutch policies toward work and income. However its strategies are not easy to reconcile with critical observations,

appearing in the 1991 policy paper *World of Difference*, about conventional small enterprise support approaches and their disappointing results.



Because fieldwork found less evidence of training, licensing and credit facilities than claimed in written material available in dossiers, scoring on these dimensions is lower than those given on the basis of the ex-ante and ex-post desk studies. Fieldwork did confirm, however, the desk study findings of CEED’s modest efforts to establish small businesses and to aid trainees in marketing.



### 3.1.7.5 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 1 (nil)

With CEED’s collapse, no other body stepped in to take over its staff, students and material assets. The exception was the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, which repossessed computers, furniture and other items in the same week that it closed. CEED’s organisational and institutional legacy is thus negligible.

In its last years, CEED continued to be overwhelmingly dependent on donors. Income from its training activities accounted for around 11 to 13 percent of total income. It tried

to reduce costs, but did so unevenly. Low compensation of staff proved to be a false economy, as high staff turnover lowered overall efficiency and sustainability.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 2 (modest)

CEED was officially recognized as a non-profit (Section 21) company. It evidently developed contacts with other NGOs in the same sector, as well as working relationships with tribal authorities, Chambers of Commerce and micro-finance organisations. During its existence, CEED enjoyed the patronage and support of a number of national and local government bodies, large corporate givers, foreign donors and foreign-funded agencies like the Youth Development Network. The parastatal Umsobomvu Youth Fund, in the first years of its partnership, rated CEED's performance highly. It made use of CEED's "life skills" training materials. By 2005, however, the Fund had evidently modified its views; it withheld a grant pending CEED's agreement to changes that it had stipulated.

#### *Users' interest and benefits*

Rating: 2 (modest)

Informants to this study, all former senior CEED staff persons, spoke of positive effects that their experience of working in CEED had on their careers. In the case of trainees, however, systematic information in the period 1997-2000 is not available, and probably does not exist. In 2000 evaluators had advised CEED to improve its monitoring capacity, yet an external evaluation in late 2004 revealed that CEED never developed means to track its former students and clients. Information on actual benefits and impact is therefore merely anecdotal.

#### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 1 (nil) - 2 (modest)

In designing its Youth Enterprise Programme, CEED evidently did not rely on up-to-date causal knowledge about employment creation or small enterprise development, as noted in sections 2.4 above and 5.2 below.

In its final report over 1997-2000, CEED noted trainees' having gained business skills/acumen and "confidence in themselves as a result of their formulation of a business plan". However no systematic evidence is available about how trainees applied their skills and motivations and in what numbers.

CEED had only rudimentary information-gathering systems and carried out no research. Some staff attended occasional seminars on topics ranging from "business building" to market research to HIV-AIDS awareness. Leadership exchanged information with other organisations, but it is hard to see this as reciprocal exchange. CEED was run from the top down, with virtually no staff participation in thinking, planning and decision-making. It could thus never become a "learning organisation".

Overall sustainability rating: 6.5 (modest)

### 3.1.7.6 Impact

CEED's impact appears to have been strongest on individuals. Some former senior staff said that the experience of working in CEED had had a positive impact on their professional lives and careers. On the other hand, the very high turnover of junior staff, and widespread expressions of staff dissatisfaction suggests less-than-positive impacts in this intermediary category. No evidence could be found to indicate that CEED had had an impact on other organisations or on public or private policy.

### 3.1.8 Sibikwa

<i>Grantee:</i>	<i>Sibikwa Community Theatre Project</i>		
<i>Projects:</i>	a) <i>Sibikwa Youth Employment Programme (ZA003108) June 1997 - July 1998</i>		<i>€ 27.185</i>
	b) <i>Sibikwa Youth Employment Programme - Environmental Project (ZA003109) August 1998 - December 1998</i>		<i>€ 14.994</i>
	c) <i>Sibikwa - Development of Community Theatre (ZA003114) October 1999 - March 2000</i>		<i>€ 48.718</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	a) <i>To enable marginalized youth to learn via performing arts by developing two stage productions and put them on tour.</i>		
	b) <i>To train youth in theatre techniques, making them employable in theatre work, and educate communities on care for the environment.</i>		
	c) <i>To further develop the Sibikwa Community Theatre Project as a resource for youth.</i>		
<i>Location:</i>	<i>Benoni, East Rand of Gauteng province</i>		
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon III</i>		

#### 3.1.8.1 Introduction

Established in 1988, Sibikwa -- the word means “we are spoken for” in Nguni -- was from the outset focused on youth and their issues, chiefly through dramatic arts. Its first play concerned teenage pregnancy. Also covering dance, music, mime, Sibikwa has become one of South Africa’s major training centres for the performing arts and arts management.

In 1991 it acquired a disused factory in an industrial zone of Benoni, a formerly “white” municipality close to large low-income settlements on the eastern periphery of Gauteng province. Those premises, now refurbished thanks to Dutch assistance, are today in active use.

The purposes of projects supported in this sequence of grants (all in Echelon III) were:

- a) To enable a group of 16 young trainees to develop two theatrical productions, one on South Africa’s ‘truth and reconciliation’ process and one on crime and to enable them and their teachers to take the productions on tour to London and to Amsterdam;
- b) To enable a group of trainees to develop a theatrical production about the environment and put it on tour in low-income communities, using a platform truck as a mobile stage.
- c) To rehabilitate and extend Sibikwa’s premises, to create classrooms, a library, a canteen, change rooms and toilets, as well as refurbishing rooms for dance, musical and theatrical rehearsals and public performances as well spaces for storage and administrative functions.

The Netherlands was the only donor for the environmental and premises rehabilitation projects of 1998 to 2000; it accounted for about 37 percent of total funding for the 1997-1998 youth employment project.



### 3.1.8.2 Efficiency

Sibikwa's efficiency in managing these projects was good. All the activities projected were carried out within planned timeframes. Spending on the third project was 17 percent over the budget, reflecting higher than projected construction costs. Sibikwa's efficiency and transparency in the management of its resources stands in contrast to some other community theatre organisations<sup>3</sup>.

### 3.1.8.3 Effectiveness


All three projects produced the effects aimed for. One of the training efforts, the production of the theatrical piece focused on the environment, has played to large audiences. In a twenty-minute performance in local languages staged on the back of a flatbed truck, audiences of primary and secondary school students get a strong environmental message. The main piece is called "War on Waste" and focuses on litter and recycling. After its start in 1998, "Trash Truck" has regularly gone on tour each school year, in Gauteng and beyond. Since its inception it has reached an estimated 120.000 (mainly young) people.

All Dutch-supported activities, especially the upgrading of premises, enabled Sibikwa to enhance its training capacity. Those in turn reinforced its attractiveness and bargaining power for grants from the government and the South African private sector. Dutch support thus helped "leverage" more resources, increasing Sibikwa's overall effectiveness as a non-profit enterprise.

### 3.1.8.4 Relevance

The three projects were clearly relevant to Sibikwa, its students and wider set of stakeholders, as the ideas and plans originated entirely from among them and responded to well-considered needs both in the short and long term.


Two of the theatre productions showed relevance to current and important socio-political themes. In themselves they are unlikely to have contributed much toward reducing the incidence of crime or resistance to reconciliation, but they did offer cultural nuance to a public debate dominated either by cold policy talk by over-heated passions. The environmental production clearly met a need to communicate, in ways children can grasp and enjoy, essential messages about public responsibility for the environment.



<sup>3</sup> Reggy Moalusi, 'Back to basics . Community theatre is plagued by mismanagement and lack of resources' *Mail & Guardian* 20 March 2003


Fieldwork revealed a wider engagement in education - for trainees internally and for the public externally - than provided in documentation available for the desk study. Hence the higher score given for the educational dimension. Fieldwork however revealed little evidence, apart from the content of one theatre production, of Sibikwa's relevance for security and crime reduction. Hence scoring on that dimension is lower than in the desk study.

At leadership levels Sibikwa has evidently managed a good gender balance; young women routinely constitute between 35 to 45 percent of its trainees. Beneficiaries report an equitable gender environment in Sibikwa.



Fieldwork revealed a stronger and more consistent focus on skill-building for employability, and on the creation of theatre groups and their marketing, than the information available for the desk study. Hence stronger “work and income” scoring.

Sibikwa's work is consistent with Dutch urban policy, in the category social services, for improved education, especially that improving employability of young people and promoting organisational vehicles for work. Its innovative and highly successful theatre production on waste and recycling is fully consistent with Dutch policy for improved urban environments and for citizen participation.



### 3.1.8.5 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

The Sibikwa Community Theatre Project is evidently a solid, well-institutionalised organisation. As of 2007 it had seven full-time programme staff and a board of ten including Sibikwa's founding Executive Directors Smal Ndaba and Phyllis Klotz. Financial affairs are audited annually; in 2005 the external accountants congratulated Sibikwa's management for 'sound financial administration'.

Sibikwa continues to seek and receive grants from foreign and domestic donors, and in 2005 adjusted its financial accounting system to better meet donor wishes. It generates some income through performances of music and drama for public and private bodies and through special educational workshops. However a chief source of its financial security stems from services it provides as a formal accredited training institution under contract with the South African Ministry of Labour. Sibikwa achieved that status by building up and adhering to high professional standards.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

Sibikwa is a not-for-profit association under Section 21 of the Companies Act. Public authorities have long acknowledged its contributions and leadership in community-based theatre. The government's Department of Art and Culture has regularly provided Sibikwa with grants and other forms of recognition. In 2005 the South African Qualifications Authority granted Sibikwa the status of accredited provider of training services, paid via one of South Africa's 29 SETA's (Sector Education Training Authorities; in this case, one called MAPPP-SETA) set up under South Africa's Skills Development Acts. This allows Sibikwa to award young people a nationally recognized credential that will increase their employability. Sibikwa's new formal status reinforces its already high professional standards and its attractiveness to young people seeking high quality training.

Sibikwa maintains working relations with other training bodies and universities, as well as the wider community of culture and arts, subsidized and not. It was instrumental in founding a network, Gauteng Organisation for Community Arts Centres, that unites community arts efforts and affords means of enhanced training through the exchange of teachers and learners among Gauteng community arts centres. It has longstanding relationships with performing arts institutions outside South Africa, including the London International Festival of Theatre and De Nieuw Amsterdam, a multi-cultural Dutch theatre company active since 1986. Sibikwa and its programme makers have won more than a dozen major national and foreign awards for their productions.

#### *Users' Interest and Benefits*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

Among ultimate beneficiaries of Sibikwa's work, audiences are evidently enthusiastic about performances. South African authorities and NGOs with concerns ranging from environment to HIV-AIDS awareness to crime have manifested their interest in specific theatrical productions by inviting Sibikwa to perform both on special occasions and as a matter of yearly routine. User interest is apparent from the fact that supply of prospective

students exceeds the number of places Sibikwa can offer. There is attrition among learners and interns once they gain places in Sibikwa, but that is largely because they cannot afford to remain for extended periods without some income.

While improved employability is likely for ex-trainees, Sibikwa has as yet no formal means to trace participants once they move on. Senior staff with anecdotal knowledge of ex-participants say that many, but not all of them have found jobs in the performing arts or cultural sector generally. Some have formed independent performing arts companies, others have found government or NGO jobs, while yet others have had to find jobs as shop assistants or settle for other basic employment.

Informants to this study spoke of having gained, in addition to performance abilities, additional professional skills such as in financial management, workshop facilitation and management of a performing arts group. They emphasized also their personal growth, notably in self discipline and responsibility. One drew attention to Sibikwa's house rules, such as no alcohol, no drugs, and no misusing the time and resources of the organisation.

### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

Sibikwa clearly operates at a high standard of knowledge about performing arts and how to transmit it. It offers courses and learning trajectories that reflect a coherent view of specific disciplines and of the performing arts profession in general, but designed in accordance with the constraints and possibilities of South Africa. For example, it provides compensatory education to enable newly-admitted students to overcome many of the worst results of the bad education they received in the South African school system. It pays attention to knowledge management for itself and others, as shown in its cumulative annual reports, its library, its contributions to workshops on performing arts methods, theory and management of performing arts productions and enterprises. Yet its website is surprisingly cumbersome to access and has little useful content.

The "Trash Truck" production, financed originally with Dutch aid, appears to have become a recurring feature for many schools in low-income communities of Gauteng. For example, it became the centrepiece of an event organized in 2004 in Alexandra together with environmental NGOs and educationists, the 'Schools Environmental Play Festival'.

Overall sustainability score: 11 (substantial)

#### 3.1.8.6 Impact

In the absence of tracer studies of Sibikwa trainees now in working life, full and precise conclusions cannot yet be drawn about Sibikwa's training impact. Given the relatively small size of its professional sector - performing arts - impacts on unemployment and poverty are not going to be substantial. However as a model of effective learning and community education, the organisation has achieved significant recognition and respect by students and professionals in the performing arts, by large audiences in South Africa and abroad, and by official bodies for training and culture.

Given its limited field of endeavour, Sibikwa cannot offer a model commensurate with the massive problem of youth unemployment in South Africa. Yet despite its modest scope, it stands as a model of educational professionalism that dovetails with sustainable national educational systems, and is therefore consistent with Dutch policy ambitions to tackle urban poverty problems.

### 3.1.9 SAAYC

<i>Grantee:</i>	<i>Southern African Association of Youth Clubs (SAAYC)</i>	
<i>Projects:</i>	<i>a) Tshepo Themba Centre (ZA007102 : Local Youth Funds # 13) April 1996 - March 1997</i>	<i>€ 37.781</i>
	<i>b) Tshepo Themba Youth Work Resources (ZA007115) April 1997 - March 1998</i>	<i>€ 62.700</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	<i>a) rehabilitate and equip a youth centre building b) provide youth work resource materials, information and support services so as to assist youth leaders and youth workers in youth development initiatives.</i>	
<i>Location:</i>	<i>Etwatwa, East Rand of Gauteng Province</i>	
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon IV</i>	
<i>Project:</i>	<i>SAAYC Youth Work Programme – Phase 2 (ZA007126) June 1998 – May 2000</i>	<i>€ 343.298</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	<i>contribute to the development of youth organisations and community organisations that organise youth-oriented activities, via training and networking.</i>	
<i>Locations:</i>	<i>Etwatwa, and other SAAYC centres, mainly in Gauteng Province</i>	
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon III</i>	

#### 3.1.9.1 Introduction

In 1992, in the then shack settlement of Etwatwa, a local pastor founded an after-school club for youth to brush up on English grammar and to enjoy recreation together. This was the origin of the Tshepo Themba initiative. Within a year the club formalized itself as an NGO, and by 1994 it had become a branch of SAAYC. Soon thereafter the local authority, the Daveyton City Council, granted a site with a derelict building. From 1995 to early 1997 SAAYC rehabilitated it using local semi-skilled young workers, outside technical assistance from Planact, and funding from the Dutch Embassy among other foreign and domestic donors. Today the centre constitutes a focal point for Etwatwa, now a formal township with brick houses, of several hundred thousand residents.

SAAYC was set up in 1937 to foster youth clubs' interaction and their leisure and entertainment activities. In the late 1980s its mission became "comprehensive, dynamic and effective youth enhancement, advocacy and networking". As of 2007 it manages four youth centres: two in peripheral communities of Gauteng (including Tshepo Themba, its largest), one in Soweto and one in an ex-Bantustan in the Free State. In them it provides leisure activities and "life skills" training during after-school hours, thus keeping teenagers occupied and off the streets. Officially however its 'core business' is leadership training.

After the rehabilitation of the Tshepo Themba centre, the bulk of Dutch support aimed at job creation, training and recreation. Other SAAYC project objectives from mid-1998 to mid-2000 were:

- to train youth workers and to launch an association of youth workers,
- to promote a youth development network focused especially on employment, and
- to run workshops on race and racism.

Dutch aid in 1998-2000 accounted for about 40 percent of SAAYC's total funding.

### 3.1.9.2 Efficiency

SAAYC's efficiency was fair. It overspent the Dutch grant 1998-2000 by about 4 percent, yet did not carry out all projected activities. Management regularly found itself stretched over too many activities and burdened with highly diverse tasks. These lowered efficiency at times. For example, the Tshepo Themba centre manager was tasked with supervising construction, often in detail, while at the same time initiating programmes for youth.

#### *Tshepo Themba Centre*

SAAYC showed efficiency in realising the objectives of a series of grants to set up and manage the Tshepo Themba Centre. Reconstruction and fitting out were completed in early 1997, rather longer than anticipated. Leisure/training activities (arts, drama, music, sports, aerobics, computer skills, December holiday camps etc.) took place apparently according to expectation. Environmental activities (plant nursery, food gardens, park, wetland rehabilitation) met setbacks and were eventually abandoned.

For some planned initiatives, such as a Youth Information Centre and a Career Guidance Programme, no evidence could be found. Regarding education and training, the Centre provided twice-weekly 'life skills' sessions and occasional classes on environmental issues for students in nearby secondary schools.

Otherwise no evidence could be found to indicate whether or not many informal education activities ('book forum', educational tours) or preparatory measures for leadership training (human resource audits and human resource policy workshops) were in fact carried out.

Regarding livelihood promotion, SAAYC's most active year was 1997, when 24 young men followed a construction skills training course, and about 70 young people attended enterprise training courses.

A strategy of rapid expansion compromised its performance. SAAYC over-reached itself and accumulated too many objectives and tasks. By 1999 SAAYC had expanded its activities to six other youth centres, five in Soweto and one in a small town in the Free State. In 2000 it took on a centre in Sebokeng in the Vaal area. A shifting variety of after-school-hours activities emerged. At three centres a main target group was children, and the focus on 'edutainment'. Some centres served as overnight shelters for homeless youth. At a centre in Soweto, SAAYC promoted a car wash business involving 10 young people.

Most centres were hit hard by vandalism and theft. Plumbing, electricity systems &c. needed continual repair. SAAYC was "nearly converted into a maintenance company". It subsequently withdrew from four of the five Soweto Centres. In the one remaining, Phefeni, a main attraction is a computer room furnished by the company Intel.

Concerted exercises in leadership training took place from time to time in localized, one-off episodes for small groups of people. There seems to have been no consistent pattern of implementation in leadership training, despite its being described as "the purpose of our being". Records show huge inconsistencies in the claimed numbers of trainees. A report prepared in late 1999 covering most of that year states that 491 persons received training. Three years later a SAAYC report claims that "in 1999 we trained a total 6017 Train the Trainers". Hence there is reason to doubt these reports' overall validity.

SAAYC carried out one or two workshops in a projected series on racism. They appear to have been held in late 1998 and early 1999 and were focused on relations between African and Coloured youth. Contrary to expectations, the series of workshops on racism was subsequently discontinued. SAAYC intended to hold a workshop on youth employment

in March 1999 but no evidence could be found that it took place or that a projected network of youth agency directors developed from it.

In core programme management, some episodes suggest low efficiency. Leadership training camps in mid-1999 were planned for youth from the East Rand, but because few people from those communities signed up, SAAYC had to recruit participants at the last minute from across the country, since non-refundable transport and accommodation had been booked.

#### 3.1.9.3 Effectiveness

SAAYC's effectiveness was fair-to-poor.

No information is available about trainees' success in finding jobs. In 1998, following a series of unsuccessful attempts at income generation (chicken-raising, a catering service &c.), Tshepo Themba encouraged eight young mothers to start a sewing and knitting project. Thereafter, enterprise promotion and training for employability (with the exception of some computer skills training) were discontinued, as their effects were evidently disappointing.


Through its leadership's participation in wider networks, SAAYC appears to have contributed to institutional effects. It helped prepare the launch of the Youth Practitioners' Advocacy Group (YPAG), which combined a number of South African youth associations. YPAG was later transformed into the South African Youth Workers' Association - a body that is today consulted by government regarding national standards and qualifications for youth work.

#### 3.1.9.4 Relevance

SAAYC's work has been broadly relevant for the young individuals themselves. This is apparent from a participant survey (Zabala, 2002) and is also evident from the daily after-school inflow of dozens of young people making use of its facilities.


The context for youth is somber. Today, three out of four South Africans between the ages of 15 and 25 have never held a job, and most face poor prospects of ever getting one. Role models include criminals who have never held a legitimate job yet are admired for tokens of their conspicuous consumption, such as big expensive cars. In those circumstances, almost any programme trying to offer young people some means of recreation, guidance and focus in their lives will be of some use.

The relevance of the Tshepo Themba centre and its activities is evident from the community contact and needs survey that cleared the way forward. This and other centres help respond to concerns of local residents about how young people spend their time when not at school or at home.



On-the-job training and other practical measures to improve young people’s employability, such as in construction trades, were relevant for participants, whereas general “enterprise training” courses were probably not relevant for job-seekers. Fieldwork revealed that the scope and quality of training was less than that indicated in dossiers. Fieldwork found no evidence of attention to marketing issues. SAAYC’s plan in 1998 to help focus attention of youth organisation leaderships on the issue of jobs may have been relevant if it had targeted government policy-makers, who in those years rejected viable options (such as labour-intensive public works) to generate jobs. But there is no evidence that SAAYC considered such things.

However during the project period SAAYC’s leadership had difficulties to define and pursue a focused strategy. Certain centre activities at Tshepo Themba, such as care of gardens and trees and leadership training camps in 1999, failed to attract young people. In 1999 SAAYC announced an intention to employ a nurse and a doctor to provide health care services at the centres, but subsequently abandoned that plan. Meanwhile main services for young people - television, computer consoles, musical equipment, sport facilities - were intensively used. Around 2000, SAAYC regarded the introduction of the concept of *Recreational Development* -- physical development, mainly through sport -- as a milestone in the evolution of its approach. Recreational work, probably more than much vaguer notions of leadership development, has been closer to the heart of SAAYC’s approach and relevance.



Life-skills training has persisted in SAAYC’s repertoire, and thus accounts for a score along the educational dimensions. This educational work has been relevant for participants, though fieldwork revealed that it had taken place on a more modest scale than that suggested in dossiers.


SAAYC has always been led by men, but the Tshepo Themba centre’s coordinator is a woman, who has encouraged the creation of “The Women’s Connection” a women-only



group that meets to reflect on a wide range of concerns to (young) women. About two-thirds of the participants in a 2004 initiative in computer training, “Breakthrough” were women. Among participants in SAAYC activities, the general ratio of men to women appears to be about three to two.

SAAYC’s physical presence in urban areas makes it potentially relevant to urban poverty reduction. But its focus is not on urban problems as such. One of its four centres is in a small town. Much of its programming takes place outside metropolitan areas. With a USAID grant it is carrying out an awareness and counselling programme on adolescent reproductive health (mainly on HIV-AIDS matters), targeting chiefly young people in small towns and rural areas. Crime prevention is not high on its agenda, nor does it guide its work by an assumption that youth work can prevent crime.

SAAYC’s aims appear to correspond with Dutch urban policy toward (informal) social services for young people. Its wider policy relevance for urban poverty reduction, either on the terrain of crime prevention or livelihood promotion, particularly on levels of structural (policy) change, is quite modest.



### 3.1.9.5 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

The Tshepo Themba Centre today has an active leader, a staff of eight and an advisory committee of seven, all drawn from the Etwatwa community.

SAAYC is still alive -- thanks to a lucky break. After years of declining donations, SAAYC’s organisational health had, by 2006, deteriorated to the point at which it was preparing to close down. Staff had been dismissed and operations radically curtailed. But then, unexpectedly, well-wishers offered it a 5 percent stake in a coal mining company -- R 50 million in shares that thus far yield an annual income of about R 2.8 million in dividends -- that have rescued the organisation from insolvency and closure.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

The Tshepo Themba centre evidently enjoys recognition and appreciation by local residents and by public sector bodies. After its Multipurpose Centre was set up in 1997, the Gauteng provincial government built next to it a large community hall. Opened in 2002, that hall is also under SAAYC management.

At national policy levels SAAYC has occasionally gotten some official recognition, such as when it was asked to provide a statement at the 1998 national “Jobs Summit” or to

provide input to the National Youth Development Forum. Yet such rituals of consultation appear to have been hollow. One informant said: “We go to the meetings, talk, talk talk, and then the next year they call us to discuss the same issues.”

SAAYC is said to enjoy good relations with other organisations in the youth sector. But its profile is, according to independent observers in the youth sector, quite low.

#### *Users’ Interest and Benefits*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

SAAYC’s work is delivering services. Benefits continue flowing from the Tshepo Themba centre facilities and programmes. Young people in Etwatwa continue passing after-school hours there, gaining personal and social benefits of companionship, sport and cultural competence, and connections to others via the Internet. The facilities also continue satisfying a variety of community needs, from wedding parties to religious gatherings to public discussions. The other four SAAYC centres generate comparable flows of after-school educational and social benefits, though on a smaller scale.

#### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 1,5 - 2 (low to moderate)

From its direct delivery of services, SAAYC has helped improved knowledge and personal self-confidence of individuals. Those are the main kinds of benefits flowing from its work. The rate at which these are spread and multiplied is not high, but a flow is detectable.

An informant to this study, now working as a policeman, named skills in library work, community volunteer work, leadership and interviewing main benefits he acquired from long involvement at Tshepo Themba. A former field worker for Tshepo Themba, also a policeman, said that through experience in holiday camps, workshops and youth work, he had learned important skills in leadership and specific things such as telephone etiquette, that he uses today in managing traffic officers under his supervision.

Otherwise, there is little evidence that knowledge creation was a central feature of SAAYC strategies either to steer its efforts or to influence public discussion and policy.

Overall sustainability rating: 7,5 - 8 (modest)

#### 3.1.9.6 Impact

These projects’ impacts have occurred chiefly in terms of personal growth of individuals involved. Impact beyond these levels is not detectable.

In 2001 a local consultant commissioned by SAAYC carried out a survey of 401 ex-participants (59 percent male, 41 percent female) who had participated in SAAYC activities, mainly in the period 1998-2000, when the number of youth centres and activities was at a peak. In that period an estimated 2000 young people a year had contact SAAYC programmes.

Of the 401 persons surveyed, about half had been exposed to activities to raise youth awareness (“youth reproductive health”) about HIV-AIDS. The rest, three-quarters of them from urban areas and drawn mainly from community-level leadership strata, had been exposed to SAAYC leadership training, holiday camps, capacity building and sports/recreation. By asking respondents to mention content, the survey confirmed the

huge spectrum of issues -- from teenage pregnancy to voter education to drug & alcohol abuse -- which arise in SAAYC programming.

Most respondents had positive views of SAAYC activities, as they were seen to be informative/educational; a minority had negative comments, mainly about poor organisation, such as of workshops. Asked to name elements of SAAYC activities that had had impact on them, respondents listed ‘information on youth issues’, ‘different from other workshops’, ‘skills and talent development’ and ‘networks’, in that order of frequency. Impacts were felt chiefly in terms of “personal growth”, with 41 percent of respondents claiming they had achieved a higher level of personal growth, and 23 percent more involved in communities, because of SAAYC programmes. Survey results showed no relationship between SAAYC activities and employment or employability.

3.2 Echelon IV Projects

This section presents appraisals of three projects categorized by the IOB as not having been subject to input from the Spearhead Programme on Urban Combating Urban Poverty.

3.2.1 Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention and Training (ADAPT)

<i>Grantee:</i>	<i>Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention and Training (ADAPT)</i>		
<i>Project:</i>	<i>ADAPT Phase II</i>		
	<i>(ZA005905) January 1996 - December 1997</i>		<i>€ 184.305</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	<i>To help reduce violence, especially rape, against women and children in townships and squatter areas.</i>		
<i>Location:</i>	<i>Alexandra township, Johannesburg</i>		
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon IV</i>		

3.2.1.1 Introduction

Established formally in 1994, ADAPT grew out of counselling activities by and for female township residents, as supported by health and legal professionals there. All were alarmed at the high incidence of violence against women in Alexandra, a high-density township of with a shifting population hovering around 340.000.

Violence has long been endemic in South African townships. Women and girls have been disproportionately victims of it. But since the 1970s the incidence of assault, mainly by young men, has skyrocketed. By the early 1990s, one in four or five women had been violently assaulted by a man at least once if not regularly, mainly in domestic settings. Research into the explosion of violence against women and girls has revealed several cumulative factors driving most of it. A leading hypothesis is that in the 1970s and 1980s

rapidly increasing male unemployment prevented many youth from setting up households, both because few women would be prepared to marry a man who could not support them, and because it would be difficult to raise the money to pay *lobola*, or brideprice. At the same time, rapid urbanization, as apartheid controls broke down, and the increased politicization of young people brought rising expectations and an intensified challenge to the existing order... [promoting] the


need to reassert masculinity in face of a system that disempowered black men. (Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, 1996).

A movement to turn this tide of violence emerged in civil society. Dozens of local voluntary organisations started local services for victims as well as education and advocacy toward the public and the authorities. ADAPT was one of these initiatives. It stood out because it grew from within a black township, under black leadership, with an inclusive approach. "We are looking at domestic violence not as a woman's concern but as a community concern," said Mmatshilo Motsei, its founder and Executive Director until 2002. ADAPT has consistently involved men as well as women, older and well as younger residents, and a wide number of official agencies and civil society organisations.


The Netherlands provided the start-up grant for ADAPT in 1994. In the field of women and violence, ADAPT was the Netherlands' only South African grantee. In the period 1996-1997 the Netherlands was ADAPT's only donor, but recruitment of other donors thereafter did not prove difficult.

### 3.2.1.2 Relevance

At many levels, ADAPT's work is highly relevant for the urban poor from a security, social, juridical and political standpoint. It grew from a local response to appalling levels of criminal violence interwoven with conditions of urban poverty. While ADAPT does not address the fundamental issues of (male) unemployment, it does tackle socio-psychological issues of masculinity and disempowerment.




Its founding was guided by other local initiatives, consultation and research. Serious shortcomings in law enforcement and crime prevention were factors motivating the creation of ADAPT, but so too were efforts in civil society and in official circles to address the problem through better legislation and mechanisms in the criminal justice, health and education system. South Africa's new Constitution and two of its so-called "Chapter 9" institutions, the Commission for Gender Equality and the Human Rights Commission, provide the legal principles and authority to promote those improvements. ADAPT's lobbying and advocacy efforts -- particularly regarding systems of justice -- demonstrate its relevance at the level of public policy and institutions tasked with enforcing it.



ADAPT’s relevance stems from its activism both on the fronts of governance at township levels and beyond (as a model for others) and of social services, in which its own educational and health services complement and strengthen public services in Alexandra. Activities in both these dimensions are considerably more developed than given in information available in the dossier used for scoring in the desk study.

ADAPT’s purposes and approach are clearly consistent with Dutch official aid policy, notably on the ‘Women and Violence’ sub-theme of successive policies guiding official funding and other activities in respect to women and gender. It is also consistent with policy emphasis, in the category ‘social services’, on promoting safety and preventing crime.



### 3.2.1.3 Sustainability

#### *Organisational and Institutional Capacity*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

ADAPT is a small but robust organisation with a clear, focused strategies, means to carry them out and to learn from its practice. Over twelve years ADAPT has shown great organisational stability and institutional reach while at the same time expanding. It employs ten people full-time staff and has a six-person Board of Directors. It continues to attract financial support from private and public agencies, mainly South African.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

ADAPT is an association registered under Section 21 of the Companies Act. It is recognised in a substantial circle of collegial organisations (such as the South African Network of Trauma Service Providers) and activist bodies in the women's movement (such as People Against Women Abuse - POWA). It is further acknowledged among civic, welfare, academic, police and health care organisations. Noteworthy in terms of Dutch policy is the fact that ADAPT has had nothing to do with youth and youth service organisations; in the view of ADAPT's leadership, such organisations have little relevance for ADAPT purposes or programmes.

At national level it has worked in partnership with the Commission on Gender Equality; at provincial level it has received regular financial support from the Gauteng Department of Social Development; at municipal level it works closely with a variety of agencies in the criminal justice system, including local police, and the Johannesburg Department of Social Services. The Alexandra Renewal Project - the major force in urban redevelopment in ADAPT's community - provides a subsidy.

ADAPT's leadership is regularly asked to participate in national and international conferences and to comment in national media.

#### *Users' Interest and Benefits*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

Testifying to the interest and benefits of ADAPT's programmes are: (a) a high and rising flow of women seeking counselling and support (895 in 2005, 1125 in 2006); (b) a rising flow of men coming in for counselling about their abusive behaviour (287 in 2005, 705 in 2006); (c) expressions of interest in further talks among men gathered in local shebeens (taverns) in Alexandra; (d) continuing strong participation in various support groups, such as for women who have survived rape and for women who have suffered domestic violence; (e) positive receptions of workshops and other educational efforts held in local secondary schools, reaching over 5000 boys and girls in 2006; (f) continuing popularity of ADAPT training of police officers at the Alexandra Police station, an effort begun around 1997 that managed to win the enthusiasm of police officials; (g) other successful public engagement/participation efforts, such as 'Best Fathers Competition', choral music groups of adults and children and public education (not always successful) via church fellowships. Male informants spoke with regret at ADAPT's scaling-back of its training programme for men, something they feel has had significant impact on individuals and the community at large.

#### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 3 (considerable)

Originating in a 1991 study of health service responses to cases of physical injury to women, ADAPT has built its strategies on the basis of systematic knowledge acquired locally. But it has also routinely drawn knowledge from outside, chiefly through interchange with academic, legal, health and social service bodies, especially collegial organisations in the field of domestic abuse and trauma service. ADAPT regularly monitors changes in the making and enforcement of relevant laws and is engaged directly in accompanying the proceedings of family and criminal courts. It also works with criminologists, in part to advance its educational work with prisoners.

ADAPT has a well-developed system of monitoring its programmes. It routinely gathers feedback and other data about its effects and outcomes. It also regularly carries out internal and external evaluations. ADAPT is thus in a minority of South African NGOs that may be termed a “learning organisation”.

Overall sustainability score: 12 (substantial)

#### 3.2.1.4 Impact

Residents of Alexandra today tend to be more satisfied with the quality of life than residents of low-income settlements elsewhere in South Africa, being particularly positive about the number of new public social services available since political shift of 1994. Huge majorities of Alexandra residents, however, feel unsafe (Richards and others 2007). This is especially true for women and girls.

ADAPT has successfully gained hearings and then impacted community organisations, police chiefs and officers (who have changed methods of dealing with female victims of violence) judicial processes, secondary school teachers and pupils and even tavern-keepers and their patrons. Former participants in training efforts for men spoke of considerable impact on their self-image and that of other men in Alexandra. It is claimed that Alexandra was Africa’s first public demonstration by men protesting abuse of women and girls. It is plausible that ADAPT’s work, with that of others, has contributed to attitudes detected in a survey of 945 men around Johannesburg in late 2006. When asked, “Are men in general doing too much, not enough or the right amount to address the problem of violence against women in South Africa?”, just over half of the respondents chose as their response “not enough” (Ambe & Peacock 2006).

### 3.2.2 Centre for Opportunity Development

<i>Grantee:</i>	<i>Centre for Opportunity Development (COD)</i>
<i>Project:</i>	<i>Training and support for SMMEs (ZA003115) April 1999 - June 2000</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	<i>To contribute to the development of small businesses in townships and squatter areas in the Western Cape, by enabling young people to be economically active. After youth have received technical and business training, the major focus will be on business establishment and sustainability.</i>
<i>Location:</i>	<i>Western Cape</i>
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon IV</i>

#### 3.2.2.1 Introduction

The Centre for Opportunity Development was the brain child of Junior Achievement South Africa (JASA). JASA is a nationwide, autonomous, educational trust offering experiential business and economics education programmes to young people. Initially it focused primarily on school based interventions but over time the question arose; What happens to young people when they leave school and out of school youth? The Centre for Opportunity Development was an attempt to address this question.

COD provided training in business skills in a phased programme. Phase One dealt with recruitment and provided staff with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the market and develop opportunities for the area. Phase Two covered selection and student assessment. Phase Three was the business start-up course, a one week full time course. Phase Four involved simulating a business experience through establishing co-operatives and running a business in the cooperative for four weeks. Phase Five covered the post programme mentoring phase and finally in Phase Six students could access the business advisory service. In time this programme became known as the Business Establishment Sustainability Programme (BESP).

The objectives of the programme were:

- Provide theoretical and practical training in how a business functions to young people from underprivileged areas
- Enable 60 percent trainees to develop workable business plans with the help of experienced staff
- Assist trainees access funding from retail finance institutions for these business plans

The Netherlands directly funded COD for a period of one year, and then indirectly via the Youth Development Network. Dutch funding accounted for 51 percent of the total programme funding, a lot more than the initial one third stated in the funding application.


COD no longer exists. In 2000 COD's Cape Town office closed down and in 2005 JASA stopped running the BESP training.

#### 3.2.2.2 Relevance


COD responded to a documented and recognised need, that of unemployment amongst young people. It also correctly identified that the problem with much of the training provided was the absence of practical hands on experience and the simulation provided the base for this. However the relevance of COD to the problem of urban joblessness is questionable. The cooperative approach is not well suited to urban settings



where communities lack social cohesion. It did work well in more rural settings such as Elim and Limpopo. In addition there is no evidence to suggest that training in business skills equips unemployed people to start up businesses. As one interviewee stated; *“In our experience trainees under 25 are unlikely to start their own businesses.”* Similar sentiments were expressed by others working in the sector.




Fieldwork revealed that COD’s educational efforts outside its vocational training was more limited than that suggested in documentation in dossiers. Fieldwork found no evidence to suggest COD’s relevance to security and the reduction of crime.



Fieldwork revealed somewhat more rounded efforts by COD on the front of work and income than documentation available in the desk study, hence the somewhat higher scores.

There was no record of any research having being conducted by COD directly and although staff claimed the work influenced government’s support policies no direct link could be found. The programme focused on unemployed youth, a vulnerable grouping in South Africa. Although there were reports of mainly female trainees there is no evidence of any gender focused programmes or interventions in COD. In addition, the organisation did not address any cultural or religious diversity issues.



### 3.2.2.3 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 1 (negligible)

COD no longer exists. While JASA initially continued to provide the service this is no longer the case and no-one else has stepped in to fill the gap. JASA now focuses exclusively on its school based programmes.

The process of closure in the Western Cape was a difficult one leaving affected staff with a lot of bitterness and lack of interest in the organisation.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

The Centre for Opportunity Development was a programme of JASA, an established educational trust. JASA bore overarching responsibility for the programme.

JASA is a well recognized organisation with a good track record. This provided a launching pad for COD who was recognised by a range of NGOs as a provider in the field. This was reflected in the partnerships developed and the request for services COD received from its partners. In addition, they were voted the best small business advisory programme in the province in 1999 by Western Cape Big News for Small Business. The approach was also widely recognized in the sector and funded by the Youth Development Network until 2005.

#### *Users' interest and benefits*

Rating: 2 (Moderate) - 1 (Negligible)

COD provided training to a number of trainers equipping them to continue work in the sector. It also provided training to beneficiaries of several NGO partners. All three NGO partners interviewed indicated they would have been willing to pay for the service. One continues to use the approach in its training.

Benefits to trainees was uneven. The training improved people's understanding of business principles and working context. However for many, who had no desire to be an

entrepreneur this is all it was. For a few budding entrepreneurs the training was really useful. This was strengthened with the good follow up service.

Training was open to all but the majority of trainees were women. This was not linked into any gender programme or specific gender interventions.

#### *Knowledge and Capacity*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

COD provided extensive training to its staff, spending around R25 000 per annum on training trainers. Many of the staff interviewed have remained in the enterprise development sector and are now working for government, the SA institute for entrepreneurship and other NGOs with enterprise development divisions such as Nicro and Wola Nani. All those interviewed attribute their success in the field to their COD training.

Overall sustainability score: 6.5 (negligible)

The organisation has closed down. No-one is using the BESP programme in its entirety. Few businesses created through the programme continue to exist.

#### 3.2.2.4 Impact

With so few records available and institutional memory limited, it is difficult to definitively comment on the impact of COD. What is clear is that the organisation no longer exists and very few successful enterprises can be attributed to COD's interventions. Staff and partners interviewed noted that while the training provided useful exposure to the world of business it did not result in the establishment of numerous enterprises. Staff attributed this in part to the difficulties of the cooperative approach. An NGO partner explained; *"How can you put together a range of people to work together in a group who do not share the same values and work ethic."* Staff spoke of some early successes with several of the groups selecting to retain the cooperative structure and run a joint business, which is until funds started flowing. Then all the problems in the group came to the fore and in most instances they collapsed. Despite several attempts no surviving cooperatives could be located in the Western Cape. However we were able to locate a few individual businesses that had benefited from the training.

The project had limited relevance for urban development in South Africa. The co-operative model is best suited to peri-urban or rural settings and did not have great success in urban areas. The project did not significantly impact on urban joblessness nor is there any evidence to suggest it impacted on social issues.

The training was expensive (five weeks plus pre- and post-training work) and resource intensive resulting in a decision within JASA to discontinue the programme.

The failure to document the lessons from the approach has meant that others, in particular the recent government efforts around cooperatives, are not able to benefit from the COD experience.

### 3.2.3 Grassroots Adult Education and Training Trust

<i>Grantee:</i>	<i>Grassroots Adult Education and Training Trust</i>	
<i>Project:</i>	<i>“Grassroots Educare Project” GAETT 3<sup>rd</sup> phase</i>	
	<i>(ZA001207) April 1993 - March 1996</i>	<i>€ 214.713</i>
<i>Objectives:</i>	<i>To reduce the socio-economic and political disadvantage of the black population in the urban areas around Cape Town through raising the standard of pre-school education through education and training and the establishment of educare projects.</i>	
<i>Location:</i>	<i>Greater Cape Town - Western Cape</i>	
<i>Echelon:</i>	<i>Echelon IV</i>	

#### 3.2.3.1 Introduction

Grassroots Adult Education and Training Trust (Grassroots) was established in 1972 as a non-governmental organisation which believes that “it is the right and responsibility of parents within every community to take charge of the developmental needs of their young children”. Although the immediate target group was unemployed urban women, the intended beneficiaries were children from the age of 0 - school going age.

The Netherlands began assisting Grassroots in 1987 by funding a portion of its training and development work. From 1993 - 1996 the Netherlands supported the third phase of the project with goals outlined as follows:

- To develop and utilize a Management Information System to determine the development, training and education needs of educare projects.
- To facilitate the development of 90 educare projects (benefiting some 7350 children) in the following historically disadvantaged communities of Greater Cape Town:
  - Khayelitsha (sites and villages)
  - Khayelitsha (“proper”)
  - Nyanga/Crossroads
  - Langa/Guguletu/KTC
  - Cape Flats and Mitchells Plain
- To implement a comprehensive education and training programme for the staff and committees of educare projects
- To implement a staff development programme for Grassroots’ field staff.

In order that these goals might inform an urban development and training strategy, they were extrapolated into more precise objectives by the urban fieldwork team. They defined their objectives as follows:

- Identify and determine the educare needs of communities by direct consultation with them
- Enable the parents and communities of the urban areas in the Western Cape to meet their educare needs.
- Utilize community Educare Developers to meet a range of educare project development and training needs, and to promote and popularize the value of early childhood educare.
- Train local para-professionals as Community Educare Developer Assistants
- Provide technical support and materials for the overall development of urban educare projects
- Provide training in educare, financial management and organisation development skills
- Evaluate the funded project’s activities at regular intervals.

Grassroots continues to exist although it is much smaller now than it was in the funded period. What is remarkable is its resilience in adapting to a changing political, policy and financial context. Where many NGOs have ceased to operate, Grassroots has continued to redefine its role.

It is not possible to state exactly how much the Dutch contributed as a percentage of the overall budget. It was one of about three foreign governments who contributed. Records show that in the year 1993 - 94 foreign governments contributed 36 percent of funds; in the following year 21.5 percent, and in the last year (1995-96) 21 percent of all funds. The project spent only 85 percent of the total Dutch grant over the three year period.

Through the period of the funding there were significant developments. During 1993-94 there was preparation for the first democratic election and Grassroots expanded beyond its means although it was very productive. Grassroots focused on building internal organisational effectiveness, moving to scale in terms of delivery, expanding its services to rural areas and starting its National Programme to build institutional capacity in sister resource and training organisations throughout the rest of the country. In March 1994 the new South African Congress for Early Childhood Development (SACECD) was born and two Grassroots staff were appointed as office bearers. Grassroots supported the Cape Metropolitan South with 82 projects functional. In addition it conducted seminars for directors, managers and training coordinators, seminars for Fieldworkers and administrators and training for principals, teachers and parent committees on budgets, proposal writing and fundraising.

Training courses for level 1 and level 2 educare were developed which included health and nutrition modules, educare for children aged three and younger, organisational development, financial management and parent enrichment. During this year 189 urban trainees completed level 1 training. The under-three programme and first aid courses were created, 204 members of project executive committees attended 12 workshops and 89 urban trainees went on financial management course. Finally there was research and development of an advocacy video, *New Beginnings*, and a handbook on *How to start and Run a community Preschool project*.

The staff was deeply involved in policy development at the time. The increased staff, increased cost, and the reduced social investment of local corporations because of the declining domestic economy created financial tensions which led to a crisis in 1995 when the organisation showed an operational loss. Results in policy terms were also in question. Grassroots was unsuccessful in getting ECD located in one as opposed to three departments; it was unsuccessful in delaying the implementation of a reception year and it was unsure of the benefit of SACECD into which they invested a great deal of effort.


Courses for administrators, directors and managers and fieldworkers continued and they began dealing with the new accreditation framework. The home educare policy was developed as they continued to attempt to make educare centres self-sufficient.

Following a midyear evaluation, Grassroots grappled with the question of partnership, service delivery and internal restructuring in order to reposition itself in relation to both government and the community it served. It overcame its previous year's deficit but lost significant funding to bilateral aid agreements. After the evaluation, it split field services into Training and Community development. During this period it was unable to implement the management information system through lack of funding.

Since 1996 Grassroots has had a chequered career in that funding continued to reduce and government came online with support directly to ECD centres. It had to downsize further because corporate businesses decided that ECD was a government job. There are only 14 staff members now and they facilitate ECD centres access to resources in partnership with other NGOs and government, particularly local government. They continue to do training in the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) 1 and 4.


### 3.2.3.2 Relevance

Education in South Africa is seen as a critical area of intervention because of the apartheid legacy. Not only were curriculae and resources differentiated along racial lines, but young black children were left out of formal care and education entirely. The result was unqualified teachers and ill prepared learners.



In unpacking relevance it is important to differentiate between the period during which the Dutch funded Grassroots and the present. In the mid-nineties the critical areas of intervention were to get early childhood learning and development onto the national educational agenda and into the national budgets. The need for effective models, run entirely by local communities cannot be overemphasized, given the enormous vacuum around ECD. The programme recognized the need to build confident young children who would be in a position to benefit from formal education. This in turn would impact positively on poverty in two ways. Firstly it created jobs for unemployed women and secondly it created the basis for well educated learners who would be better able to find employment. This was a very significant contribution in a time of transition.

The need today has shifted and the role of supporting implementation rather than overarching policy intervention and advocacy is appropriate. The project was aligned to the second spearhead programme and contributed directly to education, nutrition and basic health care as outlined in the Dutch urban policy objectives. Teachers and parents were trained in both basic health care and nutrition and ECD centres provide a balanced midday meal. The contribution of early childhood education and care in the context of high levels of unemployment and HIV-AIDS continues to be highly relevant.



### 3.2.3.3 Sustainability

#### *Institutional and Organisational Strength*

Rating: 2 (moderate)

The organisation still exists but has downsized. It no longer has as large a training focus but training is still part of its service. In addition they continue to support the management and institutional development of ECD centres. All of the teachers who were interviewed continue to use Grassroots support resources, especially the adventure bus for outings.

Transformation has always been a very real issue for Grassroots and was given a lot of attention early on. For that reason it developed a strong black base and voice which has contributed to its sustainability. Grassroots has continued to evaluate its performance on a regular basis and to adjust the organisation in line with evaluation recommendations. This is one of the reasons it has managed to keep reinventing itself appropriately and to weather the vagaries of funding policies. Although it kick-started ECD programmes in other provinces it no longer provides any support nationally.

#### *Formal Recognition and Authority*

Rating 2: (moderate)

Grassroots is formally registered as a not for profit organisation with the ability to raise funds. It has an operational Board and record of regular audits and reporting. At times it has been a significant voice in the development of policy and remains a very active role player in the development of integrated urban development not only in its focus on ECD but in its manner of working in partnership with other organisations and authorities. It is not, however, an authoritative voice on ECD policy and was unable to get responsibility for ECD located in one government department.

The staff who over the years have left Grassroots have by and large continued to contribute significantly to the field of development, although some have branched away from ECD. All of those who were canvassed acknowledged both the formal training and the institutional experience received at Grassroots as key to their ongoing vocational progress and personal development.

### *Users' interest and benefits*

#### Rating 2: (Moderate)

Grassroots specifically attempted to direct its efforts towards developing models for delivering better child care and development more efficiently. To this end the emphasis was on creating self-sustaining educare centres which were managed and administered by the community itself. Field workers spent a lot of time and energy supporting these processes as they invariably went wrong before becoming sustainable and enduring and before community members really took control and responsibility. The presence of field workers was greatly valued and now sorely missed as Grassroots no longer has such capacity.

The approach of training teachers around child development and then supporting this with financial, budgeting and administration training has resulted in beneficiaries running their own profitable businesses and delivering, with one exception, an excellent service.

The beneficiaries valued their learning on how to structure the day most and continue to follow the preplanning. In addition they valued the first aid and nutrition training. Many users still go to Grassroots to keep abreast with developments and send their own staff on training.

### *Knowledge and Capacity*

#### Rating 2: (moderate)

Most beneficiaries had done their early training through Grassroots but have used other organisations for subsequent training. Two are waiting for NQF 5 training once it is on offer at Grassroots. They did not know who else offered such training. Most beneficiaries had done both management skills and educare training and most are involved in local principals' forums. Some had started their crèches before receiving training. In these cases their entrepreneurial spirit made them highly receptive to training. Two of the principals were less trained than people who worked for them, showing a high degree of maturity. All valued their training and most of their staff had received training and were continuing to receive training.

The involvement and ongoing support from Grassroots had been personally empowering for women who learn how to run, manage and administer their own business.

Despite having their own children beneficiaries commented on having learned how to understand the way children think and how to work with them more effectively. They were able to identify problems of abuse at home through children's behaviour felt capable of managing the situation themselves by first speaking to parents, then calling in welfare.

Grassroots had taught them things like making toys and posters themselves. Several said they used the posters for fundraising for the crèche. All use the library and materials supply. ECD centres on the whole were doing well although there was one which was completely overcrowded and should clearly not continue to be registered. Smaller crèches get support from the existing larger institutions that in turn teach the Grassroots approach and introduce them to Grassroots for support resources. They also learned how to use the contacts that they made through Grassroots for funding and support.



In conclusion, the elements of sustainability are present but the organisation is unlikely to last as it seems to have lost direction recently.

Overall sustainability score: 8 (modest)

#### 3.2.3.4 Impact

Official Dutch funding for Grassroots ended in 1996. At the time the intervention was carefully constructed and the aims identified in the initial project outline were exceeded with the exception of the Management information system which was not set up. Although the direct beneficiaries were teachers and community based committees, the ultimate beneficiaries have been the children, many of whom have now entered high school. The impact on beneficiaries was over a wide geographic area and had long-lasting effect on the overall understanding of Early Childhood Development and care.

At the time that the Netherlands policy was being implemented, there was an entirely different political and educational terrain. The emphasis on urban based education was far-sighted and resulted in the development of a successful model of black run educare centres that could form the backbone of early childhood development when it became the focal point of the new government's education and economic plan. Essentially Grassroots contributed to developing democrats who had experience of democratic practices.

The services that Grassroots once provided are now provided by many other organisations but at the time it was one of very few service providers. Without Grassroots and the Early Learning Resource Unit, which was also funded over the same period by the Netherlands, those hundreds of crèches would never have been set up and supported.

The policy impact has been largely in relation to implementation models including the integration of ECD into other urban development process. In more recent years, Grassroots has adapted to the changed developmental role of local government and now work in partnership with, particularly, the welfare officers in setting up and developing ECD centres.

The ongoing financial difficulties and unreliability of funding has meant that a number of key services have stopped, particularly that of fieldworkers monitoring the operation of the educare centres. There is also not the same degree of material development and it is therefore questionable whether the impact that has been felt over the last decade will continue without substantial injections of funding.

## 4. Summary of Findings

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter synthesizes the evaluators' appraisals of projects financed under terms of the Urban Spearhead Programme or its successors after 1996 (Echelon I) or approved with substantial involvement (Echelon II) or some involvement (Echelon III) by staff of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a further sub-section it also summarizes findings regarding grants for projects *outside* the Urban Spearhead Programme (Echelon IV) whose activities took place in urban areas.

A touchstone of the appraisal is Dutch policy to reduce urban poverty on the basis of principles laid out in the policy papers *A World of Difference* (1990) and *A World in Dispute* (1993) and elaborated in *Urban Poverty Alleviation* (1994). Specified in the policy were five priority themes: work and income; habitat; social services; urban government and institutional development; and integrated urban development.

The syntheses offered here seek to strike balances between the general and the particular. They try to draw general lessons for policy-making by capturing recurrent, essential patterns of performance and outcomes. But they also try to take account of the particularities of cases selected to illustrate Dutch policy choices. For in their settings, targeted problems, strategies, implementing bodies and partners, the projects are diverse. Striking such balances has not been made easier by the uneven quantities and qualities of available information.

### 4.2 Projects in Echelons I, II and III

The nine project clusters in these echelons reflect diverse realms. Some had a clear and consistent focus on urban priority groups and their institutional and policy settings. Others approached their issues with no particular urban focus; indeed several showed a loose spatial focus that included small towns and rural areas.

#### 4.2.1 Efficiency

Efficiency levels were generally in the range of fair-to-poor.

Determining the extent of output achievement is not straightforward. Project descriptions included indicators of outputs that were specific and time-bound (being usually bound to the timespan of the grant) in more than half the cases; but output indicators were judged measurable in less than half the cases. Moreover, the written record of outputs achieved is far from comprehensive.

It may nevertheless be estimated, roughly, that between one-third and two-thirds of output objectives (measurable or not) were routinely met. Both below and above this middle range of output performance there were significant outliers.

A number of project holders faced difficulties in converting funds and other resources into outputs according to timetables. Efficiencies were lowered chiefly by:

- staff turnover; in a number of cases this occurred in large part thanks to widespread recruitment of NGO leadership into the public sector;
- internal turbulence; discontinuities and inexperience among senior and middle managers were contributing factor in many cases;
- other management inadequacies, especially systems for monitoring performance and learning from it.

In cases where the imperatives of multilateral foreign agencies were intensely felt (reporting requirements, management supervision, etc.) efficiency levels were generally below average. Projects with limited geographic scope and well-defined target groups tended to show higher levels of efficiency.

#### 4.2.2 Effectiveness

Taking all projects together, effectiveness was fair. But there was considerable variance around that average.

Determining project effects is much less straightforward than determining outputs. Project descriptions included indicators of effects that were specific in somewhat less than half the cases. Indicators of effects were in only a few cases measurable and time-bound, the average being 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Information about outputs achieved proved quite fragmentary; informants and available evaluation reports were often more important sources of data than the project's reports and other records.

Performance varied greatly across the sample. The Safer Cities Durban project achieved very few of its outcome objectives while the Sibikwa Community Theatre organisation achieved all objectives of its three projects, and added further innovations along the way.

The effects of most projects were predominantly *non-material*, that is, in knowledge and skills, connections, informed public debate and organisational/institutional development. In most cases those were their immediate purposes. However several project holders pursued immediate *material* results, and usually did so successfully. With Dutch aid, Planact set up a physical site office in order to pursue its work in Alexandra Township; SAAYC refurbished a derelict building to create a community centre; and Sibikwa rehabilitated and expanded its premises. Hence the material contributions were, in almost all cases, assets that enhanced or multiplied programming capacities, not products delivered to end users.

Performance sometimes differed by level *within* project holders' organisations, particularly in the case of networks. Central secretariats of networks usually took on wider and more complex ranges of objectives, and they had more difficulty meeting them than did those networks' affiliates.

In some cases, effectiveness depended on the scope and cohesiveness of the community or social category forming the intermediate or ultimate priority group. In training or otherwise supporting local government officials (highly desired by authorities at all levels, who actively contributed to making such activities work) Planact and other USN affiliates usually achieved their objectives. Whereas in organisationally weaker and divided environments, project holders tended to meet delays, resistance and even outright paralysis. In a few highly fragmented, resource-scarce environments like squatter settlements, the introduction of resources -- jobs, materials and other means of family or personal gain -- triggered conflicts that set back rather than advanced anti-poverty programmes.

#### 4.2.3 Relevance

Echelon I projects showed the clearest alignments with Dutch urban policy. Two of the four cases (Planact and USN) showed relevance to at least three policy themes, and were the only project holders to show relevance to the theme of integrated urban

development. Echelons II and III comprised projects oriented chiefly toward the theme of “work and income” and “social services” and were commonly focused on youth.

#### *Governance*

Of the five main Dutch policy themes, that of urban government and institutional development appears with the greatest frequency and prominence in the strategies of Planact and Urban Sector Network. Their training and advisory efforts, together with policy research and advocacy pivoted around strengthening and influencing (local) government. Less pronounced, but also oriented toward the public sector and local organisations, were the Social Housing Foundation and Safer Cities Durban projects.

Urban governance is not, of course, only a matter of building capacities of public authorities, but also of promoting a vibrant political life. Creating political space for, and strengthening community- and membership-based organisations capable of articulating and amplifying “voice” can usually improve governance. USN affiliates worked on that front, often against strong counter-pressures, including from within their own ranks. Broadly speaking, the organisations composing the USN were never able fully to break free of their (often close) association with the ruling party and its local allies such as in the movement of “civics”. Yet other organisations operating in urban civil society have shown the usefulness of working with greater autonomy from the ruling party. Examples arise in the work of the ‘homeless peoples’ movement in several cities. There are thus grounds for concluding that in its limited choice of grantees -- however competent and influential they have been in urban affairs -- Dutch official aid may have missed opportunities to promote organisations and movements of greater relevance for anti-poverty action.

Dutch grants in this field were evidently relevant to official government policy. But there is little evidence of interest in or engagement with agents of citizen action autonomous of government and the ruling party. Hence there were evidently limits to Dutch official aid’s relevance for governance -- that is, for the creation or protection of civic space for organisations of residents to advance their agendas in negotiating ways forward with local authorities.

#### *Habitat*

Somewhat less consistently relevant were activities in respect to the policy category “habitat”. Again Planact and USN stand out in the field of housing, land, environment and community services. The project supported furnished relevant “software” in training, brokerage and organisation-building services to enable various levels of local governance, including those in the civil sector, to plan and undertake material changes, mainly in housing. Land access, given its strategic importance in the urban habitat and livelihood problematic, certainly merited attention, but did not receive it (except perhaps from Planact) in ways commensurate with the scale and importance of the issue in the South African urban setting. In its efforts to raise awareness about waste and recycling, Sibikwa can claim relevance in its contributions to public education about the urban environment.

Dutch grants for Planact and other USN affiliates were highly relevant in a context where officials were searching for and testing approaches to urban housing and infrastructural services. It has taken more than a decade of effort, but there is today a detectable, if slow and erratic, shift beyond rhetorical commitments (such as to participatory methods) toward routine practices by municipal and national government agencies. Well before the changeover in 1994, the Dutch were among the first donors to see the merits of approaches pioneered by these professional service organisations.

In the consistent promotion of the social housing model, Dutch grantmaking evidently helped speed the official adoption of that housing model by the South African authorities.

However, among housing experts the relevance of that model for sustainable anti-poverty action is a matter of dispute. These social housing projects were consistent with official urban policy of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in that they represent urban innovations. Yet because their primary target groups are not the urban poor, their relevance for Dutch policy is low.

#### *Social Services*

From the sample of projects reviewed in this study, the strongest evidence of Dutch aid's relevance in the field of social services was found in a well-designed and effective educational institution in the creative arts, Sibikwa. That training/performing academy is clearly relevant as a model of provision of training services for a specific sector. Yet it, like all other activities aimed at unemployed youth, is dwarfed by the scale of the issues to be tackled. Activities supported by Dutch grants fitted policy guidelines, and were thus policy-relevant. But with the exceptions of those, like Sibikwa, able to provide replicable models, their relevance was quite limited in that their ultimate scope for growth was limited or non-existent. Thus they were not *commensurate* with the problems. Evidence about the Durban project on crime prevention supports a similar conclusion, but with an additional demerit. The Dutch grant promoted a UN-driven model that, on paper, was fully congruent with pre-existing national policy, but was not congruent with the political and managerial context into which it was inserted from outside.


Regarding the relevance youth programming for gender equity, this study found no substantial evidence to put in question the main conclusion of the 2001 *Gender Audit* of youth projects supported with Dutch aid, namely: 'the issue [gender equity] has not yet been internalized or systematized in the policies, programmes, project design, monitoring and evaluation systems of individual partners, let alone of the sector' (Gender Links Associates 2001: 6).

#### *Work and Income*

Activities in respect to work and income were present in many projects, but their relevance for Dutch policy is weaker than might be assumed from a reading of project objectives. In particular, the dominant grow-the-young-entrepreneur strategies show little relevance to Dutch anti-poverty goals. That is because they usually fail to generate sustainable jobs. A number of project holders pursuing such strategies later sidelined or dropped them altogether because they did not repay the effort. At the same time, no evidence could be found of Dutch involvement in macro-level policy development or structural measures to improve job creation or social protection for the poor.

Nevertheless, the Dutch contribution to the community-based maintenance (CBM) model of job creation pivoting on community services is evidence of the pursuit of measures with good prospects for addressing two fundamental poverty problems: the scarcity of decent employment and the scarcity of public services for decent living environments. This Dutch-supported model is highly relevant in that it points a way forward for local and national governments on vital policy terrains.

The following chart, which aggregates scores presented in Chapter 3, provides a snapshot of the relative intensity of focus among the nine project clusters in the three main project echelons.



#### 4.2.4 Sustainability

Overall, sustainability prospects are not strong. When averaged, sustainability scores hovered around 8 -- that is, around modest levels -- across all echelons. However only three project clusters (two in Echelon I and one in Echelon IV) scored above the modest level of 8,5.

##### 4.2.4.1 Institutional and Organisational Strength

As of mid-2007, many project holders in the first three Echelons continue to function, although several operate at scales well below those of the 1990s. Several affiliates of the Urban Sector Network have closed, and the future of the Social Housing Foundation is at the moment uncertain. CEED no longer exists. RAG is facing management difficulties and Triple Trust has abandoned the standard SMME strategies it pursued at the time of the Dutch grants. Amidst turbulent social and political terrains, shifting donor interests, and the difficulties of recruiting and retaining managers of good quality, this survival rate may be seen as unexpectedly good. However, a few organisations have survived only because of continued support by one or two donors or political backers, without whom they would have been unable to continue in almost dormant conditions.

Characteristic of those organisations with the best prospects of sustaining themselves are those with clarity about who they want to serve and what strategies they should use to serve them. They provide relevant and professional services for poor people or their organisations while successfully tapping government political and financial support without sacrificing their autonomy from government. Sibikwa and some of the affiliates of the Urban Sector Network illustrate this pattern.

##### 4.2.4.2 Formal Recognition and Authority

While all organisations reviewed have formal legal status under South African law, the extent of their recognition and authority among public sector agencies and policy-makers has varied widely. National and local government bodies sought policy input from, and developed contractual partnerships with Planact and other members of the Urban Services Network. Municipal government in Durban (and Johannesburg and Cape Town) accepted UN-Habitat's Safer Cities project but had difficulty assimilating the model and putting it to work; signs of sustainability are ambiguous. Similarly, South Africa's government has tried to promote the social housing model, but advances have been slow and uneven, especially as the parastatal agency created for the purpose has faced severe internal challenges to its performance and existence.

Government agencies showed recognition for some project holders on the terrain of after-school youth activities and youth entrepreneurship promotion, exemplified in training contracts with Sibikwa and CEED and help for SAAYC's Tshepo Themba centre. But in general, youth promotion projects got most of their national recognition from participants and staff of kindred organisations in the sector, mainly those in the seven-member Youth Development Network promoted by the Netherlands Embassy. Their relatively low profile can be attributed to their preference for service delivery rather than policy experimentation, and to their partnerships with government agencies. Unlike USN affiliates they showed little capacity to develop innovations or advocate policy change through focused campaigns.

#### 4.2.4.3 Users' Interest and Benefits

Across all cases, non-material benefits (policy ideas, knowledge, skill, motivation, organisational capacity, etc.) overshadow material benefits (jobs created, built environments improved or made safer, costs to residents lowered).

Intermediate and ultimate beneficiaries contacted for this study, and those reached in earlier follow-up research, usually expressed satisfaction with their experience with the project or project holder in question. Positive responses are not surprising, since services were usually free of charge, and designed on the basis of some kind of consultation or prior needs survey. In the case of intermediate beneficiaries (project staff or associates of project activities, local leaders) it was not uncommon to hear informants say that their involvement in the project had added to their professional competence and motivation and thus helped them advance in their working lives.

Flows of benefits continuing beyond the projects' life spans are hard to verify, since systematic follow-up studies could not be found. Interviews with ex-participants and fragmentary written evidence suggest some continuing benefit flows including skills, knowledge and motivation. These accumulate mainly with *individuals*. Among participants in youth training/leisure programmes, and among staff members of the organisations providing those services, claims of permanent improvement in personal capacities are fairly widespread. Both personal and social gains are detectable as a result of Planact and some USN affiliate field innovations, training and support for local government officials and for local community activists. Professional skills in community theatre, provided by Sibikwa, represent another case, although the number of persons benefiting is far smaller than in the case of USN affiliates. Benefits accruing to former participants in enterprise promotion projects appear to be much lower and less sustainable.

#### 4.2.4.4 Knowledge and Capacity

As a rule, post-project flows of benefits tend to be sustained where project holders put knowledge-based work such as research, testing of innovations and advocacy close to the heart of their strategies and paid attention to outcomes through monitoring. Whereas projects confining themselves mainly to delivery of services, with few or no knowledge-based components, showed weaker sustainability or none at all.

This is not to claim that knowledge-based activities guarantee a sustainable flow of benefits. The USN's innovative and knowledge-based Community-Based Maintenance programme met severe headwinds and has been discontinued in all but a few locales. It lacked sufficient political backing to overcome the prevailing climate of macro-economic policies favouring public-private partnerships over public-community partnerships. Yet where government has contracted a project holder to transmit specific skills and

knowledge to select categories (for example, Sibikwa's selected trainees in performance arts; Planact's training of local councillors in local government) adequate-to-good flows of benefits have been put in motion, with longer-term results.

#### 4.2.5 Impact

Dutch urban sector policy aimed to contribute to change for South Africa's urban poor across a wide front. Impacts may be sought in the five main thematic areas, looking for material changes and for public institutional and policy development. In respect to these clusters, this study found fragmentary and anecdotal evidence to support the following informed *hypotheses* about impact.

##### 4.2.5.1 Work and Income

Several projects enabled a modest number of (young) poor ex-participants to stabilise their income through self-employment, at least in the short term. In the longer term the number surviving through that self-employment is almost certainly very small. A majority of ex-participants benefited only marginally and probably continue to survive through precarious informal under-employment.

Evidence is fragmentary, but it appears that a relatively small number *intermediary* actors, chiefly trainers and project managers, have advanced in their working lives thanks to their engagement in the projects. These may number no more than a hundred, but it is plausible to conclude that individual impact has been proportionately greater for those in the 'intermediary' than in the 'end user' category.

##### 4.2.5.2 Habitat

A modest number of poor households gained new or improved shelter as a result of USN affiliate technical, lending and organisational support as reinforced with Dutch funding. For example in the period 1999-2006 over 5000 poor households in the Cape Town area secured new or improved shelter with small, 'socially-secured' loans<sup>4</sup>. A much smaller number of non-poor households have seen their housing assets better organised as a result of support via USN and SHF to the social housing units they inhabit.

In respect to public policy, several local governments in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape took steps to improve services in waste removal, storm water drainage and other environmental problems. Those measures are directly attributable to the Dutch-supported CBM project, which also provided some of their (poorer and mainly female) co-residents with paid jobs. This innovation poses strong possibilities of a "win-win" policy solution to needs for jobs and for urban services. But South African official preference for commercial contractors has narrowed the space for such options. In most communities the positive impact could not be sustained when the pilot effort was discontinued.

Informed observers share the view that the Planact/USN impact on urban sector leadership has been substantial. At top levels of housing policy-making and practice in South Africa (e.g. national Directors-General of Housing; senior authorities managing habitat and finance at municipal level; directors of major upgrading programmes; high-level consultancies) a score of former Planact and other USN affiliate staff members have set the pace of policy and practice, frequently in pro-poor directions. Regarding material

---

<sup>4</sup> This outcome is attributable to USN's Kuyasa Fund, which in its first six years had rotated its capital 12 times, thereby adding value of ZAR 100000 (€11000) per household.



and non-material gains made by poor people, however, it is nearly impossible to make direct and unambiguous claims of attribution to that new leadership.

#### 4.2.5.3 Social Services

With assistance from USN affiliates including Planact, residents of a score of low-income urban communities now have access to community halls and other facilities for recreation, gatherings and learning, most of them brought about thanks to stronger capacities in both the civil and public sectors for planning and promotion of public goods.

On the specific terrain of performing arts, Sibikwa has had detectable, if modest, institutional impact in its consolidation as a viable training institution for young low-income people. Today it routinely generates a stream of graduates employable in the performing arts. In no other case were similar institutional impacts on vocational education detectable. Given the institutionalised uptake of its travelling public performance on the urban environment, Sibikwa has also demonstrated the power of performing arts for communicating important messages in low-income urban areas.

Public security, chiefly through greater public awareness, is said to have improved modestly for residents of a couple of low-income communities in Durban. It is however impossible to attribute those marginal improvements to the adoption of Safer Cities model as municipal policy in 2003.

No evidence could be found of any impacts in respect to food, nutrition, health and basic/primary education. Some ex-participants in “life skills” programmes promoted by youth organisations claimed that those educational experiences had affected them positively. It is plausible that stronger local-level capacities promoted by USN affiliates have led to improved water and sanitation provision in many low-income communities.

#### 4.2.5.4 Urban Governance

In many scores of urban communities, local government processes have developed at the interface of poor communities and formal institutions of governance. Training and support from Planact and other USN affiliates, particularly for local councillors and others at local levels, contributed to that outcome. The democratic content of those processes is, however, far from self-evident.

Thanks to USN affiliate activities, community-based organisations and leaders have gained capacities to plan, negotiate and articulate viewpoints on behalf of low-income residents. However, continuing ties binding USN affiliates with the ruling party probably limited those activities’ impact in promoting organised but autonomous citizen “voice” toward the authorities.

Combined with practical work at community levels, public leadership (particularly in the mid-1990s) by those associated with Planact and other USN affiliates has kept a few important notions of participation and related dimensions of governance on public agendas. However, that policy impact tends to be overshadowed by other more powerful social, political and economic interests for whom participation and equitable growth are not priorities.

#### 4.2.5.5 Integrated Urban Development

From an early hour, Planact and other USN affiliates had advocated integrated urban development, with a redistributive intent as per the slogan ‘one city, one tax base’. They

are the *only* project holders supported by Dutch aid to have consciously pursued integrated approaches to cities. By 2002 South Africa had formally adopted the ‘metropolitan’ or ‘megacity’ model of governance. Planact and USN had helped lay the ground for that policy outcome. Those policy frameworks and procedures may be formally in place, but they have yet to yield strong, consistent measures favouring pro-poor redistribution. Meanwhile South African cities remain ‘as segregated, fragmented and unequal as they were at the dawn of political liberation’ (Pieterse 2004: 82).

Viewed as a whole, Dutch grant-making in South Africa appears to have been less integrated than it might have been. In the Gauteng mega-city, where grant-making was most intense and consistent, some cross-fertilisation did take place, such as between the social housing efforts of Planact and the Social Housing Foundation. However there appears to have been no consistent effort to integrate grant-making around pivotal strategies or themes, such as citizen “voice”, municipal finance, curbing sprawl or advancing the fundamental matter of decent jobs.

#### 4.2.6 Conclusion - Echelons I, II and III

Given the diversities in scale, sector and organisational continuity, and given the uneven quantities and qualities of information, it is not possible to draw over-arching conclusions with any precision. Across the grantee types in this study’s sample, urban service organisations generally performed at fair-to-good levels -- thus above the sample’s average - in their efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact. They also showed above-average relevance for Dutch policy aims in regard to the policy themes of habitat, urban governance and integrated urban development. With a couple of exceptions they were unable to show above-average performance in regard to social services or to work and income. In its particular social service terrain of professional education in performing arts, one Echelon III grantee performed above the sample’s average in its efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact. Project holders in the sectors of youth training for work and income and for social service showed, with only a couple of exceptions, below-average performance across all assessment criteria. Again with few exceptions, their relevance for the main Dutch urban policy themes was below average.

#### 4.3 Projects in Echelon IV

The three Echelon IV projects represent three distinct sectors: early childhood education (Grassroots Educare); security for women and girls (ADAPT) and youth entrepreneurship (COD). As such they are not comparable among themselves. However, COD’s purposes were virtually identical with those of projects in Echelons II and III focused on youth and entrepreneurship. ADAPT shares some of the aims of the Safer Cities project in Echelon I, but takes a bottom-up and focused approach to specific kinds of crime.

##### 4.3.1 Relevance

In the mid-1990s, the Grassroots Educare Trust provided a model of community-based early childhood education at a moment when such models were scarce and needed. In its early years its policy relevance was therefore high. Thereafter its relevance shifted to that of direct provision of services appreciated by poor people. Particularly in its early years, it was highly relevant to general Dutch anti-poverty policies.

In the case of ADAPT it is hard to imagine an initiative that could be more relevant to security of vulnerable urban residents. This relevance stems from the project’s

rootedness in the community of Alexandra, its social reconnaissance and monitoring of feedback about its own activities, and its responsiveness to public authorities, such as the police and court system. ADAPT's work represents an outstanding example of the relevance of Dutch policies for security for women and girls as a component of sustainable urban development.

Like comparable projects in Echelons II and III, COD's strategy of creating young entrepreneurs showed little relevance to the nature or scope of South Africa's joblessness; even less relevant was its emphasis on cooperatives in urban settings. COD's strategy was hardly appropriate for tackling urban unemployment, and thus in practical terms inconsistent with Dutch anti-poverty goals.

#### 4.3.2 Sustainability

Throughout most of its existence, Grassroots Educare pursued strategies, such as field work beyond its base, teacher training and follow-up accompaniment of new centres, to enhance and multiply the flow of benefits from its model. Despite uneven uptake by public service authorities, benefits of Grassroots centres and trained participants are being sustained to a considerable degree. However the organisation itself has shrunk, lost direction and faces uncertain prospects of sustaining itself.

The flow of benefits from ADAPT's work have begun to multiply. This takes place owing to a well-considered strategy of inclusion of both men and women, an expanding engagement with many social institutions, from choral groups to taverns (thus both female- to male-oriented settings) its close engagement with public authorities and its interchange with wider networks and initiatives on women's rights, violence and public order. Thanks to these forms of institutionalisation, and to procurement of subsidies from municipal and provincial social service agencies, ADAPT's work shows good prospects of being sustained for years to come.

COD no longer exists. While some of the trainers it enabled to get training are still active, few if any other benefit streams continue to flow. Its sustainability is therefore negligible.

#### 4.3.3 Impact

Grassroots Educare's impact has chiefly been seen in the practice of other preschool care providers, and other development actors; these draw on Grassroots's model of black-run educare. However, the project did not become an authoritative voice in policy-making and knowledge-based work. It further contributed to an important new pool of persons capable of operating early childhood education centres. Its outcomes (combined with the work of others) manifest themselves in the many hundreds of educare centres providing a vital social service in the greater Cape Town area.

ADAPT's work has evidently yielded shorter and longer-term outcomes in Alexandra township. These include: psychological recovery by many hundreds of victims of abuse, changes in knowledge and attitude by both men and women, boys and girls, changes in attitudes and formal procedures by police and court systems, readiness of men to come forward for counselling about their abuse of partners.

COD's impact was negligible, at best a small number of persons who have gained work in the small enterprise promotion sector, whose overall impact is very modest.

#### 4.3.4 Conclusion - Echelon IV

Two of the three non-core project clusters in this study's sample demonstrate how community-level initiatives paying close attention to needs, norms and capacities among poor township dwellers -- particularly women and girls -- can develop into viable organisations with considerable significance in their settings. They also exemplify the relevance of Dutch policy, even where not derived from an over-arching urban agenda, in addressing day-to-day problems facing specific social categories of the urban poor.

## 5. Conclusions

This chapter considers the relevance of Dutch policy, and the adequacy of specific interventions chosen, in pursuit of urban poverty reduction in the case of South Africa.

At issue is the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). This study did not take into account other policies promoted with official Dutch backing, notably those pursued by international financial institutions and by other Dutch ministries and co-financing agencies.

### 5.1 Relevance of Policy Prescriptions

To what extent was Dutch MFA policy an appropriate answer to the question of how to combat urban poverty in South Africa?

It is difficult to dispute the appropriateness of main components of the problem statement on urban poverty appearing in *A World of Difference* (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1990):

- needs for (decent) employment and broadly-based purchasing power;
- constraints on job creation where economic policies respond chiefly to global forces that reduce the demand for low-skilled labour;
- macro-economic policies that spread and deepen conditions of urban poverty;
- in badly-serviced zones on the urban periphery, settlement schemes that lower access to jobs and markets for residents, thus offering no solutions for the urban poor.

The urban informal economy, when conceptualized as a *manifestation* of poverty, can be relevant concept for South Africa. This relevance is evident in Dutch policy statements such as *A World of Difference*, which see the informal economy as a problem of labour markets characterised by low returns, precariousness and exploitation. Otherwise, notions of the informal economy as depicted in Dutch policy show only limited relevance. In contrast to other parts of the world, South Africa's informal economy:

- employs a much smaller proportion (about 13 percent in 2003, up from 8 percent in 1997) of the non-agricultural labour force; elsewhere in Africa the proportion hovers around 75 percent;
- consists overwhelmingly of services, chiefly in petty trade (markets, *spaza* shops, &c.);
- is deeply connected with the formal, registered economy; therefore a "two sector" model is not a helpful guide to understanding what is largely a *single* economy into which many of the poor are not *excluded* but rather *adversely incorporated*.

Dutch urban anti-poverty policy fell short of full relevance for South Africa in that it paid little attention to inequality. This is remarkable in that inequality has been shown to block achievement of fundamental Dutch policy aims, especially economic growth, security and stability. South African society shows worsening inequality and inadequate respect for social and economic rights. Yet its Constitution's Bill of Rights, and many formal institutions to 'respect, protect, promote and fulfil' equal rights, provide juridical leverage against it. Various civil society organisations have in recent years demonstrated the potentials of the Constitution's human rights provisions.

In its pointers on ways forward, Dutch policy showed relevance for South African circumstances where it advocated process-based approaches which promote:

- the autonomous capacities of the urban poor to organize themselves and to negotiate realization of their rights with authorities; getting a grasp of needs and relationships in

low income settlements will, according to *A World of Difference*, require “a lot of research at micro-level”;

- enabling strategies for frameworks governing access to land and basic public infrastructure;
- a strong public sector capable of planning, with urban residents, needed public improvements, and of carrying out plans and providing municipal services;
- political renewal, in which there is “an important role for independent local organisations of civil society, media and research bodies.”

Having been formulated for contexts in which public sector structures and civil society actors are weaker than in South Africa, Dutch policy’s relevance for South Africa may have fallen short of potentials. For the country has a large and robust array of institutions, from tripartite labour management to the judicial system, capable of advancing anti-poverty measures. The main Dutch policy statement on Urban Poverty Alleviation (DGIS 1994) refers to economic settings, mainly in Asia and Latin America, where such possibilities are rarely present.

Dutch policies were insufficiently well-framed to capture other opportunities. A leading case is South Africa’s evolving public system of social protection. That is by far the largest, most effective and efficient anti-poverty instrument in the country today. Pension and child support grant programmes put cash in the hands of about one-quarter of the population every month, thus preventing total destitution among the poorest households. In the mid-1990s South Africa developed a labour-intensive public works programme of world class. Such programmes have demonstrated potentials for combating poverty and stimulating local economic development. Nevertheless, Dutch policy statements of this period pay virtually no attention to these leading anti-poverty instruments.

In its proposed ways forward for the informal economy, Dutch policy showed ambiguities. It lacked clarity on whether the informal economy was mainly a *problem* or mainly a *solution*. Policy statements in *A World of Difference* draw attention to small enterprise promotion programmes in the informal economy, and noted their very disappointing outcomes. Nevertheless, policy statements called for continued promotion of small enterprise, though putting greatest emphasis on protecting the socio-economic rights of the poor and helping organise interest groups of small entrepreneurs. Dutch policy also advocated pursuits at broader levels through research and action including promotion at macro levels of employment-intensive policies and programmes. The latter prescription is clearly relevant to South Africa, as policy research on employment issues has been badly needed.

In conclusion, stated Dutch policy in the early 1990s had a number of points of relevance for South Africa. Policy focused on fundamental issues of income and employment, public infrastructure and services; with few exceptions they addressed those issues in appropriate ways. Especially relevant were measures that could enhance the “voice” of the poor through organisation and the creation of political space in which to exercise power. However Dutch policy prescriptions were less relevant regarding the informal economy, which may be a precarious means of survival for some, but is hardly a route out of poverty. South Africa’s structural conditions, political rules and traditions influencing commerce, crafts and the labour market have severely limited the potentials of the informal economy as a solution to joblessness. Its future importance is also in doubt, as South Africa’s government has recently vowed to reduce and eventually eliminate what it terms the ‘second economy’.

Dutch policy prescriptions overlooked South Africa’s current main instrument of poverty reduction, a system of social protection based on cash pay-outs to important

segments of the poor population. They also evidently neglected its new Constitutional apparatus for the promotion of social and economic rights. For these reasons Dutch policy missed important opportunities to help reduce urban poverty.

## 5.2 Relevance of Policy as Practiced

To what extent did the chosen interventions reflect policy and adequately respond to the urban poverty problems Dutch policy intended to address?

### 5.2.1 Echelons I, II and III

Dutch official grant-making for core activity clusters was not entirely aligned with anti-poverty policy in terms of intended beneficiaries. For example, social housing does not target the poor, although it may in certain cases have anti-poverty effects by curbing the phenomenon of “downward raiding” by better-off social strata in housing schemes intended for the poor.

Dutch grants were deployed across a rather wide range of activities and levels. Many of these aimed to build knowledge and skills of individuals and to improve capacities of local-level organisations, whose efforts would, in was assumed, result in faster and better delivery of material improvements. An important minority of activities emphasized research and development of innovative models of anti-poverty action; yet others aimed to promote policy dialogue and advocacy. Among social categories targeted by the activities, township residents and youth were the best-represented. Yet a number of others, from women to local government officials to shack dwellers to non-poor consumers of rented accommodation, also figured among target groups. In short, Dutch aid supported a variety of strategic approaches at several levels across a number of terrains, prioritizing a variety of social categories. Concerted approaches were more the exception than the rule.

However, greater challenges to relevance in this core echelon arose from disjunctures between policy purposes and the institutional preconditions to realize them in practice. Some urban service nonprofits had difficulty coping with severe internal and external turbulence of the 1990s. In the cases of two public sector bodies, institutional preconditions were too weak to make effective use of imported models of crime prevention and social housing, respectively.

Nevertheless, Planact and most of the others in the Urban Sector Network achieved Dutch policy ambitions in modest measure. Collectively and singly, those organisations expanded and improved South Africa’s stock of knowledge, its pool of policy specialists and practitioners, its policy debates, local and national negotiations and on capacities among field workers and community-based leaders. Among their most important achievements have been innovative models of anti-poverty action, such as in public sector job creation, governance, planning processes, housing finance and technical aspects of construction. These might be termed policy experiments. Dutch policy alludes to innovation and knowledge-creation. In the case of professional urban service organisations oriented toward innovation and knowledge-creation, Dutch practice yielded results that stand out.

Practice in respect to income and job creation did not follow any of the alternative paths prescribed by Dutch policy, such as a pursuit of improved macro environments to boost the demand for labour, of improved socio-economic rights of informal economy workers or of labour-intensive public employment. A number of South African researchers have long worked to fill this policy gap. Today, new aid-supported initiatives involving outside experts of world class (e.g. Rodrik 2006, Pollin and others 2006) are providing

extra impetus in this fundamental area of policy development. These studies emphasise the anti-poverty potentials of macro-economic measures, namely revised approaches to inflation, curbing capital flight, greater public steering of investment, promotion of markets for tradable goods and services and wage growth in line with productivity growth. Opportunities to pursue these kinds of approaches exist in South Africa but they have lacked adequate backing for research, testing and promotion. In terms of Dutch policy, these were missed opportunities.

Projects for youth entrepreneurship/micro-enterprise promotion were, in the main, inconsistent with available knowledge about approaches and outcomes (e.g. Elkan 1989, Haggblade 1992, Maclsaac 1996) including knowledge noted in major Dutch policy statements such as *World of Difference*<sup>5</sup>. Much of that knowledge concerns the macro level contexts affecting small enterprise and the degree of political power among small entrepreneurs; it also concerns the policy levers available for public sector steering. A study carried out chiefly for the donors (CASE 1994) drew attention to serious shortcomings in strategy and performance in South Africa's SMME sector. Ten years later one of South Africa's leading authorities on this sector assessed many of these programmes. His findings cast serious doubt on their overall relevance in combating poverty. Among other things, he shows that 'the SMME economy exhibits only a weak contribution as regards employment creation because most SMMEs do not grow' (Rogerson 2004). Such findings are consistent with a recent comprehensive World Bank study whose 'results do not support the pro-SME prescription of directly subsidizing SME development to accelerate growth and reduce poverty' (Beck and others 2003). There is no evidence that Dutch policy has taken this important body of knowledge on board.

Important, if modest successes in skill-building and jobs for young people appear in projects like Sibikwa, which gained capacity thanks in part to Dutch support. But it is otherwise difficult to detect evidence of causal links between broad national advances in respect to youth (which have been few) and other Dutch-supported efforts in this field.

### 5.2.2 Echelon IV

Two of the three activity clusters supported *outside* the urban policy framework showed strong relevance for anti-poverty intentions. In them, the creation of innovative models was observable in two fields of Dutch interest in the early 1990s. Community-based approaches to reducing violence against women and girls was the main thrust of ADAPT, which got its start-up funding from the Netherlands. That may be regarded as a case of excellence in grant-making. Similarly, the Grassroots Educare Trust created a model of community-based early childhood education. Both initiatives showed positive impact and relevance for poor urban communities. In some respects they were more relevant to anti-poverty intentions than some Echelon I, II and III projects supported under terms of the Dutch urban policy.

The other non-core (Echelon IV) project, pursuing the youth entrepreneurship paradigm, was indistinguishable from similar projects categorized in Echelons II and III. Like them, its anti-poverty relevance was low.

---

<sup>5</sup> See Section 6.2 Stedelijke armoedebestrijding, sub-section "Ervaringen en beleidsuitgangspunten" in *Wereld van Verschil* (1990).



### 5.3 Lessons

The reader can draw a number of lessons from this study's findings, which may speak for themselves. Yet it is worthwhile to make explicit several pointers emerging from them. These are:

#### 1. The success of micro-level pursuits is strongly conditioned by macro-level policies.

Achievement of urban anti-poverty objectives by way of small projects would have been problematic under *any* post-apartheid policy regime. But such objectives became particularly difficult in South Africa's post-changeover transition. In that period the country has suffered a massive flight of capital; it exceeded foreign aid inflows by as much as 20 to 1. Meanwhile the rate of unemployment rose from an already serious 30 percent to a catastrophic 40 percent. Macro-economic and other national policies evidently did nothing to address those serious problems. Hence outcomes of some grantees (Urban Sector Network affiliates, ADAPT and Sibikwa) stand out all the more for having reached fair levels of achievement, even if modest in scope. It is clear that all the activities reviewed here, as with project interventions by virtually all other donors, are not *commensurate* with the enormous scale of the problems.

To what extent may the effectiveness of activities they support at micro levels be helped by macro-level policies, especially those affecting job creation for semi- and unskilled labour? To what extent might Dutch policy build on the success of South Africa's social protection system, which puts narrow but nonetheless real floors of security under many millions? Addressing those questions would draw attention to measures that are in many respects *commensurate* with the scale of the poverty problem.

#### 2. Knowledge-based approaches can yield better results.

The strongest and most consistent patterns of effectiveness and sustainability arose where project holders attached high value to knowledge -- whether in extracting lessons from their activities for their own use or in generating knowledge and models for use by others -- and had dedicated budget lines and other resources to make that learning and "policy experiment" function possible. Effectiveness and sustainability were seldom observed in the case of project holders who saw their tasks chiefly those of delivering services according standard formulas, with little investment in knowledge. It therefore makes little sense to invest in project holders lacking solid systems of knowledge management and cultures of organisational learning, and few prospects of creating such things.

#### 3. Approaches to job creation need radical re-thinking.

Joblessness is at the root of poverty in South Africa. Many continue to see conventional small enterprise promotion as the high road to job creation. Yet this study found no convincing evidence of sustainable anti-poverty outcomes by way of that approach. That finding is consistent with results of independent research carried out in South Africa and elsewhere, as noted in section 5.2.1 above.

If job creation and poverty reduction are to be tackled in serious ways, then donors will have to take these negative research results seriously. They should consider the kinds of ways forward that South African and other economists (such as those cited in section 5.2.1 above) are charting. Those policy specialists emphasise concerted public investment and macro-economic climates that enhance demand for low- and unskilled labour.

Getting the macro-economics right is crucial, but activities at meso- and micro levels can also be useful. Improving the physical environment through shelter and public services (as pilot projects noted in this report have demonstrated) is one among a number of approaches worth pursuing. Such initiatives, and the norms and institutions for channelling South Africa's own financial resources toward them, require a fundamentally different paradigm of job creation than that promoted by SMME approaches up to now.

A new job-centred paradigm is urgently needed, one that is commensurate with the scale of the problem. External financial support for expanded research, pilot initiatives and policy dialogue could help usher in more effective approaches.

4. Enhancement and protection of the political space in which the urban poor can advance their interests merit reinforcement.

This study produced findings about Dutch aid that are consistent with South African research suggesting that much -- but not all -- foreign support has tended to miss opportunities to promote democratic practice in urban civil society. It would be entirely consistent with the spirit of much Dutch policy, such as that of *A World of Difference*, to show more vigorous support for the political space in which associations of residents pursuing their agendas toward local and national authorities can do so in ways autonomous of government and the ruling party. It would also be entirely consistent with South African potentials. In contrast to much of the rest of Africa, these potentials include rich traditions of urban public action and formidable means of Constitutional protection and promotion of social and economic rights. Given the proven potentials of both citizen action and judicial activism, especially when these are combined, to advance pro-poor urban agendas, there are opportunities to be seized.

## Appendix A: Terms of Reference

## Appendix B: Persons Contacted

Name	Affiliation	In regard to	By*
Ms Nellie Agingu,	former Director, Planact	Planact	DS (tel)
Ms Rebecca Himlin	Director, Planact	Planact	DS & RM
Ms Lauren Royston,	former Planact staff, Development Works (consultants), Jhb	Planact	DS
Mr Graeme Reid	former Director, Planact	Planact, social housing	DS
Mr Victor Masinya	Community leader, Zandspruit Township	Planact	RM
Mr Joseph Matjhe	Community leader, Zandspruit Township	Planact	RM
Mr Mike Makwela	Project Officer, Planact	Planact	RM
Mr John Phosa	Deputy Chairperson of Diepsloot Community Development Forum	Planact	RM
Mr Goodwill Qushwana	Alexandra Renewal Project	Planact	RM
Ms Susan Carey	former Coordinator ad Interim, Urban Sector Network, Jhb	Urban Sector Network	DS
Mr Brian Moholo	Former Director Planact, USN, Jhb	Planact, USN	DS
Mr Frank Meintjies	Director, New Nation Consulting, Jhb	USN	DS
Mr Julian Baskin	former Planact staff, now Director, Alexandra Renewal	Planact; background to urban renewal	DS
Mr Ahmedi Vawda	former Director-General, Ministry of Local Government and Housing	Planact, USN and general urban policy	DS
Dr Patrick Bond	Former Planact staff, now at University of KwaZulu-Natal	Planact	DS
Ms Georgina Jaffee	Former Director, COPE (USN affiliate)	USN, social housing	DS
Mr Clive Forster	Former Director, BESG & Cato Manor Development Agency, Durban	USN, Housing Generator project	DS
Mr Joel Bolnick	former Coordinator, People's Dialogue, Cape Town	USN, urban development	DS (telef)
Mr Anton Krone	former Director, BESG (Pietermaritzburg)	USN	DS
Mr Cameron Brisbane	Director, BESG (in Pietermaritzburg)	USN - CBMP	DS
Ms Lynelle John	former Planact staff, evaluator of Urban Sector	USN	DS (telef)
Mr Clive Felix	General Manager, Urban Services Group, Port Elizabeth	USN	DS (telef)
Mr Francis Grantham	Ward Councillor, Exco & BESG Chairperson of	USN - CBMP	JN

	Board in 2000		
Ms Gretta Maphumulo	CBMP leader, Ntuthukoville	USN - CBMP	JN
Ms Christa Kuljian	Former Representative Mott Foundation	Planact, urban NGOs	DS
Mr Arie Diephout	Programme Management Unit, Department of Housing	Social Housing Foundation	DS
Mr Timothy Tau	financial process consultant	Social Housing Foundation	RM
Mr Thomas Ntuli	SHF trainee; now Chief Executive Officer of Greater Middleburg Housing Association, Mpumalanga	Social Housing Foundation	RM
Mr Barry Pinsky	Director, Rooftops Canada	Social Housing Foundation	DS
Mr Malcolm McCarthy	Former Director, CRIAA	Wattville/Tamboville Housing Association	DN
Dr Edgar Pieterse	Poverty and urban issues expert, Office of the Premier, Western Cape	Urban NGOs, general urban anti-poverty	DS (by telef)
Dr Mzwanele Mayekiso	planner, specialist in urban social movements, Jhb	Alexandra Township, urban movements	DS & Hans Slot
Ms Paula Parente	Local Economic Development Programme Officer, Ford Foundation, Johannesburg	Local economic development	DS & Hans Slot
Ms. Nazira Cachalia	Programme Manager, Safe Cities, Johannesburg Municipality	UN-Habitat Urban Management, Safer Cities	DS & Hans Slot
Mr Lungisa Manzi	Head, Durban Municipality Emergency Services Unit, Durban	Safer Cities, Durban	DS & JN
Mr Ismail Nxumalo,	Director, Community Policing, Dept of Community Safety, Province of KwaZulu-Natal	Safer Cities, Durban	DS & JN
Ms. Pat Horn	Director, Street Net International, Durban	Safer Cities, Durban	DS (telef)
Mr Richard Dodson	Architect, formerly with I-Trump renewal initiative for Durban	Safer Cities, Durban	DS (telef)
Mr Stelios Comninos,	former founder/director of SMME support NGO, Kuphuka, Durban	Safer Cities, Durban (evaluation); SMME sector	DS
Ms. Irene Khumalo	Director, Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention & Training, Alexandra	Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention & Training (ADAPT)	DS & Hans Slot
Mr Nhlanhla Mabizela	Trainee & Lay Counsellor (1990's)	Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention & Training (ADAPT)	RM
Mr Innocent Toto	Trainee & Lay Counsellor (1990's)	Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention & Training (ADAPT)	RM
Ms. Phyllis Klotz	Co-Director, Sibikwa, Benoni	Sibikwa	DS & RM
Mr Zandisile Dyantyi	Sibikwa Assistant Project	Sibikwa	RM

	Officer, Benoni		
Mr Phillip Ndaba	Sibikwa Theatre coordinator, Youth Against Violence, Benoni	Sibikwa	RM
Mr Molesi Mataboge	Executive Director, SAAYC, Johannesburg	SAAYC	DS
Ms. Happy Xaba	Manager, Tshepo Themba Centre (SAAYC) Etwatwa	SAAYC	DS & RM
Rev. Dan Thabethe	founder, SAAYC Tshepo Themba Centre, Etwatwa	SAAYC	DS & RM
Mr Almon Mbanyana	Former activist, SAAYC Tshepo Themba Centre, Etwatwa	SAAYC	RM
Mr Mike Dlamini	Former youth worker, SAAYC Tshepo Themba Centre, Etwatwa	SAAYC	RM
Ms Carmel Marock	independent consultant in the youth sector, Jhb	SAAYC	DS (email)
Ms Sashika Ramlutch	former Finance Manager, CEED, Durban	CEED	DS
Mr David Pieters	Former Deputy Director, CEED, Durban	CEED	JN (telef)
Ms Zukiswa Nompula	Former trainer, CEED	CEED	JN (telef)
Ms. Nozuko Mfenyana,	Programme Manager Umsobomvu Youth Fund (Midrand)	CEED	DS
Mr Wilifred Sebopela	Programme Finance Manager, Umsobomvu Youth Fund (Midrand)	CEED	DS
Ms Christine Mlumbi	Principal/owner Luthando Educare in Khayelitsha and Grassroots trainee	Grassroots	TZ
Ms Tikkie Manong	Principal/owner Luthando Educare in Khayelitsha and Grassroots trainee	Grassroots	TZ
Ms Elizabeth Bosman	Principal/owner Luthando Educare in Khayelitsha and Grassroots trainee	Grassroots	TZ
Ms Cythia Nomiliso	Principal/owner Luthando Educare in Khayelitsha and Grassroots trainee	Grassroots	TZ
Ms Beauty Ngqakayi	Principal/owner Luthando Educare in Khayelitsha and Grassroots trainee	Grassroots	TZ
Ms Mareldia Tape	Current manager	Grassroots	JB & DN
Ms Denise de Villiers	Community development worker	Grassroots	JB & DN
Mr Ismail Isaacs	Sector expert, ECD congress member and ex-staff member	Grassroots	JB
Ms Jinny Mullins	Former director, Grassroots	Grassroots	DN
Dr Tshabalala	Chair Board, Grassroots	Grassroots	JB
Mr Abdul Raja	JASA National Financial Firector	Centre for Opportunity Development (COD)	JB (by tel)

Mr Deon Damon	Former manager and now employee of the W. Cape Provincial Dept of Economic Development	COD	JB
Mr Zanele Twala	JASA national manager	COD	DN (by tel)
Mr Ryan Rode	Former training manager, COD	COD	JB
Mr Bruce Kannameyer	Former trainer, COD and current politician	COD	JB
Mr Aiden Barron	Former trainer, COD; now manager of Red Door office, W. Cape	COD	TZ (by tel)
Ms Penny Foley	Sector expert and JEP manager	COD and RAG	JB
Mr Oscar Jonkers	Owner appliance repairs business, Cape flats - former COD trainee	COD	TZ
Mr Young Kwazi	Senior Management and COD skills trainer - trainer	COD	TZ
Mr Reuben Julius	HR Coke in Paarl, was COD trainee/trainer	COD	TZ
Mr Frank Julie	Former COD Director (resigned 28 Feb 2007)	Resource Action Group (RAG)	JB
Mr Faatin Ebrahim	Chair of the RAG Board and director of Career Vision	RAG	JB
Ms Pam Beukes	Administrator and RAG Board secretary	RAG	JB
Ms Renecia Titus	Senior management at New Era, Belville ex-RAG trainee/trainer	RAG	TZ
Ms Soraya Mentoer	Editor, at AIDC, Observatory - RAG trainee/trainer	RAG	TZ
Ms Faida Salie	Junior financial controller, in private sector - trainee	RAG	TZ
Mr Sydney Pichou	Executive Director, Northern Cape Youth Development Agency	RAG	TZ
Mr Paul Bradnum	Former director and business consultant	Triple Trust Organisation (TTO)	JB
Mr Donovan Pedro	Director Operations	TTO	JB
Mr Seth Tladi	Director Operations	TTO	JB
Ms Florence Hlangadala	Project co-ordinator/administrator, GAPA Centre in Khayelitsha - TTO trainee	TTO	TZ
Mr Kidwell Giyo	Owner leatherwork studio in Guguletu - TTO trainer/trainee	TTO	TZ
Mr. Mvoto	Owner of Spaza shop, Khayelitsha - TTO trainee	TTO	TZ

\* DN = Debbie Newton; JB = Jacqui Boulle; JN = Jabu Ntuli; RM = Raji Matshedisho; DS = David Sogge; TZ = Patricia Zweig

## Appendix C: Documents

### 1. Project-related

#### Re: ADAPT

ADAPT *Annual Reports 2005, 2006*, Alexandra: ADAPT

Communication Initiative, ADAPT

<http://www.comminit.com/experiences/genderviolence/sld-2049.html>

#### Re: CEED

CEED 2000, *Final Narrative and Financial Report to the Royal Netherlands Embassy 01 October 1997 to 30 September 2000*, Durban: CEED

Youth Development Network 2005, *Final Consolidated Report to the Royal Netherlands Embassy 4/2003 - 6/2005*, Johannesburg: YDN, 30 September

Nyoni, J. & S. Vilakazi, 2005, *Draft Final Evaluation Report for Hivos of the Centre for Education and Enterprise Development (CEED)*, Durban, January

#### Re: Urban Sector Network

Bean, R. 2003, *USN Network Office, Institutional Arrangements and Governance of Affiliates, Mid-Term Evaluation of Financing Agreement (SA/73200-99/20) between the European Community and the Urban Sector Network*, Pretoria: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research - CSIR

Built Environment Support Group 2006, *Habitable Environments Partnership*, PowerPoint slideshow, Pietermatizburg: BESH

Built Environment Support Group 2004, *A Cost-Benefit and Comparative Analysis of the Msunduzi Municipal Service Partnership Projects*, Pietermatizburg: BESH

Built Environment Support Group 2003, *Partnerships for Better Living Environments. An Introductory Guide to Habitable Environments Partnerships*, Pietermatizburg: BESH

Susan Carey 2006, *The Rise and Fall of the Urban Sector Network (USN)*, unpublished paper

Mensink, Jeroen 2006, 'Housing Generator Revisited' *ArchiNed* 31 October

Napier, M. and others 2003, *Urban Sector Network Phase 11 Mid-Term Evaluation Report. Global Report for the period January 2000 to December 2002*, Pretoria: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research - CSIR

Steeman, A-M. 1997, *First Annual Evaluation Report, USN*, Johannesburg: USN

Tilman, H. and R. Wall (no date), *Housing Generator Project*, <http://www.africaserver.nl/hg/jury/index2.htm>

USN, 2005 *Progress and Financial Report on the Urban Sector Network (USN) Projects for*

*the Period October 2004 - March 2005. Submitted to The Royal Netherlands Embassy, May 2005*

*USN 2004, Progress and Financial Report on The Urban Sector Network (USN) Projects For The Period April to September 2004. Submitted to the Royal Netherlands Embassy December*

*USN 2004, The Urban Sector Network's Experience of the People's Housing Process (PHP), Johannesburg: USN*

*USN 2003, Urban Sector Network Funding Proposal to the Royal Netherlands Embassy 1 April 2003 - 31 March 2005*

*Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2003, Municipal Cost Recovery in Four South African Municipalities researched for the Built Environment Support Group (BESG) Johannesburg: CASE*

#### Re: Planact

*Development Works 2006, Re-membering Planact: Report on "the Planact Way", Prepared for Planact, Johannesburg: Development Works (unpublished paper)*

*Planact Annual Reports: 1990/91, 1992/93, 1993/94, 1994/1995, 1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/2000, 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05, 2005/06*

*Planact 2003, Beneficiary Survey Results--Vosloorus PHP Phase*

*Planact 2006, NGOs as Innovators and Agents of Change: A History Interpreted by Development Practitioners, Conference held by Planact on August 4-5, 2006, Hosted by the Centre for Urban and Built Environment Studies at Wits University, Source: [http://www.planact.org.za/conference\\_summary\\_report.htm](http://www.planact.org.za/conference_summary_report.htm)*

*(No name given) 2002, (No title) [Evaluation of Muldersdrift Housing Trust Foundation (MHTF)], unpublished document in Planact archives*

#### Re: Safer Cities

*Comminos, Stelios 2003, eThekwini Safer City Project: End Evaluation. Durban: eThekwini Municipality*

*eThekwini Municipality 2003, Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy, Durban: eThekwini Municipality*

*O'Leary, Brian 2007, 'Changes in the Quality of Life of Durban's People', *Social Indicators Research*, 81: 357-373*

*Pelser, Eric & Antoinette Louw 2002, 'Lessons from Practice' in E. Pelser (ed.) *Crime Prevention Partnerships. Lessons from Practice*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies*

#### Re: SAAYC

*SAAYC Narrative Report to Royal Netherlands Embassy June 1998 to January 1999  
SAAYC Consolidated Narrative Report to Royal Netherlands Embassy June 1998 to January*



1999

SAAYC Consolidated Narrative Report to Royal Netherlands Embassy December 1998 to May 1999

SAAYC Consolidated Narrative Report to Royal Netherlands Embassy June to November 1999

SAAYC Narrative Report to Royal Netherlands Embassy December 1999 to May 2000

SAAYC Narrative Report to Royal Netherlands Embassy October-December 2000

SAAYC Consolidated Report to Royal Netherlands Embassy June 1998 to December 2000

SAAYC Report 2005 to Youth Development Network Year 2005-6

Zabala, G. no date (2002?) *Impact Study Report*, Johannesburg: ICMS

Youth Development Network 2005, *Final Consolidated Report to the Royal Netherlands Embassy 4/2003 - 6/2005*, Johannesburg: YDN, 30 September

#### Re: Sibikwa

Sibikwa Community Theatre Project 2005 *Annual General Report*, Benoni: Sibikwa

Sibikwa Community Theatre Project 2006 *Annual General Report*, Benoni: Sibikwa

#### Re: Social Housing

Hunter, Roland 2006, *Are NGOs Relevant to the Delivery of Social Housing?* PowerPoint presentation for Planact conference. <http://www.planact.org.za/commentary.htm>

Martin, Richard 2004, *Evaluation of the Social Housing Foundation's USAID Grant-Finance Programme. Final Report*. Washington DC: Mega-Tech, Inc.

#### Re: Triple Trust

Triple Trust Organisation, *Annual Reports 2004/2005*, 1993, 1994, 1999/2000, 2000/2001  
Cape Town: TTO

TTO, 1994, *Final narrative report to RNE*, TTO

TTO, 1999, *Interim narrative report to RNE*, TTO

TTO, 2000, *Second progress narrative report to RNE*, TTO

TTO, 2000, *Combined financial and narrative report: Summary of project activities*, TTO

Allanic, B., M. Waring & Z. Mankayi 2001, *Evaluation of the first phase of the project "Promoting the development of small scale economic activities in rural areas of the Western and Eastern Cape"* Prepared for CCFD and SIDI, Johannesburg: CRIAA SA-DC

Case 2001, *Survey of Triple Trust Trainees: Impact evaluation report Eastern and Western Cape*, Prepared for TTO

City of Cape Town, *SMME newsletter Big News*, March 2006 edition

Gibson, Alan, Hugh Scott and David Ferrand, 2004, *Making Markets Work for the Poor, An objective and approach for governments and development agencies*, ComMark Trust

#### Re: Resource Action Group (RAG)

Gender Links Associates 2001, *Gender Audit of Dutch Support to the Youth Policy Sector*, <http://www.genderlinks.org.za/docs/advisory/youth.pdf>

Resource Action Group 1999, *Survey of ex-trainees report*

RAG 1998, *Narrative Progress Report to RNE*

RAG 1999, *Narrative Report to the RNE Operation Hope Report 1998 - 1999*

RAG 2000, *Narrative Progress Report to RNE*

RAG, 2001, *Narrative Progress Report to RNE*

Altensteadt, Victor 1998, 'From Rag to Riches', *Track Two*, Centre for Conflict Resolution vol. 7 no 3. [www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7\\_3/p24.html](http://www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7_3/p24.html)

<http://www.idasa.org/newsletter/2004%20edition%201.pdf>

Youth Development Network, 2005, *Narrative Report for RNE*

Re: Centre for Opportunity Development (COD)

Youth Development Network, 2005, *Narrative Report for RNE*

<http://www.jasa.org.za>

Re: Grassroots

GRASSROOTS *Annual Reports 1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006*, Athlone: Grassroots

Renkema, Fedde and Norma Rudolph 1995, *Evaluation of Dutch assistance to ELRU and GAETT*, December

Rickards, Jinny 1996, *Final Report to The Royal Netherlands Embassy*

## 2. Background

Ambe, Donald & Dean Peacock 2006, *Understanding Men's Perceptions of their Own and Government's Response to Violence Against Women. Findings From a Survey Of 945 Men in the Greater Johannesburg Area*, Sonke Gender Justice Network, Johannesburg

Baskin, J. 1993, *Communities, Conflict and Negotiated Development*, report of a seminar 23 June, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

Beck, T. and others 2003, *Small and Medium Enterprises, Growth and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence*, Policy Research Working Paper 3178, Washington DC: World Bank

Bond, P. 2006, *Neoliberal urban policy: Are those Planact fingerprints?*, Paper presented to the Planact conference on NGOs as Innovators and Agents of Change: A history interpreted by development practitioners, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 5 August 2006; source: <http://www.planact.org.za/>

CASE 1994, *Micro-Enterprise Development in South Africa*, Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry (authors: Ros Hirschowitz and Mark Orkin)

Charlton, S. 2005, *An Overview of the Housing Policy and Debates, Particularly in Relation to Women (or Vulnerable Groupings)* Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

Dammers, Chris and others 1998, *Study on European Union Support for Decentralized Cooperation in South Africa*, Brussels: COTA

DGIS, 1994 *Stedelijke Armoedebestrijding*, Sector- en themabeleidsdocumenten van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, DGIS, Den Haag

Elkan, W. 1989 'Policy for Small-Scale Industry: A Critique', *Journal of International Development*, 1:2, pp. 231-260

Everatt, David 2001 'From Urban Warrior to Market Segment? Youth in South Africa 1990-2000' *Development Update*, 3:2

EC Court of Auditors 1998, *Special Report No 7/98 in respect of the European Community Development Aid Programme regarding South Africa (1986-1996)*. Brussels: European Community

Haggblade, S. 1992, 'A Proposal for monitoring small enterprise promotion' *Small Enterprise Development* 3:4

Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project 1996, *South Africa: The State Response to Domestic Violence and Rape*, New York: Human Rights Watch

IODSA 1999, *Report on Evaluations of Donor Assistance to the Republic of South Africa, 1994 - 1999*, International Development Cooperation, Johannesburg: International Organisation Development South Africa

IODSA 2002, *Evaluation of ODA to Democracy and Good Governance. Report to Department of Finance*, International Development Cooperation, Johannesburg: International Organisation Development South Africa

IOB, 2004, *On solidarity and Professionalisation. Evaluation of Municipal International Cooperation (1997-2001)*, The Hague: Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, IOB Evaluations Nr. 297

Karungu, P., E. Marabwa & M. Stettler 2002, *Evaluation of ODA to the SMME Sector, Report to Department of Finance*, International Development Cooperation, Johannesburg: IODSA

Maclsaac, N. 1996, *Micro-Enterprise Support: A Critical Review*, Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1990, *Een wereld van verschil. Nieuwe kaders voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking in de jaren negentig*. Den Haag: SDU-Uitgeverij

Mohammed, S. and K. Finnoff 2005, 'Capital Flight from South Africa 1980-2000' in G. Epstein (ed) *Capital Flight and Capital Controls In Developing Countries*, London: Edward Elgar, pp. 85-115

Pieterse, Edgar 2004, 'Recasting Urban Integration and Fragmentation in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Development Update*, 5:1, pp. 81-104

- Pillay, P. and E. Tjønneland 2002, *From Aid to Partnership. A Joint Review of Norwegian-South African Development Co-operation 1995-2001*, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute
- Pollin, R. and others 2006, *An Employment-Targeted Economic Program for South Africa*, New York: United Nations Development Program
- Reitzes, M. and Steven Friedman, 2001, *Funding Freedom? Synthesis report on the impact of foreign political aid to civil society organisations in South Africa*, Research Report Number 85, Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.
- Richards, R. and others 2007, 'Measuring Quality of Life in Informal Settlements in South Africa' *Social Indicators Research* 81: pp. 375-388
- Rodrik, Dani 2006, *Understanding South Africa's Economic Puzzles*, Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Development Project on South Africa
- Rogerson, Christian 2004, 'The impact of the South African government's SMME programmes: a ten-year review (1994-2003)' *Development Southern Africa*, 21:5 December, pp. 765-784.
- Royston, Lauren. 2004, *South Africa: The Struggle for Access to the City in the Witwatersrand Region*, [http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-32030-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-32030-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)
- Seekings, Jeremy and N. Nattrass 2005, *Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa*, New Haven: Yale University Press
- SPM Consultants 1996, *Evaluation of the European Special Programme on South Africa. Main Report*, Stockholm: SPM.
- Smit, Warren 2004, 'The Urban Imagination and Realpolitik' *Development Update*, 5:1
- SA Cities Network 2006, *State of the Cities Report 2006*, Johannesburg: South African Cities Network
- South Africa Department of Housing 2006, *Annual Report 2005-2006*, Pretoria: Department of Provincial and Local Government
- Topham, S. and others 2005, *Swedish Support to Urban Development and Housing in South Africa*, Sida Evaluation 05/07, Stockholm: SIDA Department for Africa
- UNDP 2004, *South Africa Human Development Report 2003*, New York and Pretoria: United Nations Development Program
- Van Donk, Mirjam and Edgar Pieterse 2004, 'Contextual Snapshots: Development Challenges and Responses During the Transition' in E. Pieterse & F. Meintjies (eds), *Voices of the Transition. The Politics, Poetics and Practices of Social Change in South Africa*, Sandown: Heinemann, pp. 38-52

## Appendix D. Questions for Field Study - South Africa

To assess the policy of the Netherlands Government regarding urban development in South Africa, information is required about the design and performance of the activities it selected for financial support. Indicated below in six categories are the issues for which this study needs information. These correspond with the main issues posed in the *Terms of Reference, Evaluating Dutch aid efforts in support of sustainable urban development (1991-2004)*.

Information is to be gathered from documentation on the project and implementing organisation(s) or “project holders”, as well as from two kinds of respondents:

- persons involved in, or with close knowledge of the processes of project design and management;
- persons meant to be main beneficiaries.

Not all issues/questions are relevant for both kinds of respondents.

Projects selected for attention have been assigned to one of four categories or “echelons”. Responses to all questions are needed regarding projects in echelons 1, 2 and 3. Echelon 4 projects are to be evaluated for ex-post relevance. Such projects may show results with *indirect* bearing on main Dutch urban development policies. For those projects, responses are required only to questions under 4 (sustainability), 5 (impact), 6.2 (project relevance) and 6.3.6 (cross-cutting themes).

### 1. System of Objectives

- 1.1 Problem analysis - was one explicitly made? If so, how adequately? Did it fit South African context? Was it based on best available causal knowledge? Developed with or influenced by priority groups?
- 1.2 Was the programmatic response -- the system of short, mid- and long-term objectives -- designed around an adequate cause-and-effect logic?

### 2. Effectiveness

- 2.1 Specify outputs and degree of their congruence with outputs/results planned
- 2.2 Specify qualitative and quantitative outcomes (effects/results) of outputs and their congruence with project purposes. Whether intended or not, specify outcomes in terms of enhanced (or reduced) participation by poor and marginalized.
- 2.3 Specify qualitative and quantitative outcomes in influencing public agendas on key issues: habitat; basic social services; government & institutional development; work & income; integrated urban development.

### 3. Efficiency

Were activities/outputs completed on time and within budget? Specify among financial, human and material inputs, and activities planned and realized.

### 4. Sustainability

- 4.1 For how long, and to what extent did project activities continue after the end of Dutch support?
- 4.2 For how long, and to what extent did project outcomes (effects/results) continue to flow after the end of Dutch support? Specifically:

- 4.2.1 *Institutional and organisational outcomes*: To what extent have project results become embedded in an organisation or routine system? How reflected in management, work processes, budgeting, collaborative relations with “boundary partners” of the organisation? Are processes and results originating in the project financially sustainable?
- 4.2.2 *Formal recognition and authority*: To what extent did the project holder(s) gain official (legal) recognition, or subsidization, by public authorities, or status/appreciation by authoritative organisations, persons? To what extent did the project influence wider public policy or legislation?
- 4.2.3 *Interest and Benefits for Users*: Among intended beneficiaries, what is the extent of uptake, or evidence of interest and appreciation in project processes and results? What changes (material, non-material; objective, subjective) do intended beneficiaries attribute to the project?
- 4.2.4 *Development of Knowledge and Capacity*: To what extent did project holders improve or expand knowledge and skills among themselves and among intended beneficiaries? Did the project improve/enlarge an reservoir of knowledge accessible to others, including priority social groups? To what extent did it contribute innovations?

## 5. Impact

- 5.1 How and to what extent has the project’s priority social group been affected in the short and long term (in terms of living standards, exercise of citizenship, self-respect, etc.)?
- 5.2 How and to what extent did the project contribute to changes in public policies and practices with detectable influence on urban poverty, exclusion and inequality in South Africa? To changes in policies and practices favoring integrated urban development?

## 6. Relevance of Netherlands Policy

- 6.1 To what extent was Dutch policy on urban development an adequate response to the problem(s) the Dutch wanted to see addressed?
- 6.2 To what extent were the chosen interventions (projects, activities) adequate responses to the problems prioritized by Netherlands policy? Were project objectives consistent with needs and priorities of
- intended beneficiaries,
  - South Africa,
  - global development priorities (in re urban development)
  - Netherlands funding authorities.
- 6.3 To what extent were the following policy priorities reflected in the project:
- 6.3.1 Habitat delivery [ including aspects of planning and system management ]
- Housing [specify type, size, affordability of housing, building materials used; integration of land rights, finance, organisation]
  - land access, land rights [specify degree of embedding in system of land registry, titles, credit, improved infrastructure such as sanitation]
  - access to transport and energy [specify type of transport, whether public or private, fuel economy &c.]
  - access to drinking water [specify type: well, central tap, house connection, degree of elaboration, such as for sanitation]
  - access to sanitation [specify type and degree of collective vs private provision]

- 6.3.2 Basic Social Services delivery [ including aspects of planning and system management ]
- safety and crime [specify degrees of attention along spectrum from simple control through prevention ]
  - food and nutrition [ specify approaches: production, distribution, improved purchasing power and/or control over purchases at household level, etc]
  - basic health [specify type of intervention from basic curative to educative/preventive and health monitoring ]
  - basic education [ specify degree of formality and degree of attention to access by vulnerable groups ]
- 6.3.3 Urban Government and Institutional Development
- Participation of the poor in decision-making; accountability to the poor
  - legislation, rules, policy
  - policy-making processes
  - public management
- 6.3.4 Work and Income
- promoting creation of decent jobs
  - protecting formal and especially informal sector workers
  - enabling entry into markets for decent jobs
  - enabling entrepreneurship [licensing, credit, training]
  - promoting consumer protection
- 6.3.5 Integrated urban development
- Promoting equity, ending “apartheid city”
  - improving municipal coherence and efficiency
- 6.3.6 Cross-cutting themes
- Was attention paid to gender equity?
  - Was attention paid to vulnerable groups (non-nationals, elderly, women with dependents, handicapped &c)
  - To what extent did the project promote research? [ specify kinds of research and dissemination promoted, e.g. baseline studies, policy experiments, comparative models; degree to which research geared to development of practice and policy, promoting citizen awareness and participation]
  - To what extent did the project promote respect for cultural and religious, diversity?

## Appendix E. Terms of Reference for Research Assistants, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape

### South Africa Field Study

#### Evaluation of Dutch Government Support regarding the Urban Sector

To fulfill the *Terms of Reference, Evaluating Dutch aid efforts in support of sustainable urban development (1991-2004)*, the South Africa field study requires information on effects and outcomes of a sample of projects/organisations. Among these are:

[ a listing of project holders to be visited in the respective metropolitan area ]

The research assistant would work in close consultation with the South Africa Field Study team of consultants, with [name of chief evaluator] as chief point of contact. In regard to these three projects/organisations noted above, the research assistant would be expected to:

1. help identify of persons, or groups of persons, who were expected to benefit from the project activities noted above. Of primary importance are “intended beneficiaries” or “end users” of project activities; also to be approached would be persons at intermediary levels, such as project trainees or officials whose approaches or understanding the project sought to influence.
2. help obtain written material (such as reports on specific activities, reports of evaluations, &c) of relevance to the study.
3. interview a selected number of those identified, either individually or, where possible, in groups of two or more. Interviews may be face-to-face or by telephone, depending on circumstances. Among the main kinds of questions to be posed to interviewees are:
  - a) What were circumstances of your involvement with the project activity/ organisation (As trainee? As participant in carrying out project work? Member of consultative or steering group? Etc. Over what period(s) of time? Are you still in contact with the project/organisation?)
  - b) What changed for you personally, in the short term, as a result of your involvement in the project/organisation? In the longer term, what difference (if any) did your involvement make for your working or personal life? Please cite specifics (changed professional know-how? Changed self-confidence? Changed connections/ relationships? Etc.)
  - c) What changed for wider groupings (at community level, among other organisations, among certain types/categories of people) as a result of the project/organisation? You may not have specific, first-hand knowledge of changes at these wider levels, but please be as specific as possible.
  - d) To the best of your knowledge, have any project/organisation activities led to changes in the ways official bodies approach the issues (different ways of talking about or approaching the issues? Different policies, practices, budgeting? Etc.)
  - e) In comparison with other projects/activities/organisations that you know trying to address the same issues, was there anything special about the project/organisation we’re talking about here? Are there special strong points, or weak points, that stand out?
4. provide a written report that both summarises main findings and reaches conclusions in regard to sustainability and impact, as indicated in *Questions for Field Study - South Africa*.

Time allocation: Up to XX hours (x days) at Rands 1500 per day. Time will be spread out over the month of February 2007.