

**Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

**Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)**

**EVALUATING DUTCH AID EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF  
SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1991-2004)**

**FIELD STUDY ETHIOPIA**

***Final Report***

**28 May 2006**

**Theo van der Loop  
NEDWORC Foundation  
Zeist, The Netherlands.  
[www.nedworcfoundation.nl](http://www.nedworcfoundation.nl)**

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## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AASP	Addis Ababa Sewerage Project
AAWSA	Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority
ADLI	Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation
ADMAS	Child Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (NGO)
ANUMI	African Network of Urban Management Institutions
BEMO	Policy Memorandum (“Beleidsmemorandum”)
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CIBISIDO	Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization
CRDA	Christian Relief and Development Association
DA	Development Association
DOC	Daughters of Charity
DPPC	Disaster and Prevention Preparedness Committee
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
FGAE	Family Guidance Association Ethiopia
FUPI	Federal Urban Planning Institute
FWFCA	Former Women Fuelwood Carriers Association
GTZ-IS	German Technical Assistance – International Services
HP	Health Post
IDMO	Identification Memorandum
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IGU	Income Generating Units
IHA/UDP	Integrated Holistic Approach/Urban Development Programme
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDP	Municipal Development Programme
MFI	Micro Finance Institution
MILIEV	Environment and Economic Independence (Programme of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MOFA	Ministry of Federal Affairs (recently changed into Ministry of Works and Urban Development)
MOFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MOLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MWUD	Ministry of Works and Urban Development (before 2001, and again from October 2005; from 2001 – 2005 Urban Development was under the Ministry of Federal Affairs)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NUPI	National Urban Planning Institute
ORAAMP	Office for the Revision of the Addis Ababa Master Plan
ORET	Development-Related Export Transactions (Programme of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
PANE	Poverty Action Network Ethiopia
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PHC	Primary Health Care
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSCAP	Public Service Capacity Building Programme
SCP	Sustainable Cities Programme
SCP-Dessie	Street Children Project (Dessie)
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SFPI	Specialised Financial and Promotional Institution
TAS	Training, Activities (income) and Sites (TAS Approach)
TDHL	Terre des Hommes Lausanne, Switzerland
TOR	Terms of Reference
UDCBO	Urban Development Capacity Building Office (previously UDSS)
UDP	Urban Development Programme; two separate projects: a) part of IHA/UDP, and b) overall programme of DOC.

UDSS	Urban Development Support Services (now: UDCBO)
UFDE	Urban Field Development in Ethiopia
UHP	Urban Health Program in Addis Ababa
UMP	Urban Management Programme (UN-Habitat)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
WFC	Women Fuelwood Carriers

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
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In Ethiopia a team of senior experts has been involved:

- Dr. Zewdie Shibre
- Dr. Hailom Banteyerga
- Dr. Solomon Mulugeta
- Dr. Tegegne Gebre Egziabher
- Mr. Zikre Negatu

A number of others have been helpful in the collection of data on which this report is based, and they have been mentioned in Appendix H. Furthermore, this study benefited greatly from the good cooperation of a large number of intermediary and implementing organisations, as well as of the various categories of beneficiaries.

Acknowledgements are also due to the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Ethiopia, in particular, Mrs. Antoinette Gosses, Deputy Head of Delegation, and in Kenya, in particular Mr. Jan Bauer.



**Map 1: Ethiopia, and the location of Addis Ababa and Dessie ('Dese').**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Background and Goal of the Evaluation

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has embarked on the programme evaluation, entitled “Evaluating Dutch Aid Efforts in Support of Sustainable Urban Development (1991-2004)”. This programme evaluation consists of several elements, including Field Studies in four countries: Ethiopia, Nicaragua, the Philippines and South Africa (cf. Appendix A). The present report concerns the field study in Ethiopia which was the first of the four, and therefore is to provide the model for the other country studies.

The main reasons behind the decision to conduct this evaluation by IOB are the relevance of the topic of sustainable urban development, the considerable resources devoted to it in recent years by the Netherlands government, and the fact that it has not previously been evaluated by IOB. In 1991 the Spearhead Programme on Combating Urban Poverty was created, and in its sectoral policy document “Urban Poverty Alleviation” of 1994 five priority themes were identified: Work and income, Habitat, Social services, Urban government and institutional development, and Integrated urban development. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether the resources committed to sustainable urban development helped to meet policy goals. A secondary purpose is to assess the strategic choices made in implementing the policy. The research questions cover the five evaluation criteria: Efficiency, Effectiveness, Relevance, Sustainability, and Impact. The goal of the Field Study Ethiopia is to investigate whether the impression arisen out of the desk research of the project and programme files corresponds to the reality on the ground (viz. Appendix A).

### Methodology

The projects and programmes were distinguished by IOB in four different ‘Echelons’ according to the degree in which the Spearhead Programme Sustainable Urban Poverty Reduction was involved. In Echelon I projects this involvement is greatest in that projects have been designed with close involvement of the Spearhead and funded directly by it; the involvement decreases along the echelons with Echelon IV projects experiencing no relation at all with the urban policy as such.

The actual field mission Ethiopia is divided in three main parts: the evaluation of the Ethio-Dutch bilateral projects, the evaluation of the multilateral projects implemented in Ethiopia, and the establishment of an overview of urban policies in Ethiopia in the past 15 years. The methods used in the field were the following: field visits to the project sites; interviews with implementing organisations; surveys, group discussions and/or interviews with the end-users/beneficiaries; certain project specific methods; writing a brief evaluation/appraisal paper for each project; interviews at Ethiopian Ministries; and interviews with staff of UN-Habitat and of the Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi.

### Policy Responses to Urban Problems in Ethiopia

In this Chapter an investigation is made of the policy responses to urban problems in Ethiopia and in how far that relates to Dutch urban policies. In Ethiopia three periods can be distinguished. Firstly, the period before 1991 in particular characterised by the Marxist government which nationalized urban land and rental housing. Secondly, the decade of the 1990's when the country as a whole had been experiencing market-oriented reform. The final period (since 2000), has shown most developments in the urban arena in particular as a result of the poverty reduction strategy process. Although there have been incidental measures related to urban development in Ethiopia, there has not been a comprehensive national urban development policy, neither before 1991, nor in the 1990s. The neglect of cities was caused by several factors, in particular the low urbanisation rate (17%), and the government's almost exclusive focus on Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI). This relative neglect of the cities even resulted in an *increase* (albeit small) in urban poverty.

The analysis in Chapter 2 concludes that in the 1990s there were not many commonalities between Ethiopian and Dutch policies on urban development; the Dutch policy was more a kind of reaction to the neglect by the Ethiopian government. Dutch projects and programmes were often providing support to the existing programmes of Ethiopian NGOs and CBOs, and as such the Dutch policy was complementary to the Ethiopian policy. However, in recent years the Ethiopian government has approved a National Urban Development Policy, and is currently in the process of approving its



second Poverty Reduction Strategy paper (PRSP), entitled: "Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty" (PASDEP), which has a solid urban component. It is shown in Chapter 2 that the four pillars of the PASDEP Urban Development Strategy and its three main supporting action areas, in fact, have many commonalities with the five priority themes of the Dutch policy on sustainable urban development. Both the international donor community's efforts and the Dutch advisory capacities in the area of urban development have played a role to influence the Ethiopian government in this area. In sum, during the 1990s the Dutch projects and programmes related to urban development did not influence the process of policy formulation in Ethiopia very much. They did, however, support and thereby influence NGOs and CBOs who later became an integral part of the comprehensive consultation process for establishing Ethiopia's poverty reduction strategies. This is another factor causing the urban policies to show so many similarities in recent times.

### **Bilateral Projects: Echelon 1 and 2**

The seven bilateral projects are analysed and appraised in the Chapters 3 and 4. There are three Echelon-1 projects, one in Echelon-2 and the last three are in Echelon-4. In this section, representing Chapter 3, the four projects of the Echelons 1 and 2 will be assessed according to the five evaluation criteria and their indicators as mentioned in Appendix G. This appendix also gives the average scores for these four projects taken together. All four projects of Echelons 1 and 2 were based on a solid problem analysis. In fact, quite a lot of preparations were made: studies were done, surveys were undertaken, and discussions were held with staff at the Ministry and with implementing organisations in The Netherlands and in Ethiopia. Moreover, in most cases (except in the case of the UFDE-project) the future beneficiaries participated in quite direct ways: the involvement of beneficiaries and local intermediary organisations took place through surveys, discussions and/or local committees. As a result of these various rounds of studies and discussions, quite a lot of adjustments were made to the original project proposals. This resulted on the one hand in proposals well-adapted to the local circumstances, but often preparations took such a long time that either the momentum was lost, or the interest of certain stakeholders gradually waned, and participants became impatient and started putting pressure on intermediary organisations. This in turn led the latter to propose *pilot phases* (SCP-Dessie and UFDE) in stead of trying to pursue the full project proposed originally, or to request a reduced amount of funding to speed up the approval procedure (UHP).

### **A-Efficiency**

The four Echelon 1 & 2 projects analysed in the above are in size and scope relatively small projects, and on the whole they have more characteristics of projects undertaken by International NGOs than by Governments; in fact, in most of these projects NGOs and governments are cooperating. In order to establish whether the policy has been implemented effectively we will look into three factors: money, contents and time.

#### *Money*

In funding terms the Echelon 1 projects are small with between Euro 70,000 to 210,000 each. In other words the funding directly derived from the Urban Development Policy has amounted in Ethiopia only to about 360,000 Euro. The Echelon-2 project (IHA/UDP) received, with Euro 730,000, twice as much as all Echelon-1 projects taken together. Keeping in mind that it concerns low levels of funding, in some projects still the amount spend per beneficiary were discussed and judged on the high side (for example, in the SCP-Dessie project about 1,800 Euro was spend on each of the 45 girls). However, in most instances there are also other beneficiaries, who benefit only from specific parts of the project (e.g. the families of street children that received housing), but most importantly *pilot* projects are usually expected to be more costly. In conclusion, the financial efficiency in the four projects has been clearly on an acceptable level, and the input of human and material resources has been quite appropriate.

#### *Contents*

The contents of the four projects do not point to a coherent policy or programme; therefore, they are too diverse. Although all of them have aspects of integrated, urban development, the extent of it varies greatly. With respect to the specific contents, certain projects are rather limited (mainly health, focus on street children), while the others are much broader (land & housing, integrated slum upgrading).

#### *Time*

Time has been less efficiently used. Not only was there often a long preparation period, but most projects required budget neutral extensions due to such factors as underutilisation of funds and slow implementation. In certain cases this was due to external factors, such as the slow disbursement of funds by donors. The four projects lasted on average a total of about four years, which is quite long for such relatively small projects. The project that took least time (SCP-Dessie) was even cut short by exceptional circumstances: since the international NGO was leaving Ethiopia altogether the remaining funds were simply distributed among the 45 beneficiaries.

### **B-Effectiveness**

Considering the area of effectiveness, it has to be remembered that the projects differ substantially in the number and scope of activities planned: from modest (SCP-Dessie) to an almost endless list of activities (IHA/UDP). The projects are considered effective in that the majority of the planned activities were actually realised (SCP-Dessie, IHA/UDP), or that the *main* activities were realised (UFDE), while one project mainly failed (UHP).

### **C-Relevance**

The relevance scores established before the field study on the basis of files (cf. the B-columns in Appendix G) does not change substantially when the local stakeholders' opinions are considered as assessed by the evaluators (cf. the A-columns in Appendix G). Although not funded from the Dutch Urban Development Policy budget, IHA/UDP scores highest and its integration aspect is greatest; SCP-Dessie and UFDE have similar scores in the medium range, while UHP is clearly least relevant and also least integrated.

#### *Cross-cutting Issues*

From the cross-cutting issues, gender has been explicitly considered in all four projects with positive results for the women/girls involved; the same can be said about the involvement of vulnerable groups (except for the UFDE project). Research has been important in two projects (UFDE and IHA/UDP): both project proposals were based on prior research, while publications were also made on the experiences gained with the respective project implementations. Finally, UFDE also came about through an explicit request from the Addis Ababa City Government (i.e demand orientation).

### **D-Sustainability**

#### *(a) Institutional and organizational strength*

Some of the projects were part of a broader organisation, while others stimulated the rise of new local organisations. The Urban Health Project (UHP) was only a small part of a much broader organisation, the Daughters of Charity (DOC), having clear operational and financial procedures, some stability in funding and long term goals within their Urban Development Programme. With DOC's various activities funded by different donors, it was often difficult to identify the actual project activities. However, the Primary Health Care strategy itself failed because there was not enough flexibility to adjust to the changing government policies. The IHA/UDP project is also part of a broader organisation with clear procedures; its long term strategy is one of exiting the project area once a new, local organisation can take over certain functions; however, the new organisation in question, the 'Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization' (CIBISIDO), seemed integrated but remains dependent on the parent organisation and lacks participation from the residents. In the other two projects, new local organisations arose: some were quite successful in acquiring benefits for the community (e.g. in both project sites of UFDE), while the other one was temporarily successful (SCP-Dessie).

#### *(b) Formal recognition and authority.*

The formal recognition in two projects occurs mainly through the mother organisations (DOC, IHA/UDP), but the informal associations themselves have little recognition or authority. This is different for the SCP-Dessie and UFDE projects, where the local organisations do have formal recognition from local governments, although the Development Association in the Addis Ababa site is much more formally recognised than the CBO in Debre Zeit.

#### *(c) Interest and benefit of users*

The levels of interest of the users are relatively higher in the UFDE and SCP-Dessie projects since they were able to actually acquire concrete benefits for the users. In addition, the users' interest has clearly been decreasing in the two other projects compared to earlier phases of the projects in

question: in UHP all project activities collapsed after a promising start, and in the IHA/UDP project the local organisation is as we have seen losing the confidence of the beneficiaries.

*(d) Development of knowledge and capacity*

In most projects the interventions resulted in substantial transfers of knowledge, awareness and skills by means of specialised project staff and/or through participation in local and community associations. Many of these staff members were retained within the area, and could continue undertaking their tasks; the positive role of the associations have been discussed already in the above. Generating new knowledge has become more difficult after the closure of the projects.

The four aspects of sustainability taken together lead to lower field study scores (A-column in Appendix G) compared to the scores of the desk study (B-column) for two projects (UHP, IHA/UDP), especially because the interest of the users waned and the formal recognition dropped in the course of the project period. The reverse holds true for the UFDE project where especially the users' interests and the formal recognition received a boost with all the benefits the local organisations were able to acquire for them though the local governmental organisations in recent years. The scores of the SCP-Dessie project were quite stable before and after the field study.

### **E-Impact**

On the short term all four projects had clear positive effects or impact. Living conditions improved for the target groups either directly, or indirectly through access to land (UFDE). Effects on the longer term for a broader group or area than that of the beneficiaries are positive: neighbours benefit in certain cases (UHP, SCP-Dessie), or the residents of adjacent neighbourhoods (IHA/UDP), or the people in the area where the project beneficiaries came from (UFDE). However, the overall poverty situation is not likely to change as a result of such small-scale projects. The two pilot projects could have had such a wider-ranging impact if only the original proposals could have been implemented. The project area of IHA/UDP, Teklehaimanot, has, of course, been a learning ground and this could well benefit other slum upgrading activities that this organisation is currently involved in. This applies to a lesser extent to UHP since the strategy was rendered un-viable after the change of health policy, and the remainder of the project was mainly stop-gapping, and even outright hand-over of remaining funds to the clinic in order to support its change of purpose.

Whether the projects were a useful reaction to the problems identified, varied greatly. UHP, although there were benefits for the users in the initial phase, turned out to be useless once the policy changed. SCP-Dessie was very useful and was actually replicated (until it ran out of funds). UFDE was useful to acquire a plot of land to live on; in both sites this 'simple' fact appeared to be sufficient to motivate the residents to set up local organisations to pressurize the local government for various necessities. IHA/UDP was useful for several years, but seems to have run into its limits: deteriorating housing conditions, declining participation of residents, and government attitudes favouring outright demolition.

As stated in the above, the long preparation procedures led implementing organisations to propose *pilot phases* (SCP-Dessie and UFDE) or to request a reduced amount of funding to speed up the approval procedure (UHP). However, in neither of these cases was ever again referred back to the original amounts; not only did no follow-up of the pilot phases take place, but no attempts whatsoever were made to revive these projects; a notable case in point is the "closure" of the UFDE-project where an evaluation of the pilot phase was budgeted and scheduled, but in the end never undertaken and somehow 'forgotten'. This is the more surprising since these three projects were of the Echelon-1. The local communities often tried to pick up the pieces and form associations which became successful against all odds, or perhaps because they had no more alternatives left. On the whole, it seems that most of these projects were quite suddenly abandoned by stakeholders, in particular by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Embassy and/or implementing organisations. In part, this can be explained by the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and the complete stop on new commitments (including project extensions) in either of the two countries. However, it needs to be found out from the other field study countries if this represents a pattern, for example coinciding with the fate of the Spearhead and its aftermath, or that the situation in Ethiopia was unique (in particular due to the conflict). One of the recommendations resulting from the above will underline the continuity of policies which has proven to be of crucial importance for the sustainability and the impact of programmes, such as the Dutch Urban Poverty Reduction programme.

#### **Bilateral Projects: Echelon 4**

In this section (cf. Chapter 4) the three projects of the Echelon 4 will be compared according to ex-post relevance, sustainability and impact and their indicators as mentioned in Appendix G. The Echelon-4 projects were also mainly based on a kind of problem analysis, but in general this was a much shorter process (than for the Echelon 1&2 projects), and especially in the case of the two ORET projects it concerned mainly technical issues. These processes were also much more characterised by the involvement of Ethiopian counterparts in the decision-making process: since under ORET the counterpart has to guarantee 40% of the funding, the feeling of ownership is much more developed.

#### **Relevance**

The relevance scores established before the field study on the basis of files (cf. Appendix G) do not change substantially when the local stakeholders' opinions are considered. It decreases for the WFC, while it increases a little for the other two projects. All three projects are characterised by one dominant aspect, and one minor score; thus, the integration aspect is rather limited. The question arises if any problems could be attributed to this lack of integration of the priority themes. This applies not so much to the DAF project, since there were hardly any serious problems, but it does apply for the other projects. The WFC project was a success until the loan capital was finally transferred from the ILO to a commercial Micro Finance Institution (MFI) which took a long time to select since there were only a few MFI's at that time. However, the association, FWFCFA, had not build up enough capacity and leadership to guide this process effectively. Once the hand-over was complete the donors and implementing organisations never looked back to the project, partly because of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. A more integrated approach, with more participation from the beginning from the women themselves and from their association (i.e. FWFCFA), could indeed have brought about a closer involvement of this association and thereby better guidance and monitoring of the credit disbursements and repayment process. In the case of the AASP a larger focus on integration is likely to have gone a long way in preventing some of the serious problems that arose in this project. For example, an expert firm (Tauw Milieu) recommended a close monitoring of sludge collection in the *small* communities and the participation of the community thereby, but there is no evidence at all that this was undertaken. As it happened, certain communities turned against transfer stations and the nuisance (in particular the stench) they caused, and with the help of the Kebele one was even (temporarily) shut down. With a more integrated approach, including community participation and proper management of the stations, the intervention is indeed likely to have attained a much higher (ex-post) relevance.

The question whether the Echelon 4 projects could be more relevant than the Echelon1&2 projects remains difficult to answer. The WFC project, similar in funding requirements to the Echelon 1&2 projects clearly was not, because it failed in particular because it was not integrated enough. The other two projects accomplished significant progress in very specific elements of the urban fabric (i.e. transport and sanitation). However, one has to realise that there are many more such components that need more or less urgent attention, and these two projects absorbed quite a lot of funding from the Dutch (respectively about 22 and 8 million Euro, as compared to only 1 million Euro for the four Echelon 1&2 projects taken together). In addition, these two projects were co-financed by the Ethiopian government who paid 40% of the total project costs. The contribution of the Ethiopian government and implementing organisations in the Echelon 1&2 projects was often provided in kind (building, office space, staff, land, etc.); it is difficult to estimate this contribution in monetary terms, but it will be much lower than 40% (often below 10%). This is likely to have an effect on the feeling of ownership on the side of the Ethiopian organisations involved.

#### *Cross-cutting Issues*

From the cross-cutting issues, gender and vulnerable groups are explicitly considered in the WFC project, and the latter also by the AASP. Demand orientation has played a clear role in both the AASP and DAF projects. Environmental concerns were mandated for the AASP since it was a MILIEV project, but also for the other two projects such concerns played an important role in the design as well as implementation stages of these Echelon-4 projects.

#### **Sustainability**

The average sustainability levels as indicated in Appendix G are similar for Echelon-4 and Echelon-1&2 projects. For AASP and DAF these levels are of course boosted by the organisational strength and formal recognition of the established government organisations implementing the interventions, and claiming the successes of the increased sludge collection and the enhanced urban transport

capacity respectively. The sheer *volume* of the funding also has a lot to do with the greater recognition. However, the problems of the AASP project, in particular the management of transfer stations and the improvement of the access road to one of the sludge lagoons, require urgent attention if the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) is not to lose part of their enhanced recognition. The WFC project has one of the lowest scores for sustainability because the credit model failed decreasing the scores for the recognition of the local organisation (FWFCA), which in itself had acquired some strength since its establishment with help from German donor support.

For both WFC and AASP the interest of the users has fluctuated during the course of the projects resulting in the current downward trends, in particular the lack of credit requests from WFC and the community uprising against the sludge transfer stations. The DAF busses are still appreciated but in the mean time several other deliveries of busses have supported the service level of Anbassa City Bus Service company. Once developed, knowledge and capacity have less to suffer from the ups and downs of a project.

### **Impact**

Regarding impact a comparison can be made between the Echelon-4 projects and the Echelon 1&2 projects. The two projects absorbing by far the most funding could have been expected to make the biggest impact. Both the AASP and the DAF projects did make a large impact, however, each affected only *one* of the many problem areas with which Addis Ababa is confronted, i.e. sanitation and transport; and even then, the impact has been only on a limited geographical area (sludge collection for a part of the city), or only for a certain period (until the delivered buses have worn out completely).

On the whole, all seven projects did have some positive effects on the short term which resulted in improvements of living conditions for the target groups and beyond, and about half of the projects also had positive effects on the longer term (cf. Appendix G). To change the overall poverty situation a much broader and more sustained effort is needed as is currently undertaken by the Government of Ethiopia through the PRSP-process (Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, SDPRP-I, and Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty, PASDEP) in which most bilateral and multilateral donors are involved as well. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the interventions of four projects can be considered as a useful reaction to the problems identified at the start, while the strategies of two other projects (UHP and WFC) have to be considered a failure. The seventh project (IHA/UDP) has a sword of Damocles hanging above its impact: the policy of the Addis Ababa City government to demolish the entire neighbourhood.

### **Multilateral Programme: Urban Management Programme (UMP)**

The Echelon-I Urban Management Programme (UMP) in Ethiopia has been much appreciated by various stakeholders although the direct results should not be found in concrete activities on the ground, but much more in less tangible achievements as capacity building and human resource development. Regarding efficiency, it has to be judged with a small 'reasonable' score, in particular because of the slowness in comparison to the amounts of money spend. The contents, however, is relatively highly appreciated (cf. Appendix G). The appraisal of effectiveness comes close to 'Good', because many of the goals have been achieved, as indicated in particular by the achievements indicated in Chapter 2 of this report in the area of, for example, urban national policy formation, urban municipal legislation, and enhanced management structures.

UMP has been a project that was highly supported from the Dutch Urban Development Policy; there were many missions from the Spearhead staff members and close involvement in the selection of the first UMP Director, a Netherlands national. From the viewpoint of the Dutch policy the general relevance of UMP is therefore rather high; however, when looking at the 'Relevance-scores' in Appendix G they are in total rather moderate. The reason is that the programme can only score on two out of five categories. The cross-cutting issues add another positive dimension: although there was no explicit attention for gender, it was clearly directed at the poor, while urban environment was one of the main themes involved. Research has been an integral part of the whole programme, while specific activities were explicitly demand driven.

The sustainability has been judged to be relatively high, due to the institutional strength and formal recognition of the participating institutions in Ethiopia (Ministry of Works and Urban Development, Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO), city administrations, etc.) and in Kenya (UN-HABITAT); on the negative side is the problem that the anchor institution, UDCBO, has been

overloaded as was indicated both by UN-HABITAT and by the experiences of the evaluation team in approaching them. However, the interests of the users and of other stakeholders was particularly high as was underlined in the above. Last but not least, a great deal of knowledge has been generated.

### **Issues for the Future**

There are several issues for the future, some for the other field studies within the present programme evaluation, and some more general issues. The other field studies should look into the issue of ownership in relation to the own contribution of the Ethiopian counterpart organisations. In the present field study it was found that the feeling of ownership is higher in the ORET programmes where the Ethiopian government has to contribute 40% of the total project costs, than in the Echelon 1&2 projects (usually below 10%). Another issue to be investigated in the other field study countries is the way many projects were subject to sudden closure and even outright abandonment. Most of the Echelon 1 projects were quite suddenly abandoned by the stakeholders and donors. In part, this can be explained by the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, but it needs to be investigated in the other field study countries if this represents a pattern, for example coinciding with the fate of the Spearhead and its aftermath.

Two more general issues are the following. A temporary institutionalisation of a policy, as has been done with the Spearhead on Urban Poverty Alleviation, has serious flaws for the sustainability of projects. The main question is who or which institution will follow-up on the promises made and the expectations raised? In the projects under study in the present report, pilot phases were proposed and never even considered for follow-up; projects were implemented with reduced funding in order to speed up approval procedures, but the original budgets were never again raised; and, even more revealingly, projects were not properly evaluated, and no department insisted on it although its funding was budgeted. Although these instances in Ethiopia could partly be explained away with the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, it *cannot* explain why nobody took up the issues again after the end of the conflict two years later. The evidence of the other country studies will be most revealing though.

Finally, time and again throughout this report it has become clear that the continuity of donor policies is of crucial importance for the sustainability and the impact of programmes, such as the Dutch Urban Poverty Alleviation programme, and of projects under this programme. Therefore, the question needs to be asked again whether the instrument of the freezing of aid efforts when conflicts arise is the right one. Perhaps a distinction should, in any case, be made between completely new projects and project extensions since as we have seen in the above the latter is particularly disruptive for the Ethiopian target groups, as well as for the Ethiopian and the Dutch implementing organisations.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

### Context

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has embarked on the programme evaluation, entitled “Evaluating Dutch Aid Efforts in Support of Sustainable Urban Development (1991-2004)”. This programme evaluation consists of several elements, including Field Studies in four countries: Ethiopia, Nicaragua, the Philippines and South Africa (cf. Appendix A). The present report concerns the field study in Ethiopia which was the first of the four, and therefore is to provide the model for the other country studies.

The ‘Field Study Ethiopia’ took place between 5 December 2005 and 31 January 2006 under the responsibility of Dr Theo van der Loop through a contract between IOB of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NEDWORC Foundation, Zeist; the concerned Terms of Reference are added as Appendix B. Within that period, he has made two missions to Ethiopia, and a brief visit to Kenya on the way back from Addis Ababa. In Ethiopia a team of local senior experts has been involved to collect the necessary data from implementing organisations, from beneficiaries of projects and programmes, and from key persons in government institutions, NGO’s and CBO’s, and to report on it. The head consultant for the *global* evaluation of the urban programme, Dr Marc Lammerink, visited Ethiopia from 9 to 12 January 2006 in order to monitor the implementation of the overall ToR (viz. Appendix A), the Framework (viz. Appendix C) and the Checklist (viz. Appendix D) during the field study.

### Background of Evaluation

The main reasons behind the decision to conduct this evaluation by IOB are the relevance of the topic of sustainable urban development, the considerable resources devoted to it in recent years by the Netherlands government, and the fact that it has not previously been evaluated by IOB. In 1991 the Spearhead Programme on Combating Urban Poverty was created as an outgrowth of the policy resolution outlined in the policy document “A world of difference”. The policy on alleviating urban poverty was subsequently elaborated on in another policy document “A world in dispute” and in the sectoral policy document “Urban Poverty Alleviation”, published in 1994 by the Spearhead Programme. This latter document identified five priority themes:

- 1) Work and income,
- 2) Habitat,
- 3) Social services,
- 4) Urban government and institutional development, and
- 5) Integrated urban development.

These different themes received the same “weight” in that policy document. In addition it drew attention to three general themes: women in development, culture, and research. In 1996 the Spearhead programme was discontinued, and urban issues were expected to be mainstreamed in the overall programmes.

### Goal of the Evaluation and of the Field Studies

The purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether the resources committed to sustainable urban development helped to meet policy goals (cf. Appendix A). A secondary purpose is to assess the strategic choices made in implementing the policy. This evaluation is not only an attempt to render account for more than a decade of projects; it is also intended to be a teaching tool for future endeavours. The latter will naturally depend on the outcome of the evaluation and the extent to which lessons can be distilled in the priority areas of work and income, habitat, urban social services, urban government and integrated urban development. Even though urban poverty is not currently seen as a priority, it is widely recognised that meeting the MDGs will largely depend on the results achieved in urban areas, if only because of the sheer number of urban poor. In addition, one of the targets of MDG 7 – ‘ensuring environmental sustainability’ – is achieving ‘a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020’. Two major indicators of progress are access to functional sanitary facilities and safe shelter, including access to land.

The research questions are meant to inspire careful reflection and thoroughgoing analysis. Answering them will involve dissecting policy and scrutinising individual cases. To fulfil the purpose of the evaluation, the following questions will have to be addressed:

- 1) How goal-oriented was the Dutch policy and the resultant portfolio for sustainable urban development? This encompasses: a) the extent to which Dutch policy was a sensible and appropriate response to the problem of urban poverty (later subsumed under the umbrella term 'sustainable urban development') and the Netherlands' position in multilateral fora, in which international agendas and initiatives were shaped; b) the way that plans were translated into action and c) the short and long-term impact of aid efforts.
- 2) How effective were the activities targeting urban poverty? That is to say, were the goals of the project met (with aid largely provided in the form of project funding)? If these goals have not yet been met, is it likely that they will be met in the future?
- 3) How efficient were these activities? What did they cost, and how were these funds allocated (expertise, duration)? Were the activities completed on time and within budget, and were they subject to a monitoring and evaluation system? In other words, what is the relationship between inputs and outputs?
- 4) How sustainable are the results? Will the intended effects endure after the intervention has come to an end?

Given the policy developments in the years covered by the evaluation, it is useful to divide the period into different phases. The most important transition is from a specific focus on alleviating urban poverty to urban development in general, as reflected in the description and implementation of policy.

The questions above, which stem from the results chain system, are summarised in the evaluation matrix in Appendix A. They can be broken down as follows to address the specific target group: men, women and children, and to cover the five evaluation criteria: Efficiency, Effectiveness, Relevance, Sustainability, and Impact.

#### Question set 1

- Is the policy a good response to the problem?
- Are the interventions a good response to the specific problem?
- Have living conditions improved for target groups (with respect to the environment, water supply and income)?
- Has the poverty situation changed?

#### Question set 2

- Are the facilities/services created by the projects actually used?
- Are there more job opportunities?
- Do the urban poor participate in consultative bodies?
- Have the problems of the urban poor become a permanent item on local agendas of both the government and NGOs?
- Has urban poverty become a component of the bilateral relationship?

#### Question set 3

- Have the planned facilities/services been realised within the set time limit and budget?

#### Question set 4

- How long after the end of the intervention will the activities continue?

The above questions should be supplemented with a number of more general questions which are directly inspired by the description of policy:

- How demand-driven were the activities in question?
- Was an effort made to create scope for relevant research?
- What was done to ensure that policy could act as a catalyst?

The above questions are mainly concerned with the more project-oriented activities. In the case of the Dutch role in a forum like Habitat, it will be necessary to look into the extent to which the government's standpoints (as expressed in the instructions given to the ministry's delegations) are reflected in the reports, resolutions, specific activities, etc. (see further Appendix A).



The goal of the Field Study Ethiopia is to investigate whether the impression arisen out of the desk research of the project and programme files corresponds to the reality on the ground, including the issue of relevance and impact (viz. Appendix A and B).

### **Selection and analysis of Projects and Programmes**

The projects and programmes were distinguished by IOB in four different 'Echelons' according to the degree in which the Spearhead Programme Sustainable Poverty Reduction was involved (cf. Appendix E): in Echelon I projects this involvement is greatest in that projects have been designed with close involvement of the Spearhead and funded directly by it; the involvement decreases along the echelons with Echelon IV projects experiencing no relation at all with the Spearhead Programme; these projects were for example financed by other Dutch programmes (e.g. ORET and MILIEV).

The Echelon I and II projects will be studied from the viewpoint of the Urban Poverty Alleviation policy. The five evaluation criteria are applicable in full. Regarding the Echelon III and IV projects, only the ex-post relevance will be investigated (cf. Appendix E): Have those projects designed from a different policy nevertheless contributed to results that were specifically intended by the policy for Urban Poverty Alleviation and/or Sustainable Urban Development?

During the field study the selected projects and programmes were evaluated according to the five main evaluation criteria mentioned above with the help of a Checklist (attached as Appendix D). It was designed on the basis of the ToR (Appendix A) and the Framework (Appendix C) after sustained discussions with IOB and the head consultant. Through the desk research IOB has evaluated the projects and allotted indicative scores to certain evaluation criteria (cf. the columns marked 'B' in Appendix G); in the present study this will be compared with scores and appraisals given by the intermediaries and beneficiaries (cf. columns marked 'A' in the same Appendix), although one has to bear in mind the subjective nature of these 'scores' which are to be analysed solely in conjunction with the qualitative analysis.

### **Methodology**

In The Netherlands Theo van der Loop has reviewed the project files and made summaries and copies to be used in Ethiopia. The actual field mission Ethiopia is divided in three main parts: the evaluation of the Ethio-Dutch bilateral projects, the evaluation of the multilateral projects implemented in Ethiopia, and the establishment of an overview of urban policies in Ethiopia in the past 15 years in order to be related to the Dutch urban policy and initiatives.

#### *1) Evaluation Bilateral Projects*

According to the files, nine urban bilateral projects were registered in Ethiopia for the evaluation period (1991 – 2004). Following the distinction in Echelons explained in the previous section, three of the nine projects were categorized as Echelon I, one project as Echelon II, and the remaining five as Echelon IV. Among the latter, three projects scored positively on two or more of the central themes (mentioned above), while two projects each scored on only one of these themes (cf. Appendix G). Therefore, the latter two projects were not included in the Field Study. The seven projects selected following this procedure are listed in Table 1.1.

**Table 1.1: The selected bilateral projects in Ethiopia.**

<b>Nr.</b>	<b>Abbrev.</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Echelon</b>
1	UHP	Urban Health Program in Addis Ababa	I
2	SCP-Dessie	Street Children Project in Dessie	I
3	UFDE	Urban Field Development in Ethiopia: Pilot Project in Addis A. & Debre Zeit	I
4	IHA/UDP	Integrated Holistic Approach/Urban Development Programme in Addis A.	II
5	WFC	Women Fuelwood Carriers: Pilot Credit Scheme in Addis Ababa	IV
6	AASP	Addis Ababa Sewerage Project (Miliev/ORET)	IV
7	DAF	Delivery of 266 DAF City Busses and spare parts (ORET)	IV

The methods used in the field were the following:

- field visits to the project sites;
- interviews with project coordinators, intermediaries and implementers using the Checklist (Appendix D);
- brief surveys, group discussions and/or interviews with the end-users/beneficiaries using the Checklist (Appendix D);
- certain project specific methods (e.g. making a digital video, contact via e-mail/telephone, collecting project documents, and contacting related government departments);
- writing a brief evaluation/appraisal paper for each project; the seven Project Reports are added to the present report as Attachments.

## *2) Evaluation Multilateral Programmes implemented in Ethiopia*

According to the files, the main multilateral players in the urban arena in Ethiopia are UN-HABITAT, World Bank and UNDP. One of the main multilateral programmes implemented in Ethiopia to which The Netherlands has contributed financially is the Urban Management Programme (UMP) of UN-HABITAT, World Bank and UNDP. The file study (cf. Appendix E) categorized UMP as an Echelon I programme. There are several other activities of UN-HABITAT in Ethiopia, and although it is difficult to directly link them to Dutch financing, an overview will be given of these activities especially since over the years The Netherlands has provided substantial funds for the general and special purpose contributions to UN-HABITAT (cf. Chapter 5).

The methods used to evaluate multilateral programmes are the following:

- Interviews with the responsible persons at UN-Habitat in Nairobi (Director of Regional Office for Africa and the Arab States, Coordinator UMP Programme, Chief of Global Urban Observatory, current and previous head of Ethiopia desk, Chief and staff of Training and Capacity Building Branch);
- Interview with the Deputy Permanent Representative, UNEP/UN-HABITAT, Royal Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi;
- Interviews with the Programme Manager for Ethiopia at the UN-Habitat office in Addis Ababa;
- Interviews with implementing organisations in Ethiopia, who are in some cases also the end-users, such as the Ministry of Works and Urban Development, the former Ministry of Federal Affairs, and the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO); it turned out to be difficult to get all the information required as in particular at this UDCBO the staff seemed to be too busy or unreachable. Even a brief list of questions remained unanswered (cf. Appendix F).

These programmes were targeted mostly at implementing organisations, and not directly at the urban poor.

## *3) Overview of Urban Policies in Ethiopia*

An overview paper was written by a local expert in cooperation with Theo van der Loop which outlines the main issues in the national discussion in Ethiopia with respect to urban development. This deals with the point of view of the government, as well as that of the NGO's. It includes the current discussion as well as its main course of development from the early 1990s onwards (the period of the evaluation). In addition, key persons involved in urban policies were consulted, and their opinions were later incorporated into the urban policy paper (viz. Appendix H). The purpose of this assessment of the Ethiopian urban policies in this period is to relate it to the Dutch urban policy and initiatives.

## **2 POLICY REPONSES TO URBAN PROBLEMS IN ETHIOPIA**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Following the downfall of the semi-feudal government of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974, a hard brand Marxist Junta (known as the Derg) ruled Ethiopia until the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in June 1991. The Derg issued barrages of proclamations, but above all, it was its nationalization of urban and rural land, rental housing, major manufacturing industries, banks, insurance companies, leading business firms, and agricultural enterprises that adversely affected the national economy in general and the urban economy in particular.

Under the leadership of the EPRDF, the country as a whole has been experiencing market-oriented reforms. This reform program has in general led to improvements in economic stability and growth in terms of real GDP, which according to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) averaged about 5% per annum during the greater part of the post 1991 period. Regardless of these facts however, Ethiopia's GDP per capita remains fixed at about 100 US \$ making it one of the poorest countries in the world. The explanation behind this largely lies in the primarily agrarian nature of the economy on the one hand and on the rather high rates of natural increase in the country on the other hand. The urbanisation rate in Ethiopia is one of the lowest in the world with just 17%.

The purpose of this Chapter is to investigate in how far the Dutch policy on urban development is related to the Ethiopian policy responses to urban problems in the country; were there common features, or was the Dutch policy (critically) complementing the Ethiopian policy? A second purpose relates to the project level: in how far were Dutch project initiatives demand driven, and to what extent did they influence the process of policy formulation in Ethiopia? For these purposes this chapter has been divided in three sections reflecting three periods; firstly, the period before 1991 as a background to the discussions (Section 2.2); secondly, the decade of the 1990's and the possible overlaps between the policies of Ethiopia and the Netherlands (Section 2.3); and finally, the substantial recent developments in urban policies in Ethiopia in order to put possible recommendations in the right context (Section 2.4). The answers to the questions mentioned above will further be summarised in the conclusion to this chapter (Section 2.5).

### **2.2 Period before 1991**

Ethiopia has never had a comprehensive national urban development policy until recently. Thus, what we can refer to as urban policy in Ethiopia for the most part is limited to the statements of intent in various national economic development policy documents and to certain key proclamations and regulations concerning urban areas. Although attempts to prepare master plans for cities like Addis Ababa dates back to the first few decades of the 20th century, the Haile Selassie I government has not taken serious measures worth considering urban policy until the late 1950s. Mentions of urban issues, especially the government's concern for addressing urban housing problems do appear in the Second and Third Five Year Development Plans of the country that were published during the early and late 1960s.

The greatest landmark in the Junta's policy towards urban development was Proclamation No. 47, 1975 that nationalized urban land and rental housing. The damages that this proclamation did to the urban economy were so enormous that the Junta itself started to introduce some remedial measures prior to its downfall. Some of these remedial measures included the introduction of a rather new policy of "Mixed Economy". This was a significant shift in policy because espousing such an idea was punishable by death during the early years of the Junta. Because of this policy shift, the government began to open windows of opportunity for private sector investment even in the area of housing provision.

One of the major damages done to the urban sector by the nationalisation of urban land and rental housing (cf. Proclamation 47, 1975) was its almost irreparable disruption of the urban housing market. Nearly all cities and towns of the country are presently suffering from acute housing shortages in large part because of this proclamation. In this regard, the estimated housing backlog in Addis Ababa alone is somewhere around 250,000 to 300,000 units. The great majority of the rental houses nationalized in accordance with the stipulations of this proclamation now constitute the core of slum settlements in the major cities of the country. Some of the restrictions that this proclamation placed on the production of owner-occupied units and affordable rental accommodations are still in place in many parts of the country whereas the rent-freeze that it imposed on public housing has proven to be the major factor behind their neglect and disrepair.

The introduction of modern urban planning practice in Ethiopia dates back to the production of a master plan for Addis Ababa during the short-lived period of Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941. Beginning from this period, Addis Ababa has witnessed the preparation of a number of master plans by famous planners including highly reputed planners like Le Corbusier and Sir Patrick Abercrombie; most of these plans were shelved and later revised. The Haile Selassie Government had also made serious attempts to prepare master plans for several other secondary towns of Ethiopia with the help of foreign consultants. The Derg has accomplished some noticeable works in this regard. One of its main achievements in this area concerns the establishment of a special office to prepare the reputed 1986 Addis Ababa Master Plan and the consequent transformation of the same office to the National Urban Planning Institute.

### **2.3 The Decade of the 1990s**

#### *Decentralization*

The decentralization and democratization efforts in Ethiopia are only about fifteen years old, and in the past there was a strong tradition of centralisation in the country (cf. Van der Loop 2002: 12). Perhaps the most important policy measure that the EPRDF introduced immediately after coming to power in the early 1990s was introducing a federal system of governance. The federal system, which was based mainly on ethnic considerations, constituted nine national regional states. It also reorganized the Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations and placed them directly under the control of the Federal Government.

The process of decentralization has affected the course of urban development in Ethiopia considerably. Perhaps its most important impact in this regard is the positive role that it played by boosting the ability of secondary cities to attract both foreign and domestic investment. Historically Addis Ababa has been attracting the lion's share of either domestic or foreign direct investment until the early 1990s. It was partly because of this that the city emerged as a textbook example of a primate city by housing approximately one-third of the urban population of Ethiopia in the early 1990s. After decentralization took hold however, regional capitals and several other large towns began to attract a substantial proportion of the investment funds that would have otherwise landed in Addis Ababa. As some unpublished reports indicate, for instance, they secured approximately 48 percent of the domestic investment capital approved during the 1992-1998 period. As regards the number of projects approved, their share was even larger, 60.5 percent during the same period (Gashaw, 2000). Due in part to this development, the primacy of Addis Ababa has been on the decline. Currently, despite having an estimated population that is close to 4 million, the city accounts only for about 26 percent of the total urban population of the country. As a direct outcome of this development, it appears that new regional growth poles are on the rise more or less indicating that the administrative decentralization has by default led to the emergence of a decentralized pattern of urban development.

#### *Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI)*

One of the earliest economic development policies introduced by the EPRDF was the declared policy of "Agricultural Development Led Industrialization" (ADLI). Undoubtedly, the principal reason behind the introduction of such a rural-biased economic development policy was the fact that about 80 percent of the population was then and still is living in rural areas. It is important to bear in mind here however, that the government does not only have the welfare of the rural populace as its principal area of concern but it also considers the agricultural sector as the leading source for the generation of the surplus needed to help bring about sustainable growth in other sectors; in addition the rural

population makes up the majority of the electorate, and the recent elections (May 2005) have shown that the political parties in the opposition got most of their votes from the people living in the cities. As a result of the above-mentioned factors, the government gave only limited attention to urban issues especially during the early and mid 1990s due in part to its preoccupation with the rural development agenda. For instance, the factors explaining the government's initial reluctance to formulate policies that can effectively address some of the glaring problems of urban Ethiopia such as the issues of rising unemployment, deepening poverty, acute housing shortage, the fast deteriorating kebele rental units and problems surrounding urban governance seem to lie partly in its preoccupation with ADLI. The cumulative effect of the clearly agrarian oriented national economic development policy of Ethiopia is such that the incidence of poverty has dropped slightly in the rural areas whilst it has risen considerably in urban areas. For instance, the incidence of poverty dropped from 47% in 1995/96 to 45% in 1999/2000 in rural Ethiopia whereas it increased from 33.3% to 37 % in urban Ethiopia during the same period (MOFED, 2002).

#### *Urban Land Lease Legislation and the Urban Poor*

Another main policy decision made by the EPRDF concerning urban development was its passing of the urban land lease legislation by issuing Proclamation No.3. 1994. The principal aim of the proclamation was not only to adopt a market oriented land and housing development system whilst retaining land as public property. It was also a declared intention of the government to create a steady source of revenue for city governments so that they could use incomes generated from leaseholds to provide better municipal services to the citizenry. However, it appears that even the Addis Ababa City Administration has not managed to earn much from such transactions due in part to shortcomings surrounding the implementation of the policy. Currently city administrations are the sole suppliers of land and the Government retains high levels of control over land use and design. In Addis Ababa, a Land Development Agency has been established to assist in converting agricultural land to urban development (it distinguishes different plot sizes and leasehold regulations; cf. Tarekegn Assefa, 2004).

As the experience of most parts of urban Ethiopia indicates, the leasehold system has not only fallen short of generating the expected amount of municipal incomes but also remained insensitive to the housing plights of the urban poor due to two major reasons. The first reason in this regard is the fact that all applicants seeking building land have to deposit a substantial amount of money in a blocked account prior to acquiring access to urban land. As the experience of Addis Ababa shows, those who wish to access building land through the cooperative way are required to deposit Birr 8,000 in a blocked account (the ability to do this, is much more decisive than the official criteria of age and income of the household head). The deposit will be released only after construction has started and work on the housing has reached a certain stage, the minimum of which appears to be the completion of the foundation of the building. In cases that involve leasehold, the house builder should make an advance deposit, which amounts to 20 percent of the amount tendered in a winning tender offer prior to securing the building land.

The second factor is the paucity of credit facilities for potential homebuilders. Not only are such facilities in short supply. The mortgage interest rates fare is also forbiddingly high. Overall, the proportion of households in Addis Ababa that can access bank credit under existing housing and loan regulations are not more than 4 percent of the total (Tarekegn Assefa, 2004). Although it seems that Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs), are on the rise and performing reasonably well, their beneficiaries have been rural residents rather than the urban population. Among the glaring reasons behind this discrepancy are the limited loan ceilings, short loan durations and high interest rates of the MFIs. As the results of an ongoing research at the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Addis Ababa University suggests, the Addis Ababa City Administration has already put in place a special MFI to address this issue. The MFI lends money for households seeking to pay the rather high down payments required to access the condominium flats that the City Administration is producing (see below). Although the program looks well thought out, the great majority of the needy households cannot access the MFI's funds because its interest rates are even higher than that of the mortgage interest rates of the Construction and Business Bank.

#### *Housing and Slum Improvement*

The lack of a comprehensive housing policy did not stop urban administrations to take actions that they hoped would contribute towards improving the urban housing situation. Such actions included encouraging the private sector to provide rental accommodations, the provision of building land to

developers and prospective owner-occupiers and initiating city wide community based slum improvement programs in cities like Addis Ababa. The rate of housing production however, is very low compared to the fast rising demands.

The community based slum improvement programs of Addis Ababa have been going on steady in the recent past. The key players in this regard are the municipal government itself and various NGOs. The beneficiaries participate mainly in the forms of cash contributions and labour and by finally managing finished public works as owners. Although both actors have done a lot to date, the sheer magnitude of the problem dwarfs their rather impressive achievement. It is important to note here that the efforts of both the municipal government and the NGOs have to date concentrated on improving infrastructure while neglecting housing. The principal reason behind this appears to be the fact that a large majority of the units that need improvement are kebele units.

#### *Urban Planning*

Nearly all of the master plans prepared prior to the 1990s were defective in the sense that they were prepared in a non-participatory way and that they tended to focus on the reorganization and beautification of the urban space while failing to address effectively the key social and economic problems of Ethiopian cities and towns. Comparatively the urban planning practice of the post 1991 period has attempted to correct these weaknesses albeit on a limited scale. For instance the recently approved Addis Ababa City Development Plan (2001-2010) prepared by the Office for the Revision of the Addis Ababa Master Plan (ORAAMP) has shown not only depth in the methodological and technical analysis of urban issues, but also in its participatory approach. It has drawn upon the contributions of public sector institutions, professional associations, the private sector and the wider public.

While the Office for the Revision of the Addis Ababa Master Plan (ORAAMP) was busy revising the Addis Ababa master plan, the National Urban Planning Institute was engaged in the preparation of master plans for several other cities and towns of Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the various national regional states have also been producing development plans for some of their urban centers. With the exception of those of Adama and Mekele, both of which have apparently attempted to follow the example set by Addis Ababa, the development plans prepared at regional levels are very much lacking both in quality and content. In virtually all cases however, planning exercises are severely constrained not only by the challenges that rapid urban growth poses but also by low institutional and human capacities. Even when development plans are ready, most city administrations find it extremely difficult to implement them due to a host of financial, legal and technical problems. One major problem worth mentioning here is the conflict of interest that arises between city administrations and the farmers that occupy the expansion areas of the cities. The general understanding is that the city administrations should give appropriate compensations (usually amounting to estimated farm incomes of ten years) to the farmers when they ask them to abandon their farmlands in order to make way for new industrial, commercial or residential development. More often than not, city administrations find it difficult to offer such compensations at the time of eviction partly because the incomes they expect to collect from the leaseholders take a substantially much longer time to accumulate.

## **2.4 The Recent Policy Developments (since 2000)**

#### *Urban Planning*

Crucially, the existing policy and regulatory frameworks allow regional governments to plan and manage their cities. These policies and regulations, however, stop short of allowing the emergence of private urban planning firms. Even though the regional governments have the mandate to prepare master plans for their cities and towns nearly all of them are constrained by serious capacity problems. In fact, almost invariably regional governments and city administrators face dire financial problems and severe shortages of professionals when it comes to plan preparation. Besides, they lack up to date socio-economic data and land information. As a policy response to these problems, the federal government has recently reorganized the National Urban Planning Institute and given it new roles under the slightly modified name of Federal Urban Planning Institute. The present roles of the institute include research and training and serving as the hub of information on the urban areas of the country. In addition to this, the Federal Urban Planning Institute will also be working towards filling the

information gap left by the Federal Mapping Agency with respect to cities and towns. When it comes to plan production, the main role of the Federal Urban Planning Institute would be that of enabling the regional governments and other appropriate institutions including private planning firms to prepare or revise master plans.

As regards the nature of the urban plans, the recent experience, especially that of ORAAMP has been that of abandoning traditional master plan preparation approach in favour of the preparation of structural plans. ORAAMP has, as mentioned earlier registered exemplary achievements in this regard. Both Adama and Mekele have followed the footsteps of Addis Ababa while preparing their development plans. As things stand at present, the country's planning professionals are beginning to show preference for the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) approach apparently based on the South African model. It came about through the South-South cooperation between the cities of Johannesburg and Addis Ababa under the multilateral Cities Alliance programme (see Chapter 5). As the experience of South Africa suggests, IDP is a planning system used mainly at the local government level, for example in South Africa the "Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (2000)" requires municipalities to draw up an IDP as a single, inclusive and strategic development plan (cf. IDP 2004/05). IDP's nature is such that it advocates a phased planning consisting of six major phases.<sup>1</sup> The successful adoption of IDP in the Ethiopian context certainly calls for a large-scale capacity building both at the regional and local government levels.

#### *Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP I)*

As stated earlier, urban poverty has been deepening in Ethiopia in the recent past. Approximately two-thirds of the households in cities like Addis Ababa live at or below subsistence levels (Ashenafi Gossaye, 2001). The Ethiopian government has developed a strategy to address urban poverty in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), entitled "Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program" (SDPRP I; 2002-2005). However, the discussion of the nature and preferred solutions of urban problems in the 200 pages long document is less than three pages (MOFED, 2002). In a way, this is indicative of the fact that urban areas are still not receiving their due share of policy attention despite contributing about 55 percent to the GDP while housing only 17 percent of the total population.

Some years have passed since the federal government started encouraging the various national regional governments to improve their systems of urban governance so that they could be better equipped to achieve the broad developmental targets that are spelt out in the SDPRP I document. The government did this deliberately because an effective poverty reduction program as a rule calls for the existence of an efficient, transparent and accountable local government that is sufficiently responsive to the fundamental needs of the citizens. Accordingly, the Amhara, Tigray, SNNPR and Oromia national regional states as well as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have attempted to improve urban governance through legal and institutional reforms and capacity building. They did this based on the understanding that such changes would lead to greater autonomy or self rule, improved delivery of municipal services, better provision of infrastructure, improvement of access to land and alleviation of housing problems. According to MOFED, city councils and mayors are already in place in 24 municipalities. Additionally provisional councils have been established in more than 31 towns.

To date, however, nearly all of the above-mentioned pioneering national regional states are far from realizing their expressed expectations of improvements in municipal service delivery and slum upgrading due to a host of problems. Some of the leading challenges in this regard include the immensity of the problems themselves, paucity of financial resources, dire shortage of skilled labor and the almost non-existent local capacity when it comes to project design, and implementation. Regardless of these shortcomings however, the *emerging* national regional states such as Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambela, Harari and Somali have also recently called for the review of their respective national legal and institutional frameworks with the intent of restructuring their urban legal and institutional frameworks.

The SDPRP-I came about after several rounds of consultations with donors, private sector, NGO's, academic institutes, etc. which was an innovative, learning experience for Ethiopia. For the NGO sector it was at first coordinated by the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), an

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<sup>1</sup> This involves work plan preparation; the formulation of a vision (the annual Strategic Agenda); the kinds of benefits to be delivered; the development of strategies; operational planning; and monitoring, evaluation and review (cf. IDP 2004/05).

indigenous secular umbrella organisation of over 250 NGOs operating in Ethiopia. More recently, the Poverty Action Network Ethiopia (PANE) grew out of CRDA and is also involved in the consultations. Within CRDA there exists since three years the National Urban Development Forum of NGOs, which has a steering committee consisting of representatives of 16 NGOs. The Forum has five core strategies: research, identifying capacity building needs, advocacy, networking, and promoting shared learning. The main donors in the urban arena are GTZ and the World Bank. GTZ is strongly involved in, among other areas, urban governance through support to the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO) and the city of Addis Ababa, while the World Bank operates through such broad programmes as the Public Service Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP) and the Urban Development Infrastructure Fund. The role of UNDP and UN-HABITAT will be further investigated in Chapter 5.

During SDPRP I progress and achievements were realized in six main areas (cf. Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2006: 3):

1. The development of national policies (the National Urban Development Policy; see below), legislation and regulations.<sup>2</sup>
2. The development and management of capacity building support, including training.<sup>3</sup>
3. The development and management of national programs and projects, in particular in urban management and capacity building.
4. The completion of studies, reports and assessments in a number of areas including urban land, spatial planning, municipal finance, housing, infrastructure and services development.
5. Institutional and organizational reform - supporting good governance, for example several states passed legislation creating the institutional and legal framework for urban local government authorities.
6. During SDPRP I, the Addis Ababa City Government has pioneered new and innovative initiatives in many areas including: integrated housing development, urban upgrading, operational decentralization, financial management, and land management. These initiatives will be replicated and scaled up to regional urban centers in the next development plan (see below).

#### *National Urban Development Policy*

One of the principal factors that made it very difficult for the various national regional states and the city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa to implement effectively their urban legal and institutional reforms was the lack of a comprehensive national urban development strategy. In the absence of such an overarching policy direction, each region had to improvise its own approaches to urban development without losing sight of the overall objectives of SDPRP I. Fully cognizant of this problem, the Ministry of Federal Affairs managed to produce a comprehensive national urban development policy and got it approved by the Council of Ministers in March 2005. Since October 2005 the name of this Ministry has changed again: before 2001 it was Ministry of Works and Urban Development, and currently it is again the Ministry of Works and Urban Development.

The content of the draft national urban development policy is such that it is sufficiently comprehensive and mindful of all the key areas that need constructive intervention. The policy as a whole is premised on the federal system of governance adopted by the country and its already declared strategy of rural and industrial development. Currently only the Amharic version of the policy document is available. Broadly speaking, the policy aims at facilitating the creation of a multi centered national urban system with a well-developed hierarchy of urban places of various size-classes. Within this general context, it expects all urban centers of the country to serve principally as centers of industry, commerce and services. In order to ensure a balanced economic development in both rural and urban areas, it does not only advocate a strong urban-rural linkage but also calls for the establishment of agro processing and other industries that use local resources as raw materials even in the smaller towns. As such, the policy envisions the development of well-defined regional hierarchies of large, medium sized and small towns nested within the overall multi-centered national urban system. Overall, the national urban development policy can be seen as an elaboration of many of the core objectives of urban poverty reduction strategies specified in SDPRP I.

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<sup>2</sup> In particular the Re-Enactment of Urban Lands Lease Holding Proclamation 272/2002 and the Expropriation for Land for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation Proclamation 455/2005.

<sup>3</sup> Between January 2003 and September 2005 training was provided to a total of 3,771 municipal and kebele councillors, and 1,440 technical staff. MoFA has provided capacity building support for development of planning units in the four larger regions.



### *Millenium Development Goals (MDG's)*

The UN's eight Millennium Development Goals each has its own specific targets, but all are also interrelated and as such, the achievement of any one of them would contribute considerably towards the achievement of the others. The MDG that specifically aims at improving the living conditions of the urban populace is Goal 7, Target 11 that aims at achieving "a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers" by 2020. This goal is very relevant for Ethiopia because an estimated 80 percent of the urban population of the country is presently living in slums. The country was therefore quick to put in place the SDPRP I with the principal aim of using it as an instrument to achieve urban MDGs. Irrespective of this, however, the government has attempted to step up its MDGs implementation programs as of mid 2005. Accordingly, it has established MDGs' Task Force consisting of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the UNDP as the coordinator of the UN Country Team, the World Bank and UNICEF. Under the guidance of this task force, the government is presently putting so much effort into the implementation of the program that Ethiopia is being viewed by the UN as one of those countries that could succeed in achieving the MDGs. Nevertheless, the fact remains that a substantial work remains in the area of localizing the MDGs. The country actually completed its MDGs needs assessments almost a year ago. The results of the assessments indicate that approximately 7 billion USD is required to finance Goal 7, Target 11 of the MDGs. What needs to be done now is establishing regional and local level MDGs task forces and translating the national needs assessments into the specific realities of the implementing regions and urban centres.

### *Housing in Addis Ababa*

The Addis Ababa city Administration has launched a massive urban renewal program in 2004/2005 with a determination to upgrade the inner parts of the city. The overall plan of the program is to build 200,000 residential units in a span of five years in the inner parts of Addis Ababa where most of the people tend to be dwelling as tenants in rundown public (kebele) housing. Of these, the plan for the 2004/ 2005 period was to produce 45,000 units. Accordingly, construction has been going on at about 102 building sites in different parts of the city in 2004/2005. The GTZ-IS (German Technical Cooperation-International Services), which plays a technical advisory role in the whole venture, is also an active partner in the production of these condominium units. As latest reports indicate, the construction of some 30,225 units is nearing completion of which 912 units are ready for hand over. The municipal government intends to transfer finished units to eligible applicants through a rent-and-own process, which can take 15 to 20 years. As such, it requires from the potential homeowners an upfront payment of 10 to 30 percent of the project cost. However, it appears that the great majority of the target population simply cannot afford to pay such down payments.

### *Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)*

The Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP-I) played a significant role in paving the way for the achievement of the MDGs in urban Ethiopia. The principal vehicle that is presently in place to scale up the achievement of the MDGs is the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), entitled "Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty" (PASDEP), which runs from 2005/06 to 2009/10. The draft received from MOFED is dated October 2005 after which a round of consultations with donors, private sector and NGOs (CRDA and PANE) was scheduled. In the middle of January 2006 the Council of Ministers discussed it and referred it to the House of Peoples' Representatives (HPR) for further discussion and approval (cf. The Ethiopian Herald 14-01-2006).

The Council thereby requested the Ministry of Works and Urban Development and the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO) to write a more detailed national urban development plan before the next session of the HPR, which has been completed and is entitled "Urban Development and Construction Industry Component of PASDEP" (Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2006). Let us first consider the urban development sub-component. The main emphasis during SDPRP I was on the development of policy, legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks supported by substantial capacity building efforts. Lacking has been a major investment in housing, infrastructure and services, except in Addis Ababa. This investment will take place during PASDEP through the four "pillars" of the PASDEP Urban Development Strategy:

- 1) Support for small & micro enterprise and job creation,
- 2) Integrated housing development,
- 3) Improved access to land, infrastructure and services, and

4) Promoting urban-rural and urban-urban linkages.

In financial terms an amount of Eth Birr 19.1 million is earmarked whereby the largest portion (73%) is allotted to the housing program, and the second largest (12%) to the infrastructure and services program (cf. Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2006: 10). The urban strategy has three main supporting action areas, which are:

- Strengthening the policy, legal, regulatory and institutional framework;
- Capacity building for federal, regional and city authorities; and
- Result oriented performance monitoring, evaluating and reporting system.

Regarding the construction industry sub-component of PASDEP the main emphasis will be on the pillars of private sector development and human resource development which take up respectively 32% and 63% of the total cost estimate for this sub-component of Eth. Birr 2.4 million (cf. Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2006: 14).

## 2.5 Conclusion: Relations between Ethiopian and Dutch Urban Policies

Although there have been incidental measures related to urban development in Ethiopia, there has not been a comprehensive national urban development policy, neither before 1991, nor in the 1990s. The neglect of cities was caused by several factors: firstly, the majority of the population lives in rural areas; secondly, the specific policy of ADLI focussed on agriculture, and led to a preoccupation with the rural development agenda; and thirdly, the majority of the electorate was (and still is) rural, and the opposition's voting base is located in the cities. This neglect even resulted in an *increase* (albeit small) in urban poverty. Therefore, in the 1990s there were not many commonalities between Ethiopian and Dutch policies on urban development; an increase in urban poverty is even in outright contrast to the results targeted by the Dutch policy. The Dutch policy was a reaction to the neglect by the Ethiopian government, and Dutch projects and programmes were often providing support to the existing programmes of Ethiopian NGOs and CBOs (as we will see in this report). In sum, the Dutch policy was complementary to the Ethiopian policy. The Dutch projects were, therefore, demand driven in the sense that they were requested by local private organisations, not by the government.

**Table 2.1: Comparison of the Ethiopian urban strategy under PASDEP with the priority themes of the Dutch policy on urban sustainable development.**

Ethiopia's Urban Strategy (PASDEP)	Dutch Priority Themes of Sustainable Urban Development
<b>Four Pillars:</b>	
1. Support for small & micro enterprise and job creation,	(1) Work and Income
2. Integrated housing development,	(2) Habitat
3. Improved access to land, infrastructure and services, and	(2) Habitat & (3) Social Services (partially)
4. Promoting urban-rural and urban-urban linkages.	
<b>Three Action Areas:</b>	
5. Strengthening the policy, legal, regulatory and institutional framework;	(4) Urban Government and Institutional Development
6. Capacity building for federal, regional and city authorities; and	(4) Urban Government and Institutional Development
7. Result oriented performance monitoring, evaluating and reporting system.	(4) Urban Government and Institutional Development
<b>Two general principles:</b>	
8. Consultations for PASDEP and the Urban Strategy	(4) Urban Government and Institutional Development: Participation
9. Integrated Urban Strategy	(5) Integrated Urban Development

The Ethiopian policies, or the lack of it, on urban development analysed in this chapter has ultimately led to a National Urban Development Policy, as well as to a separate urban policy as part of the country's second poverty reduction strategy for the period 2005/06–2009/10, entitled "Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty" (PASDEP). The four pillars of the PASDEP

Urban Development Strategy and its three main supporting action areas discussed in the previous section have, in fact, many commonalities with the five priority themes of the Dutch policy on sustainable urban development (cf. Table 2.1). The first three pillars are very similar to the first two Dutch themes, and include, although only partially, the third Dutch theme of social services. The fourth Dutch theme is covered mostly by the three main supporting action areas, while the participation component of this Dutch theme is included under the comprehensive consultation process that preceded the PASDEP. The fifth Dutch theme coincides with the integrated nature of the Ethiopian urban strategy. Finally, the fourth pillar dealing with linkages in the urban system is rather specific to Ethiopian conditions, and is not found among the Dutch themes.

Several factors could help to explain this substantial correlation. Firstly, PASDEP is Ethiopia's poverty reduction strategy paper and as such has been influenced by general principles held in the international donor community. Secondly, the *Dutch* Institute of Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS) in Rotterdam has been heavily involved in Ethiopia, in particular with the Ministry of Works and Urban Development and the Ministry of Federal Affairs. Not only has the IHS provided training courses to many Ethiopian staff members of these ministries, but it has also been contracted by these ministries for advisory assignments.<sup>4</sup>

In conclusion, during the 1990s the Dutch projects and programmes related to urban development did not influence the process of policy formulation in Ethiopia very much. They did, however, support and thereby influence NGOs and CBOs who later became an integral part of the comprehensive consultation process for establishing Ethiopia's poverty reduction strategies. This is another factor causing the urban policies to show so many similarities in recent times.

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<sup>4</sup> In fact, Ethiopia's Urban Development Strategy was developed by the Ministry of Works and Urban Development but was assisted by an Urban Development Specialist who has been a long-term employee of the IHS and currently is an independent consultant based in the Netherlands.

### 3 BILATERAL PROJECTS: ECHELON 1 & 2

In this chapter the four bilateral projects of the Echelons 1 & 2 will each be introduced, analysed and appraised. In the final section (3.5) an overall appraisal will be made of the four projects.

#### 3.1 Urban Health Program (UHP)

Acronym:	<b>UHP</b>
Title:	<b>Urban Health Program in Addis Ababa</b>
Project number(s):	ET009401
Contribution in Euro:	68,067
Project period:	1995 - 1999
Location:	6 Kebeles (50,000 inhabitants) in Kechene, North Addis Ababa
Intermediary organisation:	Daughters of Charity (DoC)
(Local) Government involved:	Municipal (A.A.) Health Department
Direct Achievements:	Support to St. Mary's Clinic and set up two Health posts
Endusers/beneficiaries:	Endusers of district primary health care

##### 3.1.1 Project Design

The overall objective of the UHP project was to support the urban Primary Health Care (PHC) component of the broader Urban Development Programme (UDP) of the Catholic NGO 'Daughters of Charity' (DOC). Although the project was mainly related to health issues, its relevance is also extended to 'Integrated Urban Development' since it is an integral part of the broad and integrated UDP. As a result intermediaries and beneficiaries could not always distinguish clearly between these components, and sometimes it was quite difficult to isolate the specific contribution of this project. The project was designed on the basis of a clear analysis of the problem area, notably a study covering 5000 households; subsequently DOC developed its UDP in the Kechene area, PHC being one of its components.

The funding of the project was a joint undertaking by DGIS and Memisa (respectively Dfl. 150.000 and Dfl. 114.428). DGIS's contribution was limited to 150.000 so that a shortened BEMO would be sufficient, and the approval procedure faster. The recipient organisation was DOC, which was and still is operating in the same area with its broader UDP. This UDP has been financed, and still is, by a range of donors, including "Mensen-in-Nood", and currently Cordaid (which provided in 2005 about 63% of all its funding). The project envisaged a Primary Health Care strategy (PHC) which was intended to offer integrated and good quality curative, preventive, promotional and referral health services to the population in 6 Kebeles in Addis Ababa through St. Mary's Clinic and 6 Health Posts (HP). DOC had managed this clinic since the late 1980s in one of the project kebeles, and it was to be the focal point of the PHC; as an indication of its size, the clinic treated over 35,000 patients in 1998. In order to bring health care closer to the people, the project envisaged one health post in each of the six kebeles.

The specific objectives were:

- i. Decreased morbidity and mortality caused by the prevailing health problems, especially affecting women and children
- ii. Improvement of the quality of health services given at St. Mary's Clinic and upgrade it into a referral site for the HP, Community Health Agents and Traditional Birth Attendants.
- iii. Improved health awareness among the population in the catchment area through health education
- iv. Primary Health Care activities integrated with the other development projects (in UDP).

The planned activities were:

*St. Mary Clinic:*

- 1) Maintain in quantity and quality the health services presently offered by St. Mary's Clinic.

- 2) Implement a cost recovery system to improve the financial basis of the clinic by charging patients for their treatment and by setting up a drug revolving fund.
- 3) Organise refresher courses for staff of St. Mary's Clinic on different health topics.

**Health Posts:**

- 4) Establish in cooperation with Kebele health committees, 6 Health Posts, one in each Kebele.
- 5) Select, train and supervise 2 Traditional Birth Attendants and 2 Community Health Agents for each Health Post.
- 6) Start curative, preventive and promotional activities from these 6 Health Posts, including environmental sanitation programmes and community based HIV/AIDS care programmes.

**General:**

- 7) Coordinate all health services with the ministry of Health and the Public Health Department.
- 8) Increase inter-sectoral cooperation within the overall programme (i.e UDP).

These activities were intended to lead to the following outputs/results according to the Logical Framework (LF-23) of the Primary health Care Component: Reduction in incidence of disease; Increased health awareness and information; Active traditional birth attendants and health committees; and Safe and proper disposal of human waste and refuse.

### 3.1.2 Appraisal

#### **Introduction**

The Urban Health Program (UHP) was developed as an integral part of the integrated Urban Development Programme (UDP) by the Daughters of Charity (DOC) on the basis of an extensive survey of 5,000 households. In the design and development of the specific strategy that UHP was going to employ, i.e. the Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy, there was broad *participation* of the community, the local government and the Addis Ababa city administration, particularly through discussions and through committees.

#### **A - Efficiency**

The transfer of inputs into results has on the whole been reasonably efficient, although factors outside the control of the project management took their toll. Firstly, there was an underutilisation of funds because the project could not be implemented as planned as a result of a changing policy of the Ministry of Health (cf. section B). Secondly, the implementation was slow and took about two years longer than expected; the delays were not only caused by policy changes, but also by the fact that donors did not release funds on time, that the government bureaucracy was slow, and that the involvement of the community took its time. The input of human resources, either the staff of the St. Mary's Clinic, or the Traditional Birth Attendants and Community Health Agents was judged efficient by all stakeholders involved. The material resources of the project concern a vehicle, equipment as well as the drugs to be used in the clinic.

#### **B – Effectiveness**

Table 3.1 shows that the majority (over two-thirds) of the planned activities has been realised. These activities were explained in further detail in the progress reports (e.g. the report dated 5-5-1999). The first activity, maintaining health services, includes for example the following: patients treated in St. Mary's Clinic during 1998 (31,960), patients treated in Health Posts (4,937), growth monitoring of under-5-year olds (3,634), immunisations of under-1-year olds (515), HIV/AIDS counselling and care (218 & 350), ante natal care by traditional birth attendants (476), home deliveries by traditional birth attendants (205), nutrition rehabilitation (44), de-worming children (50), and health education (9,289 attendants in 191 sessions).

Only two of the six Health Posts were set up in the course of 1995, while the others were suspended because the Ministry of Health changed its regulations shortly after that, stipulating that health posts were required to have salaried staff (traditional birth attendants and/or community health agent); no funds had been earmarked for this purpose within the project. The two existing posts changed status and were used mainly as referral posts for St. Mary's Clinic. Partly as a result of this development, the project was in the later phases under-utilizing its allocated funds; partly this was also a result of other factors such as: slow implementation, delayed release of funds, and delayed signing of agreements with the local governments. The remainder of the funds (i.e. Eth. Birr 150,922) was allotted to St. Mary's for HIV/AIDS counselling and care. In the mean time, St. Mary's Clinic had been made independent of UDP (in 1997).

**Table 3.1: UHP-Project: Activities planned and realised, and those still existing today.**

Nr.	UHP: Activities planned	Activities realised at end of project (1999)	Activities realised and still existing in 2006
1	Maintain health services offered by St. Mary's Clinic.	Yes	Partly; converted in HIV/AIDS Laboratory
2	Implement a cost recovery system at St. Mary's Clinic.	Yes	Partly (now in the laboratory)
3	Organise refresher courses for St. Mary's staff.	Yes	Part of staff still working in Laboratory
4	Establish 6 Health Posts (HP).	Partly (2 HP)	No more functioning
5	Train 2 TBA's*) and 2 CHA's*) for each HP.	Partly (for 2 HP)	Part of them are still operating
6	Start PHC activities in/from these 6 HP's	Partly (for 2 HP)	No more functioning
7	Coordinate with Government	Yes at diff. levels (Kebeles, Addis A. City Dept. & Ministry)	Yes (i.e. between DOC and Government)
8	Increase inter-sectoral cooperation within UDP	Yes, partly	UDP is still being operated by DOC

\*) TBA = Traditional birth attendant; CHA = Community Health Agent.

The last activity, increase inter-sectoral cooperation, underscores the integration aspect of this project through the following:

- cooperation with the engineering department of DOC regarding the construction of new latrines plus education on sanitation; the project built eight communal showers, 50 latrines, water distribution centres (*bonos*) and waste disposal pits, most of which are still in use even today (cf. Project Report attached);
- work with local schools to assist in health education on HIV/AIDS, personal hygiene and sanitation;
- work with local municipality and zonal health office regarding garbage collection (which was not effectuated);
- a Health Awareness Day was organized with all four clinics in the area (awareness, education and information).

In sum, the project has been only partly effective, and gets a score of 'fair' in Appendix G.

### **C - Relevance**

The UHP and its Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy is a major element in the health sector development program in Ethiopia. The broader Urban Development Programme (UDP) is part of the current sustainable development and poverty reduction policy of the country. Therefore the project is clearly aligned to the national policy on development and health program, in particular to the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP-I; cf. Chapter 2).

With respect to the five priority themes of the policy on Urban Poverty Reduction, the interviews with intermediaries and beneficiaries have led to an adjustment of the scores given before the Field Study (cf. Appendix G): it has been established that the UHP-project scores highly on one theme, i.e. Social Services, but also has scores on three other themes. Of the social services theme, the scores are in particular high on the basic health and education aspects. However, the relevance of this project is not limited to that; it includes such habitat issues as drinking water and sanitation (construction of communal showers and water points, latrines and waste disposal pits), and such urban government issues as participation of the community and public-private partnerships, especially with the Kebele; it also concerns a pro-poor policy and participation of the poor is one of the goals of the project. In addition, the project has clear aspects of integrated urban development, not only by incorporating several themes in the project itself, but also because it is an integral part of the UDP.

The PHC strategy of the UHP is a good response to the needs of the beneficiaries according to the intermediaries and beneficiaries themselves. The Kechene community was suffering from communicable and water born diseases which could be avoided by providing health care and health education and by putting sanitary facilities in place, as was done through the UHP. At the same time, an effort was made to bring health care and health education closer to the people, in particular those

with disabilities. The PHC is a good response to the promotion of preventive health, which is the major component, and major strategy of the national health sector development program.

Concerning the cross-cutting themes, attention for gender and vulnerable groups was quite explicitly incorporated into the project (cf. attached project report); apart from the initial survey, research was much less an element of importance.

#### **D – Sustainability**

Table 3.1 (the last column) indicates that at least a substantial part of the realized activities still exist today and that part of the effects are still continuing today, i.e. about seven years after the finalisation of the project. A few years after the closure of the project the clinic was changed into an HIV/Aids laboratory, because MOH insisted that it should be upgraded to a health centre with 24 hours service. This was beyond the scope of the project. The Sisters of Mary now manage it as a laboratory clinic with voluntary counselling and testing. The health posts were subsequently abandoned, leaving as physical evidence of the project the communal latrines and showers, water points and waste disposal pits, which are still being maintained by the community. Furthermore, the human resources development (i.e. clinic staff, traditional birth attendants and community health agents) are still quite relevant; the traditional birth attendants are still rendering services to the poor community, such as antenatal care, home delivery and identification and referral of high-risk members. In general terms, the institutional development of the DOC was enhanced by the project as well, as evidenced by the fact that the DOC is still operating its UDP in Kechene. In institutional and behavioural terms a part of the achievements have been sustainable until today (as is explained in the following).

##### **(a) Institutional and organisational strength**

The UHP being an integral part of DOC's activities did not develop its own institution and procedures since the DOC had already been operating with success for many years. To approach this element of sustainability, therefore, we have to look at the institutional and organisational embedding of the project in DOC. As shown by the Organigram (cf. Annex 10 to the attached progress report), the development interventions and results were fully integrated into DOC's organizational context, and were structured and managed by DOC, and implemented through clear work processes; it also indicates clear organizational processes and (financial) administration.

The sustainability of the UHP-project itself is questionable since the main physical vehicles of the strategy consisted of the health posts and the clinic; the former do not exist anymore, while the latter has changed its purpose to a much narrower focus (albeit important). However, DOC closely works with the community and the community is well represented in the project planning and implementation (cf. Annex 3 to UHP-Project Report). The strategy used was to involve the community by forming committees from the inception of the UHP activities. The local government was involved at all levels of decision-making. In fact, the health committee works closely with the local government health team (Kebele administration). Consultative meetings were held to discuss developments of implementation including prioritization of activities. The local organizational capacity created has contributed to the sustainability of most health related activities.

##### **(b) Formal Recognition and Authority**

Again it is difficult to separate recognition for UHP from the broader UDP. However, the formal recognition of the implementing organization, DOC, is substantial. DOC is a legally recognized non-profit making organization and has been working closely with the local and national government through its various branches on development activities. It is accountable to the Catholic Church in Ethiopia. It is well accepted and appreciated by the community and the government. In fact, the project is essentially run by a committee of eleven people out of which 10 represent the community and one the Kebele leadership; a health program coordinator, representing DOC, worked closely with the project committee. After the completion of the project, the Kebele took over certain activities of DOC, as some beneficiaries recount (cf. attached UHP-project report):

*The people here are keeping the area clean. They have to clean their compounds every week as a group. The Kebele supervises the neatness of the area. There is also discussion on health matters in the kebele. The Kebele health committee is active. Of course we do not get the service we used to get from DOC. You see DOC gives food, clothing to the poor. It closely follows the condition of the people including for elderly and disabled. Before the DOC health program was implemented, the community used to suffer from eye infections, water born diseases such as diarrhea, children*

*used to die. Now these problems are minimized. Children take vaccination regularly, they drink clean water and people use pit latrines.*

The Kebele is building new latrines and closely monitors the disposal of waste materials and sewerage. If any family disposes waste in the open field it would be fined, for example:

*I was fined Birr 15. Since then I put waste materials in the public container. The men also help in cleaning the compound. The neatness and health situation has improved. We do not hear of eye infection and diarrhea. Before the project many children used to die because of diarrhea. Now we are keeping our compounds clean and we drink clean water. Some of us use the "bono" water distribution centers and most have water supply through pipes in their houses. The community is improving. There is now HIV/AIDS education and the youth come to our homes and teach us about HIV/AIDS.*

DOC's recognition is also indicated by the number and variety of donors that provide funding (cf. project report).

#### (c) Interest and Benefits for Users

The interest of the users in the intervention has been given in a direct way through the beneficiaries' perceptions. For example, Sister Adanech was running one of the two Health Posts, and her work has been appreciated very much by the beneficiaries who remember her even today (cf. Annex 9 to UHP Report: 19):

*"She used to run the clinic and used to go from house to house to monitor our health conditions. There were those people in green uniform (traditional birth attendant/community health agent), who used to check every house in the community. They used to teach us how to keep our compounds and ourselves clean. Those who were seriously ill were referred to St. Mary's Clinic. The closure of the clinic affected us very much, especially for those of us who are old and physically disabled."*

The original target group is at least in greater part still present in the original project area. Ownership of the project is quite important for sustainability, and the community has this feeling of ownership of the project: for example, they are still maintaining and using the sanitary facilities, such as water distribution centres and communal showers. The community has learned how to be organized and tackle most of its health problems (cf. the work of the health committees as mentioned in the above).

#### (d) Development of Knowledge and Capacity

The 'know-how' present with the implementing organisation, DOC, has been transferred through the intervention to the beneficiaries with the help of the program coordinator, the project committee, the clinic's staff, the traditional birth attendants and the community health agents. Access to new knowledge and innovation of knowledge reservoir has been secured through training, workshops and educational/informational gatherings at the community level. This new knowledge has been made accessible to the target group through the home visits made by traditional birth attendants and community health agents, through the clinic and through the project committee. Discussions conducted with a number of beneficiaries indicate the sustainability of the program: their health conditions have improved because they *learned* through the project how to protect themselves from diseases. This has been assessed positively also by the evaluators.

#### *Financial Sustainability*

The UHP project as such has been completed and closed in 1999. However, the DOC is still a financially sustainable organisation with support from various donors. Currently the biggest part of its funding comes from only one donor, the Dutch Cordaid, but efforts are made to diversify the portfolio, although Cordaid and its predecessors (Cebemo and Memisa) have been reliable partners for almost twenty years.

### **E - Impact**

The efforts of the UHP undertaken by DOC within the framework of its UDP have led to effects both on the short term as well as on the long term: living conditions of the target group have improved as an immediate result of the project activities (in particular in the areas of health, sanitation and participation), while in the longer run the poverty situation has changed, especially due to changes in attitudes and knowledge, to the principle of grassroots participation, and to the partnership with the local government (in particular the Kebele). Discussions with intermediaries and beneficiaries arrive at the same conclusions as evaluation reports: the project made an important impact in improving the health condition of the community by way of a reduction of water born infections, increased immunization, and enhanced awareness of health and environmental sanitation through the use of waste disposals, use of latrines and showers (cf. UHP-Project report).



The project, small in funding terms, did accomplish documented changes of attitudes among the community and beyond towards vulnerable groups reducing their stigma and discrimination, such as people living with HIV/AIDS, the disabled and the elderly. It also accomplished enhanced awareness of environmental sanitation. Awareness and attitudes tend generally to affect also others than the direct target groups, and thus the project had an impact on a wider group of people than the target groups alone. The program of empowering communities through forming associations and committees is a major feature of sustainability of DOCs UDP intervention activities. The elders association, the association of people with disabilities, of the youth and of the people living with HIV/AIDS (this association for example has 110 members) are strong and functional.

### Conclusion

UHP was a small project in terms of funding with a large target group. It was efficient but not effective; although *most* activities were realised, the *major* strategy of PHC and Health Posts failed, and the target clinic's purpose has changed to HIV/AIDS. The relevance of the project per se for the Urban Development Policy and its integratedness are small, although both are enhanced by the fact that it is a part of a broader programme. The sustainability of the project per se is rather small since its strategy failed, notwithstanding the fact that the DOC's broader programme is sustainable as such. The project did however have an impact on the health situation and in particular on health awareness in a sustainable manner.

### 3.2 Street Children Project in Dessie (SCP-Dessie)

Acronym:	<b>SCP-Dessie</b>
Title:	<b>Street Children Project in Dessie</b>
Project number(s):	ET009001
Contribution in Euro:	82,589
Project period:	1995 - 1997
Location:	2 kebeles in Dessie
Intermediary organisation:	Terre des Hommes (Lausanne)
(Local) Government involved:	Dessie Town Council
Direct Achievements:	Support to street children and families, Drop-in centre, etc.
Endusers/beneficiaries:	Streetchildren themselves in Dessie.

#### 3.2.1 Project Design and Project Closure

The overall objective of the Street Children Project in Dessie (SCP-Dessie) was to improve the detrimental and extremely difficult living and working conditions of street children in addition to improving the capacity of their families and the community at large to prevent their children from drifting into street life. Dessie is a medium-sized town located within a geographical area in Ethiopia which has repeatedly suffered from drought and famine. As a major town in the province of Wollo, the town has always acted as a magnet to drought-affected people from the surrounding areas. Successive droughts have always brought an influx of whole families into the town. Even when the major impact of the drought recedes, members of these families who survive the drought often remain behind in the town and continue to lead a marginal life. The extreme hardship under which such people have to live and the breakdown of families and separation of children from parents that always accompanies a major drought has made the phenomenon of street-children common in Dessie for a long time.

The first proposal for this project from 1993 requested a budget of over € 330,000, but in December 1994 it was changed to a one year pilot project with a budget of almost € 50,000, and later the balance of € 32,589 was provided as a bridging fund for the period August through December 1996. The pilot project included 3 groups of each 15 girls between the age of 8-14 years.

While it lasted, the project must have been a kind of an oasis for the 45 children in the wide and harsh desert of poverty: The children were showered with privileges and facilities and were clearly envied by those who were not part of the project. The social workers reported that there were many children coming to the drop-in centre asking to be admitted to the project, and the girls themselves were

continuously imploring the project staff to extend the same privilege to their sisters and brothers. Unfortunately, the project did not move to the stage where it could be replicated on a wider scale to make a difference to a larger number of children. Even worse, the project was terminated suddenly when TDH moved out of Ethiopia. To say the least, this must have been very traumatic to the children who suddenly lost the privileges. Since the girls did not have the same age and educational level when they joined the project, some were not yet mature and ready to face the challenges of life when the project was terminated.

### **Project Closure**

The closure of the project was in many ways untidy. Firstly the quality of the independent (UN) evaluation report was not acceptable for the embassy. Thereafter, the embassy withdrew unilaterally from the project, which raised the anger of the Terre des Hommes representative in Ethiopia since they had lend funds to the project for a vehicle with the understanding that it would be reimbursed in 1997 by the project donor which did not happen. Finally, after various scandals in 1998 and 1999 with expatriate staff of Terre des Hommes, involving paedophile networks and a suicide, TdH completely withdrew from Ethiopia (cf. the websites mentioned in the Notes of the attached SCP-Dessie Project Report). The suggestion in one of these websites that the closure of TDHL's delegation office in Ethiopia was part of the organization's 'strategy to develop local capacity and ensure long term sustainable benefits of projects' seems far-fetched. Various attempts to hear the official version of TdH in Lausanne met with outright unwillingness to provide any kind of information (by e-mail and phone). In any case, the Project succeeded in its long term objective of becoming a local NGO by registering with the Ministry of Justice under the name of Child Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (ADMAS) in January 2002.

### *3.2.2 Appraisal*

#### **Introduction**

Respondents who had been involved in the implementation of the Street Children Project in Dessie (SCP-Dessie) explained that the project started with a study on the overall situation of street children in this town. The study was conducted by three social workers commissioned by Terre des Hommes Lausanne (TDHL) in collaboration with experts from the Family Guidance Association of Ethiopia (FGAE), the Dutch embassy, and the office of the Social Affairs of the Zonal administration. A questionnaire survey, visits and observation of the living conditions of families and neighborhoods of the children were undertaken so as to understand these children's problems and life conditions. The analysis in the study mentioned above resulted in the prioritization of the problems and needs of the children and in setting the general context into which the project was to enter. The beneficiaries participated in the process by filling out the questionnaires and attending the group discussions conducted. The participation of the Family Guidance Association Ethiopia (FGAE), the Dutch embassy and the Bureau of Social Affairs shows the inclusion of stakeholders.

#### **A Efficiency**

The total amount of the project funding for the pilot year (1995) was Birr 371,892 (at that time equal to about €50,000). Out of this, the direct beneficiary expense was 57% which included food, educational materials, tools and training material, hospitalization and other expenses. Thus, the average direct and total expenditure per beneficiary per month amounted to Birr 389 and Birr 688 respectively. To give a rough basis of comparison, the minimum wage in Ethiopia at that time was Birr 105 per month. This raises the issue of whether more efficient modalities were not available to achieve the same results with less resource or, conversely, support a larger number of children for the same resources. Taking into account the management capacity and facilities of the children and their families, providing the services by the project appears to have been the better option than providing direct financial assistance. However, taking the total expenditure per beneficiary, it appears that the project could have supported additional number of children with the same amount of funding, and therefore, it was only fairly efficient.

With respect to human resources, the project mainly utilized three social workers who attended to 15 girls each. From the close attention given by the social workers and the deeper relationship that was established and continued with the beneficiaries, it was observed that the involvement of the social workers has been efficient, and it achieved the required outputs. The material resources, such as facilities for training, recreation and cooking were utilized appropriately. The set time limit of a pilot one year was extended budget-neutrally until late 1997. As explained earlier (Section 3.2.1), the project

itself was closed after that. The activities and services planned and realised are mentioned in Table 3.2.

## B Effectiveness

Two girls, belonging to the original target group, were interviewed; they stated that during their stay in the project they were provided with counselling services, food, training in cooking, school support (uniforms, fees and stationery), and recreational events, which have contributed to their well-being and improvement in their lives. They also stated that they had very close relationships with the 3 social workers who were acting as 'mothers' to them. It was quite clear during the interviews that the children (now adolescents) still maintain this relationship and the 'mothers' still try to keep track of the whereabouts of their children. It was quite clear that, at least the two girls interviewed for this evaluation have developed a personality that is marked with confidence and a positive attitude towards life which is only possible under a nurturing and positive environment. Around 50% of the beneficiary girls have now become individuals who lead their lives earning their own livelihood. Most have utilized the skills training and counselling provided by the project to build their career and family lives. An indication for the current conditions of the majority of the beneficiary girls and their families is given in Annex 1 (of the SCP-Dessie Project Report) which shows current jobs and own family establishment. The houses constructed for the families of the 12 beneficiary girls (and which are still occupied by the families as is evidenced by the attached short digital video made of the project), have made a significant improvement in the life of the families as contrasted to their life in plastic shelters on the street.

**Table 3.2: SCP-Dessie Project: The activities and the services provision planned and realized.**

	<b>Activities/Services planned</b>	<b>Activities/Services realized *)</b>
1	Food, clothing, basic health/personal sanitation and temporary shelter	Feeding of children (two meals a day); food service; clothing was provided regularly; housing provided to 12 girls and their families; health/sanitation information provided
2	Access to education	School support that included uniforms, fees and educational materials
3	Guidance and counselling, and child advocacy services	Counselling to adjust the behaviour of the beneficiaries and help them harmonize with their families and friends, and counselling for family
4	Skills training program	Skill training in leather technology, cooking and paper work
5	Sports and recreational facilities	Recreational programs like tours and sports
6	Family support program	Support for family members: 12 one-roomed houses were built for families of the 12 beneficiaries who were living on the street in plastic shades; and Credit schemes for 23 families of the girls
7	'Closure of project'	The beneficiaries were given Birr 2,500 when the project ended to help them establish their own businesses; most likely related to hasty departure of TDHL from Ethiopia.

\*) Sources: described by end-users and implementing organisations.

The project pioneered intervention in improving the lives of street children in Dessie town, and raised awareness about the case of street children among the general public, the police, local community associations (in particular the *Idirs*, a neighbourhood based savings association), government offices including the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission and the Social Affairs Bureau, schools, etc. This was achieved through workshops organized by the project. The outputs of this awareness are that organizations and individuals started to visit the project and offered support; some *Idirs* started to mobilize their members to support street children, while the police started to be less harsh on street children and support them in their reintegration with the family. Another indicator of the raised awareness is the increasing number of requests by children and families for inclusion in the project. The increasing number of organizations working on street children in Dessie and the modelling of the improvement of the beneficiaries were the right things done so that potential beneficiaries actually benefited. This is evidenced by the fact that some 450 street children were supported by the organization that took over the activities and assets of the project, i.e. the Child Rehabilitation and Development Organization (ADMAS) after TDHL pulled out of the project.

Therefore, although the project involved only a relatively small number of beneficiaries, the effectiveness of the activities undertaken and the services provided (cf. Table 3.2) has been relatively high.

### **C Relevance**

The intervention was a good response to the specific problems of street children in Dessie as it was based on the study conducted that included the beneficiaries' inputs on their needs and problems. The objectives of the project were consistent with the necessities of the potential beneficiaries as sufficient focus was made on raising awareness on the needs and problems of street children. In addition the inclusion of awareness raising on the UN convention on child rights was useful in increasing the prevention of the causes of streetism. The overall objectives of the project are in alliance with the MDGs and the needs of the country.

The relevance scores given to the five priority themes before and after the Field Study are mentioned in Appendix G. Regarding habitat, the Kebele has made available a piece of (marginal) land on which the project provided 12 one-roomed houses for 12 families of the target children. The houses also have a common latrine and a common cooking place. The houses are constructed with corrugated iron sheet roofs and mud walls, and meant an improvement compared to the plastic shelters in which the families were living earlier, as confirmed by the beneficiaries. The plot also includes eucalyptus trees which could be harvested in the future.

The project scores on all four aspects of the Social Services component in Appendix G. As regards to safety and crime, workshops were organized targeting police officers in Dessie, aimed at increasing their awareness and helping adjust their perspective towards street children. The improvement of the life of the street children by itself contributes towards reducing crime. Food was provided to the children and part of their families. Concerning basic health, the beneficiaries received hospitalization services and counselling on issues such as HIV/AIDS and reproductive health, while the end users have expressed that the project has played a significant role in enhancing their access and performance in their education as well. One of the respondents said the main benefit for her was the assistance to pursue her education, the counselling provided and the skills training she received. She feels most of the beneficiaries share this opinion. With respect to institutional development and urban governance, there was cooperation between the project and the police, the kebele and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee, and as a result the police adjusted their attitude towards street children. The awareness raising may eventually lead to adjustments in legislation.

In the area of work and income, the project provided credit services to 23 mothers of the beneficiaries with which they were able to supplement their family income. The credit repayment was almost 100%. Some of the beneficiaries also received credit for setting up container shops and run their own small businesses. All the beneficiaries were given Birr 2,500 when the project ended and some respondents expressed that they utilized that productively, although they also indicated that most girls were still very young at that time and might have used this amount in a consumptive way. All beneficiaries have received skills training, which some of them are using currently to earn their living. Although several of the beneficiaries have pooled their resources to live together and work together in the container shops in Gonder town, there was no organization formed as a result of the project.

As is clear from the above, the project had an integrated and holistic approach targeted at the lives of the 45 girls.

#### *Cross-cutting themes*

During the study conducted prior to starting the project it was felt that girls are particularly vulnerable when they lead a life on the street, and as a result all selected beneficiaries were girls. One of the respondents expressed that it would have been preferable if boys could also have benefited from the project. The beneficiaries were clearly in the vulnerability category: young girls between the age of 8 and 14, and they were composed of what the social workers termed 'on-street' (those who don't have shelter and are living on the streets) and 'off-street' (those who are living with their families but spend most of their time on the streets either engaged in sale of items or just wandering). Concerning demand orientation, the project incorporated the felt needs of the beneficiaries through the study and questionnaire survey conducted prior to its start.

## **D Sustainability**

TDHL is no longer operating in Dessie (nor in Ethiopia), and it would be difficult to assess the sustainability of a project that was designed to be a *pilot* project. However, the following sustainability issues are quite influential:

- The activities started by TDHL focusing on street children continued under the local organization, ADMAS, which took over the facilities, and about 450 children have benefited from different rounds afterwards. ADMAS used more or less the same model established by TDHL. However, at the moment the project is not functioning properly due to lack of budget (the training facilities are currently not being used; cf. video).
- The effects of the project have continued in the well being of the beneficiaries and their families, as analysed in the previous sections. In addition, the agenda of street children is promoted through the 'NGO forum' established by NGOs working in Dessie, and which meet once a month.

### **(a) Institutional and Organizational Strength**

The project was an integral part of the implementing organization (TDHL) as evidenced by the fact that the same organization had another project focusing on children in Jarri (some 30 - 40 kms away from Dessie). As the project has now ceased to function, it is not applicable to refer to institutional and organizational strength in the context of the original organization (TDHL). However, the development interventions and results have been embedded in the organizational context in terms of the existing staff and resources from the previous project: the three social workers and a project manager are still working in the newly formed organization that took over the project. The experience from the activities with the original 45 girls has allowed the easier operation of the subsequent 450 beneficiaries. The project was operating with a lean structure with a project manager, secretary, the three social workers and trainers. The activities were implemented with a clear work process and observing the reporting and regulatory requirements of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (DPPC). It was noted that the Country Representative and the Regional Representative from head quarters closely supervised the project. There was a financial administration system and quarterly reports are submitted to the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (DPPC) and it was also audited.

### **(b) Formal recognition and authority**

The implementing organization was legally recognized and was invited to meetings and workshops in the town by other organization and the region on issues relating to street children; this applies to TDHL as well as to ADMAS. The activities of the project were appreciated by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (DPPC), the social affairs bureau, the police, teachers, Kebele officials (provided land for houses), the City Council and interested individuals. The activities of the project continued with the funding from other organizations including the Italian government and others.

### **(c) Interest and benefit for users**

The users, i.e. the beneficiary girls and their families, the Kebele officials, teachers and individuals expressed interest in the intervention and even offered their assistance where-ever possible. The social workers were able to provide the whereabouts of most of the beneficiaries (listed in Annex 1 of the attached SCP-Dessie report). The facilities of the project, i.e. the training workshop, the vehicle and the compound, are still existing and maintained well. They are generally being used by the local NGO, ADMAS, although at present the project has come to a halt due to funding shortage.

### **(d) Development of knowledge and capacity**

The social workers and trainers in the project have developed comprehensive experience in the counselling, training and management of street children. These experts are still working with the current organization and are accessible for further expansion.

### ***Financial sustainability***

The project was able to raise funds for the project of the 450 beneficiaries after the original 45. But since then, it is facing shortage of funds and is downsizing the activities and the facilities are kept idle at the moment.

## **E Impact**

The efforts clearly lead to effects both on the short term and long term at least for the 45 girls and their families who were the beneficiaries of the pilot project, especially those that were provided with houses and credit, and those that were able to acquire (regular) jobs through the training/education

provided by the project. The expertise developed by the social workers and local organization which took over from TDHL in addressing the problems of street children will continue to be valued in the future (when funds are made available as is planned by the Labor and Social Affairs Bureau of the region in cooperation with four NGOs, including ADMAS). The advocacy work done to promote the cause of street children in Dessie town by the project is also likely to have a lasting impact. However, the poverty situation has not changed in Dessie because of the project. The pilot project was just a drop in an ocean since the famines continued year after year. The number of street children has been increasing in Dessie in the past few years especially after the HIV/AIDS pandemic started taking its toll. This shows that a lot of work still needs to be done to attend to the plight of street children. Current estimates indicate that the number of children living on the streets of Dessie and nearby Kombolcha (also a medium-sized city) is about 5,000.

### Conclusion

SCP-Dessie was a small, pilot project for a small target group. It was efficient and effective, and has been very beneficial for the 45 girls and their families. The relevance and the integration aspect were reasonable. The sustainability has been good, although recently questions have arisen. The effects of the project for the beneficiaries and their families in terms of knowledge and awareness, housing facilities, skills training, and credit, are still benefiting most of them. Although TDHL has left quite suddenly, a local association (ADMAS) has taken over and used the model to support another 450 street children (positive impact). However, currently the activities have been stopped because of lack of funding. In hindsight, the project ended too abruptly with TDHL hurriedly leaving the country, even dividing the remaining funds among the beneficiaries as a gift (or redemption money?), and the Donor abandoning what was started as a pilot project.

### 3.3 Urban Field Development in Ethiopia (UFDE)

Acronym:	<b>UFDE</b>
Title:	<b>Urban Field Development in Ethiopia: Pilot Project in Addis Ababa &amp; Debre Zeit</b>
Project number(s):	ET009302 / 3
Contribution in Euro:	210,812, in 2 parts: 98,272 technical assistance, and 112,540 as starting fund to divide & develop plots ('urban fields').
Project period:	1994 - 1999
Location:	2 Urban Fields: Keraniyo (Addis Ababa) and Debre Zeit
Intermediary organisation:	University of Amsterdam and Miz Hasab Research Centre
(Local) Government involved:	Ministry of Works and Urban Development (later named Ministry of Federal Affairs); Region 14 (Keraniyo) & Region 4 (Debre Zeit)
Direct Achievements:	Provide residential plots and title deeds with limited services
Endusers/beneficiaries:	Inhabitants of two Urban Field sites

#### 3.3.1 Project Design

The philosophy of the Urban Field Development project is based on the provision of sites and activities for the urban poor. It also includes training activities in order to help people engage in activities. This is a departure from the sites and services approach which tries to provide the poor with developed sites for house construction. The original TAS approach, i.e. integrated Training, Activities (income) and Sites, was proposed in 1993 with a total budget of 2 million US \$; this was supported by the Region 14 Government. The approach was abandoned as a result of discussions at DGIS about the IDMO of February 1995, and it was decided to continue with three separate activities, the S.A.T. approach with the emphasis on Sites. In order to speed up the process of approval the University of Amsterdam proposed a pilot phase of two urban fields with the budget mentioned above which was approved in November 1995.

The pilot phase of the project is implemented in Addis Ababa, Keranio area and Debre Zeit (kebele 02). The two regions agreed to provide land for the project. Accordingly, a total area of 18 hectares was allotted for the project by the Oromiya regional government and a total land of 9 hectares was allotted by the City government of Addis Ababa. The latter took much longer time than the former. The

latter also involved some compensation to be paid for farmers while the former did not involve compensation since it was already within the city limit. Some of the inhabitants of the locality were however incorporated in the project.

The entry point for the project is the provision of sites for the urban poor who were selected on the basis of specific criteria such as income, family size, gender and age of the household, the dwelling status of the household etc. Key informants mentioned that the recruitment was done objectively using a computerized system. A total of 2,842 candidates were registered in Debre Zeit and more than 2,000 in Addis Ababa. The selected beneficiaries were: 464 in Debre Zeit and 425 in Addis Ababa. Beneficiaries came from 4 kebeles in Addis Ababa and from all over the town in the case of Debre Zeit. According to the project requirement, the beneficiaries will pay a monthly contribution of 10 Birr to create an Urban Field Development Fund.

According to the land administration rule, land allotted for residential purposes should be occupied or demonstrate some form of construction within a period of 6 months. Since the poor who were resettled in the peripheral areas could not strictly meet this city regulation, an arrangement was made such that the occupants will be given a *collective* title deed for the first 5 years and will have individual title deed after these 5 years have elapsed. It is hoped that this will reduce land speculation on the part of the beneficiaries and will also avoid the 6 months requirement for land occupation and allows incremental house construction which may better suit the socio-economic condition of the beneficiaries.

The project was managed by a technical committee at woreda level and village level committees at grass root level. The former includes members from the beneficiaries, the city government (administration) and other concerned bodies. The village level committee is a local committee which is formed by the beneficiaries. In addition to this, there were counterparts from the Netherlands and Ethiopian governments as part of the management team.

### 3.3.2 Appraisal

#### **Introduction**

The 'Urban Field' concept has been developed in studies on Kassala, Sudan, and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (cf. Beeker 1998). The elaborate project proposal dated November 1994 provides a limited pre-study of the Ethiopian situation. Potential beneficiaries, i.e. future residents of the urban fields, were not involved in this preparation process.

#### **A/B - Efficiency and Effectiveness**

In this section the different program components will be discussed according to their achievements, their efficiency and their effectiveness.

##### (1) Land allotment process

Once the beneficiaries were selected, site plans were prepared and land allotment took place on a lottery basis. In Addis Ababa, the plots were divided into three different sizes of land depending on the local topography. These are 252 plots of 70 m<sup>2</sup>; 145 of 91 m<sup>2</sup>; and 28 of 150 m<sup>2</sup>. Plots in Debre Zeit (Debre Zeit) were all of equal size, i.e. 160 m<sup>2</sup>. In Debre Zeit land allotment was smooth and there was a quick response on the part of the town administration. The land allotment process in Addis Ababa however was fraught with problems. This relates to the claims made by the previous occupants who demanded compensation and the nearby cooperatives also claiming access to the market area. It was mentioned that there were some instances of conflict between the new comers and the inhabitants of the surrounding areas involving even some physical encounters between some people. Key informants mentioned that the project management was frustrated and even temporarily abandoned the process of land allotment in Addis Ababa hoping that they would be able to come back after things had settled. The four kebele committees however formed a joint committee who wrote a letter to the Addis Ababa city mayor. This got a response and land was allotted. The problems however recurred and it took five rounds of land allotment to complete the process. This delayed the process substantially. A total of 450 plots were allotted but 24 people were rejected by the woreda committee on the basis that they did not qualify for the land and one woman in the mean time passed away. Currently a total of 425 beneficiaries have occupied their plots and all have constructed their dwelling units. Most of the beneficiaries particularly in Addis Ababa were women. A small number of beneficiaries in Debre Zeit did not take up their plots. In conclusion, the process of land allotment was efficient and effective in Debre Zeit, but it has faced great difficulties in Addis Ababa. On the whole,

however, the goal of access to land, which is often the major bottleneck for future residents, was achieved, although delayed.

#### (2) House construction

As it was mentioned previously the entry point of the project is to provide land that will be used for house construction. The difficulty however is to find the capital needed to construct own houses. The project has made a provision that each beneficiary receives a loan in the form of building material (18 iron sheets and 80 wooden poles and nails) worth 750 Birr. The loan was given on the condition that a group of beneficiaries form an *Iqub* (a local savings association) so that the loan can be reimbursed to this *Iqub* group. This system has materialized in Debre Zeit and the beneficiaries received the assistance of building material after creating 10 different *Iqub* groups. An exception to this arrangement was made for those 67 beneficiaries who used their own money to construct their houses but received the loan in cash. The system of loan provision however did not materialize in Addis Ababa. Focus group members and key informants indicated that by the time they were ready to construct their houses they were told that the Dutch assistance to Ethiopia has discontinued due to the Ethio-Eritrea conflict. Thus the delay in land procuring process in Addis Ababa has caused the beneficiaries to lose the assistance they would have received from the project for house construction. As a result, the beneficiaries in Addis Ababa occupied the land slowly as they have to use own means to construct their houses while house construction in Debre Zeit started early on. For instance according to the Ministry of Works and Urban Development, 358 dwellings in Debre Zeit were constructed by the end of 1999 and about 60 families were living in their houses at the time while in Addis Ababa only 53 plots could be distributed by December 1999. Currently most beneficiaries have constructed their own houses. The objective of helping the people to construct their own houses in Addis Ababa seems to have faced problems and this has resulted in delays in house construction.

A related issue to house construction is the issue of toilets. The project envisaged communal toilets to be constructed for four households on a common area. This is to maximize the use of the land for house construction. The key informants mentioned that this aspect of the project was found out to be difficult to implement since different people occupy the land at different time and construct their houses at different times. It is thus not possible to pool together the resources and efforts of the households to construct toilets. As a result, the lack of toilets has been mentioned as one of the major problems faced by the occupants. A lady in Addis Ababa mentioned that they are using open air and it has become a serious problem for most occupants. Some people however have gone a step further to modify the original plan and construct individual toilets in their possession.

#### (3) Infrastructure, Water, and Services

One of the components of the project was to provide the site with different infrastructure particularly kindergarten, health post, play ground, market, administrative office, central area, and access roads. Land was allotted to each one of these functions in the site plans. It was however found that most of these infrastructure components were not provided, and much of the land allotted to these services remains vacant to this date. The only exceptions were the administrative office which was built by the project in Debre Zeit and the open market sheds constructed in both Addis Ababa and Debre Zeit. The market sheds in Addis Ababa are not functional because the land where the sheds were constructed is disputed by others who claim ownership. The Debre Zeit market sheds which are found outside the pilot project area however are now developed into shops by the local committee after the project has phased out and is being rented to private persons. There are 12 shops which are rented for a monthly rent of 160 Birr each, and these earnings are used by the local committee. The pilot projects have received assistance for access roads in both sites, namely an amount of 71,000 Birr and 75,000 Birr in Addis Ababa and Debre Zeit respectively. The key informants mentioned that the project had also a plan to provide water for the beneficiaries. This however was never realized and it has become a major problem for the Addis Ababa beneficiaries in particular since the neighbourhood is known for its water shortage. In both sites it was finally the community that managed to acquire water services for the residents by negotiating with the kebele administration.

#### (4) Training and Activities

Training and activities formed the particular innovation of the project before it was turned into a pilot phase (cf. from TAS to S.A.T.; see section 3.3.1). The project was supposed to provide adequate training to the beneficiaries which will later be used by them to carry on different production activities. But in the pilot phase only a feasibility study and a 10-day training on fattening were provided.



#### (5) Green Area and urban agriculture

The Debre Zeit area has an uphill forestation program that protects the project area from flooding, and the pilot project was able to plant some trees there. The community benefits from the sale of grasses from this area. It is indicated that about 700 Birr is earned annually. A two hectare plot of land is also allotted for urban agriculture in Debre Zeit area. The community is using this land and derives a yearly income of about 6,000 Birr. These sources of income are useful to undertake community activities. Such sources of income however are not available in Addis Ababa.

The foregoing describes the planned and accomplished activities of the project. Many of the projects' planned activities, such as infrastructure, services, training, and income activities, remain unaccomplished, partly because the project was transformed into a pilot phase. The major accomplishments were the access to plots (although delayed in Addis Ababa), the fact that most residents managed to build houses on these plots with or without project loans, and that the local committees managed to achieve some successes (e.g. in water provision).

#### **C - Relevance**

With respect to the five priority themes identified by the policy on Urban Poverty Reduction, the interviews with intermediaries and beneficiaries have not led to major adjustments of the scores given before the Field Study (cf. Appendix G): as shown in the previous section (A/B) a number of planned activities and services were not realized due to varying causes. The strategy could be a good response to the needs of the beneficiaries as far as the provision of plots is concerned. The extent to which the other components were actually realized however is a main stumbling block that will decrease the relevance of the project for poverty alleviation. Devoid of the envisaged activities, infrastructure and services the project has become a land provision or housing project rather than a poverty alleviation program as planned from the outset. The successes of the local committees through ad hoc public-private partnership with the Kebeles needs to be underlined.

With respect to the cross-cutting themes, gender has been used as one of the selection criteria to determine the future residents. There was no explicit attention for vulnerable groups or culture, while demand orientation was somewhat positive (cf. the letter of the Mayor of Addis Ababa requesting DGIS for this assistance). Research has been generated on the basis of the experience of the UFDE pilot project, and a number of papers were presented at a seminar which were compiled in a published reader (cf. Zewdie and Zelleke 1998).

#### **D - Sustainability**

The UFDE project is a *pilot* project expected to be scaled up. The pilot project however has to be sustained if the benefits are to have lasting effects. The project had no phase-out strategy, and it seems to have stopped abruptly, especially due to the consequences of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. The people were left only with the land whose title deeds were not clearly settled. It is also noticed that in both Debre Zeit and Addis Ababa a few beneficiaries are selling their land and leaving the project area; at the same time we have assessed that the majority of the original inhabitants still live in the project area.

##### *(a) Institutional strength and (b) Formal recognition*

The two project sites are now run by *local committees* which were established during the project period, and which are attempting to meet the needs of the community. In Addis Ababa, the local committee has transformed itself into a Development Association and now has a legal status. The Development Association has embarked on a number of initiatives that ease down the problems of the community. For instance, it has become instrumental for about 100 people to take loan from micro finance institutions. It was later discovered that the borrowers faced a repayment problem since they used the money to construct houses instead of using it for business activities which might have helped them to repay their loans. The association also succeeded in installing electricity in the project area. This was made possible through community contribution and the credit system they were granted by the electric power authority due to the hard work of the association. Each individual in the community was made to pay 230 Birr upfront and pay about 1271 Birr in five year period. The committee could not make use of the UFDE fund for electricity since all members did not pay the money. In addition, the Development Association with the cooperation of the kebele administration, has provided two water points. Recently the Development Association is even taking concrete steps to ensure title deeds for the individual beneficiaries. In Debre Zeit too the local committee with the help of the kebele administration has helped the community to secure their title deeds. It also has some sources of

income from the sales of grasses, shop renting and urban agriculture. This income however is not sufficient, and needs to be diversified and strengthened. In this regard, the Addis Ababa site is disadvantaged and needs some innovations.

Despite the successes, the committees are not very well structured in an organizational form. The financial and human resource capacity of the committees were not considered at the time of establishment or exit. The Debre Zeit committee is not a formal committee and is not recognized by government or other agencies. The Addis Ababa committee however has developed into a Development Association and has a better recognition by authorities, government and non-government organizations. These committees have gone far to keep the interest of the community particularly in terms of helping the community acquire the services and infrastructure that should have been provided by the project. Nevertheless, several problems remain (see below).

*(c) Interest of users and (d) Knowledge development*

In terms of the interest and benefit of users, the land aspect of the project has been sustained, partly as a result of the hard struggle made by the local committee members. This has even transformed towards obtaining individual title deeds, and the majority of the original residents continue to live in the project area underlining their interest in it as users. The other components of the project are mostly not realized although people have been able to build houses with or without project loans. There is no indication on the development of knowledge and capacity in the project. The activity component of the project which was supposed to impart knowledge and skills in the project is never realized.

In general the four dimensions of the sustainability issue indicate that the sustainability of the project is positive despite the fact that the project did not deliver many of the components proposed. The access to land and housing, in combination with local committees that have grown in the process and have achieved major successes, appears to guarantee a definite degree of sustainability. The proof of that is the fact that the original residents are in majority still living in the project areas.

**E - Impact**

A very clear impact of the project is its ability to help the beneficiaries acquire access to land. Land access is a very serious problem in the city of Addis Ababa and Debre Zeit not only for the poor but also for the non-poor as well. Land access will give the poor a sense of security and ownership. The beneficiaries are highly appreciative of the access created for them and they see land access as a very critical component that would improve their living condition. In both sites the project has given rise to the creation of an agglomeration or settlement clusters. This as envisaged in the project could serve as a seed bed for urban field development and could be seen as an experiment if any future policy is envisaged along this line. The hurdles of obtaining land and the financial problems of the people however should be underlined if it is to be used as an experiment. As it stands now, there is no evidence that the city government has made use of the model to effectuate its peripheral development programs. The project has remained a one time activity and it was never upgraded to the envisaged level and scale. The site and activity approach has not influenced the city government's policy, neither in the area of poverty reduction, nor urban renewal or peripheral development.

**Conclusion**

UFDE was a relatively modest *pilot* project: when the project changed into its pilot status the original, broader TAS-approach was modified into a site and housing approach. Its efficiency was split between the two project sites: efficient in Debre Zeit, but in Addis Ababa the land allocation process was so much delayed that the other components suffered severely. The project was effective in the sense that the main activities were achieved: residents from overcrowded inner city areas got access to land, and built their houses partly with project loans. The relevance is good, but the integratedness decreased when it was turned into a pilot project. The sustainability of the project is high: most of the originally selected residents continue to live in both urban fields, and the local associations have grown in the process into successful organisations. The impact of the project beyond the two project sites seems to be limited, and the government is focussing more on constructing large numbers of housing units in condominiums. Another reason why the impact has remained limited is that the donor has abandoned the pilot project, and initiated no follow-up, not even the budgeted evaluation, the immediate reason being the Ethio-Eritrean conflict.

### 3.4 Integrated Holistic Approach/Urban Development Programme (IHA/UDP)

Acronym:	<b>IHA/UDP</b>
Title:	<b>Integrated Holistic Approach/Urban Development Programme in Addis Ababa</b>
Project number(s):	ET92003
Contribution in Euro:	732,000
Project period:	1992 - 1995
Location:	4 Slums: Kebele (41), 42, 43 & 30 Teklehaimanot, Addis Ababa
Intermediary organisation:	NGO 'IHA/UDP' and Emmanuel Baptist Church
(Local) Government involved:	Addis Ababa Municipality, especially Kebele 41.
Direct Achievements:	Slum Upgrading
Endusers/beneficiaries:	Inhabitants of 4 low-income housing areas; original and current

#### 3.4.1 Project Design

The IHA/UDP is an NGO working in urban areas and it is one of the 16 founding members of the CRDA Urban Forum. IHA/UDP's urban poverty alleviation project in Addis Ababa was initiated in mid 1989 and began work in January 1990. The project worked in four poor kebeles of the Teklehaimanot area in the city covering a total population of about 30,000 people. These kebeles are currently found in the Addis Ketema Sub-city following the restructuring of the city administration. The project is an up-scaling of the former Redd Barna Ethiopia project implemented in one of the kebeles (nr. 41). The project claims that it has built upon the former pilot project by overcoming its deficiencies. The project in these kebeles ended in 1997 and was replaced by a community based organization, Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organisation (CIBISIDO), which is now responsible for running the former project activities.

The IHA/UDP has two main dimensions underlying its philosophical underpinnings. The first is its 'integration' and 'holisticness', which refers to the recognition of the fact that poverty cannot be alleviated by the un-integrated and sectoral approach that is typical of most government structures, local authorities or even non-government agencies. The issue of poverty alleviation has to be seen holistically because of the multiple interlinked problems underlying poverty which requires an integrated approach to solve them, in a way that leads to synergetic effects. The second dimension of the IHA/UDP is its community based approach. This is expressed in terms of addressing the felt needs of the community and ensuring community involvement. The latter is captured by putting in place a structure of participation that runs from a family to sub zone committee, neighborhood groups and kebele. The IHA-UDP project consists of four different components:

- 1) Physical Upgrading,
- 2) Health and Sanitation,
- 3) Community Development and
- 4) Income Generating Activities.

The Physical Upgrading Component involves repairs and construction of new houses, reconstruction/repairs of kitchens, latrines, showers and cloth wash facilities, public fountains, roads, alleys, ditches, lanes etc. The houses built are envisaged to be maintained through a revolving fund to be created through rent collected from houses. Communal facilities will be maintained through some arrangements involving the community. The Health and Sanitation involves preventive and curative aspects. The preventive aspect has eight components involving health education, MCH, nutrition, safe and clean water, immunization, environmental health, control of communicable diseases and minor treatment (first aid). The Community development component consists of four projects: (a) the 'old' people's programme (conscientisation, counselling, daily activities), (b) the delinquency prevention youth programme (literacy classes, arts and crafts, library and homework assistance, gardening etc), (c) the disabled (mentally retarded) children programme (child care centre, information dissemination, and education), and (d) the 'Aids prevention and rehabilitation' programme (counselling, information dissemination, raising awareness). The income generating activities involves food processing, garment making, fuel briquetting etc through offering training and upgrading skills and organizing people.

### 3.4.2 *Appraisal*

#### **Introduction**

The project is an up- scaling of the former Redd Barna Ethiopia project implemented in kebele 41 between 1981 and 1986. The project claims that it has built on the former pilot project by overcoming its deficiencies, for example one of the lessons IHA/UDP drew from the pilot phase of Redd Barna is the necessity for a proper exit strategy and ensuring sustainability of the project. The design was based on an old base line survey from 1989 among the potential beneficiaries of the project.

#### **A/B - Efficiency and Effectiveness**

In monetary terms, the project acquired a total grant of over 54 million Birr during the period of 1989-1997. The breakdown of the input by the donor country shows that the Netherlands (NGOs and government) is by far the greatest donor covering about 42 % of the total input, followed by the UK with about 27% (cf. Table 1 in the attached IHA-Progress Report). The planned pattern of expenditure shows that, physical upgrading received the highest share (36%), followed by primary health care (25%), community development (21%) and income generation (11%); the balance (almost 7%) is allotted to administration, indicating that most of the budget was envisaged for program activities. Each of the four components consist of a number of activities and a Mid-Term Evaluation of the project held in March 1993 counted in total 52 different activities.

##### *1. Physical upgrading component*

The physical upgrading component shows the most visible achievements of the project. It has achieved *most* of the planned objectives or even *over-achieved* in some areas. For instance 1,102 new houses were constructed although only 659 were planned. The only target that was not achieved fully concerns the communal kitchens: 705 realised out of the envisaged 1379 (see further the IHA-Project report and its Annex 1). An appreciation was extended from the residents' focus groups and the housing beneficiaries, stressing the deplorable housing conditions they used to live in, and the improvements which took place as a result of the upgrading of their houses, kitchens and toilets. The process of housing improvement has involved the neighbourhood groups for selecting the beneficiaries and those who could be involved in the construction business as labourers. The envisaged plan for the maintenance of the housing stock in the project area was to use a revolving fund from rents collected.

##### *2. Community development component*

Most of the community development sub-components have achieved slightly less than planned. For example, the youth and child program organized 2,000 members (although 3,000 were envisaged), and the general community education could target 20,000 people (of the planned 30,000). Similarly, the seminar/orientation component targeting municipal/local government, the seminar for households and zone coordinators held before the election of the neighbourhood groups, and the orientation given to ex-soldiers, slightly underachieved. The training component has achieved the planned objective, including training of education extension workers and of neighbourhood groups, and professional and skills training. The education component has fallen short of the planned target for kindergartens and sponsorships of (blind) children, as has the special care beneficiaries program for the destitute old, the destitute disabled, and the difficult youth labourers.

According to the Mid-Term Evaluation of March 1993, the project has brought significant qualitative changes in the community. The major achievement in this regard is community empowerment and community participation. This involved the education extension workers or 'yellow girls', and the neighbourhood organizations. Upon the insistence of the community The education extension workers consist of only girls who completed 12th grade and who are members of the community. Thirty education extension workers were recruited as planned and they were trained and they assisted in setting up the different community organizations, teach community members and generally serve as a bridge between community members and the project. The pre-phase out evaluation commends the achievements of education extension workers in terms of both their role in community activities by creating linkages and understanding about the project by working house to house in the community and their personal development about community work.

The participation of the community is effected through community structures which consists of the kebele, zones and sub-zones. The kebele is divided into zones with each zone comprising about 100-120 houses. The zone is divided into sub-zones with 25-30 households. The smallest unit is family

level Neighbourhood Group with about 5-10 households. Community representatives are selected from each level. Regarding the community empowerment, the project leader commented that the community can now voice its concern. It was stated that the community has even gone to the prime minister and to the mayor of Addis Ababa to complain about the demolition of the area when the project area was threatened to be demolished by the city government at different times.

In terms of education, the kindergartens have enabled the enrolment of pre-school children to increase from 100 in 1989 to 500 in 1997. The primary school enabled the enrolment of 600 sponsored children by 1997. The enrolment of students in pre-school and elementary education encourages education in the community. In addition as students go to school it decreases the number of street children and also allows mothers to enter the labour market. The 'Big Brother-Big Sister' programme which is a programme in which senior students help junior ones either in acquiring literacy or in national examination tutoring has increased the overall educational status of the young in the community (815 children have entered formal education after acquiring literacy through their programmes).

The youth programme is an important corner stone of the project. The base line survey showed that about 66 % of the project area is composed of youth and children. This indicates the significance of meeting the needs and interests of the youth and the children in the community. The program has established a youth centre which has different facilities such as offices, gymnasium, basketball field, in-door games, a library, a recreation centre etc. The program has allowed the youth to participate in different activities such as sports club, drama, music, poetry, film shows etc. This creates a sense of community where the youth have a place to spend time and provides an opportunity for the physical and mental growth of the youth. The programme for the marginalized group is a programme that has three sub-components. The disabled rehabilitation centre, a day care centre for the elderly who are provide with food (judged as poor food though) and counselling, and the rehabilitation centre for mentally and physically handicapped children.

### *3. Health and Sanitation component*

The health component is in terms of the sheer number of programmes by far the largest component (cf. Annex 1 to the project report). Some of the components are: health clinic, pre and post natal care, nutrition, environmental sanitation, and health education. In terms of the qualitative changes of the program, it has been instrumental in addressing well the preventive aspects of health. The health education provided must have brought attitudinal changes among the residents. The nutrition program has assisted children in need and has catered to their growth and development. Similarly the outpatient services of the clinic which is charging only 10 Birr is also appreciated by the residents. However, the residents do have serious complaints about the present status of the health clinic.

### *4. Income generation component*

The income generation unit has fallen somewhat short of the targets. For instance, 23 basketry beneficiaries were reached (out of the planned 53), 13 block making beneficiaries (of 15), 23 garment making beneficiaries (of 50), and 65 beneficiaries in food processing (of 100). The income generation unit has the primary objective of creating employment opportunities for the poorest of the poor in the community. Beyond this objective the income generation unit has additional objectives of generating funds within communities to finance various social services and to create a revolving fund from which persons with interest in small business activities can borrow money to get started. All the activities, except the hollow blocks production unit, employ women. The number of beneficiaries engaged in various income generation activities is not remarkably significant.<sup>5</sup> The payment beneficiaries receive is also quite low, which is most likely related to the quality of the product or the services they provide. Despite its ambitious objectives, the income generation unit has suffered a sustained loss and has proven difficult to continue. An income generation study showed that all the income generation activities are working at a loss. Part of the reason for the inability of the income generation units to flourish is that the government does not allow subsidies to any NGO or community activity that is competing with private sector undertakings.

In sum, the project has achieved a substantial degree of efficiency as well as effectiveness in terms of implementing and fulfilling the objectives despite problems in some components and sub-components.

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<sup>5</sup> Food processing (45 employed), Basket making (37), Hollow block making (13), and Garment manufacturing (26 regular and 80 temporary).

For certain activities the program has faulted in keeping the time table due to factors beyond the control of the project. As a result, some of the donors were frustrated and have pulled out while others have stayed with the project. The cost effectiveness of the project is difficult to evaluate. The only thing that can be seen is that the large majority of the budget has been assigned for program activities as opposed to administrative expenses. The project leader believes that in the business of poverty alleviation, it is difficult to be cost effective since human development is complex and is not like material development. It is however important to make note of the fact that one of the advantages NGOs and CBOs have over government is the cost-effective provision of services as a result of the removal of the bureaucratic hurdles.

### **C - Relevance**

The fact that the project has been organized to be need based (cf. the base line survey of 1989) and holistic is an indication of the relevance of the project activities. According to this base line survey, the 11 community priorities were housing, environmental health, road and alleys, preventive care (PHC), job creation and skill training, recreation for youth and child, improvement for community shops, kindergarten and primary education, electric light, welfare assistance for the aged, socially disadvantaged and handicapped, and, finally, fuel briquettes. These priorities have been incorporated into the four project components.

Another indication is the constant interaction and consultation of the community regarding the project activities and programs through the neighbourhood groups and meetings, which was not only to help them understand the complex nature of the problem of poverty but also to enable them to assume full ownership of the existing and emerging programs. As long as people are made to own programmes and activities, relevance is achieved because people will not and cannot own what is not applicable and relevant for them. Though the project has achieved relevance by undertaking activities which were the concerns and the priorities of the communities, there are however some demands and needs which were not met by the project. For instance the case of fuelwood briquettes which was demanded but not fulfilled is a case in point. The human waste recycling was also demanded by the community but not achieved by the project despite technical and feasibility studies.

A final aspect of relevance is whether the IHA/UDP approach has influenced the urban poverty reduction strategies at city level in Addis Ababa. The City of Addis Ababa has embarked on a number of strategies to deal with the problem of urban poverty in the city. Among these are micro and small enterprise development, low cost housing, rehabilitation of street persons and beggars and slum upgrading. These activities however are undertaken not in an integrated manner as in the case of IHA/UDP. Though the City Government recognizes that there are many NGOs in the city working in urban poverty reduction, it does not seem that the approach followed by the city government is dictated by the works of the NGOs including that of IHA/UDP.

Regarding the cross-cutting themes, gender has been important with respect to the education extension workers (all girls), the kindergarten, and the income generation units (women are working in many of them). Various types of vulnerable groups (elderly, handicapped) are specifically targeted within the framework of the project as we have seen in the above. Research has been generated through the MA Thesis written by the IHA/UDP director which was intensively used in the writing of the project proposal in the late 1980s. The experience which this director gained in the project area were much later used as the basis for her PhD Thesis.

### **D - Sustainability**

One of the lessons IHA/UDP drew from the pilot phase of Redd Barna is the necessity for a *proper exit strategy* and ensuring sustainability of the project. Towards this goal IHA/UDP from the beginning attempted to implement projects that will sustain themselves, for which agreements were made with the government; however, by 1992/93 the change of government in the country nullified the prior commitments and the project was forced to sign new agreements among others with the city government. By 1995 an alternative phase out strategy was devised in cooperation with the donors. This strategy focused on human and financial resources. In terms of human resource strategy, the elements were the institutionalization and establishment of a new community board, entitled 'Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization' (CIBISIDO), the employment of a manager of this organisation, technical committees, neighbourhood groups, Elders and Youth groups, sponsorship trusts, capacity building, awareness creation for government officials, human development, conscientisation, social issues, and, finally, social justice awareness to community

leaders. The *financial* strategy included a revolving fund (rent collection), cost recovery (fees from clinics, Youth membership, mothers' contribution), assets (office, equipment, vehicles etc), profits from the income generation unit, endowment, and sponsorship (sponsor a child, sponsor an elderly person, sponsor a programme, etc.). The Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization (CIBISIDO) officially began to operate in July 1997 while the IHA/UDP's involvement with Teklehaimanot phased out in December 1997. Though CIBISIDO is officially responsible to run the program, IHA/UDP remains the main intermediary to channel funds from organizations which sponsor different components of the project.

Currently, *CIBISIDO's Board* has 15 members with representatives from workers, kebele, the Youth association, sub-city, neighbourhood group, government office responsible for NGOs and GO. Technical support committee and elders committee are also formed; the former is mainly advisory while the latter is meant to mediate any conflict and complaints in the community or between the community and the organization. The three programmes that are now running are income generation, health services and social welfare services (former community development). Physical upgrading which was a major component of the IHA/UDP is no longer running at present. The first impression one gets is that most of the programs of IHA/UDP are still continuing under CIBISIDO. There are however some programs which were discontinued or stopped. The programmes which are currently running have sponsors while those which are found expensive or face other problems are discontinued.

*Health Services:* The clinic is running and is providing outpatient services, health education and medical care services for a fee of 10 Birr per month. It is sponsored by Ethio-Swedish health professionals as planned in the phase out strategy. Residents however have complained that the services provided by the clinic now are rather minimal. They indicated that there is no medicine except condoms and aspirin and they would like to see the clinic service to be improved significantly. This perception partly has come from the interest of the people to have more advanced curative services rather than a focus on preventive care. The nutrition program is now supported by the Canadian Church though it has been discontinued for one year in the past. The suction truck is providing environmental health services for residents for a fee of 55 Birr. Though the suction truck also provides services for other IHA/UDP project areas on the agreement of cost sharing, there is difficulty of maintenance since the fee collected is quite low. The elderly programme is continuing and is sponsored by Help Age International. The primary school program is still carried out and currently there are about 1000 sponsored students. The training and skill development program for delinquent youth is now discontinued because the local organisation (CIBISIDO) does not have enough funds to continue it.

The *income generating unit* has stood on its own and continues with most of the activities started in IHA/UDP. The hollow block unit however has stopped due to reasons beyond the capacity of CIBISIDO: a private land owner confiscated the space where the hollow block premise was operating. The producers collected their compensation and left the area. The income generation activities which are still existing are like before operating at a loss. Although the *physical upgrading component* is no longer a part of the Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization (CIBISIDO) program, the project has envisaged to use the fund from house rent for maintenance purposes. While a total of about 500,000 Birr has been deposited in an account, the money could not be used due to administrative problems. As a result the envisaged maintenance could not be undertaken. This has led houses to deteriorate and run down.

In terms of the *community structure*, the education extension workers have phased out with the IHA/UDP. The education extension workers or yellow girls now have become an integral part of the different project activities assuming different positions. According to the CIBISIDO manager the neighbourhood groups at different levels continue and participate in project administration and project activities. This, however, could not be confirmed by residents; they mentioned that though the neighbourhood groups have been re-elected after the phasing out of IHA/UDP, there has not been any meeting of the community for the last seven years. The neighbourhood groups do not also meet to carry out project activities.

To summarize the four factors of sustainability:

*(a) Institutional and organizational strength*

It was indicated in the above that the development efforts of IHA/UDP are now institutionalized under the CIBISIDO, which is run by a board and managed by a manager, and has different committees which have clear mandates and functions. It is now organized as a Community Based Organisation (CBO). CBOs are only registered with the City Government, in contrast to 'Development Associations' which, as we have seen in the previous section, are registered with the Ministry of Justice. This means that CBOs (like CIBISIDO) rely on Development Associations (like IHA/UDP) for its finance because CBOs cannot directly receive funds from donors. This creates not only dependency on the part of the CBO but also their activities could possibly be influenced by the Development Association.

*(b) Formal recognition and authority.*

Following the above, CIBISIDO is not formally recognized by the Ministry of Justice but is rather given a CBO licence just like idirs or iqubs (local savings associations) by the city government. This deprives the necessary legal status for CIBISIDO to foster contacts and linkages with other agencies and undertake developmental activities. It therefore becomes difficult for this organisation to operate on its own. It may also be losing its community base if the neighbourhood groups are not operating like before. The mentioned lack of meetings could easily isolate the community from the CIBISIDO management and board.

*(c) Interest and benefit of users*

In terms of the interests and benefits of users, the interventions currently carried out are follow ups of the previous programs. As these programs were earlier identified on the basis of the felt needs, it seems that their continuation represents the felt needs of the community. It is however important to monitor and see whether the felt needs of the community have changed or not in order to form a basis for the continuation of the programs and activities. The fact that some of the facilities, particularly housing, are deteriorating and other activities are being discontinued indicates that the physical dimension which is the most visible aspect of the project is deteriorating. The income generation unit cannot also continue in its current status and urgently needs restructuring. In addition, some of the centres (e.g. the youth centre) which are currently recovering part of their costs, need to be scaled-up to full cost-recovery. On the whole, the project beneficiaries still exist in the area and in fact the number of project beneficiaries have increased significantly due to population growth. Those individuals which have been trained as project workers are also retained currently but assume different positions. For instance the education extension workers are now integrated in different project activities.

*(d) Development of knowledge and capacity*

Within the project, human resources sustainability is substantial. It is meant to ensure the quality and quantity of the know how present with the implementers, and most of the current project workers are from the previous projects. This ensures the continuity of knowledge and know how. However, in terms of access to new knowledge, the project still needs to design methods and means of introducing new ideas to project workers.

## **E - Impact**

Certainly the project activities are all geared towards changing the lives of the people. The focus group participants remember the pre-project situation of the area as sub-standard and deplorable. For instance the Youth focus group members expressed the situation as follows

*Though some of us were small we remember the situation well. The community was destitute. They were gathered in this area from different places. The extent of poverty could be seen in the plastic houses they were living. There were no latrines and kitchen facilities. There was also a high level of potable water problem which exacerbated the health hazards of the poor people. In addition, there was no access road in the area. The Youth in the area did not have any recreational facilities and thus the majority used to be affected by delinquent behaviour and practices.*

All focus groups agree that there has been improvement in the housing conditions of the people, the health conditions, the conditions of the marginalized and the elderly and the situation of the youth. This could also be ascertained from observing the facilities and services the project is undertaking.

Beyond material improvement, the above-mentioned *attitudinal changes* as well as the *skills upgrading* brought about by the project should also be appreciated. In terms of attitudinal changes the



health education, the awareness raising seminars and the empowering of people all will have a lasting impact on the people. The skills training program is an important instrument in changing the lives of people towards self reliance and employability. The lives of communities will not be changed unless education is used as entry point for the community. The sponsorship programs and the kindergartens affects positively not only the children and students but also their parents and the community at large. In addition some concrete impacts of the project are not difficult to see, such as the decrease witnessed in new cases of sexually transmitted diseases in the period from 1997-2003 (cf. table 5 in the attached project report); this could at least partly be attributed to the different health activities undertaken in the pre and post IHA-project periods.

### **Conclusion**

The IHA/UDP was by far the largest of these four projects in terms of funding and number of beneficiaries. It was efficient and effective. The relevance was high, and it was the most integrated of the four projects; this, however, also has its downside with a very large number of activities raising questions about management and coordination. The broad range of facilities, training, awareness raising, and community building are surely useful, although income generation and credit provision lagged behind, but, more importantly, the living environment continued to retain its slum character, and housing conditions are even deteriorating. The sustainability of the project was intended to be guaranteed by a planned exit strategy of IHA/UDP, leaving the project activities to a local association (i.e. the 'Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization', CIBISIDO). There are however two problems with the implementation of this exit strategy. Firstly, the local association is still not fully independent since it has the status of a CBO and funds have to come through a Development Association, in this case IHA/UDP. Secondly, the participation of the population in the association and in the neighbourhood group is in the end disappointing; apparently no meetings have taken place for about seven years. Sustainability could be reduced to zero if the Addis Ababa City Government starts to implement the concrete plans it has designed to demolish the entire neighbourhood (currently undecided due to the elections of May 2005 and its aftermath). The impact of the project on other areas could be important when IHA/UDP will use the lessons learned when implementing projects in other areas.

### **3.5 Conclusion: Echelon 1 & 2 Appraisal**

In this section the four projects of the Echelons 1 and 2 will be compared according to the five evaluation criteria and their indicators as mentioned in Appendix G. This appendix also gives the average scores for these four projects taken together. First, however, the preparations made for the four projects will be compared.

#### *Introduction: Problem Analysis and Participation of Beneficiaries*

All four projects of Echelons 1 and 2 were based on a solid problem analysis. In fact, quite a lot of preparations were made: studies were done, surveys were undertaken, and discussions were held with staff at the Ministry and with implementing organisations in The Netherlands and in Ethiopia. Moreover, in most cases (except in the case of UFDE) the future beneficiaries participated in quite direct ways: the involvement of beneficiaries and local intermediary organisations took place through surveys, discussions and/or local committees. As a result of these various rounds of studies and discussions, quite a lot of adjustments were made to the original project proposals. This resulted on the one hand in proposals well-adapted to the local circumstances, but often preparations took such a long time that either the momentum was lost, or the interest of certain stakeholders gradually waned, and participants became impatient and started putting pressure on intermediary organisations. This in turn led the latter to propose *pilot phases* (SCP-Dessie and UFDE) in stead of trying to pursue the full project proposed originally, or to request a reduced amount of funding to speed up the approval procedure (UHP).

#### **A-Efficiency**

The four Echelon 1 & 2 projects analysed in the above are in size and scope relatively small projects, and on the whole they have more characteristics of projects undertaken by International NGOs than by Governments; in fact, in most of these projects NGOs and governments are cooperating. In order to establish whether the policy has been implemented effectively we will look into three factors: money, contents and time.

### *Money*

In funding terms the Echelon 1 projects are small with between Euro 70,000 to 210,000 each. In other words the funding directly derived from the Urban Development Policy has amounted in Ethiopia only to about 360,000 Euro. The Echelon-2 project (IHA/UDP) received, with Euro 730,000, twice as much as all Echelon-1 projects taken together. Keeping in mind that it concerns low levels of funding, in some projects still the amount spend per beneficiary were discussed and judged on the high side (for example, in the SCP-Dessie project about 1,800 Euro was spend on each of the 45 girls). However, in most instances there are also other beneficiaries, who benefit only from specific parts of the project (e.g. the families of street children that received housing), but most importantly *pilot* projects are usually expected to be more costly. In conclusion, the financial efficiency in the four projects has been clearly on an acceptable level, and the input of human and material resources has been quite appropriate.

### *Contents*

The contents of the four projects do not point to a coherent policy or programme; therefore, they are too diverse. Although all of them have aspects of integrated, urban development, the extent of it varies greatly. With respect to the specific contents, certain projects are rather limited (mainly health, focus on street children), while the others are much broader (land & housing, integrated slum upgrading).

### *Time*

Time seems to be less efficiently used. Not only was there often a long preparation period, but most projects required budget neutral extensions due to such factors as underutilisation of funds and slow implementation. In certain cases this was due to external factors, such as the slow disbursement of funds by donors. The four projects lasted on average a total of about four years, which is quite long for such relatively small projects. The project that took least time (SCP-Dessie) was even cut short by exceptional circumstances: since TDHL was leaving Ethiopia altogether the remaining funds were simply distributed among the 45 beneficiaries.

## **B-Effectiveness**

Considering the area of effectiveness, it has to be remembered that the projects differ substantially in the number and scope of activities planned: from modest (SCP-Dessie) to an almost endless list of activities (IHA/UDP). The projects are considered effective in that the majority of the planned activities were actually realised (SCP-Dessie, IHA/UDP), or that the *main* activities were realised (UFDE), while one project mainly failed (UHP).

## **C-Relevance**

The relevance scores established before the field study on the basis of files (cf. the B-columns in Appendix G) does not change substantially when the local stakeholders' opinions are considered as assessed by the evaluators (cf. the A-columns in Appendix G). Although not funded from the Dutch Urban Development Policy budget, IHA/UDP scores highest and its integration aspect is greatest; SCP-Dessie and UFDE have similar scores in the medium range, while UHP is clearly least relevant and also least integrated.

### *Cross-cutting Issues*

From the cross-cutting issues, gender has been explicitly considered in all four projects with positive results for the women/girls involved; the same can be said about the involvement of vulnerable groups (except for the UFDE project). Research has been important in two projects (UFDE and IHA/UDP): both project proposals were based on prior research, while publications were also made on the experiences gained with the respective project implementations. Finally, UFDE also came about through an explicit request from the Addis Ababa City Government (i.e demand orientation).

## **D-Sustainability**

### *(a) Institutional and organizational strength*

Some of the projects were part of a broader organisation, while others stimulated the rise of new local organisations. The Urban Health Project (UHP) was only a small part of a much broader organisation, the Daughters of Charity (DOC), having clear operational and financial procedures, some stability in funding and long term goals within their Urban Development Programme. With DOC's various activities funded by different donors, it was often difficult to identify the actual project activities. However, the Primary Health Care strategy itself failed because there was not enough flexibility to

adjust to the changing government policies. The IHA/UDP project is also part of a broader organisation with clear procedures; its long term strategy is one of exiting the project area once a new, local organisation can take over certain functions; however, the new organisation in question, the Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization (CIBISIDO), seemed integrated but remains dependent on the parent organisation and lacks participation from the residents. In the other two projects, new local organisations arose: some were quite successful in acquiring benefits for the community (e.g. in both project sites of UFDE), while the other one was temporarily successful (SCP-Dessie).

*(b) Formal recognition and authority.*

The formal recognition in two projects occurs mainly through the mother organisations (DOC, IHA/UDP), but the informal associations themselves have little recognition or authority. This is different for SCP-Dessie (i.e. ADMAS) and UFDE, where the local organisations do have formal recognition from local governments, although the Development Association in the Addis Ababa site is much more formally recognised than the CBO in Debre Zeit.

*(c) Interest and benefit of users*

The levels of interest of the users are relatively higher in the UFDE and SCP-Dessie projects since they were able to actually acquire concrete benefits for the users. In addition, the users' interest has clearly been decreasing in the two other projects compared to earlier phases of the projects in question: in UHP all project activities collapsed after a promising start, and in the IHA/UDP project the local organisation is as we have seen losing the confidence of the beneficiaries.

*(d) Development of knowledge and capacity*

In most projects the interventions resulted in substantial transfers of knowledge, awareness and skills by means of specialised project staff and/or through participation in local and community associations. Many of these staff members were retained within the area, and could continue undertaking their tasks; the positive role of the associations have been discussed already in the above. Generating new knowledge has become more difficult after the closure of the projects.

The four aspects of sustainability taken together lead to lower field study scores (A-column in Appendix G) compared to the scores of the desk study (B-column) for two projects (UHP, IHA/UDP), especially because the interest of the users waned and the formal recognition dropped in the course of the project period. The reverse holds true for the UFDE project where especially the users' interests and the formal recognition received a boost with all the benefits the local organisations were able to acquire for them through the local governmental organisations in recent years. The scores of the SCP-Dessie project were quite stable before and after the field study.

## **E-Impact**

On the short term all four projects had clear positive effects or impact. Living conditions improved for the target groups either directly, or indirectly through access to land (UFDE). Effects on the longer term for a broader group or area than that of the beneficiaries are positive: neighbours benefit in certain cases (UHP, SCP-Dessie), or the residents of adjacent neighbourhoods (IHA/UDP), or the people in the area where the project beneficiaries came from (UFDE). However, the overall poverty situation is not likely to change as a result of such small-scale projects. The two pilot projects could have had such a wider-ranging impact if only the original proposals could have been implemented. The project area of IHA/UDP, Teklehaimanot, has, of course, been a learning ground and this could well benefit other slum upgrading activities that this organisation is currently involved in. This applies to a lesser extent to UHP since the strategy was rendered un-viable after the change of health policy, and the remainder of the project was mainly stop-gapping, and even outright hand-over of remaining funds to the clinic in order to support its change of purpose.

Whether the projects were a useful reaction to the problems identified, varied greatly. UHP, although there were benefits for the users in the initial phase, turned out to be useless once the policy changed. SCP-Dessie was very useful and was actually replicated (until it ran out of funds). UFDE was useful to acquire a plot of land to live on; in both sites this 'simple' fact appeared to be sufficient to motivate the residents to set up local organisations to pressurize the local government for various necessities. IHA/UDP was useful for several years, but seems to have run into its limits: deteriorating housing conditions, declining participation of residents, and government attitudes favouring outright demolition.

As stated in the above, the long preparation procedures led implementing organisations to propose *pilot phases* (SCP-Dessie and UFDE) or to request a reduced amount of funding to speed up the approval procedure (UHP). However, in neither of these cases was ever again referred back to the original amounts; not only did no follow-up of the pilot phases take place, but no attempts whatsoever were made to revive these projects; a notable case in point is the “closure” of the UFDE-project where an evaluation of the pilot phase was budgeted and scheduled, but in the end never undertaken and somehow ‘forgotten’. This is the more surprising since these three projects were of the Echelon-1. The local communities often tried to pick up the pieces and form associations which became successful against all odds, or perhaps because they had no more alternatives left. On the whole, it seems that most of these projects were quite suddenly abandoned by stakeholders, in particular by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Embassy and/or implementing organisations. In part, this can be explained by the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and the complete stop on new commitments (including project extensions) in either of the two countries. However, it needs to be found out from the other field study countries if this represents a pattern, for example coinciding with the fate of the Spearhead and its aftermath, or that the situation in Ethiopia was unique (in particular due to the conflict). One of the recommendations resulting from the above will underline the continuity of policies which has proven to be of crucial importance for the sustainability and the impact of programmes, such as the Dutch Urban Poverty Reduction programme.

## 4 BILATERAL PROJECTS: ECHELON 4

In this chapter the three bilateral projects of the Echelon 4 will each be introduced, analysed and appraised. Since the Echelon 4 projects were not designed from the policy on Urban Sustainable Development, not all evaluation criteria are applicable here (cf. checklist in Appendix D), and the focus will be on ex-post relevance, sustainability and impact. In the final section (4.4) an overall appraisal will be made of the three projects.

### 4.1 Women Fuelwood Carriers (WFC)

Acronym:	<b>WFC</b>
Title:	<b>Women Fuelwood Carriers: Pilot Credit Scheme in Addis Ababa</b>
Project number(s):	ET011701 / 2 / 4 / ET14902
Contribution in Euro:	308,000
Project period:	1995 - 1999
Location:	Four areas in the periphery of Addis Ababa
Intermediary organisation:	ILO, the Former Women Fuelwood Carriers Association (FWFCA), and Gasha Micro-Financing Share Company
(Local) Government involved:	Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs (MOLSA)
Direct Achievements:	Pilot Credit Scheme, Training, Transitional Phase
Endusers/beneficiaries:	Women Fuelwood carriers in the four areas of Addis Ababa

#### 4.1.1 Project Design

The Pilot Credit Scheme for Women Fuelwood Carriers (WFC) was launched in 1995 as a component of the then ongoing Women Fuel Wood Carriers Project funded by Germany. It was estimated that there were some 15,000 WFC in Addis Ababa who were subjected to harassment, beating and rape by forest guards and hooligans. Many WFC were under the age of 18 years. The fund allocated to the credit, methodology, and loan capital of the Pilot Credit Scheme for WFC overall amounts to Euro 308,000. The project was intended to identify areas of more productive work (such as plantation tending, nursery activities, organize WFC as member of small business enterprises like petty trading and injera baking), to protect the forests, to mitigate environmental degradation, and to avoid illegal tree cutting.

Germany (GTZ) first funded the project. Given the limited impact which the WFC project could make in terms of outreach through group-based income generating activities, the need for putting emphasis on assisting the WFCs to engage in individually operated micro-enterprises through credit provision became apparent. The Netherlands Government donated US\$268,750 to the then on-going WFC project for the implementation of a pilot credit scheme. Of this amount \$68,750.00 was earmarked for research, design and training while the remaining balance represented the Loan Fund Capital.

The Dutch support to the Pilot Credit Scheme includes the funding of the following activities.

- design the credit scheme's methodology;
- training of staff and group members including 6 Credit Field Officers who were ex-WFC, and staff of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA);
- training of WFC members in skill acquisition such as basic business skills, handcraft, weaving, carpet making, handcrafts, farming and animal husbandry;
- the fund advanced for the scheme (\$200,000) was disbursed in May 1996 as loan capital to be managed by ILO and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA).

The scheme's approaches and methods are based on the Grameen Bank model of a group guarantee system whereby five like-minded Women Fuel Wood Carriers first establish solidarity groups, which then federate to form credit centres. The scheme provides for full membership participation in appraisal, disbursement, follow up and repayment of loans both at group and centre levels. Democratically elected group leaders and centre chiefs, assisted by credit field officers, play key management roles in

the operation of the scheme. Four sites namely Entoto, Kolfe, Yeka and Keranyo were formed for effecting the Pilot Credit Scheme. Each credit centre covered 30 women organized in 6 solidarity lending groups of 5 members.

The long-term objectives of Pilot Credit Scheme for WFC were:

- to provide an appropriate model for the development of a local-scale credit scheme to support micro and small enterprises undertaken by Women Fuel Wood Carriers in Ethiopia;
- to assist the WFCs, through access to credit, in the development of viable and profitable income generating activities;
- to contribute to increased capacity of the Former Women Fuel wood Carriers Association (FWFCA) in its mobilization, organizational and management skills to plan and implement a variety of social and economic services.

#### 4.1.2 Appraisal

##### **Introduction**

The Women Fuelwood Carriers (WFC) project was originally a spin-off of the World Bank Calub Gas Development Project for which various studies were made. The German government (GTZ) first took it up in conjunction with the ILO, while the Dutch project was set up as a follow-up. A study was made and it was estimated that around 15,000 WFC were living and/or working on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. The perceptions of the WFC themselves were also documented in that study.

##### **Relevance**

The WFC project ran for about 3.5 years (Sept.1995 – Feb.1999) and the Netherlands government funded Euro 308,000. In late 1996 the “Former Women Fuelwood carriers Association” (FWFCA) was set up through support from the Federal Republic of Germany, and it received the formal recognition from the Ministry of Justice in late 1997. The credit scheme was solely intended for members of the FWFCA. The project started rather promising when the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) and the ILO managed the Pilot Credit Scheme on a temporary basis until a permanent arrangement with an independent financial institution for its administration was established. Thus, to oversee the overall operations of the Scheme an Interim Board of Trustees was formed: chaired by the Head of the Women Affairs Department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA).<sup>6</sup> The Loan Fund Capital, eventually to become the property of the FWFCA, was put in a trust with ILO Geneva and loanable funds were transferred to the Interim Board of Trustees based on projections of loan payments.

Under the management of the ILO and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA), various successes were reported: within 24 months of operation, the scheme was able to provide services to 539 members organized in 112 firmly established and cohesive groups (cf. Table 1 and 2 in the attached WFC Project Report). The final report of the ILO shows that as of October 1998, short term loans amounting to Birr 350,985 were disbursed to 80 per cent of the Scheme’s registered members operating a broad range of micro-enterprises. The size of individual loans disbursed over the implementation period varied between Birr 150 and 1,500 depending on the type and scale of business activities undertaken by borrowers. The purpose for which the loan was used varied considerably; most important was the retailing of food items, but also house renting, food processing and weaving were important (cf. Table 3 & 4 of the project report).

As the Pilot Credit Scheme does not require collateral for loan authorization and disbursement, its performance in loan recovery depends on the degree of trust and mutual support prevailing among its members at group and centre levels. Collective responsibility of borrowers at group and centre levels guards against misuse of loans, sanctions defaulters and pays defaulted loans; and thereby provides the basis for ensuring regular loan repayments. One missing instalment of loan repayment is considered as a default, which is collected from contribution or savings of groups and centre members. Over the first 24 months of loan disbursement and collections, there were some occurrences of delayed bi-monthly loan repayments, almost entirely due to borrowers who did not earn sufficient income from their business operations and were unable to meet their repayment schedules. All missed

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<sup>6</sup> The Interim Board of Trustees further consisted of representatives from the Specialized Financial and Promotional Institution (SFPI), the Ethiopian Women Entrepreneurs Association, the Ministry of Agriculture and the WFC project and the association of the WFC.

repayments were, however, collected from compulsory saving and, as of July 1998, the Pilot Credit Scheme has been able to achieve a loan repayments rate of 100 percent.

The Pilot Credit Scheme for the women fuelwood carriers is in principle a relevant project in urban development since it addresses extreme poverty in the urban setting. It focuses on women who have been leading an impoverished life. The Pilot Credit Scheme aimed at looking for alternative sources of income for WFC who were also household heads by designing the credit scheme, availing funds for loan, capacity building, skills training for ex-WFC in various income generating activities, leadership and management. However, the project targets only few of the priority themes, mainly work and income, and thus its (ex-ante) relevance for the Dutch urban policy is rather small, although bigger than for one of the Echelon-1 projects (cf. Appendix G). The *ex-post* relevance is on the whole even less than the ex-ante relevance, in particular because the credit scheme was not valued anymore by the 'beneficiaries' and because the organisation building has been disappointing; as a result the training could not be used efficiently without credit, and some women even reverted to fuelwood carrying. A minor positive impact has been added in the scores on urban governance because of the enhanced participation of the FWFCA.

#### *Cross-cutting Themes*

The attention for gender in the project is quite obvious, while the target group, the WFC, clearly belong to one of the more vulnerable groups in society. Demand orientation, research and culture were much less directly incorporated into the project. The reduction in the illegal cutting of trees brought about by the project has helped reduce environmental degradation.

#### **Sustainability**

##### *(a) Institutional and organisational strength*

After an initial successful period under the Interim Board of Trustees, the transfer of the credit scheme and the transitional period (most of 1998) led to persistent disruptions of the project. Firstly, when the first phase of the project came to an end in early 1998 and the second phase of the project got delayed, this created a huge transitional gap which led to the loss of the broad organizational and resource base. Secondly, the FWFCA was not strengthened in its leadership and management abilities because the Interim Board of Trustees monopolised most of the decision making process. It focused on attracting more members and less on the strengthening of the leadership aspect on the side of WFC. As a result, the association was not able to play the role it should have done as owner of the loan credit money. Moreover, on the side of the ILO and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) there was no concern shown once they handed over the management of the credit scheme to the FWFCA and Gasha Micro Finance Private Share Company (Gasha). Thirdly, the transfer of the management of the credit scheme to Gasha, although desirable according to the policy of the government on management of micro finance credit, created a different business scenario for the WFC. They were no longer seen as a marginalized group to be assisted, but as *clients* for business making. The interest rate, the loan repayment schedule, and the saving requirements all discouraged WFC and almost all withdrew from the scheme. Gasha notified the association about the increasing rate of money to be paid as a result of loan defaults, but neither of the two did anything to find a solution to the problem.

The efforts made by the ILO and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) to build a strong ground for the Pilot Credit Scheme/WFC and achieve the long-term objective of the project and all the money used for the methodology development as it stands, remains a waste. Thus, the Pilot Credit Scheme/WFC can be described as a failure. The numbers of women that are still benefiting from the project activities are insignificant.

##### *(b) Formal Recognition and Authority*

Through the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA), ILO and international donors formal recognition of the project and association was at one point quite substantial. However, it seems all of them withdrew at the same time, partly as a result of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, and the association was clearly not yet ready to take over, while Gasha was also new in the area; in fact, the FWFCA was only their second client. Currently recognition is quite low, although the World Bank may be moving in with a new initiative.

*(c) Interest and Benefits for users*

The benefits for the users were at first very substantial (cf. the loans taken and the activities undertaken with these loans), but when the loan conditions changed suddenly at the handover to Gasha they quickly lost interest.

*(d) Development of Knowledge and Capacity*

The ups and downs of the project, as well as the various training programmes and courses (cf. the attached WFC-project report) have led to the development of knowledge, especially in the area of credit provision: do's, and particularly don'ts in the case of very poor women. This could perhaps be used when a new micro credit scheme will be designed by the World Bank.

*Future sustainability*

The future sustainability of the project seems rather small, unless, as is underlined by the current management of the FWFCA, the World Bank will be moving into the area to work with the association on a much broader credit programme.

**Impact**

The impact of the project is rather limited; although there were good results and some major successes in the short term (e.g. loans disbursed and employment opportunities generated), in the longer term the project fell apart and even some women reverted to fuelwood carrying. No more micro credit loans were requested and the FWFCA is gradually dissociating itself from Gasha. On the other hand, living conditions did at least temporarily improve for the target group and their families, and for many of them it will have a lasting effect. The project may have been an adequate reaction to the perceived needs of the women, but the way the project was hurriedly handed over and closed was no less than disastrous. Nevertheless, the FWFCA is still existing, and is even considered to become a part of a wider World Bank programme; in this way, the Dutch project may have an, albeit indirect, more structural impact on the poverty situation of the WFC and their families.

**Conclusion**

The WFC project was a medium-sized project in terms of funding for a small target group, i.e. about 120 ex-WFC in four credit centres. Its ex-ante relevance was small, but the project was initially quite successful with international training of the association (FWFCA) leaders, training of credit field officers, skills training of WFC to assist in developing income generating activities, the development of a credit scheme model, the actual disbursements of credit and the use of that for new income generating activities by the women. However, the scheduled hand-over of the loan capital from the ILO to a Micro Finance Institution (MFI) took a long time because there were hardly any experienced MFIs at that time; the decision for the inexperienced Gasha company was finally taken as a last resort, and the ILO, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) and the donor never stopped to see the result and left the project, partly as a result of the Ethio-Eritrea conflict. In the mean time, the FWFCA had not developed enough capacity to steer this process; it had remained too dependent on the Interim Board of Trustees. On the whole, therefore, we can conclude that the ex-post relevance of the intervention is rather small mainly because the credit scheme collapsed, and, without credit, the training could not be used efficiently, and some women even reverted to fuelwood carrying.



## 4.2 Addis Ababa Sewerage Project (AASP)

Acronym:	<b>AASP</b>
Title:	<b>Addis Ababa Sewerage Project (MILIEV/ORET)</b>
Project number(s):	ET014601 / 2
Contribution in Euro:	8,000,000
Project period:	1997 - 2001
Location:	Four transfer stations in Addis Ababa and one sludge lagoon in the periphery of Addis Ababa
Intermediary organisation:	Interbeton and DHV
(Local) Government involved:	Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority (AAWSA)
Direct Achievements:	4 transfer stations, one sludge lagoon and equipment/vehicles; involvement and training of local contractors
Endusers/beneficiaries:	Residents where sludge is removed, and inhabitants of areas neighbouring the transfer stations

### 4.2.1 Project Background

The Addis Ababa Sewerage Project (AASP) was started in December 1997 and was expected to be completed in December 2001, but it was already completed in August/September 2000. According to the agreement between the Dutch government and the Ethiopian Government 60% of the project fund was to be covered by the Dutch government and 40% by the Ethiopian government. Interbeton B.V took the contract to implement the project. DHV took the supervisory work of the project, both Dutch companies. According to the financial reports of the Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority, the project expense amounted to Birr 98,702,777 out of which Birr 51,447,834 for construction works and Birr 47,254,943 for the purchase of supplies. The objective of the project was to improve waste disposal and treatment and stop the pollution of rivers.

The project included the construction of four sites of sludge transfer stations and the construction of one sludge treatment plant involving sludge lagoons for the dry and rainy seasons and sludge drying beds, site office with electric generators and a shed for trucks and the construction of the access road from Yerer Ber to the site. Heavy duty construction machinery, different sizes of trucks to carry sludge and other equipments were purchased (cf. Annex to AASP Project Report). The project gave ample opportunities for local contractors to be involved in the construction of the sludge beds and other earth moving activities that created opportunities for the transfer of knowledge and the gaining of better experience in the areas of project management, quality control and safety.

### 4.2.2 Appraisal

#### Introduction

The Addis Ababa Sewerage Project (AASP) is an ORET-project based on the Masterplan study, entitled "Development of Wastewater Facilities for the City of Addis Ababa" developed with assistance from a French and a German company and completed in February 1994. This study resulted in a detailed strategic plan for the period until 2005, and for the longer term until 2015. The current proposal is modelled on the 'Immediate Action Plan', which was Phase 1 of the Masterplan encompassing in total three phases with the understanding that follow-up phases might be considered. Technical advice (including cost comparisons) was requested and received in 1997 from NEI and in 1998 from Tauw Milieu. The latter recommended special attention for and monitoring of sludge collection in the *small* communities and the community participation thereby. In the discussions on the design of the project there was no participation of potential beneficiaries.

#### Relevance

Some of the accomplishments of the AASP project are the following:

- The capacity of the Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) to lift sludge from the community has more than doubled.
- The use of the transfer stations as a strategy to increase the lifting of sludge has worked since it increased the clearing of sludge from the community by two times.

- The Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) is able to lift sludge at a cheaper price because of the project assistance.
- The graders, loaders, and rollers are effectively being utilized in the preparation of access roads within the treatment areas and repairing of sludge drying beds.
- The dumpers are helping in the collection of dried sludge from the sludge drying beds.
- The skipper trucks are effectively being used in the transporting of dry sludge.
- The trucks with inbuilt vacuum pump are effectively helping in the lifting of sludge.
- The sludge pumping machines are also working and speeding up the work.
- The water pump is used to clear showers but was not appropriate for draining sludge.
- The project involved local contractors and training of operators and drivers.
- It has created jobs for a significant number of personnel including seasonal workers. There are now about 60 regularly employed workers, excluding those given contractual labour work to clear sludge from sludge drying beds.

From the above it is clear that the AASP project is very relevant for only one aspect of the priority themes, i.e. sanitation, which in itself is a crucial problem since when it is not solved it has major repercussions on the health of the population and on the urban environmental conditions. In hindsight we can conclude that the project has also been relevant for generating local employment in particular for local contractors; for example during the construction period of over two years about 400 people were employed regularly and currently formal employment exists especially for transporting the sludge. Moreover, the local contractors have been trained in methods and procedures of Dutch project management and implementation. For example, not a single serious accident occurred, hence the imposed safety measures were implemented well. Therefore, the ex-post relevance is a little higher than the ex-ante relevance (cf. Appendix G).

However, a number of problems have occurred during and, in particular after the project:

- The trailers stationed in the sludge transfer stations are not working as planned because it was difficult to pull them which has to do with the technical aspect of the trailers.
- The spare part issue remains a big problem. DAF trucks have problems of spare parts.
- There was no consideration made to protect operators of dumpers, gardeners, loaders from sludge dust.
- The idea of using a water pump to drain sludge was wrong and this caused the water pump motor to easily break and also cause sludge in the tube to pollute clients' compounds.
- Training for technicians was not given.
- As a condition under the ORET programme, the choice of equipment, contractor and consultant was left to the Dutch government. There is a feeling that the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) was not given a chance to decide on the equipments and look for cheaper and better trucks. There is a general fear that the DAF trucks may reach a stage where they can no longer be maintained.
- The Yerer Ber road is still a problem; it was constructed by a local contractor a few years before the project started, but had dilapidated rapidly during the construction phase of the project. Funds were requested to improve the road, but the Dutch Government felt that it was the responsibility of the Ethiopian government to undertake this work; besides, the Ethio-Eritrean conflict had started by this time and therefore no new commitments were possible. As a result, the sludge lagoon and drying beds in Kotebe are severely underutilized, and vehicles suffer at the potholed access road.

#### *Cross-cutting themes*

Sanitation is an issue that applies to men and women alike; it may have somewhat more effect on vulnerable groups since they are less likely to be able to make their own arrangements in this respect, in particular since the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) can remove sludge cheaper than private companies (see below). Since the project was based on the Ethiopian Masterplan there is some degree of demand orientation. No direct effect can be seen on either research or culture. The project has a positive impact on the urban environment.

#### **Sustainability**

The preparations for a follow-up phase (2 and 3 of the Masterplan) have been stopped during 1999/2000 because of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and the freezing of aid efforts. Interbeton and DHV had established their offices and workshops with the intent to complete three phases, but due to the

political situation had to withdraw completely already after Phase 1. This has clearly affected the sustainability and impact of the project in a negative way.

*(a) Institutional and organisational strength*

As the accomplishments and problems discussed above (under Relevance) indicate, the learning-by-doing aspect was quite substantial for the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA). Therefore, the project has in an indirect way enhanced AAWSA's institutional capacity.

*(b) Formal Recognition and Authority*

The formal recognition of the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) was enhanced by the increase in their capacity to tackle the important problem of sludge collection and drying.

*(c) Interest and Benefits for users*

The Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) is the major collector of sludge from the community, and their price is much lower than what private companies offer. It was reported that while private collectors charge Birr 200-250 per truck (3 cubic meters), the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) charges Birr 69, and thinks that it would continue doing so until sludge is able to be transported via underground tubes. According to the head of this authority, handing over sludge collection to the private sector would discourage the community from seeking sludge to be cleared from their septic tanks and open pit latrines. This would affect the health of the community and sludge would overflow to the nearby rivers causing a lot of pollution and harm to the health of the community. Nevertheless, the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) could not meet the demand for sludge collection and is encouraging private investors to participate in the work and there are some private companies collecting sludge. Moreover, the authority is encouraging organizations to collect their sludge and bring it to the treatment plants. Several organizations are doing so, and hence overall sludge collection has increased. The demand for sludge collection from the community is high, but requests made have to wait for three to four months, although the plan is to respond to such requests within eleven days.

Four sludge transfer stations have been constructed, in Sellasie, Kechene, Kolfe and Gejja. One of them, Gejja, has never been operational, but the other stations are working. The trailers in the three transfer stations are used for collecting sludge which is transferred to the underground tank via the sludge irrigation canal built with an *open ditch*. The process allows for a lot of sludge to travel on the surface, because most of the underground tanker space is filled with silts causing the depth of the tankers to be reduced from five to two meters. The attempts made to remove the silted sands and other materials have not been successful. In fact, the Selassie station has been temporarily stopped because the sludge overflow was affecting the surrounding neighbourhood, and the local community complained after which the Kebele ordered the station to stop operations. Currently negotiations are taking place between the Kebele and the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) on how to proceed.

*(d) Development of Knowledge and Capacity*

The Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) has gained a lot of knowledge from this project, both from the achievements and the mistakes. In addition, the project gave opportunities for local contactors to be involved in the construction of the sludge beds and other earth moving activities that created opportunities for the transfer of knowledge and the gaining of enhanced experience in the areas of project management, quality control and safety.

*Future sustainability*

The management of the sludge lagoons and drying beds are quite effective, but that of the transfer stations needs to be improved urgently. The two remaining transfer stations risk to be shut down as well because of silting problems in the tanks. Furthermore, the Yerrer Ber road needs to be improved without delay in order to save the vehicles from further damage and to use the sludge lagoon to its full capacity. However, no clear plans have been tabled for these problems as yet!

The Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) had to clear the nearby trees and had to discontinue its forest development, because the forests and trees would attract bigger birds that can cause danger to airplanes especially during landing and takeoff. Kotebe and Kaliti are located in the direction of the airport. The dried sludge cannot be sold to farmers to use it as fertilizer because it is

not cleaned from other harmful materials. The sludge contains rusted metals and sharp things which could harm farmers; currently, it is simply being piled up.

### Impact

The impact of the project has been significant in several respects:

- ✓ It succeeded in reducing the amount of sludge that used to be accumulated in the open latrine pits and septic tanks and in effect over flowed and continued to pollute the rivers exposing the community to different water born diseases.
- ✓ The experience gained in sludge management and maintenance of sludge lagoons and drying beds, running the sludge equipments and maintaining them has built the technical capacity of the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA). All sludge equipments, heavy machineries, trucks, dumpers, and pumps are running. Of course this has been a major challenge in terms of getting spare parts and covering cost of maintenance to the authority.
- ✓ The attitude of the community towards sludge management has changed. Informants explained that there is high demand for sludge clearance by the community. Although the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) planned to respond to such demands within eleven days of application it is taking them three to four months. Although the population has increased, the demand for sludge clearance shows the rising awareness of the community to keep their environment clean and keep themselves healthy.
- ✓ Knowledge transfer and job opportunity for a significant number of workers has been another impact of the project. Local contractors worked along with the Dutch company in the construction of sludge drying beds and sludge lagoon. This capacity is in place and maintenance of sludge drying beds is not a problem. Moreover, a significant number of people got permanent and seasonal employment as a result of the project.

### Conclusion

With a Dutch contribution of 8 million Euro, the AASP is a large project. However, the relevance according to the Urban Development Policy and its priority themes is rather marginal, and there is no question what-so-ever of an integrated approach. Despite its size, it was intended to be only the first out of three phases outlined by the 1994 Masterplan discussed in the above. Due to the Ethio-Eritrean conflict the Dutch support was stopped, and the involved Dutch companies packed up and left the country. The fact that Phase 2 and 3 of the Masterplan were as a result of the conflict not considered, affected both sustainability and impact of the first phase activities in a negative way since the three phases were envisaged as one integral project, and therefore the continuity was distorted. The project resulted in important achievements, such as operational sludge beds and (part of the) transfer stations, effective use of the majority of the equipment, increased sludge collection, raised awareness among population, transfer of knowledge, enhanced capacity of the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA), and employment opportunities. Nevertheless, some important problems remain, such as the overflow of sludge in the transfer stations, various technical problems with the equipment, and the dilapidated state of the Yerar Ber road.

### 4.3 Delivery of 266 DAF City Busses and Spare Parts (DAF)

Acronym:	<b>DAF</b>
Title:	<b>Delivery of 266 DAF City Busses and spare parts (ORET)</b>
Project number(s):	ET008801
Contribution in Euro:	22,400,000
Project period:	1994 - 1998
Location:	Addis Ababa
Intermediary organisation:	DAF, Anbassa transport company and Izatco Suppliers
(Local) Government involved:	Ministry of Transport and Communication
Direct Achievements:	Enhanced inter-city transport for low-income population
Endusers/beneficiaries:	Bus travelers at stops and/or inside busses

#### 4.3.1 Project Background

The project concerns the supply of 266 DAF city buses acquired through a 60% grant from the Netherlands Government and the rest paid by the Ethiopian Government. The grant amounted to 22.4

million Euro (DFL 49.3 million). The objective of the project, as originally stated, was improvement of public transport through the supply of 200 intercity buses and another 50 city buses. The latter were meant for use in Addis Ababa. However, the project was subsequently revised to focus only on the supply of city buses (266 in number) for Addis Ababa as this appeared to have gained much higher priority for the Ethiopian Government. The last shipment of the 266 buses was made on 22/10/97 and Anbassa City Bus Service Enterprise (the implementer of the project which operates the buses) confirmed the delivery of all the buses on 2/4/98. In addition to the supply of the buses and the required spare parts, the project provided for the establishment of a workshop and the placement of a resident engineer from DAF to help the city bus operator develop the necessary technical expertise to maintain the fleet.

#### 4.3.2 Appraisal

##### **Introduction**

The project document and the interviews with the management of the implementing organization indicate that there was a systematic analysis of the significance of the intervention within the context of Ethiopia. The project document for example addressed among other things technical issues and sustainability, financial sustainability, and economic viability. The interviews on the other hand showed that the Government of Ethiopia and the implementing organization were highly concerned with after-sales services and supply of spare parts both of which indicate that there was a clear appreciation of the technical context within which the intervention was to take place. This was of course highly enhanced by the fact that Ethiopia was to pay a substantial 40% of the total costs leading to a clear sense of ownership of the project on the Ethiopian side. However, apart from the technical aspects, not many other issues have been considered.

The problem analysis was made with the participation of organizational stakeholders: The Addis Ababa City Administration, the Anbassa City Bus Service Enterprise, the Addis Ababa Transport Authority were all closely involved in the identification and implementation of the intervention. However, there was no evidence of the direct involvement of the final beneficiaries (i.e potential bus users). This, however, does not seem to be a significant omission in the context of this project.

##### **Relevance**

Personal mobility in Ethiopia as a whole is low with an average of less than 0.5 km per person per day in motorized transport. Even in Addis Ababa, the capital city, private vehicles and taxis represent only a small fraction of the transport system of the city. Other means of mass transit systems like trains/trams do not exist at all and most people either walk or use city buses to go to work, school or the market. The high rates of population growth coupled with the limited capacity of the public bus transport agency have resulted in severe pressure on mass transport in the City. According to the information acquired from the Addis Ababa City Government the number of bus users in Addis Ababa was 43% higher than that anticipated in the 1986 Master Plan. The same source indicates that despite some subsidy, increasing transportation rates are unaffordable for the majority of urban dwellers: 60% of the urban population cannot afford taxis and over 20% cannot afford bus services according to estimates of the Addis Ababa City Government. Furthermore, information obtained from the Anbassa City Bus Service Enterprise indicates that between 70% to 80% of bus users are low-income individuals who cannot afford the relatively high taxi fares.

The project, which resulted in the supply of 266 new DAF city buses was, therefore, a relevant response to the urban transport problem of Addis Ababa. The Addis Ababa Transport Authority and users agree that the project has contributed to the improvement of the capacity of the Enterprise to provide bus services to more people of the City. The managers of the Enterprise interviewed for this evaluation strongly stated that the *timing* of the intervention was particularly important: the buses arrived at a critical moment when the fleet of the Enterprise was completely aged and therefore unable to continue providing appropriate service.

Beneficiaries interviewed for this evaluation also indicated that the city bus service in general is a very important service oriented towards the need of the poor in bridging the problem of transport. It was also indicated that there is an acute shortage of reliable means of mass transportation in the city and the city bus service is the number one choice of the poor. Even if the fare is not affordable for all, most beneficiaries indicated that the middle and low-income families use such service as a major means of transportation. Especially, students mentioned the importance of such service for their day-

to-day transport needs and also indicated that it is also affordable. Workers and some other beneficiaries indicated that they are living in outskirts of the city (where accommodation costs are relatively cheap) and working in the city centre, thanks to the availability of the city service.

One of the objectives of the project – providing safer and more reliable transportation - was clearly aligned with the necessities of the public in Addis Ababa and the needs of the Country. Generally, users value a public transport system that is convenient, safe and affordable. All the stakeholders of the project agree that the supply of the 266 buses has contributed to the achievement of these objectives through:

- The replacement of the old fleet of buses which were not reliable and required very frequent calls to the garage
- Opening-up of new bus lines (or lengthening of existing lines) which improved the coverage of the bus network and access to outlying areas
- Better features in the design of the new buses (they came with a dual circuit system and an engine retarder which gave the buses better brakes and improved safety)

The reduction in bus waiting time, which has been stated as one of the objectives of the intervention, proved very difficult to establish because of absence of measured data before and immediately after the intervention. The data obtained from the Enterprise states that currently, “ the average waiting time ranges from 30 to 60 minutes”.

The interviewed beneficiaries indicated that the city bus service is consistent but noted certain reservations on its reliability and safety. Users specifically mentioned that over-suffocation, long waiting times, late arrivals and, even missed arrivals of the busses create considerable problems in their day-to-day life. Users also mentioned that the service has no or little consistency, and hence, they could not rely upon the service entirely. Theft and congestion were also mentioned as major problems in using buses. However, the urban poor continue to use the service as a major transportation means, as there is no other more reliable and better means of transportation at a cost that is affordable for the poor.

The DAF project is ORET financed, and not designed from the viewpoint of the Urban Sustainable Development policy; therefore, the relevance with respect to the five priority themes is quite limited: urban transport was particularly enhanced and as a result also opportunities to acquire employment and income; besides, as seen in the above, it was particularly appreciated by low-income bus travellers. However, the project has no characteristics of an integrated urban development, and overall relevance for the policy therefore remains limited and indirect, although the access to employment opportunities and social services has increased as a result of better city transport services.

#### *Cross-cutting Themes*

The effects of the project were gender neutral in the sense that better transport services benefit men and women alike. Users indicated that it is the poor who are the consistent users of the city bus, both men and women. No mention was made regarding the impact of the project on vulnerable groups (children, the elderly and handicapped bus users) nor is there any evidence that the needs of such users have been considered in the design of the buses. For example, lowering the ground clearance of the buses (or employing a lowering movable step at the entrance) to make the buses easier for use by the elderly and the handicapped does not seem to have been considered.

The level of interest and participation in the design of the project clearly indicate that the project was demand-driven rather than donor-driven. The Ministry of Transport and the public transport company devoted significant attention and made careful specifications for the buses to adapt them to local conditions. Furthermore, similar projects dealing with the delivery of more DAF buses have been subsequently implemented after the delivery of the 266 buses. This indicates that the level of interest and the demand for expanding the city’s bus services is sustained and reflects the underlying needs of the Country. For example, the Enterprise reported that at the moment some 700 buses are needed to fully meet the demand for bus services in the City. The Enterprise currently has some 463 buses. Research on technical matters and specifications are continuous, but did not lead to a direct impact on policy development. No specific mention could be made on the inclusion of cultural aspects in the service.

Information obtained from the Anbassa City Bus Service Enterprise also indicates that 150 of the buses were fitted with an intercooler system which reduces pollution, although the “Euro 1 norm” was

not implemented.<sup>7</sup> Issues regarding the impact of the 266 buses on pollution will be hard to pinpoint in the absence of concrete measurements before and after the delivery of the buses. Even without measurements, however, it is obvious that the replacement of the old fleet of buses (which would obviously contribute to a lot of pollution) with a new fleet by itself will reduce pollution in relative terms. On the other hand, it was reported that all the old buses were not immediately discarded after the delivery of the new buses. In Ethiopia, like in other developing countries, fleets are often kept in service beyond what is considered to be their 'normal economic lifetime' elsewhere in the world. This is achieved through 'cannibalization' of parts and modifications. The resolve to keep a vehicle in service as long as it has some 'life' in it often results in compromised standards and reductions of engine efficiency.

### **Sustainability**

#### *(a) Institutional and organisational strength:*

The Anbassa City Bus Service Enterprise is a well-recognized, well-established formal institute, closely related to the Ministry of Transport. The Anbassa enterprise was selected to undertake the project because it was the only public enterprise offering city bus services in Addis Ababa. The company had the comparative advantage in terms of experience and logistical support (three maintenance depots within the City) and was the most viable and natural candidate for hosting the project. Consequently, the integration of the project with the core activities of the company has been seamless and the institutional dimension of the sustainability of the project is not in question. The last batch of the 266 buses was delivered in April 1998 and most of them are still in use (information obtained from the operator, and confirmed through a visit). The workshop and the training facilities, which were established as part of the project, still exist and are functioning. Even though the management reported a significant staff turnover, it was indicated that training has continued.

One aspect of the institutional arrangement for the intervention was that there would be a local agent that will assist the Enterprise in the supply of spare parts and provide it with technical assistance. The management, however, reported that it has not received meaningful support from the local agent, IZATCO, in the supply of spare parts and technical assistance. The Management feels that the increase in the number of DAF trucks and buses in the Country warrants a competent local sales-agent for the DAF brand. The owner of IZATCO, on the other hand, stressed that the Enterprise often uses spare parts from other sources (non-genuine), and subsequently complains about IZATCO when these spare parts do not work properly.

#### *(b) Formal Recognition and Authority:*

The Anbassa City Bus Service Enterprise is a public enterprise with its own Management Board, and is subject to the common reporting, financial and administrative requirements. The company, therefore, has the legal and institutional recognition as the sole provider of city bus services in Addis Ababa. Similar projects financed by other donors (e.g. 50 DAF buses financed through a soft-loan from the Belgian Government) have also been embedded within the same company. Also according to the users interviewed the city bus service is a well-recognized transportation system in the city for the majority of the population.

#### *(c) Interest and Benefits for Users:*

Individual interviews with users indicated that the service still exists, however they were not aware about the addition of 266 busses into the service, neither the termination of the project. It was mentioned during these interviews that the city bus service is a long lasting one, and it is the major means of transportation for the majority of the users. They further indicated that the city bus transportation is serving them with less cost, and also provides a better access to their work and hence, better living conditions. Students indicated that it gives them better mobility and better access to different places. On the other hand, users strongly criticized the city's bus system for exposing them to higher health risks because of the congestion and the suffocation in buses. Therefore, the service is considered as posing health risks to users.

#### *(d) Development of Knowledge and Capacity:*

Knowledge on technical specifications is being accumulated in the process by the implementing organisation which will help them in specifying future bus and spare part deliveries. The training has

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<sup>7</sup> Applying the "Euro 1 norm" would require *turbo* inter-cooling which was not favoured by the Anbassa City Bus Service Enterprise (because it would compromise on the space between road level and bus-floor).

helped in acquiring knowledge of the new bus types. Discussions and interviews with the management indicate that the resident engineer from DAF who worked within the Company for two years as part of the project has adequately transferred his technical expertise to the staff through training programs.

#### *Financial Sustainability*

With regards to financial sustainability it would not be appropriate to discuss the issue within the context of the project because, as indicated earlier, the integration of the project with the core activities of the implementing organization is complete. Hence, trying to isolate and measure the financial performance of the 266 buses would be very complicated if not impossible as this would require a management information system which can provide detailed financial information and history at the individual bus level. Such a management information system is not currently available within the Enterprise. The interviewed General Manager of the Addis Ababa Transport Authority indicated that the operating costs of the company have risen by almost 60% in the last 13 years but bus fares have not changed over the same period. The management also believes that it is offering a highly subsidized service and has proposed a tariff revision which has been subsequently approved by the Board; it has not yet been implemented since the Government has not yet made its decision on the matter. At the same time, however, the Enterprise reported that the level of subsidy provided by the city administration has consistently declined over the years from Birr 0.2621 to Birr 0.08 per passenger at the moment, and therefore it becomes increasingly more difficult to keep the buses running since these government subsidies remain crucial as long as ticket prices stay constant.

#### **Impact**

Data obtained from the Anbassa City Bus Service Enterprise indicate that the buses were delivered in 3 lots: 100 in 1996, 100 in 1997 and 66 in 1998. Graphs 1 and 2 (in the attached DAF Project Report) summarize the number of passengers served by the Enterprise and the total number of kilometers covered each year for the period 1995 to 2004. Since there were no additional purchases of buses until 2002 by the Enterprise, the increase in the number of passengers and kilometers driven between 1997 and 2002 can be attributed to the 266 buses delivered through the project. The number of routes has also shown a similar increase over the same period indicating that the delivery of the 266 buses has contributed to the widening of the city bus network (cf. Graph 3 in the attached DAF-report). It is clear from these graphs that the level of service has improved with the addition of new buses into the fleet, and then started to decline with the aging of the fleet.

Improvement in the living conditions of users is a function of various factors, including the availability of an affordable and convenient urban transportation system. Some users underlined the importance of the city bus services in this respect. Some beneficiaries indicated that it has become possible for them to live in the outskirts of the city (where accommodation costs are relatively lower) and continue to work in the city centre primarily thanks to the availability of the city bus service.

#### **Conclusion**

The delivery of DAF busses to the Anbassa bus company concerned a large project, involving a Dutch contribution of over 22 million Euro, for a large target group. It has taken place under the ORET-programme, stipulating that 40% of the delivery costs are carried by the receiving country. Therefore, the feeling of ownership was quite high in Ethiopia, and this translated into a lot of preparatory discussions on technical aspects of the busses and the delivery conditions (including spare parts and training). It has been a very relevant intervention to enhance public transport for the poor in Addis Ababa. Moreover, the timing was excellent because the existing fleet of busses was aged at the start of the project, and many vehicles needed sustained repairs. The additional busses allowed an increase in the number of passengers and of kilometres, as well as an extension of the network through new routes. In addition, the provided transport services enabled the bus users to live in the relatively cheaper suburbs while retaining their work in the city centre; more in general, work and income are enhanced by the improved bus service. Considering the priority themes of the Dutch policy, however, the ex-ante relevance is quite marginal, while the ex-post relevance is not much higher. The sustainability score is quite high although it is difficult for users to isolate the effects of the current delivery of buses from more recent ones. For the time the DAF buses have been used (and some are still being used), the impact of the intervention was quite substantial.



#### **4.4 Conclusion: Echelon 4 Appraisal**

In this section the three projects of the Echelon 4 will be compared according to ex-post relevance, sustainability and impact and their indicators as mentioned in Appendix G.

##### *Problem Analysis en Participation of Beneficiaries*

The Echelon-4 projects were also mainly based on a kind of problem analysis, but in general this was a much shorter process (than for the Echelon 1&2 projects), and especially in the case of the two ORET projects it concerned mainly technical issues. These processes were also much more characterised by the involvement of Ethiopian counterparts in the decision-making process: since under ORET the counterpart has to guarantee 40% of the funding, the feeling of ownership is much more developed.

##### **Relevance**

The relevance scores established before the field study on the basis of files (cf. Appendix G) do not change substantially when the local stakeholders' opinions are considered. It decreases for the WFC, while it increases a little for the other two projects. All three projects are characterised by one dominant aspect, and one minor score; thus, the integration aspect is rather limited. The question arises if any problems could be attributed to this lack of integration of the priority themes. This applies not so much to the DAF project, since there were hardly any serious problems, but it does apply for the other projects. The WFC project was a success until the loan capital was finally transferred from the ILO to a commercial Micro Finance Institution (MFI) which took a long time to select since there were only a few MFI's at that time. However, the association, FWFCA, had not build up enough capacity and leadership to guide this process effectively. Once the hand-over was complete the donors and implementing organisations never looked back to the project, partly because of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. A more integrated approach, with more participation from the beginning from the women themselves and from the association (FWFCA), could indeed have brought about a closer involvement of this association and thereby better guidance and monitoring of the credit disbursements and repayment process. In the case of the AASP a larger focus on integration is likely to have gone a long way in preventing some of the serious problems that arose in this project. For example, an expert firm (Tauw Milieu) recommended a close monitoring of sludge collection in the *small* communities and the participation of the community thereby, but there is no evidence at all that this was undertaken. As it happened, certain communities turned against transfer stations and the nuisance (in particular the stench) they caused, and with the help of the Kebele one was even (temporarily) shut down. With a more integrated approach, including community participation and proper management of the stations, the intervention is indeed likely to have attained a much higher (ex-post) relevance.

The question whether the Echelon 4 projects could be more relevant than the Echelon1&2 projects remains difficult to answer. The WFC project, similar in funding requirements to the Echelon 1&2 projects clearly was not, because it failed in particular because it was not integrated enough. The other two projects accomplished significant progress in very specific elements of the urban fabric (i.e. transport and sanitation). However, one has to realise that there are many more such components that need more or less urgent attention, and these two projects absorbed quite a lot of funding from the Dutch (respectively about 22 and 8 million Euro, as compared to only 1 million Euro for the four Echelon 1&2 projects taken together). In addition, these two projects were co-financed by the Ethiopian government who paid 40% of the total project costs. The contribution of the Ethiopian government and implementing organisations in the Echelon 1&2 projects was often provided in kind (building, office space, staff, land, etc.); it is difficult to estimate this contribution in monetary terms, but it will be much lower than 40% (often below 10%). This is likely to have an effect on the feeling of ownership on the side of the Ethiopian organisations involved.

##### *Cross-cutting Issues*

From the cross-cutting issues, gender and vulnerable groups are explicitly considered in the WFC project, and the latter also by the AASP. Demand orientation has played a clear role in both the AASP and DAF projects. Environmental concerns were mandated for the AASP since it was a MILIEV project, but also for the other two projects such concerns played an important role in the design as well as implementation stages of these Echelon-4 projects.

### **Sustainability**

The average sustainability levels as indicated in Appendix G are similar for Echelon-4 and Echelon-1&2 projects. For AASP and DAF these levels are of course boosted by the organisational strength and formal recognition of the established government organisations implementing the interventions, and claiming the successes of the increased sludge collection and the enhanced urban transport capacity respectively. The sheer *volume* of the funding also has a lot to do with the greater recognition. However, the problems of the AASP project, in particular the management of transfer stations and the improvement of the access road to one of the sludge lagoons, require urgent attention if the Addis Ababa Water & Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) is not to lose part of their enhanced recognition. The WFC project has one of the lowest scores for sustainability because the credit model failed decreasing the scores for the recognition of the FWCA, which in itself had acquired some strength since its establishment with help from German donor support.

For both WFC and AASP the interest of the users has fluctuated during the course of the projects resulting in the current downward trends, in particular the lack of credit requests from WFC and the community uprising against the sludge transfer stations. The DAF busses are still appreciated but in the mean time several other deliveries of busses have supported the service level of Anbassa company. Once developed, knowledge and capacity have less to suffer from the ups and downs of a project.

### **Impact**

Regarding impact a comparison can be made between the Echelon-4 projects and the Echelon 1&2 projects. The two projects absorbing by far the most funding could have been expected to make the biggest impact. Both the AASP and the DAF projects did make a large impact, however, each affected only *one* of the many problem areas with which Addis Ababa is confronted, i.e. sanitation and transport; and even then, the impact has been only on a limited geographical area (sludge collection for a part of the city), or only for a certain period (until the delivered buses have worn out completely).

On the whole, all seven projects did have some positive effects on the short term which resulted in improvements of living conditions for the target groups and beyond, and about half of the projects also had positive effects on the longer term (cf. Appendix G). To change the overall poverty situation a much broader and more sustained effort is needed as is currently undertaken by the Government of Ethiopia through the PRSP-process (Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, SDPRP-I, and Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty, PASDEP) in which most bilateral and multilateral donors are involved as well. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the interventions of four projects can be considered as a useful reaction to the problems identified at the start, while the strategies of two other projects (UHP and WFC) have to be considered a failure. The seventh project (IHA/UDP) has a sword of Damocles hanging above its impact: the policy of the Addis Ababa City government to demolish the entire neighbourhood.

## 5 MULTILATERAL PROGRAMMES

### 5.1 Introduction

One of the main multilateral organisations working in the urban arena in Ethiopia is the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). The Government of the Netherlands has a longstanding relationship with this organisation and has been one of its staunchest supporters. The financial contributions to UN-HABITAT in the biennium 2002-2003 are divided into five categories (cf. UN-HABITAT 2002):

- 1) General purpose contributions to the UN-HABITAT Foundation; in 2002 the Netherlands was the sixth largest donor with over US\$ 450,000, and from 2003 onwards the annual contribution would be raised to US\$ 1.2 million, making it the second largest donor;
- 2) Special purpose contributions to the UN-HABITAT Foundation for programme and project activities, including support for the multi-year Sustainable Cities Programme (SCP); the Netherlands was, after the European Commission, the second largest donor with almost US\$ 5 million in 2002 for the total special purpose contributions (incl. category 3 below);
- 3) Special purpose contributions to the UN-HABITAT for country-based technical cooperation activities (included under category 2);
- 4) Indirect support to UN-HABITAT through the contributions to UN, of which funds are allocated to UN-HABITAT through the regular budget (almost US\$ 14 million) and the development account (US\$ 650,000);
- 5) Support to multi-donor programmes in the human settlements sector partly or entirely executed by UN-HABITAT:
  - a. From 1997-2000 a total of US \$ 4.4 million has been contributed to UNDP for the Urban Management Programme (UMP) executed by UN-HABITAT;
  - b. During 2001-2002 an amount of US \$ 2 million has been contributed to Cities Alliance, a joint initiative of the World bank and UN-HABITAT.

On 20 February 2003 the Government of the Netherlands and UN-HABITAT signed a two-year Partnership Programme. The total commitment of the Netherlands for this partnership amounted to a total of over Euro 7.8 million.

Compared to other African countries, relatively few initiatives have been undertaken in Ethiopia by UN-HABITAT. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, after the change of government in the early 1990's from the Marxist Junta (the Derg) to the EPRDF, and the subsequent process of separation between Ethiopia and Eritrea (completed in 1993), initiatives from UN-HABITAT started to materialize only very slowly. It took a few years for UN-HABITAT to initiate needs assessment missions to Addis Ababa, for example under the UMP programme in 1994/95, and after that it took a few years before implementation could start. Secondly, the coordinating Ministry of Works and Urban Development was working rather bureaucratically, partly because of the legacies of the Derg, partly because of the lack of capacity at the Ministry itself. It is quite revealing that one of the first initiatives implemented was the Capacity Building for Sustainable Urban Development programme which started only in 1998. The main initiative, the UMP, is discussed in the following section, while several other activities are mentioned in section 5.3.

## 5.2 Urban Management Programme (UMP)

Acronym:	<b>UMP</b>
Title:	<b>Urban Management Programme (Multilateral)</b>
Project number(s):	WW059404
Contribution in Euro:	8,000,000
Project periods:	- In World Bank premises Phase 1 (1986-1991); - At UN-HABITAT: Phase 2 (1992-1996); Phase 3 (1997-2001); and Phase 4 (2002-6)
Location:	Global, with specific activities in Ethiopia
Intermediary organisation:	UN-HABITAT, World Bank, UNDP
(Local) Government involved:	Urban Development Support Services/Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO), Ministry of Works and Urban Development, and Ministry of Federal Affairs
Direct Achievements:	Strengthening the local urban governance capacity and enhancing good governance.
Endusers/beneficiaries:	Local civil servants

### 5.2.1 Programme Design<sup>8</sup>

The UMP is one of the largest global technical assistance programmes in the urban sector. It is a joint undertaking of UNDP, UN-HABITAT and the World Bank. The programme develops and applies urban management knowledge in the fields of participatory urban governance, alleviation of urban poverty and urban environmental management, and facilitates the dissemination of this knowledge at the city, country, regional and global levels. The development objective of the UMP is to strengthen the contribution that cities and towns in developing countries make towards human development, including poverty reduction, improvement of local participatory governance, improvement of environmental conditions and the management of economic growth.

The global Urban Management Programme Office is located within UN-HABITAT in Nairobi, Kenya. There are four Regional Offices and two sub-regional offices as follows: The Regional Office for Africa in Abidjan, Ivory Coast and the East and Southern Africa Sub-Regional Office in Johannesburg, South Africa; The Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand, and the South Asia Sub-Regional Office in New Delhi, India, the Regional Office for Arab States in Cairo, Egypt, and the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean in Quito, Ecuador. City Consultation and Institutional Anchoring activities are undertaken by these Regional and Sub-Regional Offices.

Initiated in 1986 with Phase 1 (1986 - 1991), the UMP took a global perspective and focused on the development of urban management frameworks and tools on the issues of land management, municipal finance and administration, infrastructure and urban environment. Lessons were synthesized and key information concerning support to national and regional capacity-building was widely disseminated.

Phase 2 (1992 - 1996) used the frameworks and lessons learned to build capacity at the regional level, using mechanisms such as regional panels of experts and workshops and consultations to introduce new policies and tools. During Phase 2, the Programme was decentralised and Regional UMP Offices were established to carry out programme activities.

Following the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996, Phase 3 (1997 - 2001) was initiated. It built on and re-focused the work of the first two phases to the local level, emphasizing city consultations and institutional anchoring. Phase 3 had three themes: urban poverty alleviation, urban environmental sustainability and participatory urban governance, with gender as a cross-cutting issue. During this Phase, 120 city consultations have been carried out through 19 regional anchor institutions and 40 national and local institutions. It is through the city consultation that participatory decision-making and

<sup>8</sup> Based on Habitat Debate, Special UMP-Issue (2005), and on the website: <http://www.unhabitat.org/programmes/ump/>.

governance is achieved, and through institutional anchoring that sustainability is ensured. There are currently four Networks of Anchor Institutions in the world, and in Africa it concerns the Africa Network of Urban Management Institutions (ANUMI), of which the Municipal Development Programme (MDP), based in Harare, is one of the anchor institutions.

Phase 4 (2002 - 2006) is currently in its final stages; the programme is in a process of closure with the networks and the anchor institutions taking over. It continued with the themes from Phase 3 and a new focus area was added: HIV/AIDS. This is a critical area and an urgent priority, especially in terms of urban management to address the spread and treatment of the disease. Phase 4 brought a stronger focus on pro-poor governance and knowledge management activities that had direct impacts on the living conditions of the urban poor. It was focused on synthesizing the experiences of the first three Phases and further institutionalizing the participatory process. Greater emphasis was placed on the consolidation of experiences, the integration of UMP activities with other initiatives and a stronger knowledge base on urban management. The exciting new development, one that has been planned and prepared for over the past two years, sees UMP goals and activities firmly in the hands of regional and local partners, with continued support from UNDP and UN-HABITAT.

These networks are expected to intensify the further development, transfer and exchange of the substantive knowledge on various aspects of urban management. They will provide technical and advisory services to local authorities and civil society partners advocate and influence policy changes at local and national level.

*"After nearly two decades, the UN system is handing over the Urban Management Programme to its beneficiaries at the regional, national and local level. This passing of the baton of one of the largest global urban programmes is in every sense a measure of its great success." (Anna Tibaijuka, Executive Director UN-HABITAT, in: Habitat Debate 2005: 2).*

### 5.2.2 Appraisal

The global Urban Management Programme (UMP) has since 1986 gone through four multi-year phases, each with a different emphasis concerning the specific topics supported (cf. previous section). 2006 will be the year of the closure of UMP and the handing over to local network organisations. The appraisal for UMP's activities in Ethiopia will be analysed in this section from the viewpoints of different stakeholders. However, firstly, an overview will be given of the specific activities that have taken place, and are currently going on, in Ethiopia under this programme in order to arrive at a more concrete picture of its achievements.

In Ethiopia, in recent years UMP/UN-HABITAT has assisted the Government of Ethiopia in developing a national policy and strategy for slum upgrading by mainstreaming innovative urban development methodologies, for example, participatory planning, community-led upgrading initiatives, innovative financing mechanisms for upgrading, appropriate land tenure options, etc. This assistance was delivered under the name "Integrating Local Development Planning and Slum Upgrading in Urban Policy in Ethiopia" (cf. UN-HABITAT 2004). The partners involved, apart from UMP, were: World Bank, GTZ, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Addis Ababa City Government, International and Local NGOs and CBOs. The Ministry of Federal Affairs and the Addis Ababa City Government have identified *upgrading* as one of the key priority strategic issues. The main activities are identified as follows:

- 1) Draft National Strategy for Slum Upgrading (submitted in 2005). Through UMP additional funding from the British DFID was arranged for this. Feedback is expected from the ministry (either the Ministry of Federal Affairs or the Ministry of Works and Urban Development), the regions and the city administrations to finalize the strategy paper.
- 2) Slum Study for Addis Ababa: Draft submitted 1st week September 2005.
- 3) A Training of Trainers workshop on planning regulations, standards and procedures took place from 9 to 12 November 2005.
- 4) A Training and Capacity Building Consultant, and a Local Government Financial Management Consultant: Selection of these two consultants is pending because the authorization letters from UMP have not yet been forthcoming.
- 5) Paper and Workshop on Local Development Planning: Draft Paper submitted for comments.
- 6) Study visit for senior government officials to India: Study visit to take place in early 2006.
- 7) Development of a Conceptual Framework, Terms of Reference and Management Framework for the Preparation of a National Urban Upgrading Training Manual; the draft

was completed in November 2005, and currently UMP's authorization letter is awaited. The Payee will be the Federal Urban Planning Institute.

The key organisation in Addis Ababa for these activities is the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO), which is implementing the policies developed at the Ministry of Works and Urban Development (formerly the Ministry of Federal Affairs). The Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO) is also the anchor organisation for all UN-HABITAT activities in Ethiopia. Unfortunately this organisation and its management turned out to be very difficult to contact. An informal meeting was held with the director, but there came no answer from this organisation on the requested very brief list of structured questions (cf. Appendix F). The director indicated at that meeting that the UMP was certainly a very useful programme, but that some components could well have been done directly by the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO) and/or the Ministry of Works and Urban Development without involvement of UN-HABITAT; in other words funding can more often directly go to UDCBO. That this statement is more wishful thinking than based on a rational assessment of capacities at different organisations will be shown below.

The importance attached to the UMP by the relevant Ethiopian authorities can also be judged from other activities. In September 2004, a high level Ethiopian delegation attended UN-HABITAT'S World Urban Forum in Barcelona (the Minister of State of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, the Director of the Urban Development Capacity Building Office, and the Addis Ababa City Government). Furthermore, in 2003 the Ministry of Federal Affairs had *requested advisory support* for its urban management capacity building programme in a letter to the Executive Director of UN-HABITAT; the focus thereby is on integrating local development planning and slum upgrading in Urban Policy in Ethiopia. This official request clearly indicates the Ministry's recognition of and interest in UN-HABITAT's programmes, in particular the UMP. This request is further based on the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (SDPRP-I) which identified major capacity problems of municipalities in the following six areas: institutional arrangement and governance; municipality revenue; organisational structure and staffing plan; service delivery ;urban planning and land management; and lack of urban development policy and strategy (cf. MOFED 2002, and UN-HABITAT 2004). Since that time most of these issues have been taken up, and in particular there is now a national urban policy and strategy (cf. Chapter 2), in which UMP has played an important role.

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an assessment of UN-HABITAT already in 2002, in which there is specific attention for UMP, stating among other things that UMP is in general being "... appreciated positively, both in terms of relevance and effectiveness." (2002: 13). UMP as a multi-agency partnership is commended for emphasising the inclusiveness of stakeholders, including communities, local and national government agencies, NGOs and private sector entities. The conclusion of this assessment is to bring UMP under the major landmark "Partnership Programme" with The Netherlands, which has been done in the following year. While the results of this partnership programme have not yet been evaluated, the engagement into a partnership clearly marks the importance the Dutch government has attached to the UMP programme in particular and to UN-HABITAT in general.

UN-HABITAT staff themselves stress the achievements of UMP in the latest issue of Habitat Debate entitled "The Legacy of the Urban Management Programme" (December 2005). On a global level, it helped to shape the urban agenda, and created a culture of urban interests. However, they also made some critical notes. According to them UMP was weak in measuring the impacts of the above-mentioned participatory processes on the performance of local authorities and on the well-being of the poor. The follow-up to UMP City Consultations have also been weak: the participatory nature of consultations often resulted in ambitious plans, but there was no investment follow-up to ensure that these plans were implemented (e.g. Dinesh Mehta, in Habitat Debate 2005: 6-7). Concerning the implementation of programmes like UMP in Ethiopia the interviewed UN-HABITAT staff all indicated that progress is usually comparatively slow, especially due to the combination of principled decision making and lack of human resource capacity at the crucial national institutions and the city administrations.

UN-HABITAT concluded in its Project Completion Report, dealing in particular with UMP in Ethiopia, the following:

*"It is fair to say that UDCBO and the Ministry of Federal Affairs are particularly stretched with regards to human resource requirements and more specifically the needed in-house technical expertise in the field of urban management." ( UN-HABITAT 2004: 22).*

Co-ordinating and broadening the level of participation among various Government of Ethiopia institutions through the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO) is an extremely lengthy process at times. Furthermore, government administrative procedures conspire against the timely delivery of project outputs. This office has been so overloaded with various tasks that have hampered its role as facilitator and coordinator of projects like UMP. Nevertheless, UMP in Ethiopia has been at the forefront of policy development and the transfer of knowledge and methodological tools and approaches to urban management. UMP has maintained a flexible, demand-driven approach that suited immediate areas of intervention for the Government of Ethiopia.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, the Echelon-I UMP programme in Ethiopia has been much appreciated by various stakeholders although the direct results should not be found in concrete activities on the ground, but much more in less tangible achievements as capacity building and human resource development. Regarding efficiency, it has to be judged with a small 'reasonable' score, in particular because of the slowness in comparison to the amounts of money spend. The contents, however, is relatively highly appreciated (cf. Appendix G). The appraisal of effectiveness comes close to 'Good', because many of the goals have been achieved, as indicated in particular by the achievements indicated in Chapter 2 of this report in the area of, for example, urban national policy formation, urban municipal legislation, and enhanced management structures.

UMP has been a project that was highly supported from the Dutch Urban Development Policy; there were many missions from the Spearhead staff members and close involvement in the selection of the first UMP Director, a Netherlands national. From the viewpoint of the Dutch policy the general relevance of UMP is therefore rather high; however, when looking at the 'Relevance-scores' in Appendix G they are in total rather moderate. The reason is that the programme can only score on two out of five categories. The cross-cutting issues add another positive dimension: although there was no explicit attention for gender, it was clearly directed at the poor, while urban environment was one of the main themes involved. Research has been an integral part of the whole programme, while specific activities were explicitly demand driven.

The sustainability has been judged to be relatively high, due to the institutional strength and formal recognition of the participating institutions in Ethiopia (Ministry of Works and Urban Development, Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO), city administrations, etc.) and in Kenya (UN-HABITAT); on the negative side is the problem that the anchor institution, UDCBO, has been overloaded as was indicated both by UN-HABITAT and by the experiences of the evaluation team in approaching them. However, the interests of the users and of other stakeholders was particularly high as was underlined in the above. Last but not least, a great deal of knowledge has been generated.

### **5.3 Other Multilateral Initiatives in Ethiopia**

The other multilateral urban initiatives implemented in Ethiopia concern mainly activities by UN-HABITAT and the World Bank. Although it is nearly impossible to establish direct links between specific activities and funding from the Netherlands, some of the main activities are discussed briefly since the Netherlands is funding these programmes through more general contributions (as explained in the above). For UN-HABITAT this applies to such initiatives as the Cities Alliance (jointly with World Bank), the Sustainable Cities Programme, the Water for African Cities programme, and the Global Urban Observatory (monitoring MDG Target 11; cf. UN-Habitat 2003a), and various training and capacity building activities. Apart from the Cities Alliance programme, the World Bank initiated another programme with funds from the Netherlands, i.e. the Non-Motorised Urban Transport programme; however, this is excluded from the current study since it did not include any activities in Ethiopia. In the past few years the following activities have been taken place and/or initiated in Ethiopia under four other urban programmes of UN-HABITAT:

*a) Cities Alliance - Cities Development Strategies*

The objective of the activity is to enable stakeholders in urban development –and foremost the City Council- to effectively address critical and urgent issues of urban development, promote equitable economic growth, prevent and alleviate urban poverty, develop affordable and participatory options for upgrading, and to manage the city's resources and environment for sustainability. A proposal was written by UN-HABITAT and discussed with Ethiopian authorities, but it was stopped in 2003 because no progress could be made on the Ethiopian side. Since the structured questions were not returned and no appointment could be made with the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO), no further information is available on this issue.

*b) Water for African Cities*

The objective of the Programme is to tackle the urban water crisis in African cities through efficient and effective water demand management, build capacity to mitigate the environmental impact of urbanization on freshwater resources and boost awareness and information exchange on water management and conservation. The demonstration project is working with the Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority (AAWSA) in improving efficient management and use of water by developing a water management strategy. This is a fairly recent programme of which implementation is only in the initial phases.

*c) "Cities without Slums"*

The goal of the initiative is to assist the Municipality of Addis Ababa and the government of the United Republic of Ethiopia to build/strengthen its approach for upgrading unplanned settlements and improve living conditions of populations living in those settlements, contributing to the realization of the global Millennium Development Goal (MDG), "Cities without Slums." Relatively small activities have been going on for several years within the framework of this project.

*d) Global Urban Observatory - Local Indicators Facility*

The purpose of the Local Indicators Facility is to support cities to develop their own indicators systems for use in the planning, management and monitoring local development strategies and services. The objective of this activity is to establish effective performance management system, which can be used as tool to evaluate the changes and the development of the city, in particular to monitor the achievements regarding the MDG-targets.

Finally, in Ethiopia today the lack of capacity stands out as a key constraint to effective decentralization. The Ministry of Federal Affairs, the Ministry of Works and Urban Development and the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO) are leading a nationwide municipal reform programme to enhance urban management capacity of local governments and support institutions at federal and regional level with the aim of addressing this critical problem. Enhancing municipal capacity entails among others training of elected councillors and local government leaders and executives in leadership skills to bring about good governance and to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of urban/municipal (local) governments. A programme is proposed under the large-scale Public Sector Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP), a major component of the Ethiopia's Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).

Apart from the remarks made in the above, appraisal of these programmes is difficult in the absence of a clear and targeted reaction from the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO). Besides, these programmes were not included under the Echelons since Dutch funding could not be directly allotted to them.



## 6 MAIN FINDINGS AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

### 6.1 Main Findings

#### *Relations between Ethiopian and Dutch Urban Policies*

The analysis in Chapter 2 concludes that in the 1990s there were not many commonalities between Ethiopian and Dutch policies on urban development; the Dutch policy was more a kind of reaction to the neglect by the Ethiopian government. Dutch projects and programmes were often providing support to the existing programmes of Ethiopian NGOs and CBOs, and as such the Dutch policy was complementary to the Ethiopian policy. However, in recent years the Ethiopian government has approved a National Urban Development Policy, and is currently in the process of approving its second Poverty Reduction Strategy paper (PRSP), entitled: "Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty" (PASDEP), which has a solid urban component. It is shown in Chapter 2 that the four pillars of the PASDEP Urban Development Strategy and its three main supporting action areas, in fact, have many commonalities with the five priority themes of the Dutch policy on sustainable urban development. Both the international donor community's efforts and the Dutch advisory capacities in the area of urban development have played a role to influence the Ethiopian government in this area. In sum, during the 1990s the Dutch projects and programmes related to urban development did not influence the process of policy formulation in Ethiopia very much. They did, however, support and thereby influence NGOs and CBOs who later became an integral part of the comprehensive consultation process for establishing Ethiopia's poverty reduction strategies. This is another factor causing the urban policies to show so many similarities in recent times.

#### *Problem Analysis*

In general, the projects were only implemented after widespread preparations, involving studies, discussions, surveys, consultations, and rounds of external advising. Although the design of the projects can be said to have improved thereby, there is also a downside: the momentum was sometimes lost, or the interest of stakeholders waned. To speed up the process, pilot projects or reduced funding were imposed; in this way, changes in project design were implemented as a result of the specific requirements of the Dutch funding.

#### *Efficiency*

On the whole, most of the projects, especially the ones originating directly from the Dutch policy on Urban Sustainable Development (Echelon-1&2), were rather small in funding terms, while they took quite a long implementation period of several years. The efficiency was reduced in some cases because projects were not closed properly, and remaining funds were just given away either to direct beneficiaries (SCP-Dessie) or to the original target clinic to change its purpose (UHP); this does not appear to have been a very productive use of funds. The actual activities undertaken seem on the whole fairly efficient.

#### *Effectiveness*

The effectiveness of the projects seems positive: generally a majority of the goals have actually been achieved. In one case (UHP), the project set-up has not been flexible enough to adjust to sectoral policy changes (i.e. in the health sector).

#### *Relevance*

The scoring system on the relevance theme was designed to accommodate the integration aspect; projects with large numbers of diverging activities score highest, and the quintessential example is the IHA/UDP project with 52 different activities and by far the highest score (cf. appendix G). The multilateral programme (UMP), in contrast, has a relatively low score, which seems an anomaly since, as we have seen, it was judged highly relevant for the Dutch policy on sustainable urban development; it seems this is related to the fact that such a programme can score only on two out of five relevance categories since it does not include actual activities on the ground. Mono-thematic projects like AASP and DAF have similar scores on sustainability and impact as the highly integrated Echelon 1&2 projects. On the other hand, a higher degree of integration could have been beneficial for certain

Echelon-4 projects (in particular WFC and AASP). In sum, integration can only explain a small part of the success of projects, and in any case needs to be analysed in combination with the other priority themes and with the qualitative investigations.

Cross-cutting issues have usually been taken into account where they are appropriate, such as attention for gender and vulnerable groups, for environmental issues, demand orientation and generation of research.

### *Sustainability*

The assessment of sustainability has not been unambiguous, especially in the areas of institutional strength and formal recognition, because often there are *different* institutions and associations involved, and interventions have a diverging impact on them. Clear distinctions need to be made between implementing organisations, receiving the external funds, and local associations which are in some way or other dependent on 'parent' organisations (in particular for external funds). In Ethiopia the legal aspect is also of influence since the formal 'Development Association' can receive external funds, while more informal 'Community-Based Organisations', or still more informal local associations, remain dependent in that area. In addition, it is difficult to compare voluntary NGOs, such as IHA/UDP, with well-established semi-public corporations (like the Anbessa City Bus Service Enterprise), public institutions (like the Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority, AAWSA) or international organisations (in the case of UMP).

The sustainability scores are overall quite substantial with UMP scoring highest, followed by the DAF buses project. The highest score of the Echelon 1&2 projects is attained by the UFDE project, in particular because of the access to land which is so crucial for sustainability. On the whole, the Dutch interventions did not have much impact either way on the already existing parent organisations (such as IHA/UDP and DOC); they continued more or less undisturbed with their broader programmes. In order to ensure sustainability of projects, such parent organisations need to make plans for a proper exit strategy, making space for community organisations to take over and develop into full-fledged CBOs/NGOs. On different occasions throughout this report it has become clear that *empowering* communities through strengthening or forming local associations and committees is an important factor for the sustainability. Sometimes newly installed local associations have become very successful (e.g. UFDE's associations), while others struggled to maintain the users' interest after initial successes (e.g. the 'Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization' in the IHA/UDP project, and the 'Former Women Fuelwood Carriers Association' in the WFC project).

The levels of interest of the users are relatively high in the UFDE and SCP-Dessie projects since they were able to actually acquire concrete benefits for the users. It is also high in UMP, but here the users of the services offered concern in particular staff of ministries, public institutions and private sector organisations. The final aspect of sustainability is the development of knowledge and capacity, which has played a role in all projects but was particularly important in the multilateral UMP programme.

### *Impact*

All seven projects did have some positive effects on the short term which resulted in improvements of living conditions for the target groups and beyond, and about half of the projects also had positive effects on the longer term. To change the overall poverty situation a much broader and more sustained effort is needed as is currently undertaken by the Government of Ethiopia through the PRSP-process (SDPRP-I And PASDEP) in which most bilateral and multilateral donors are involved as well. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the interventions of four projects can be considered as a useful reaction to the problems identified at the start, while the strategies of two other projects have to be considered a failure. The seventh project has a sword of Damocles hanging above its impact: the policy of the Addis Ababa City government to demolish the entire neighbourhood. The two most 'expensive' projects did make a large impact on *one* of the many problem areas with which Addis Ababa is confronted, i.e. sanitation and transport. In one area, the Echelon 1&2 projects did make a special contribution to impact, namely most of them achieved substantial changes in attitudes and awareness of people and organisations (in the local community, but also, for example, the awareness of the police and local government of the problems of street children).

## 6.2 Issues for the Future

There are several issues for the future, some for the other field studies within the present programme evaluation, and some more general issues.

The other field studies should look into the issue of ownership in relation to the own contribution of the Ethiopian counterpart organisations. In the present field study it was found that the feeling of ownership is higher in the ORET programmes where the Ethiopian government has to contribute 40% of the total project costs, while the Dutch government provides a 60% grant. The Ethiopian counterpart organisations were deeply involved from the initial project stages in the specifications of the project conditions, while this was much less the case with the Echelon 1&2 projects (and also with the WFC project). The contribution of the Ethiopian government and implementing organisations in the Echelon 1&2 projects was often provided in kind (building, office space, staff and land), and estimated to be much lower than 40% (usually below 10%).

Another issue to be investigated in the other field study countries is the way many projects were subject to sudden closure and even outright abandonment. Most of the Echelon 1 projects were quite suddenly abandoned by the stakeholders, in particular by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Embassy and/or implementing organisations. In part, this can be explained by the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and the complete stop on new commitments, including project extensions, in either of the two countries. However, it needs to be investigated in the other field study countries if this represents a pattern, for example coinciding with the fate of the Spearhead and its aftermath, or that the situation in Ethiopia was unique (in particular due to the conflict).

Two more general issues are the following. A temporary institutionalisation of a policy, as has been done with the Spearhead on Urban Poverty Alleviation, has serious flaws for the sustainability of projects. The main question is who or which institution will follow-up on the promises made and the expectations raised? In the projects under study in the present report, pilot phases were proposed and never even considered for follow-up; projects were implemented with reduced funding in order to speed up approval procedures, but the original budgets were never again raised; and, even more revealingly, projects were not properly evaluated, and no department insisted on it although its funding was budgeted. Although these instances in Ethiopia could partly be explained away with the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, it *cannot* explain why nobody took up the issues again after the end of the conflict two years later. The evidence of the other country studies will be most revealing though.

Finally, time and again throughout this report it has become clear that the *continuity* of donor policies is of crucial importance for the sustainability and the impact of programmes, such as the Dutch Urban Poverty Alleviation programme, and of projects under this programme. Therefore, the question needs to be asked again whether the instrument of the freezing of aid efforts when conflicts arise is the right one. Perhaps a distinction should, in any case, be made between completely new projects and project extensions since as we have seen in the above the latter is particularly disruptive for the Ethiopian target groups, as well as for the Ethiopian and the Dutch implementing organisations.

## **APPENDICES**

## **Appendix A – Terms of Reference Evaluating Dutch Aid Efforts in Support of Sustainable Urban Development (1991-2004)**

**Appendix A: Terms of Reference Evaluating Dutch Aid Efforts in Support of Sustainable Urban Development (1991-2004).**

- ***Insert Terms of Reference in Adobe Acrobat Format: 22 Pages.***

## **Appendix B – Terms of Reference “Evaluatie Activiteiten Duurzame Stedelijke Ontwikkeling Ethiopië”**

## **Appendix B: Terms of Reference “Evaluatie Activiteiten Duurzame Stedelijke Ontwikkeling Ethiopië”**

### **Terms of Reference**

#### **Evaluatie activiteiten ‘duurzame stedelijke ontwikkeling’ Ethiopië**

##### **Inleiding**

In het kader van de algemene evaluatie van het Nederlandse beleid met betrekking tot ‘Duurzame Stedelijke Ontwikkeling 1991 – 2004’ is voorzien om een reeks van deelstudies uit te voeren. Het betreft verschillende landenstudies, een nadere bureauanalyse van een aantal via multilaterale organisaties uitgevoerde activiteiten zowel op beleidsniveau als op activiteitsniveau en een kwantitatieve studie. Deze ToR betreft de veldstudie in Ethiopië

De hieronder volgende taken moeten bezien worden in het kader van de algemene Terms of Reference van de evaluatie.

##### **Taken van de senior consultant:**

Het evaluatieteam bestaat uit Dr. Theo van der Loop, aangevuld met een lokaal aan te trekken deskundige. Onderzoekmedewerker Marcel Scholten is waar nodig vanuit Den Haag behulpzaam. Gedurende het veldwerk zal het evaluatieteam gedurende vijf dagen worden bijgestaan of door de hoofdconsultant of door de inspecteur voor de IOB evaluatie.

De taken zijn de volgende:

- Organisatie en uitvoering van de veldstudie Ethiopië;
- Bezoek aan UN/Habitat-Nairobi i.v.m. Urban Management Programme en algemene inzet van Nederland binnen Habitat.
- Eindrapportage.

De werkzaamheden zullen het volgende inhouden:

- Het in kaart brengen van de hoofdlijnen van de nationale discussie in Ethiopië met betrekking tot stedelijke ontwikkeling, zowel vanuit overheidsperspectief als wel een niet-gouvernementeel perspectief;
- Het consulteren van een ruime groep/alle relevante personen die betrokken zijn geweest bij de uitgevoerde activiteiten, zowel gebruikers van de activiteiten als bedenkers en uitvoerders hiervan, en zover van toepassing zowel in Nederland als in Ethiopië;
- Het beantwoorden van de onderzoeksvragen zoals deze zijn verwoord en geoperationaliseerd dmv de evaluatiematrix in de algemene ToR en in het ‘framework voor analyse van dossiers duurzame stedelijke ontwikkeling’ voor de projecten van het eerste en tweede echelon. Aanvullend het beantwoorden van de onderzoeksvragen met betrekking tot ex-post relevantie voor geselecteerde projecten uit het vierde echelon, inclusief de analyse van de betekenis tav. het gevoerde beleid;
- Het schrijven van het eindrapport in de Engelse taal, inclusief een executive summary, waarbij deze samenvatting inclusief de hoofdbevindingen wordt besproken met sleutelstakeholders in Ethiopië;
- Presentatie van het eindrapport aan de opdrachtgever.



## **Tijdsduur**

De werkzaamheden voor de deelstudie zullen worden verricht binnen een periode van 1,5 maanden. Hiervoor zijn 34 werkdagen beschikbaar.

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## **Appendix C – Framework for Analysing Sustainable Urban Development Dossiers**

## **Appendix C: Framework for analysing sustainable urban development dossiers**

### **1. Introduction**

The framework is based on the reconstruction and description of the policy's main outlines as reflected in the ToR, and the interpretation of the policy indicators by the evaluators.

The evaluators do not claim to present an entirely objective view of the policy. However, they believe they have done their best to understand and assess its practical implementation, both in terms of accountability and of the lessons learned.

#### **1.1 Reconstructing the policy**

Over the years, policy on urban development has focused on the following themes. These themes and their supporting activities are described in the 1994 sectoral policy document *Urban Poverty Alleviation*.<sup>9</sup> Although the alleviation of urban poverty was originally the central theme, the concept of 'urban poverty alleviation' was superseded in 1996 by 'sustainable urban development'. The various themes are given equal weight in the policy document. In documents from this period, all themes include a special focus on women in development, and on vulnerable groups such as children. For research purposes, space has been set aside for further policy development.

The themes are as follows: work and income; habitat; social services; urban government and institutional development; and integrated urban development.

##### *Work and income*

Activities geared to: stabilising income; lowering the cost of living; generating work and income; improving access to credit; providing technical training and support and finally, activities that target improvement in marketing.

##### *Habitat*

Activities geared to: setting up land registries to improve access to land and registration of ownership rights; granting credit and issuing mortgages; neighbourhood renewal; sanitation and safe drinking water; sustainable energy and transport; improved combustion

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<sup>9</sup> The various themes are fleshed out in disparate ways, ranging from a summary of feasible interventions via a description of the prior conditions to a more general consideration of the themes' significance. No clear, concrete aims are formulated.

technology as a means of creating more efficient fuels and public transport, and also non-motorised means of transport.

#### *Social services*

Activities geared to: basic education (both formal and informal), with a special focus on women and girls; services aimed at the economic, legal and financial aspects of small-scale food production and distribution; improving the system of basic health care especially at institutional level, in tandem with related sectors such as environmental health; making services more accessible to vulnerable groups such as street children; and promoting security through activities aimed at young people and crime prevention.

#### *Urban government and institutional development*

Activities geared to: reorganising existing institutions; improving legislation; promoting public-private partnerships; and improving urban management. Also activities aimed at strengthening the involvement of the urban poor and NGOs that represent them.

#### *Integrated urban development*

Activities geared to an integrated approach to economic, social, administrative and infrastructural problems. The 'concentration city' approach is one example of this. In the policy document, this theme is on the same level as the others. It is mentioned as one of the opportunities for tackling urban problems.

## **1.2 Adapting policies**

After the Spearhead Programme was terminated in 1996 and the sector-wide approach was introduced, the various themes continued to receive attention, but less explicitly from an urban development perspective. Greater scope was created for urban environmental problems (including air pollution, urban agriculture, waste management, drinking water and sanitation). From 2000 onwards, no more specifically urban policies were designed, so the subject ceased to receive special attention.

However, in the recent policy document *Mutual interests, mutual responsibilities*,<sup>10</sup> the section entitled 'Environment and Water' refers to MDG7 and explicitly states the need to

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<sup>10</sup> The Hague, October 2003, page 32

improve the living conditions of slum-dwellers. For the themes of water and sanitation, education, HIV/AIDS, the environment and the 'Good Governance' sector, there are opportunities for supporting initiatives in both urban and rural settings.

## **2. The framework in greater detail**

The framework described in this section was designed to facilitate a balanced assessment of the policy and related projects and activities. It indicates what information is needed in order to measure effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact. It features three charts for assessing the relevance and sustainability of policy implementation. It also explains how the ratings have been calculated.

### **2.1 Measuring effectiveness and efficiency**

Information about the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy's operationalisation can be found in the various intervention/project dossiers.

*Effectiveness* is the degree to which the aims have been achieved. The key concept is 'outcome', which is defined by the OECD as 'the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs'. This is based on the assumption that the intended results and their relative importance have been formulated clearly and unambiguously.

Effectiveness is assessed by examining the aims/intentions and the results achieved.

Assessment ratings are as follows:

*Poor*: less than a third of the aims were achieved;

*Fair*: between 1/3 and 2/3 of the aims were achieved;

*Good*: at least 2/3 of the aims were achieved.

*Efficiency* is the accuracy with which financial, human and material resources are converted into results in order to achieve formulated aims. Each activity is listed in the matrix with its size (the expenditure on the activity), duration, future activities (itemised) and past activities (itemised).

There are several supplementary questions to be answered:

- Is there a clear problem analysis of the particular country context (policy-receiver)?
- Was the problem analysis designed with or without the involvement of the ultimate target group and other stakeholders?
- What was assessed as *good* and *poor*?

On the basis of the documents, the researchers can draw conclusions as to whether the project activities were conducted efficiently, i.e. on target and within budget. If less than 1/3 of the project's aims have been achieved, the rating is *poor*; the rating *fair* is given when between 1/3 and 2/3 of aims have been achieved; and the rating *good* is given when over 2/3 of aims have been achieved.


## **2.2 Assessing relevance: radar charts**

A charting method was designed for systematically recording which policy themes and activities were given prominence and how they were inter-related. The charts make it possible to award a final rating for the relevance of the development intervention.


*Relevance* is the degree to which the aims of a development intervention coincide with the needs of the target group, the needs of the country, the global priorities and the policy of the donor and the executive partner. We will now elaborate on the two charts and then explain the ratings.

The radar chart is designed to record how far central policy themes have been operationalised and implemented in the countries (level 1) and how the operational themes, in turn, have been fleshed out in concrete projects (level 2). The degree of concentration on the various themes is interpreted as a measure of how well the policy has been implemented, and thus the degree to which the intervention is relevant. The chart also makes it possible to see how relevant the various stakeholders judged the intervention to be. In our opinion, the model makes it possible to work from the concrete plane of each intervention (as described in the project documents) towards a further abstraction without sacrificing the essential features. As such, it is an indicator of policy relevance. It is also a perception-based indicator of how the various stakeholders evaluated the intervention.

**Figure 1: Radar chart: Sustainable development Level 1 and 2**



**Level 1: Central themes**



## **Level 2: Fleshing out of themes**

Key to Figure 1 and 2

..... *Level of intent and outcome, based on dossier study (evaluators):*

——— Current rating as given by the various stakeholders:

a) policymakers Netherlands; b) policymakers in recipient countries; c) intermediary organisations; and d) end-users..

The **radar chart** (Figure 1) has two levels. On the first level are the central themes assigned priority in urban development. These five themes have already been listed. At country level, the chart shows the degree of attention given to these central themes, as found within the activity itself and in the degree of cohesion with the context in which it takes place. It is vital to analyse the context per individual country (including national policy), because this is one of the things that will reveal whether, from the Dutch policy viewpoint, the total range of supporting activities is well-balanced. Conversely, it will also show whether the interventions per country are relevant within the context of each separate country.

The second level in the radar chart makes it possible to rate how far the implementation is integrated **within** the specific themes, as assessed by the evaluators and the various stakeholders involved in operationalising the activities ('project' implementation). In the chart, the radial axes at the second level represent the implementation of the various elements of the central themes. Completing the information at second level serves as a transition to ultimately giving a reliable ranking at the first level.

For the theme 'Habitat', for instance, this means that detailed information is recorded about the degree of integration within the theme, and that simultaneously, insight is gained into the quality of the achieved outcome. Possible interventions are therefore formulated in the model as an ascending quality scale of the intervention aims and outcomes, to which a ranking can be given. For instance, for 'water', the ranking reflects whether a water supply is provided by a communal well for 50 households or by supply to individual homes. The latter is given a higher ranking. The ascending quality of intervention scale has been based on policy documents used by the various sectors during



the evaluation period. The scales referring to the various thematic elements have been provisionally worked out as described below. It should be noted that only a few of the sub-territories can be given a quality/quantity rating using existing policy guidelines. For all the other cases, the researchers developed their own scale. In addition, the relative quality depends on the local context, which means that the accuracy of the scale will always be checked per country. After all, from the viewpoint of the poorest city-dwellers, it can never be realistic to aim at the highest 'quality'.

For **Habitat**, the ascending scale is graded as follows:

- Housing: 1) zinc roofing; 2) zinc roofing and sound walls, including water and sanitation; 3) a good basic house with land rights; 4) house, land rights, with local financing; 5) house, land rights, financing and organisation in the neighbourhood.
- Land and land rights: 1) land access; 2) land access, consideration of land registry issues, and ownership registration; 3) land access, credit facilities for the poor and reliable registration of land rights in the land registry; 4) same as (3) but done throughout entire neighbourhood: full-scale neighbourhood renewal.
- Access, transport and energy: 1) non-motorised transport; 2) public transport (buses); 3) public transport, logistics, maintenance; 4) public transport, logistics, maintenance and better combustion technology/ higher-efficiency fuels.
- Drinking water: 1) well within a radius of 200 metres; 2) central water tap or well with maintenance and management systems 4) domestic water supply, with maintenance and management system and consideration of gender issues; 5) same as (3) and (4), plus focus on hygiene and sanitation instruction.
- Sanitation: 1) efficient pit latrine (including septic tank); 2) bucket latrine system (bucket collection); 3) sewerage (cheaper options within the same field include small bore sewers, condominium systems and public toilets); 4) same as 1, 2 and 3, including maintenance and management issues as an ascending quality.

For the points included under '**Social services (basic and others)**' the more detailed qualitative rating has been added by the researchers in cases where it was not operationalised in the policy. The ascending scale is graded as follows:

- Law and order: aspects of crime prevention and crime-fighting by catering for the needs of marginalised groups, ranging from basic crime-fighting through prevention to offering a new start to offenders.
- Food and nutrition: efforts to improve small-scale production and distribution with a view to increasing food security.
- Basic health care: from strengthening institutions in order to secure better access for vulnerable groups (women and children), to providing supplementary information programmes about the importance of prevention, to ultimately monitoring the health situation of vulnerable population groups.
- Basic education: formal and informal, with a special focus on poor women and girls. The range ascends from basic access to primary education to specific interventions aimed at educating vulnerable groups.

For **Urban government**, the scale is less easy to define. It ranges from strengthening policies for tackling urban poverty issues to involving the urban poor in the decision-making process (including decentralised budgets), through direct influence and also representation by non-governmental organisations (CBOs and NGOs).

### **Work and income**

The aim is to stabilise employment, chiefly by creating conditions for ‘security’. The following key concepts get a proportionally higher ranking when they are tackled in these clusters: licensing system, credit facilities, training, market support, and establishing an organisational structure.

### **Integrated urban development**

The ranking for the component ‘integrated development’ depends on how holistic the approach is. Because context is the determining factor, it may be possible to argue in favour of emphasising one particular element because the others have already been provided for elsewhere.

In conclusion, the models given above are designed for assessing the actual implementation of interventions and the degree to which the chosen approach is conceptually integrated. By taking both elements into account, a judgment can be made

about the operationalisation of the policy. This does not answer the question of whether the ultimate results, whether positive or negative, should be interpreted as a direct consequence of the policy, the implementation, or a combination of both.

When using the three models to assess the aspects and themes mentioned above, the following stages come into play:

1. The evaluators give an ex ante rating based on the project document and activity appraisal documents about the degree to which the above-mentioned elements fulfil the original ‘wishes’ (i.e. how far the policy has been translated into activities).
2. Based on the totality of project dossiers, the evaluators give an ex post rating for the outcomes achieved for the interventions to be studied.
3. At country level, evaluators give a supplementary evaluation of what has been achieved, based on interviews with various stakeholders (end-users, intermediary organisations and policymakers). This yields a score on the main axis of the sustainable urban development radial axis (1 to 5). All the scores get a quality rating, and the final conclusions are ultimately based on this.
4. Wherever possible, the evaluators give a qualitative assessment of the Dutch policy’s relevance based on the question ‘To what extent is the policy an appropriate response to the problems of sustainable urban development in the context in question?’

Sources: The primary sources are the project dossiers, and the secondary sources are interviews with selected stakeholders and other parties involved in the various countries.


### **2.3 Assessing sustainability: the Boschlust model**

A further model offers insights into the sustainability of the interventions. *Sustainability* is the extent to which positive effects continue after the intervention has been terminated. However, the assessment involves more than simply checking whether something is still in existence.

The Boschlust model (see Figure 2) differentiates four aspects of sustainability:

- a. The importance the users attach to the intervention.

- b. The emphasis on developing knowledge and capacity for maintaining or managing the activities.
- c. Having formal recognition and authority from the appropriate key institutions and organisations.
- d. Being sufficiently institutionalised to enable activities/interventions to be carried out professionally or non-professionally, and to ensure that the other three conditions are met. If a project covers all four aspects, it can be argued that it has a better chance of being 'sustainable' in the long term. A great deal of the information used in the Boschlust model comes from interviews in the field.



**Figuur 2:**      *Conditions for project sustainability*

### **Guidelines for assessing core concepts in sustainability**

***Institutional and organisational strength:*** the degree to which the development interventions and results are embedded in an organisational context, and the way in which this is structured, managed and implemented by transparent working processes.

Core concepts:

- are part of the implementing organisation's core activity
- have transparent organisational processes and sound administration (financial and other)

- contribute to 'continuity' via the user groups, the authorities and/or non-governmental organisation. The contributions may be material or non-material.

-

**Formal recognition and authority:**

- official (legal) recognition by the implementing organisation
- rating of the organisation's quality
- recognition by authoritative organisations or individuals as significant in conducting the activities
- if relevant, delegation of powers and/or delegation of budgets.

**Users' interest and benefits:**

- gender-specific user recognition of the intervention (better and cheaper housing, more secure housing, cleaner surroundings, less expensive health care, access to employment)
- the user-group is physically present.

**Knowledge and capacity:**

- quality and quantity of the know-how used in the intervention.
- access to new knowledge and renewal of knowledge pool (including training and education)
- user group has access to the existing know-how and capacity.

**Sustainability ratings are compiled as follows:**

**Substantial:** the various elements of sustainability are currently present and likely to last. This will enhance the sustainability of the net profits.

**Modest:** The elements of sustainability have been achieved to a limited degree, but it is not definite or probable that they will last, which may endanger the sustainability of the net profits.

**Nil:** No elements of sustainability are present.

According to the degree of achievement, the various points of the model are given a rating of 1, 2 or 3 (negligible – moderate – considerable). This means that the sustainability score (see

above for details) will be 6 or less (nil), between 6 and 10 (modest), or 10 or over (substantial).

## **2.4 *Assessing impact***

Where possible, the evaluators at country level form a judgment about **impact**. Impact has to do with the long-term effects (positive and negative, desirable and undesirable) that are directly or indirectly caused by the intervention. The main questions to be answered are:

- Has the target group ultimately benefited?
- Have the efforts produced both short-term and long-term effects?
- Has the policy and the activities it generated proved to be a meaningful and appropriate response to the problem in question? If the effectiveness and efficiency ratings are positive and the approach is also integrated, it can rightly be concluded that the policy is relevant.

The judgment will be based on answers to the questions about the degree of effectiveness, the degree to which the policy is integrated (see radar charts), data from internal and external reports, and information obtained from field research.

(Version dated 27 July)

## **Appendix D – Checklist for Field Study Investigations**

## **Appendix D – Checklist for Field Study Investigations**

### **Field study: Format for Questionnaires and Checklist**

*Theo van der Loop, 20 December 2005*

#### **Research Method**

For each project there are two broad types of respondents: (1) Intermediary, implementing organizations, and (2) End-users. Certain issues/questions mentioned below are relevant for both types, while other questions are specific only for one of them.

For Projects nos. 1 to 4 of the list, the questions under A through E will be investigated.

For Projects nos. 5 to 7, **only** the following questions will be investigated: under C (Q. 7 & 31–35), under D (Q. 36-57) and under E (Q. 58-61).

The specific methods of data collection will be designed in cooperation with local experts, but, in general, for implementing organizations interviews are appropriate, while end-users can more efficiently be approached with group-discussions and brief surveys.

#### **Introduction**

- 1) Is there a clear problem analysis made of the specific context/policy of Ethiopia?
- 2) How has the problem analysis been realised: With or without the participation of the beneficiaries and/or stakeholders?

#### **A Efficiency**

- 3) In how far have the available resources (inputs) been transferred into results in order to achieve the formulated objectives? Specified into:
  - a. Financial resources (the amount)
  - b. Human resources
  - c. Material resources
  - d. The set time limit
  - e. Specify the activities/services to be realised
  - f. Specify the activities/services actually realised

#### **B Effectiveness**

- 4) In how far have the targeted results been achieved? In how far have the project's outputs led to the realisation of the objectives?
  - a. Specify the outputs of the project.
  - b. Specify the targeted effects/results of the outputs, and their relative importance
  - c. Are the facilities/services created by the project actually used?
  - d. Have beneficiaries really gained from the products and/or services that have been offered?
  - e. Were the right things done so that potential beneficiaries actually benefited?
- 5) On the policy level: What difference has the project made in practice on urban development:
  - a. Do the urban poor participate in consultative bodies?
  - b. Have the problems of the urban poor become a permanent item on local agendas of both the government and NGOs?
  - c. Has urban poverty become a component of the bilateral relationship?



## **C Relevance**

### FOR ECHELON 1/2/3 PROJECTS:

#### General questions:

- 6) Is the *policy* a good response to the problem? To which extent is the Dutch policy on urban sustainable development an adequate response to the needs and issues of sustainable development in the context of Ethiopia?
- 7) Are the *interventions* a good response to the specific problem? Are the objectives of each of the projects consistent with the necessities of the potential beneficiaries, with the needs of the country, with the global priorities and with the policy of the donor?

#### Themes and Sub-Themes (cf. Spiderweb diagrams):

Scores indicate in how far the following aspects have been applicable in an integral way.

#### **(a) Habitat**

- 8) Housing: Main attention has been on:
  - a. Zinc roof,
  - b. zinc and solid walls incl. water and sanitation
  - c. solid, simple house incl. land rights
  - d. house, land rights and finance
  - e. house, land rights, finance, and organisation in the neighbourhood.
- 9) Land and Land Rights: Main attention has been on:
  - a. Access to land,
  - b. Access to land and attention for land register, en ownership registration,
  - c. Access to land and to credit for the poor, and proper recording in land register,
  - d. Same as under item c, but now on level of the neighbourhood: area sanitation.
- 10) Access to/Opening up of an area, Transport, and Energy: Main attention has been on:
  - a. Non-motorized transport,
  - b. Public transport (busses),
  - c. Public transport, logistics, maintenance,
  - d. Public transport, logistics, maintenance, and better combustion techniques/better performing fuel
- 11) Drinking water: Main attention has been on:
  - a. Well within radius of 200 meter,
  - b. central tap,
  - c. central tap or well, with plan for maintenance – management systems,
  - d. water connection in the home, maintenance/management and attention for gender issues
  - e. Same as under c or d, including attention for hygiene en sanitation information.
- 12) Sanitation: Main attention has been on:
  - a. Well functioning pit latrine (including also a septic tank),
  - b. System with casks/barrels (collection – bucket latrine) ,
  - c. Sewerage (cheap alternatives within the same realm are small bore sewers, condominium systems, public toilets),
  - d. Same as under a, b or c, including issues dealing with management as increasing quality.

#### **(b) Social (basic) Services**

- 13) Safety and Crime: Main focus has been on:
  - a. Prevention and Crime control, among other things by anticipating the needs of marginalized groups, on an upward scale from simple control, through
  - b. Prevention, to
  - c. Offering a new perspective
- 14) Food and Nutrition: Main attention has been on:
  - a. Attention for improvement of small-scale production, and
  - b. Improvement of distribution aimed at an increase in food security.
- 15) Basic Health: Main focus has been on:
  - a. institutional strengthening in order to guarantee access for vulnerable groups (children and women), on an upward scale through
  - b. complementary programs for information on the importance of preventive aspects, to
  - c. monitoring of the basic health situation of vulnerable groups.
- 16) Basic Education: Main attention has been towards:

- a. Both formal and informal, with attention for poor women and girls, on an upward slope from simple access, until
- b. specific interventions directed exclusively at education for vulnerable groups.

**(c) Urban Government and Institutional Development:** Main focus has been on:

- 17) Participation
- 18) Legislation and issuing of Rules
- 19) Public-Private Partnerships
- 20) Urban Management
- 21) Reorganization Institutes
- 22) Strengthening policy making directed at the problems of urban poor.
- 23) Participation of the urban poor in the decision making process (for example decentralised budgets), both through direct influence, and through representative non-governmental organizations (cbo's and ngo's).

**(d) Work and Income:** Main attention has been on:

- 24) Marketing
- 25) Licensing
- 26) Credit provision
- 27) Training
- 28) Organisation building

**(e) Integrated Urban Development**

- 29) Holistic (degree of integration)
- 30) Context: are other aspects already being catered for in a different way (or context)?

**(f) Cross-cutting Themes**

- 31) Gender and Development: In how far has specific attention been paid to gender issues?
- 32) Vulnerable groups: In how far has specific attention been paid to the position of vulnerable groups?
- 33) Demand orientation
- 34) Research: In how far was research included, and did it lead to enhancement of policy development?
- 35) Culture: In how far were specific cultural aspects included?

***FOR ECHELON 4 PROJECTS (e.g. DAF-Busses, Women Fuelwood Carriers and Sewerage Project):***  
*Activities are evaluated only for ex-post relevance, seen from the viewpoint of the beneficiaries. Such projects could show results which, indirectly, i.e. through their area of operation (urban issues), could make it possible to comment on the intentions of the undertaken policies for urban development.*

Q. 7: Are the *interventions* a good response to the specific problem? Are the objectives of each of the projects consistent with the necessities of the potential beneficiaries, with the needs of the country, with the global priorities and with the policy of the donor?

Q. 31 - 35: as above.

## **D Sustainability**

General questions:

- 36) Do the realized activities still exist today, i.e. a number of years after the intervention has stopped?
- 37) To what extent have the effects continued after the finalisation of the program?

Specific Indicators:

**(a) Institutional and organisational strength:**

- 38) The degree and the way in which the development interventions and results have been embedded in an organizational context,
- 39) The way in which this has been structured,
- 40) The way in which it has been managed,

- 41) The way in which it has been implemented through clear work processes,
- 42) In how far has it been an integral part of the core activity of the implementing organization,
- 43) Clear organization processes and sound (financial) administration,
- 44) Contribution to 'conservation' through user groups as well as the government and/or NGOs (both material and immaterial contributions)

**(b) Formal Recognition and Authority:**

- 45) Official (legal) recognition of the implementing organization,
- 46) Appreciation of the quality of the organization,
- 47) Recognition by authoritative organizations or individuals, as important actor to implement the concerned activities,
- 48) (If relevant:) The delegation of authorities and possibly of budgets,
- 49) Did other donors (than the Netherlands Government) actually provide funds?

**(c) Interest and Benefits for Users:**

- 50) Recognition of the interest of the intervention by users, according to gender (better living for less cost; more guarantees for shelter; cleaner environment; less costs for health; access to work);
- 51) Presence of User Groups: Is the original target group still present in the original project (area; trained individuals)?
  - a. Still existing? (individual & common)
  - b. Maintained well?
  - c. Ownership changed?

**(d) Development of Knowledge and Capacity:**

- 52) Quality and Quantity of the 'know-how' present with implementers involved in the intervention;
- 53) Access to new knowledge and innovation of knowledge reservoir (including training & education);
- 54) Accessibility of the target group to the existing 'know-how' and capacity.

**Financial Sustainability**

- 55) Is project still financially sustainable (since Netherlands Government funding stopped)?
- 56) Future financial sustainability?

**Expectations**

- 57) Long-Term Sustainability: Will the benefits of his project continue in the future?

<b>E Impact</b>
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- 58) Did the efforts lead to effects both on the short term as well as the long term?
- 59) Have living conditions improved for target groups?
- 60) Has the poverty situation changed?
- 61) In how far has the policy and the resulting activities been a useful and adequate reaction to the perceived needs problems?
- 62) (*Only for Projects Nos. 1 to 4:*) In how far did the Dutch policy on Urban Sustainable Development have an impact on the Ethiopian policies in this area? In how far did this Dutch policy have a catalytic function?
- 63) Which major constraints could not be solved by the project activities as such?

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## **Appendix E – Analysis of Files ‘Sustainable Urban Development’ Ethiopia**

## **Appendix E – Analysis of Files ‘Sustainable Urban Development’ Ethiopia**

### **Analyse dossiers ‘duurzame stedelijke ontwikkeling’ Ethiopië**

#### *Achtergrond*

Voor de keuze van activiteiten (de data base) voor de evaluatie ‘stedelijke urbane ontwikkeling’ vanuit het MIDAS is de locatie, ‘stad’, de bepalende factor geweest. Alle geselecteerde activiteiten in de verschillende landen en voor de wereldwijde programma’s beslaan één of meer van de aandachtsterreinen zoals genoemd in de sectornotitie. De activiteiten zijn opgenomen indien deze aan één van de van tevoren geselecteerde kenmerken uit het administratieve systeem voldeden. Het betreft de volgende kenmerken:

- a. contractpartij bevat Habitat; *of*
- b. beherende organisatie bevat Habitat; *of*
- c. uitvoerende organisatie bevat Habitat; *of*
- d. dimensie is Stedelijke Armoede Bestrijding (SAB); *of*
- e. nummer Kbe is 461 of 747 (de onder het speerpunt vallende budgetten voor Stedelijke Armoede Bestrijding); *of*
- f. toetsresultaat voor ‘Armoede’ is POS/NEU (positief/neutral) en het Gebied komt overeen met STA (stad), NAT (nationaal) of GLO/INT (globaal/internationaal).

Een nadere analyse van de beleidsbeschrijving (zie de ToR voor deze evaluatie) maakt duidelijk dat het beleid, zeker tot 1996, voornamelijk vorm gekregen heeft, *hetzij* door directe **financiering** vanuit de middelen die het speerpuntprogramma ter beschikking stonden, *hetzij* door een grote **inhoudelijke cq. intellectuele betrokkenheid** vanuit het speerpunt bij de operationalisering van activiteiten in de stad, die gefinancierd werden vanuit andere middelen.

Op basis van bovenstaande tweedeling is voor wat betreft Ethiopie besloten tot een indeling in vier categorieën/echelons van activiteiten, die als algemeen interventieniveau het domein van stedelijke ontwikkeling/armoedebestrijding en de stad kennen.

- I ste echelon: De betreffende activiteit is tot stand gekomen na consultatie met en goedkeuring door de deskundigheid binnen het speerpuntprogramma<sup>[1]</sup>, blijkend uit het beoordelingsmemorandum (BEMO). Daarnaast heeft de financiering volgens het MIDAS plaats gevonden lastens de kbe’s ‘stad’ (461 of 747).
- II de echelon: De deskundigheid vanuit het Speerpuntprogramma heeft, evenals bij eechelon I, een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij de uiteindelijke goedkeuring van de financiering van de activiteit, zoals blijkt uit het beoordelingsmemorandum (BEMO). De financiering is echter vanuit andere middelen gekomen, bijvoorbeeld vanuit multi-laterale fondsen of vanuit allocatie voor een land of regio.
- III de eechelon: Noch bij de financiering, noch bij de beoordeling speelde het speerpuntprogramma ‘stedelijke ontwikkeling’ een rol. Wel heeft het speerpuntprogramma een zekere adviserende rol gehad ten aanzien van de activiteit, blijkend uit de correspondentie en het bemo rond de activiteit.

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<sup>[1]</sup> Tot 1996 blijkt dit uit de inbreng vanuit het speerpuntprogramma DST/UR van waaruit ook de zgn. technische advisering (TA) wordt verzorgd. Na de opheffing van het speerpuntprogramma in 1996 komt de specifieke stadsdeskundigheid vanuit de Directie Rurale en Urbane ontwikkeling (eerst DRU/UO, later DRU/SE) tot in ieder geval 2000.

- IV de echelon: De activiteit speelt zich af in de ‘stad’, maar van enige inbreng vanuit het speerpuntprogramma is geen sprake. De activiteit sluit wel aan bij één van de aandachtsgebieden genoemd in het Themabeleidsdocument ‘Stedelijke armoedebestrijding’.

Voor de overige landen geldt dat dezelfde indeling in vier echelons zal worden aangehouden. Voor wat betreft de periode na de opheffing van het speerpuntprogramma en als gevolg van de herijking en delegatie in 1996 blijven dezelfde kenmerken van kracht voor een indeling in de vier echelons, met dien verstande dat vooral gekeken zal worden naar de intellectuele inbreng vanuit het gedachtengoed van het speerpunt. In die periode zijn er op verschillende Ambassades themadeskundigen geplaatst, die naast andere aandachtspunten, ook de ‘Stad’ in hun portefeuille hadden. Dit betreft de Ambassades in India (vooral de stedelijk milieu component), China (stad en bedrijfsleven en daarna meer stedelijke ontwikkeling en water), Suriname, Nairobi (meer habitat), Pakistan (stad en bedrijfsleven), Managua en Costa Rica/Lima. Op die wijze garandeerden zij nog enige intellectuele inbreng voortkomend uit het door het speerpunt ontwikkelde beleid.

Redenerend vanuit het ontwikkelde beleid voor stedelijke ontwikkeling concluderen we dat alleen binnen de echelons I t/m III het beleid in meer of mindere mate intellectueel en soms ook financieel actief is geweest met betrekking tot de ontwikkelingsactiviteit. De activiteiten vanuit echelon IV zijn geheel los van het beleid rond stedelijke ontwikkeling tot stand gekomen. Er is noch een traceerbare intellectuele inbreng noch financiële inbreng geweest vanuit het speerpuntprogramma of beleid ‘stedelijke ontwikkeling’.

Een eerste selectie van de Ethiopie dossiers toont dat van de negen bi-laterale dossiers er drie vallen binnen het echelon I, dwz. direct toegerekend kunnen worden aan het ‘beleid’ in meest pure zin. Echelon II levert één dossier op, te weten het ‘Urban Development Programme’. Daarbij voerde het landenbureau en de Ambassade het penvoerderschap en had het Speerpunt ‘Stedelijke ontwikkeling’ een adviserende en medeoordeelende rol vanuit haar technische advisering.(TA).

De overige vijf dossiers vallen onder echelon IV. Vanuit de financiering gezien gaat in de echelon IV projecten de meeste financiering om. Dat komt doordat in deze groep enkele grotere financieringen zitten vanuit het gemengde kredieten programma, de zgn. ORET/MILIEV gelden. De programma’s zijn opgenomen daar ze betrekking hebben op het domein van de ‘stad’ en omdat er in deze programma’s tenminste één van de kenmerken van het stedelijke beleid terug te vinden zijn. In het geval van Ethiopie gaat het om projecten rond de kenmerken vervoer, sanitatie en stedelijk milieu.

De ToR vraagt antwoorden op vragen met betrekking tot output, outcome, impact, relevantie en duurzaamheid van het beleid of van de activiteiten die voortgekomen zijn uit dit beleid. Dit betekent dat in het kader van deze evaluatie die activiteiten hierop beoordeeld kunnen worden, die vallen binnen de echelons I t/m III. Alleen uit die activiteiten kan direct afgeleid kan worden of het beleid efficiënt en effectief is uitgevoerd. De echelon IV activiteiten worden alleen beoordeeld op de ex-post relevantie, geredeneerd vanuit de ontvangers van de activiteiten. Bij activiteiten vanuit echelon IV geeft antwoord op de efficiency en effectiviteits vragen alleen inzicht in overwegingen die voortkomen vanuit ander (niet noodzakelijk stedelijk) beleid. De ex-post relevantie wordt wel beoordeeld in het veld, omdat het heel goed mogelijk is dat vanwege het werkterrein, de stedelijke omgeving, de echelon IV activiteiten opmerkelijke resultaten laten zien die het indirect mogelijk maken de intenties van het gevoerde beleid voor stedelijke ontwikkeling te becommentarieren.

### **Speculatieve reflectie vooraf**

Het zou kunnen zijn dat activiteiten, ontwikkeld vanuit een meer *geïntegreerde* aanpak zoals voorgestaan door het stedelijk ontwikkelingsbeleid, uiteindelijk minder (ex-post) relevantie hebben in de ogen van de gebruikers dan een min of meer eenzijdige maar duidelijk gefocuste activiteit op het gebied van bijvoorbeeld urbaan transport (voorbeeld van levering van 100 DAF bussen voor openbaar vervoer in Addis Abeba). Op basis van zo'n resultaat zou het gevoerde beleid kunnen worden becommentarieerd op de effectiviteit of efficiency van de intenties van het beleid. Het zou kunnen betekenen dat het beleid niet in staat is geweest voldoende focus aan te brengen tijdens de operationalisering van het beleid middels uitgevoerde activiteiten in het veld, waardoor de verwachte resultaten/effekten niet zijn behaald. Dit zou kunnen wijzen op een onvoldoende realistische uitvoering.

### ***De portefeuille in Ethiopië***

Een analyse van het dossier van Ethiopië geeft het volgende resultaat voor de activiteiten die vallen onder eechelon I en II. Beoordeling van de dossiers heeft plaatsgevonden op basis van het ontwikkelde framework en de hierboven omschreven indeling in eechelons van de geselecteerde activiteiten uit het dossier. Het betreft allemaal activiteiten die reeds geruime tijd geleden zijn beëindigd.

#### **Echelon I bi-laterale activiteiten:**

##### **Urban Health Programme:**

- MIDAS code: ET 009401
- Doelstelling: Ondersteuning van het district Urban Health Care programme in Addis Abeba.
- Budget: Fl. 150.000 (Euro 68.067)
- Looptijd geplanned: 3 jaar (1/1/95 tot 31/12/97)
  
- Relevantie<sup>[2]</sup>: a) Habitat: **0**; b) Soc. Voorz: **2**; c) Sted. Bel: **0**; d) Werk en Ink.: **0**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **1** (Project innovatief alleen op gebied Public Health maar binnen context van organisatie met veel bredere aanpak, zie spinnenwebdiagram Urban Health Program in bijlage)
- Efficiency<sup>[3]</sup>: **Matig**, te weten in termen van Tijd: 2; Geld: 2; Inhoudelijk: 2 (gezondheidszorg is al onderdeel van meer omvattend institutioneel programma).
- Effectiviteit<sup>[4]</sup>: **Goed**: armen hebben beter toegang gekregen tot voorzieningen in gezondheidszorg).

<sup>[2]</sup> Op basis van spinnenwebdiagram voor niveau 1 en 2 (zie Framework pag. 4).

<sup>[3]</sup> Volgens het 'Framework voor analyse dossiers' (pag. 3) scoort een activiteit een 1 bij minder dan een derde gerealiseerd van projectactiviteiten binnen gestelde termijn en binnen gestelde budget, een 2 bij een derde tot tweederde gerealiseerd, een 3 bij meer dan tweederde deel gerealiseerd en een 9 in geval geen uitspraak is te doen.

<sup>[4]</sup> Scoring van effectiviteit op basis van realisatie doelstellingen en activiteiten: slecht bij minder dan 1/3 gerealiseerd; matig bij minder dan 2/3 gerealiseerd en goed bij meer dan 2/3 gerealiseerd.

- Duurzaamheid<sup>[5]</sup>: **11 (substantieel)**, te weten: Inst. Kracht: 2; Formele rekenning: 3; Belang gebruikers: 3; Kennis: 3.

#### **Straatkinderen project Dessie:**

- MIDAS code: ET 009001
- Doelstelling: Verbetering van de leef- en werksituatie van straatkinderen in de stad Dessie door de opvang mogelijkheden van hun families en gemeenschap te versterken.
- Budget: Fl. 103.818 (Euro 47.110)
- Looptijd geplanned: 1 jaar (1/8/05 tot 31/7/96)
  
- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **1,1**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **3**; c) Sted. Bel: **0**; d) Werk en Ink.: **1,5**  
e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **2** (zie spinnenwebdiagram Dessie in bijlage)
- Efficiency: **Goed**; In termen van tijd: **3**; Geld: **3** (wel duur); Inhoudelijk: **3** (grote voortgang geboekt in één jaar!)
- Effectiviteit: **Goed** (meer dan 2/3 van de beoogde doelen is gerealiseerd).
- Duurzaamheid: **9 (bescheiden)**, te weten: Inst. Kracht: 1; Formele rekenning: 2; Belang gebruikers: 3; Kennis: 3.

#### **Urban Field Development in Ethiopie:**

- MIDAS code: ET 009302/ET 009303
- Doelstelling: Verlenen van Technische Assistentie door de UvA aan IDR/AAU en regio 4 en 14 om het UFDE concept van de grond te krijgen en projectstaf te steunen. Het ruimtelijk indelen van 'urban fields' aan de rand van Addis Abeba en Debre Zeit voor bewoners uit overbevolkte kebeles. Proefproject om op experimentele wijze betaalbare en legale grond voor huizen te realiseren.
- Budget: Euro 200.811.
- Looptijd geplanned: 3 jaar (1/1/95 tot 31/12/97), uitloop tot juni 1999.
  
- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **1,6**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **0,5**; c) Sted. Bel: **1,6**; d) Werk en Ink.: **0,8**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **3** (zie spinnenwebdiagram Urban Field Development in bijlage).
- Efficiency: **Matig**; In termen van tijd: **1/2**; Geld: **2**; Inhoudelijk: **2** (een kleine twee).
- Effectiviteit: **Matig**; Het doel, het (her)vestigen van mensen is slechts gedeeltelijk gelukt, enerzijds omdat in een van de wijken het niet gelukt is de grond vrij te krijgen voor de stadsinrichting. In de andere wijk is dit voor een groot deel wel gelukt en zijn allerhande zaken gerealiseerd zoals de uitgifte van 461 plots, het bouwen van 73 huizen, verbeteren van de publieke ruimte (o.a. markt gebied) en planten ruim 10.000 bomen.
- Duurzaamheid: **6,5 (net bescheiden)** te weten: Inst. Kracht: 1,5; Formele rekenning: 1 Belang gebruikers: 2; Kennis: 2.

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<sup>[5]</sup> De score voor de mate van duurzaamheid is als volgt: 6,5 net bescheiden, 9 bescheiden en 11 substantieel, zie Boschlustmodel in Framework (zie pag. 8).



## **Echelon I multi-laterale activiteiten:**

### **Urban Management Programme:**

- MIDAS code: WW059404
- Doelstelling: Vergroten van lokale stedelijke bestuurscapaciteit en bevorderen van good governance op lokaal niveau in Noordafrikaanse regio
- Bijdrage in budget: Euro 8.000.000
- Looptijd geplanned: 10 jaar (1986-2006).
  
- Relevantie<sup>[6]</sup>: a) Habitat: **0**; b) Soc. Voorz: **0**; c) Sted. Bel: **3**; d) Werk en Ink.: **0**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **0**
- Efficiency<sup>[7]</sup>: **Matig**, te weten in termen van Tijd: 1; Geld: 2; Inhoudelijk: 2 (veel bijeenkomsten, consultaties en publikaties; budget was niet toereikend; te weinig concrete meetpunten om vanuit gedetailleerd plan te zien wat gerealiseerd zou worden).
- Effectiviteit<sup>[8]</sup>: **Matig tot slecht**: Doelstellingen zijn maar zeer ten dele behaald (zie ook mid-term evaluation 1995).

Duurzaamheid<sup>[9]</sup>: **6 (nihil)**, te weten: Inst. Kracht: 1; Formele rekening: 1; Belang gebruikers: 1; Kennis: 3.

## **Echelon II bi-laterale activiteiten:**

### **Urban Development Project:**

- MIDAS code: ET 92003
- Doelstelling: Verbetering van de levensomstandigheden van de bewoners van vier krottenwijken in Addis Abeba door middel van rehabilitatie van krotten, opzet van inkomensgenererende activiteiten en voorziening van gezondheidszorg.
- Budget: Fl. 1.440.500 (Euro 436.025)
- Looptijd geplanned: 1/8/92 tot 1/3/94. Looptijd gerealiseerd tot het einde van december 1995
  
- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **2,4**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **1,9**; c) Sted. Bel: **1,2**; d) Werk en Ink.: **1,5**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **3** (zie spinnenwebdiagram Urban Development Programme in bijlage)
- Efficiency: **Goed**; In termen van tijd 2; Geld 2; Inhoudelijk: 3 ; Weliswaar is de looptijd wat langer geworden dan voorzien, maar in die periode zijn de voorziene activiteiten gerealiseerd binnen het beschikbare budget.

<sup>[6]</sup> Op basis van spinnenwebdiagram voor niveau 1 en 2 (zie Framework pag. 4).

<sup>[7]</sup> Volgens het 'Framework voor analyse dossiers' (pag. 3) scoort een activiteit een 1 bij minder dan een derde gerealiseerd van projectactiviteiten binnen gestelde termijn en binnen gestelde budget, een 2 bij een derde tot tweederde gerealiseerd, een 3 bij meer dan tweederde deel gerealiseerd en een 9 in geval geen uitspraak is te doen.

<sup>[8]</sup> Scoring van effectiviteit op basis van realisatie doelstellingen en activiteiten: slecht bij minder dan 1/3 gerealiseerd; matig bij minder dan 2/3 gerealiseerd en goed bij meer dan 2/3 gerealiseerd.

<sup>[9]</sup> De score voor de mate van duurzaamheid is als volgt: 6,5 net bescheiden, 9 bescheiden en 11 substantieel, zie Boschlustmodel in Framework (zie pag. 8).

- Effectiviteit: **Goed** (in grote lijnen een effectieve interventie vanuit een goed lopende organisatie met inspirerende éénling die enthousiasme over weet te brengen op anderen).
- Duurzaamheid: **9 (bescheiden)**, te weten: Inst. Kracht: 2; Formele rekening: 2; Belang gebruikers: 3; Kennis: 2.

Gemiddelde relevantie en duurzaamheid voor Ethiopie van alle echelon I en II activiteiten<sup>[10]</sup>:

- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **1,3**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **1,9**; c) Sted. Bel: **0,7**; d) Werk en Ink.: **1,3**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **2,3** (zie spinnenwebdiagram Ethiopie in bijlage)
- Duurzaamheid: **8,9 (bescheiden)**, te weten: Inst. Kracht: 1,6; Formele rekening: 2; Belang gebruikers: 2,8; Kennis: 2,5.

*(De cijfers achter de komma hier suggereren misschien een hoge mate van exactheid, echter deze cijfers geven niet meer aan dan een indicatie of het bijvoorbeeld een volle of magere twee is. Bovendien zijn in dit geval de cijfers gebaseerd op slechts 4 projecten. Daarnaast is belangrijk ons te realiseren dat de bestudeerde activiteiten voortgekomen zijn uit het centrale beleid, en niet uit een specifiek voor het land geformuleerde beleid. Zo is voor Ethiopië wel geformuleerd dat 'de stad' expliciet onderdeel is van de bi-laterale samenwerking, maar het is niet verder uitgewerkt tot wat voor interventies dit zou moeten of kunnen leiden.)*

**Echelon IV bi-laterale activiteiten:** De ex-ante relevantie ten opzichte van het Nederlandse beleid

Op basis van de spinnenwebdiagrammen is ook een scoring gemaakt van de ex-ante relevantie gezien vanuit het Nederlandse beleid van echelon IV projecten. Het gaat daarbij om projecten die niet zijn voortgekomen vanuit het beleid, maar daar wel een zekere relevantie voor kunnen hebben in termen van bereikte resultaten. Het zijn activiteiten die vooral op één van de aspecten van relevantie scoren. Zij laten geen integrale aanpak zien. Om eventueel latere beleidscommentariering te onderbouwen hierbij ook de scores voor de vier echelon IV activiteiten.

#### **Pilot Credit Scheme for Women Fuelwood Carriers**

- MIDAS code: ET 011701/702/704/ ET 014902
- Doelstelling: Beschikbaar stellen van een kredietsysteem voor houtdrages uit Addis Abeba ter ondersteuning van kleinschalig ondernemerschap.
- Budget: Euro 308.481
- Looptijd sept 1995 – januari 1998, uiteindelijk maart 1999
  
- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **0**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **0**; c) Sted. Bel: **0**; d) Werk en Ink.: **4**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **1** (zie spinnenwebdiagram Pilot Credit Scheme in bijlage)

#### **Youth Counseling Services (FGAE)**

- MIDAS code: ET 013901/902
- Doelstelling: Versterken van jeugdprogramma's van de Family Guidance Association in Ethiopie (FGAE) op het gebied van seksuele voorlichting en

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<sup>[10]</sup> De multilaterale projecten die ook in Ethiopie hebben plaatsgevonden op het niveau van echelon I en II zullen in op een later tijdstip dezelfde analyse ondergaan.

- distributie voorbehoedsmiddelen in 4 subbranches in Addis Abeba. Versterken van bewustzijn mbt. Verantwoordelijk seksueel gedrag
- Budget: Euro 409.297.
- Looptijd sept. 1996 – oktober 2002 (fase 1 en 2)
- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **0**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **2**; c) Sted. Bel: **0**; d) Werk en Ink.: **0**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **0** (zie spinnenwebdiagram Youth Counseling Services in bijlage)

#### **Slachtafvalinstallaties in Addis Abeba**

- MIDAS code: ET 014501/Miliev 94/17
- Doelstelling: Leverantie van slachtafvalverwerkingsinstallatie aan Addis Abeba om acuut milieu probleem op te lossen.
- Bedrag: Euro 679.558.
- Looptijd jan 1998 – december 2001 (afgesloten dec. 2002)
- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **0,2**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **0**; c) Sted. Bel: **0**; d) Werk en Ink.: **0**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **0** (zie spinnenwebdiagram Slachtafvalinstallatie in bijlage)

#### **Addis Abeba Sewerage Project and Consultancy Services**

- MIDAS code: ET 014601/602/Miliev 97/30
- Doelstelling: Verbeter van de afvalverwijdering en verwerking dmv. Levering van installatie, bouwen van transfer stations etc. in Addis Abeba, tevens stoppen vervuiling rivier.
- Bedrag: Euro 8.058.639.
- Looptijd dec 1997 – aug. 2001 (afgesloten dec. 2002)
- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **2**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **0**; c) Sted. Bel: **0**; d) Werk en Ink.: **0**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **1** (Project vindt plaats in de context van masterplan voor Stedelijke Ontwikkeling van Addis Abeba, waardoor er een zekere vraaggestuurdheid is. Plan is louter beton en ingenieurs, zie spinnenwebdiagram AA Sewerage System in bijlage)

#### **Leverantie DAF autobussen**

- MIDAS code: ET 008801/ORET 94/12
- Doelstelling: Verbeteren van openbaar busvervoer in Addis Abeba en daarbuiten door levering van stadsbussen.
- Bedrag: Euro 22.396.636.
- Looptijd nov. 1994 – febr. 1998 (afgesloten jan. 1999)
- Relevantie: a) Habitat: **1**; b) Soc. Voorz.: **0**; c) Sted. Bel: **0**; d) Werk en Ink.: **0,5**; e) Geint. Sted. Ontw.: **0** (Project verbetert openbaar vervoer voor de stedelijke armen en verbetert daarmee ook indirect de mogelijkheid voor vermarketing van producten, zie spinnenwebdiagram DAF autobussen in bijlage)

De vier echelon IV activiteiten blijken niet geheel onverwacht op basis van de doelstellingen van het geformuleerde beleid voor stedelijke ontwikkeling een lage score te geven ten aanzien

van de ex-ante relevantie. Het zijn activiteiten die over het algemeen slechts op een van de thema's een matige score laten zien.

### **Nawoord**

Zoals gezegd de vergelijking met de ex-post relevantie van een aantal van bovenstaande projecten kan bij een hoge score een interessante conclusie opleveren ten aanzien van het gevoerde beleid. Het kan namelijk leiden tot de volgende redenering: veel van de interventies die ondernomen zijn in de stad en die in het geheel niet voortgekomen zijn uit het gedachtegoed van de beleidsnotitie (integrale aanpak etc) blijken een hoge relevantie te hebben vanuit de intenties van de doelstellingen van het beleid, te weten het verbeteren van de armoede situatie voor de allerarmsten in de stad.

Het kan dus heel goed zijn dat activiteiten die vanuit het beleid beoordeeld (ex-ante) erg eenzijdig zijn en laag scoren tav. relevantie, uiteindelijk wel een geweldige bijdrage bleken te zijn voor de realisatie van doelen van datzelfde beleid vanuit het perspectief van de ontvanger(s), zoals zou kunnen blijken uit een hoge score voor ex-post relevantie.

Dat levert eventueel beschouwingen op over de vraag hoe belangrijk eigenlijk die integrale aanpak is, en misschien suggereert de nota in die zin ook wel veel meer dan uiteindelijk waar is te maken.

## **Appendix F – Structured Questions on Multilateral Programmes in Ethiopia**

## **Appendix F: Structured Questions on Multilateral Programmes in Ethiopia**

Addis Ababa, 13 January 2006

Ato Gutema Bulcha  
Director, UDCBO  
Addis Ababa

Dear Ato Gutema,

As per our discussion of yesterday, I hereby send you a brief list of Structured Questions as I have promised.

The answers will be crucial for the evaluation of the global Sustainable Urban Development Programme which is currently being undertaken by the independent "Policy and Operations Evaluation Department" (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under this global evaluation four Field Studies will be undertaken of which Ethiopia is the first; the others are South-Africa, Nicaragua and Philippines. I am involved in the Ethiopia Field Study composed of:

- ✓ Multilateral projects, in particular through UN-Habitat;
- ✓ Seven bilateral projects; and
- ✓ Overview of Urban Policies in Ethiopia since 1991.

The structured questions are as follows:

### **UMP - Urban Management Programme:**

- 1) Which concrete activities have taken place under the UMP programme in Ethiopia?
- 2) What is your evaluation of the impact of these activities?
- 3) In how far has the UMP programme contributed to the new policies on urban development?

### **MDP – Municipal Development Programme:**

- 4) Which concrete activities have taken place under the MDP programme in Ethiopia?
- 5) What is your evaluation of the impact of these activities?
- 6) In how far has the MDP programme contributed to the new policies on urban development?

### **Training Programmes undertaken or initiated by Un-Habitat:**

- 7) Which concrete training activities have taken place in Ethiopia?
- 8) What is your evaluation of the impact of these activities?
- 9) In how far have the training activities contributed to the new policies on urban development?

### **All UN-Habitat Programmes:**

- 10) Which programme did you appreciate the most in the past 15 years? For which reason?
- 11) How do you evaluate the intermediary role of UN-Habitat?

I would very much appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Theo van der Loop  
Nedworc Foundation  
Zeist, The Netherlands  
[thmv@xs4all.nl](mailto:thmv@xs4all.nl)

Address in Addis Ababa:  
Hilton Hotel, Room 1023  
Mobile Phone: 0911 - 30 58 04

## **Appendix G – Appraisal and Scores on Checklist Field Study Ethiopia**

## Appendix G – Appraisal and Scores on Checklist Field Study Ethiopia

**B=Before Field Study; A=After Field Study.**

Q.	PROJECTS/PROGR. Before or After FS: *)	UHP		SCP		UFDE		IHA/UDP		EcheL.1/2		UMP		WFC		AASP		DAF		Fam.Guid		SLHouse	
		B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	--	B	--
<b>Introduction</b>																							
1	Problem analysis?		yes		yes		yes		yes						yes		yes		part				
2	Particip of beneficiar.?		yes		yes				yes						yes		no		part				
<b>A - Efficiency</b>																							
3a	Money	2	2	3	2.5	2	2	2	2				2										
3	Contents	2	2	3	2.5	2	2.5	3	3				3										
3d	Time	2	1	3	2	1.5	1.5	2	2				1										
	<b>Total Efficiency **)</b>	M	M	G	G	M	M	G	G				M	M									
<b>B - Effectiveness</b>																							
4	Goals achieved? ***)	++	+	++	++	+	++	++	++				+	++									
	Appraisal **)	G	M	G	G	M	G	G	G				M	G									
<b>C - Relevance</b>																							
	<b>a)Habitat</b>		<b>0.4</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.4</b>					<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.8</b>			<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>
8	a1 Housing			2	2	1	1	4	4														
9	a2 Land rights					3	3	2	2														
10	a3 Transport					1	1	2	2									3	4				
11	a4 Drinking water		1	1.5	1.5	2	2	2	2														
12	a5 Sanitation		1	2	2	1	1	3.5	3.5							3	3.5					2	2
	<b>b) Social Services</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.8</b>										<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.3</b>	
13	b1 Safety			2.5	2.5			1	1												1.5	1.5	
14	b2 Food			3	3			1.5	1.5														
15	b3 Basic Health	3	4	2.5	2.5			3	3												4	4	
16	b4 Education	3	3	4	4	2	2	2	2												3.5	3.5	
	<b>c) Urban Govt.</b>				<b>0.4</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>0.2</b>									
17	c1 Participation					2	2	4	4				3		1								
18	c2 Legislation					2	2	1	1				3										
19	c3 PP-Partnerships				1	2	2	1	1				3										
20	c4 Urban Mangem.					2	2	1	1				4										
21	c5 Re-org.Institutes				1	1.5	1.5						3										
	<b>d) Work &amp; income</b>			<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>			<b>2.4</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>					
24	d1 marketing					2	2	2.5	2.5												2	2	
25	d2 Licensing																						
26	d3 Credit provision			2.5	2.5				1				4	2									
27	d4 Training			2.5	2.5	2	2	2.5	2.5				4	3		1							
28	d5 Org.Building			2.5	2.5			2.5	2.5				4	3									
	<b>e) Integrated U.Devt.</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>					
	<b>Total Relevance</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>
<b>Cros: Cross-cutting themes</b>																							
31	1 Gender		yes		yes		yes		yes					yes									
32	2 Vulnerable groups		yes		yes				yes			yes	yes	yes		yes							
33	3 Demand orient.						yes					yes			yes		yes						
34	4 Research						yes		yes			yes											
	5 Environment											yes	yes	yes	yes		yes						
35	6 culture												yes	yes	yes	yes		yes					
<b>D - Sustainability</b>																							
38-44	Institutional Strength	2	2	1	1.5	1.5	2	2	1.5	1.6	1.8	1	2.5		1.5		3		3				
45-49	Formal Recognition	3	1.5	2	2	1	2	2	1.5	2.0	1.8	1	2.5		1		2		3				
50-51	Interest Users	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	2.8	2.3	1	3		1		2		2.5				
52-54	Devt. of Knowledge	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2.5	2.0	3	4		2		2		1.5				
	<b>Total Sustainability</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>							
	<b>Overall Appraisal *****)</b>	<b>++</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>++</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>							
<b>E - Impact</b>																							
58	Effects on short term		+		++		+		++				+	+	+		++						
	Effects on long term		0		+		+		0/+				++	--	+		+						
59	Liv condit improved		+		+		+		+				0	+	+		+						
60	Did poverty change		0		0		0		0				0	0	0		0						
61	Useful reaction		0		+		+		0/+				+	0	+		+		++				
	<b>Appraisal Impact</b>																						
*) Before (B) or After (A) Field Study (FS).																							
**) S="Slecht", Poor; M="Matig", Fair; G="Goed", Good (cf. Appendix E).																							
***) ++ = More than two-thirds, + = between one and two thirds, 0 = less than one third (cf. Appendix E).																							
*****) ++ = Substantial (>10), + = Modest (6-10), 0 = Small/Zero (<6) (cf. Appendix E).																							



## **Appendix H – List of Persons Consulted**

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### In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia:

- Mr. Gutema Bulcha, Director, Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO).
- Mr. Getachem Adem Tahir, Head, Economic Policy & Planning Department, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED).
- Mrs. Atsede Guta, Head, Women's Affairs Department, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA).
- Mrs. Antoinette Gosses, Deputy Head of Delegation, Royal Netherlands Embassy in Addis Ababa.
- Mr. Jon Metcalfe, Chief Technical Advisor, Ministry of Works & Urban Development.
- Mr. Tewodros Tigabu, UN-Habitat Programme Manager for Ethiopia.
- Mr. Gerhard Mai, GTZ Advisor, Governance & Urban Management, GTZ.
- Mr. Teshome Shibru, Coordinator of the Urban Forum, Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA).
- Dr. Aklilu Kidanu, Director, Miz-Hasab Research Centre.
- Ethiopian Urban Management Centre (EUMC) in the Ethiopian Civil Service College (ECSC).
- Dr. Zewdie Shibre, Faculty of Business and Economics, Addis Ababa University (AAU).
- Dr. Hailom Banteyerga, Miz-Hasab Research Centre.
- Dr. Solomon Mulugeta, College of Social Sciences, Addis Ababa University (AAU).
- Dr. Tegegne Gebre Egziabher, Regional and Local Development Studies (RLDS), Addis Ababa University (AAU).
- Mr. Zikre Negatu, Faculty of Business and Economics, Addis Ababa University (AAU).
- Intermediary and Implementing organisations.
- Beneficiaries

### In Nairobi, Kenya:

- Dr. Alioune Badiane, Director, Regional Bureau of Africa and Arab States (ROAAS), UN-HABITAT.
- Dr. Eduardo Lopez-Moreno, Chief, Global Urban Observatory (GUO); former head of Ethiopia desk; UN-HABITAT.
- Dr. Rafael Tuts, Chief, Training and Capacity Building Branch (TCBB), UN-HABITAT.
- Dr. Dinesh Mehta, Coordinator, Urban Management Programme (UMP), UN-HABITAT.
- Dr. Gulelat Kebede, Senior Human Settlement Officer, Training and Capacity Building Branch (TCBB), UN-HABITAT.
- Dr. Antonio Yachan, Head (retiring) of Ethiopia Desk, UN-HABITAT.
- Ir. Jan A. Bauer, Deputy Permanent Representative, UNEP/UN-HABITAT, Royal Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi.

### In The Netherlands:

- Ir. Hans Slot, Inspector, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague.
- Dr. Marc Lammerink, Head Consultant, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague.

## **Appendix I – List of Documents Used**

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## **ATTACHMENTS**

### **Project Reports of the seven bilateral projects:**

- |   |            |   |
|---|------------|---|
| 1 | UHP        | Urban Health Program in Addis Ababa   |
| 2 | SCP-Dessie | Street Children Project in Dessie   |
| 3 | UFDE       | Urban Field Development in Ethiopia: Pilot Project in Addis A. & Debre Zeit |
| 4 | IHA/UDP    | Integrated Holistic Approach/Urban Development Programme in Addis Ababa     |
| 5 | WFC        | Women Fuelwood Carriers: Pilot Credit Scheme in Addis Ababa                 |
| 6 | AASP       | Addis Ababa Sewerage Project (Miliev/ORET)                                  |
| 7 | DAF        | Delivery of 266 DAF City Busses and spare parts (ORET)                      |