

**EVALUATION OF THE  
NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS'  
INTER-MUNICIPAL CO-OPERATION PROGRAMME  
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
GSO**

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This working document is an input to the evaluative study of the Municipal International Co-operation conducted by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a product evaluation of the co-financing programme in support of inter-municipal co-operation between Dutch local governments and those in developing countries (*Gemeentelijke Samenwerking Ontwikkelingslanden - GSO*). Willem Cornelissen (SEOR B.V., Erasmus University Holding) elaborated the report based on country studies conducted by SEOR in South Africa (with Upstart Business Strategies), Tanzania (with the Institute for Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam) and Nicaragua (with Programa Bolivar). Research in the Netherlands was conducted by Maaïke Oosterbaan (Ecorys NEI) and Mirco Goudriaan (SEOR). The authors express their gratitude to all local authorities contacted, both in the Netherlands and abroad, who all have been forthcoming in providing information and opinions, and highly appreciate the comments made by the IOB Reference Group on earlier drafts.

This report does not include IOB's reconstruction of the policies pursued by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs with respect to the GSO-programme.

*The report is the sole responsibility of SEOR BV and Ecorys-NEI and does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of either IOB or the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

## FOREWORD

Friendship ties between cities in Europe originated in mediaeval times. Commercial and military interests often motivated them. Friendship ties between European cities and those in developing countries are a more recent feature (since the 1960s) and are rooted in different motivations, ranging from sharing a common history to international solidarity. Inter-municipal co-operation involves public and private organisations at both ends of a city-linkage. Since the early 1990s, the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports Dutch municipalities and other local governments in their efforts to strengthen the governance capacities of their partners abroad through decentralised co-operation. The Ministry co-finances inter-municipal activities by making subsidies available to Dutch municipalities. In addition, the Ministry supports specific independent projects aimed at strengthening local government capacity in partner countries. The co-financing programmes for municipal co-operation together with other kinds of support to strengthen municipal development are known as municipal international co-operation.

The co-financing programme targeted at developing countries is known as the Netherlands' Inter-municipal Development Co-operation Programme (*Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden* - GSO). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has delegated the day-to-day administration of the co-financing funds to the Association of Dutch Municipalities (*Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten* - VNG).

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an independent department, responsible for the evaluation of the policies and activities of this Ministry. IOB embarked upon an evaluation of the municipal international co-operation. In the framework of this overall evaluation, it contracted the association of companies SEOR B.V. and ECORYS NEI, both from Rotterdam, to conduct sub-studies.

The present report, written by Willem Cornelissen, covers the evaluation of the results of the GSO-programme. To that end, teams composed of Dutch and local experts carried out field studies in municipalities and other local government organisations in South Africa, Nicaragua and Tanzania.

A draft of this report was presented to the Reference Group that accompanied the broader IOB study and was discussed on June 10, 2003. The observations of the Reference Group, as well as those from other readers have substantially contributed to the improvement of the report. The study took place under overall responsibility of Francis Kettenis, evaluator of IOB. IOB's evaluation of municipal international co-operation is published in the series of evaluation reports of IOB. This study is of interest to those involved in inter-municipal development co-operation and published as an IOB Working Document. The authors are solely responsible for the contents of this report.

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# 1 SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS

This report covers the results of the field study of the evaluation of the Netherlands' Inter-municipal Development Co-operation Programme, or the '*Gemeentelijke Samenwerking Ontwikkelingslanden*' (GSO). The evaluation of the GSO-programme is one component of the overall evaluation of the Municipal International Co-operation (MIC) programmes that are funded by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has entered into administrative agreements (and since 2000 into a ministerial decree) with the Association of Dutch Municipalities (*Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten* - VNG) for the administration and management of the GSO funds.

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an independent department. IOB is responsible for the evaluation of the MIC and has contracted the private companies SEOR B.V. and Ecorys-NEI, both from Rotterdam, to conduct field studies as part of the research methodology. IOB carried out the policy reconstruction, as well as the analysis of the policies concerning MIC over the last decade. The results of that reconstruction and analysis do not form part of this report.

The GSO-programme is (mostly) implemented through activities in the frame of inter-municipal co-operation (city twinning or friendship relations) and (since 1998) has two objectives:

- a) to strengthen the capacities of local governments in partner municipalities;
- b) to encourage the support of the Dutch population for international co-operation in general, by enhancing the involvement of Dutch municipalities in international co-operation activities.

Since 1998 the first objective has been (sub)divided into three specific objectives, aimed at:

- strengthening the administrative and management capacity of local governments;
- strengthening local capacity for planning and implementation;
- strengthening the participation of the citizenry in local government.

Poverty alleviation is the over-arching objective of the Dutch development co-operation, of which the GSO-programme forms a part. During the evaluation no effort has been made to assess any cause-effect relation between the GSO activities and poverty alleviation, the more since international literature has not provided evidence of a positive correlation between sound and democratic local governance and reduction of poverty.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, VNG and Dutch municipalities have had a different interpretation of what the GSO-programme is, or ought to be. They meet each other in the objective of strengthening of capacities of local governments. Since 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has argued that the objective to strengthen local governments was subordinate to the objective of achieving support by the Dutch population for development assistance. In a different view, VNG-I considered support for development assistance a side effect or derivative of the objective to strengthen

local capacities, the more since no financial means were ever made available to that end. In the formal agreements and the year 2000 ministerial decree, however, the two objectives were described in terms of equal weight. To Dutch municipalities the interest in the broader city twinning relations predominates. The strengthening of capacities of local governments is just one of the numerous activities they develop.

During the period 1997-2001, Dutch municipalities applied for GSO resources on behalf of partners in 41 countries. Of those countries 34 percent did not qualify for Official Development Assistance (ODA), but pertained to an additional group of eligible (non-ODA) countries. In terms of numbers of Dutch municipalities that have applied for funds from the GSO-programme, 46 percent did so for partners in non-ODA countries.

The product evaluation was implemented through field missions conducted in South Africa, Nicaragua and Tanzania. The activities visited in the three countries represent almost one-third (31.2 percent) of the total population of activities supported by the GSO-programme during the period 1997-2001. The product evaluation covered well over half of all the Municipal Management Training Programmes (MMTPs).

In none of the three countries visited, does a well-settled and mature system of distribution of powers and attributes between the central government and the local government exist. Over the last decade in South Africa, changes of the municipal system have been volatile, including a drastic geographic revision of the municipal spatial organisation. In Nicaragua, the political support to decentralisation has been modest at best. In Tanzania, local governments went through various change processes over the last decades, but financial resources have always been too small to implement the envisaged functions at a local level. Local governments are still largely subordinated to central government decision-making. The political willingness to come to a more decentralised public sector and to devolution of powers to the local level is more apparent in South Africa than in Nicaragua and Tanzania. Both in Nicaragua and Tanzania, financial constraints impede the day-to-day operations of local government. In general, the enabling environment in South Africa has been the most advantageous to local government development.

Local governance calls for special skills, expertise and talents that cannot always be learned by adhering to what is available within the limits of national borders or what could be learned from the past. In this regard, development co-operation may fill gaps. Training of local politicians and civil servants may contribute to their capacities in planning, management and service delivery, as stated by the three secondary objectives of the GSO-programme.

The overall assessment of both the quantity and the quality of the input leads to a positive judgement. This is particularly the case for the Municipal Management Training Programmes (MMTPs). Both in South Africa and in Nicaragua, local governments considered a frequency of one MMTP per year as adequate, if and when combined with an apprenticeship period in the Netherlands. One general monitoring mission (PUGA) every 12 to 18 months was considered sufficient. Various partner municipalities would have preferred the existence of an option for long(er) term technical assistance.

In general, the quantity and quality of the output was positive. An exception was the very large number of missions by Dutch politicians and civil servants to the partner municipalities (PUGAs). A third of these PUGAs was of a technical assistance nature;



the remainder was for contact maintenance mainly. PUGA is the basic instrument to maintain contacts between the partners. Without such personal contacts the municipal relations would possibly crumble. From an accountability point of view towards the Dutch constituency PUGAs are indispensable. Five times as many civil servants and administrators from the Dutch municipalities visit their partners abroad than the other way around. PUGAs for maintenance of contact tend to be planned and realised according to the Dutch interests and agendas (for example, the time schedule of the budget cycle in the Netherlands). PUGA end-of-mission reports painted over-optimistic views. In general, PUGAs contribute little to strengthen local governments, since the effectiveness of technical PUGAs happened to be low for on-the-job training.

The relevance with respect to the identified problems of local government was very high. The relevance with respect to the objectives of the GSO-programme was less pronounced. It should be observed, however, that the relevance was measured against the yardstick of strengthening local governance only. The understanding and interpretation of 'strengthening local government' by Dutch municipalities has been broad. Broad in the sense that almost any activity qualified as long as it related to the public sector at local level. Frequently, activities developed were internally unrelated to each other, and targeted at different subject matters and different municipal departments or units. This fragmentation, in combination with the inherent restrictions of decentralised co-operation, meant that the critical mass of activities in a single municipal relation has been low.

There are no indications that efficiency of the activities (or the GSO-programme in total) has been the main concern of the Dutch stakeholders. There are possibly two reasons for that:

- Although VNG-I requested for additional funds almost every year, the GSO-programme resources have largely matched the demand from the Dutch municipalities. There was no competition among Dutch municipalities to obtain subsidy funds (for example on the basis of best proposals or the highest leverage of resources). There has been no need for VNG-I to introduce any system to rotate or auction funds, neither to restrict the number of eligible countries or subject matters;
- The absolute amounts involved are small. Dealing with small numbers may imply that less attention is paid to efficiency. This does not mean that no attention was paid to the rightful use of resources, but that is not the same.

VNG-I and the Advisory Committee on GSO could have been more critical in appraising the applications for subsidy on efficiency criteria.

At the activity level, well over half of the PUGAs, internships (STAGEs) and municipal initiatives (GIs) have been efficient, except for the use of local expertise. Since local expertise is not fundable with GSO resources, this does not surprise. However, various partner municipalities commented that the Dutch technical assistance happens to be too eager to 'produce' results, instead of exploring the existing local knowledge first.

MMTPs in combination with apprenticeship periods (STAGE) have proven to be effective mechanisms to trigger change in both working procedures and the institutional organisation. The personal work plan (a component of the MMTP) has proven to be an important instrument to that end. Exposure generates new ideas about implementation in their own working situation. Direct dissemination of

knowledge within the organisation has not been the strength of both modalities. The establishment of networks, or the incorporation in existing networks has been modest at best. Motivation did play an important role. The simple fact that someone at the other end of the globe pays attention to your work motivates; tangible changes may result from that. Some of those changes were remarkably large as compared to the small input provided.

Overall, the assessment on effectiveness of the activities happens to be positive. Nevertheless, various projects (GIs) showed a rather modest performance. In particular in Nicaragua, the objectives happened to be too ambitious and final results remained below expectation. In Tanzania hardly any effect of the activities could be observed. In fact, in four of the six Rural Districts visited there was literally not a single inter-municipal activity going on.

Dutch municipalities use to monitor the progress of the inter-municipal activities against their annual or multi-annual plans. In most inter-municipal relations, friendship ties prevailed over a business-like attitude. Few Dutch municipalities agree with their partners on performance indicators beforehand, and none apply sanctions if performance remains below expectations. In the implementation process of larger projects, no milestones were set.

Table 1.1 provides an overview of the main findings regarding the GSO-programme. The evaluation criteria efficiency and effectiveness were assessed both at the level of the individual activity and at the level of the programme.

#### *General remarks*

At the programme level, GSO has hardly contributed as a leverage to obtain more resources from either the Dutch municipalities or their partners abroad. The subsidies have not been effective in establishing new contacts between local governments. However, the subsidies did contribute to fostering friendship ties that might have crumbled without them. In addition, the subsidies have been effective to draw the attention to the strengthening of local government, a subject matter that otherwise would possibly not have been dealt with, due to its low appeal to the Dutch civil society organisations involved.

Respondents in the three countries visited expressed their appreciation for activities supported by the GSO-programme. The apparent contradiction between modest effectiveness and high appreciation is explained by the fact that decentralised co-operation as a mechanism is highly appreciated by the recipient local governments.

The strengthening of local government refers to a change process which may require external assistance to manage it (De Bruijn, ten Heuvelhof, in 't Veld, 1998). The current implementation modalities of the GSO-programme hardly provide opportunities to do so. On the contrary, the modalities strongly aim at strengthening individual capabilities rather than at institutional change. A review and simplification of the implementation modalities should be considered for future actions.

Conditions for success are the co-ordination between the local governments (orchestrating the linkage), the continuous generation of new initiatives and ideas and investment in mutual understanding. In case one of the partners is not willing or able to invest in ideas, or in accepting the particularities or idiosyncrasy of the partner, the options for sustainable co-operation becomes bleak.

Development assistance is not a core task of municipalities in the Netherlands. The civil servants or administrators that co-ordinate the inter-municipal relations use to dispose of little time to devote to these tasks. Part of their duties might have been delegated to private organisations, such as city linkage foundations. There are few incentives to Dutch municipalities to continuously improve their performance in international relations. At the same time, the potential for decentralised co-operation has been insufficiently explored, and the restrictions insufficiently recognised in the design of the projects proposed for funding by the GSO-programme.

### 1.1 Summary of main findings on evaluation criteria

Evaluation criterion	South Africa	Nicaragua	Tanzania	Overall GSO-programme
<b>Relevance</b>				
Vis-à-vis problem	High	High	In part relevant	relevant, but the critical mass is low
Vis-à-vis policy of the recipient	High	no official policy	high, but not ready for operation	relevant
Vis-à-vis the Dutch policy	Modest	High	High	partly relevant (not relevant for public support objective)
<b>Efficiency</b>				
At the activity level	high, but of little concern	high, but of little concern	not efficient	two-thirds efficient
At the programme level	In part outside core business of municipalities	high, but of little concern	not applicable	little attention to the criterion. Development co-operation is not a core business of Dutch municipalities. No incentives in place to improve quality and performance
<b>Effectiveness</b>				
At the activity level	STAGEs and MMTPs and GIs effective. PUGA for one third effective	STAGEs and MMTPs effective, GI in part effective. PUGA for one third effective	apart from exceptions, not effective	two thirds effective. Effective for institutional change. Motivation and exposure are effective
At the programme level	partly effective (support to agencies and not direct to municipalities)	effective	not effective	critical mass is low. Some remarkably effective examples. Not effective for leverage of funds. Partly outside core tasks municipalities
Indirect effects	positive side effects	few side effects	no positive side effects	few positive side-effects



## 2 INTRODUCTION

### 2.1 Structure of the report

This report is structured as follows: after the presentation of the summary and main findings, the introductory chapter describes the GSO-programme, the city linkages, and the objectives of the evaluation. It also provides details on the research methodology used. Chapter three elaborates the concept of municipal international co-operation and the intervention logic related to that. Chapter four presents the development of local government in the three countries and identifies some common features as far as it concerns problems encountered and the external support to overcome these problems. It places the GSO-programme within the frame of external support mechanisms. Chapter five describes the main features of the input and output of the GSO-programme in South Africa, Nicaragua and Tanzania respectively, whereas chapter six describes the activity process and management aspects of the programme. The evaluation criteria relevance, efficiency and effectiveness are dealt with in chapters seven, eight and nine respectively. These criteria are being considered both at the activity- and the programme level. The report finalises by presenting a number of specific issues concerning inter-municipal development co-operation in chapter 10.

### 2.2 Inter-municipal Co-operation with Developing Countries

Since 1994, and after a predecessor programme (1991-1994), the Netherlands Inter-Municipal<sup>1</sup> Development Co-operation Programme (*Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden* - GSO) enables Dutch municipalities to respond to requests for technical and managerial assistance from partner municipalities in developing countries. Internationally, this kind of programmes is known as Municipal International Co-operation (MIC). The GSO-programme is a co-financing (subsidy) provided by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for International Co-operation. Thereto the Ministry allocates some € 2.5 million annually.

For the management and administration of the programme, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has entered into an Agreement (1994-1998) with the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG). VNG has delegated the implementation to its independent Organisation for International Affairs, VNG-International (VNG-I). In 2000 the Agreement was replaced by a ministerial decree.

Dutch municipalities may apply for GSO subsidy whenever their partner abroad is a local government organisation in a country that qualifies for Official Development Assistance (ODA), as defined by the Organisation for Economical Co-operation and Development (OECD). In addition a number of other countries qualifies as well, as result of their special relations with the Netherlands, such as South Africa, Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles, Turkey and Morocco.

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<sup>1</sup> Although the name refers to 'municipalities', in practice the target group is broader and comprises - apart from municipalities- provinces, public utility companies, polder boards, independent entities for public service delivery (social housing etc) and their corresponding umbrella organisations. Since 1998, the programme is also open to semi-public organisations for local government, as well as of the civil society, as long as they are directly involved in the city linkages (such as the linkage foundations - *stedenbandstichtingen*). The target group in the developing countries is not precisely defined, but refers in general terms to local and regional governments.

Condition for obtaining GSO subsidy is that the activities to be implemented aim at the strengthening of democratic local governance. The objectives of the GSO-programme are twofold and formally of equal importance and weight:

- a) Strengthening local governance, through well-defined collaboration programmes between municipalities 'here and there'. Since 1998 this objective has been (sub)divided into three specific objectives, aimed at:
  - strengthening the administrative and management capacity of local governments;
  - strengthening local capacity for planning and implementation;
  - strengthening the participation of the citizenry in local government.
- b) In addition, the programme aims at encouraging the support of the Dutch population for international co-operation in general, by:
  - increasing the involvement of Dutch municipalities in international co-operation;
  - increasing the involvement of Dutch citizens in international co-operation through public information activities and awareness raising.

The programme is open to activities in all municipal policy fields, such as public works, taxes and municipal finance, municipal management, waste management, citizens' participation, housing, health, environment, sanitation, education, employment, urban development, drinking water, fire brigade, etc.

The first period (1994-1998) of the GSO-programme was finalised with an external evaluation by DHV Consultants (1997). DHV considered institutional strengthening through inter-municipal co-operation a new approach in international co-operation. This approach is based on mutual trust and built on colleague-to-colleague contacts. It implies that the Dutch municipal civil servants and administrators do not take over any task or responsibility of the partner, but provide know-how, based on experience. No large investments are being made and short-term technical assistance is the core business of the programme. DHV considered the programme too much restricted to the municipal governments and suggested to broaden the eligibility for subsidy to those entities of governance that are not directly public entities (public-private, for example). It also implies that civil society organisations directly involved in the city linkages could make use of the subsidy (through the municipality). The feedback of this latter observation was evidenced by the 1998 Agreement that made GSO subsidy accessible to semi-public or private not-for-profit organisations active in the city linkages, such as Foundations (*Stedenbandstichtingen*) and community centres.

The GSO-programme is executed through six implementation modalities, of which five refer to activities abroad:

- PUGA: Programme for temporary deployment of Dutch civil servants in the partner municipality (missions for advisory services or training);
- STAGE: Apprenticeship or short internship for public servants/administrators from the partner municipality in the Dutch municipality;
- Municipal Initiatives (GIs): financing of small investments, mainly to implement knowledge supported by advisory missions and internships. This is a financing arrangement for municipalities that have a sustained relation with a partner in a developing country;
- Municipal Management Training Programme (MMTP): group-training activities for trainees who share a same (professional) background. These programmes

- normally consist of a week of lecturing, followed by one or two weeks of individual internships in the Dutch host municipality;
- General Activities (AA). Facilities for follow-up activities, south-south relations, publications and seminars in the south.

A sixth modality aims at preparing Dutch officials involved in municipal co-operation for working in non-western circumstances. VNG-I organises special courses (CUGA) and workshops to that extent.

### **2.3 Objective of the evaluation**

IOB has formulated the objective of the evaluation as follows:

*The analysis and assessment of the policy relevance, the effectiveness and efficiency of activities financed by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of municipal international co-operation, that are administered and/or implemented by the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG).*


The GSO-programme is one out of a series of programmes for inter-municipal co-operation, such as a programme for pre-accession countries (*Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Toetredingslanden - GST*), for the reconstruction of Turkey (*Gemeentelijke Samenwerking voor de Wederopbouw van Turkije - GSWT*) and the "Trilateral East West South Co-operation on a municipal level for countries in Eastern Europe, the Netherlands and Nicaragua - NEWS". This latter programme started in 1996 and was finalised in December 2001 and involved in particular the Czech and Slovak Republics, Nicaragua and the Netherlands. Among these programmes, the GSO-programme was the most important one in financial terms, with two-thirds of all disbursements for inter-municipal co-operation (figure 2.1).

The purpose of the evaluation study has been to describe and analyse how various projects that fall under the GSO-programme were executed and in which way they contributed to the strengthening of the capacities of local governments in developing countries during the period 1997-2001. In particular the research has addressed the following questions:

- How relevant has the municipal international co-operation under the responsibility of VNG been to the policy objectives concerning the strengthening of local governance (*policy relevancy*)?
- How effective have the realised interventions been to strengthen local governance (*effectiveness*)?
- How efficient has the input been in order to achieve the desired results (*efficiency*)?

It should be noted that the study did not analyse in a systematic manner the results of the GSO-programme with respect to its second objective: the encouragement of the support of the population for international development co-operation. Nevertheless, in the margin of the evaluative process information was gathered about this second objective.

**Figure 2.1** The relative importance of the GSO-programme among the co-financing programmes for inter-municipal co-operation



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MIDAS.

This report does not contain the reconstruction of the policies pursued by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs with respect to the implementation of the GSO-programme. In fact, the present product evaluation was completed prior to the conclusion of the policy reconstruction.

The field study in Nicaragua excluded the Small Local Projects programme (*Kleine Plaatselijke Activiteiten* - KPA) as subject matter of evaluation. This KPA-programme forms part of the GSO Agreement (after 2000 a ministerial decree) between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG. It is implemented in Nicaragua only and administered and managed by the *Landelijk Beraad Stedenbanden Nederland – Nicaragua*, LBSNN. For all other countries, KPA is administered by the *Nationale Commissie voor Internationale Samenwerking en Duurzame Ontwikkeling* - NCDO. The KPA-programme provides incentives to civil society initiatives. Basically it requires fund-raising by a civil society organisation, of which the proceeds may be doubled by KPA. During fieldwork in Nicaragua, the intertwining between GSO funded and KPA funded activities has been analysed.



### **Box 2.1      Towards a 'city-wide' relation: East London (Buffalo City) – Leiden**

The Dutch municipality of Leiden participated in the Lower Governments Against Apartheid (LOTA) movement in the Netherlands during the Apartheid era in South Africa. After the change to democracy in South Africa, Leiden was interested in contributing actively to the reconstruction of the South African society. While the LOTA approach had been 'to be against the South African regime', it implied a psychological shift to start supporting the South African government. Initially, Leiden was reluctant to do so and decided that it should act cautiously and all steps should be politically accountable for to the Leiden constituency. In 1995, this intention was communicated to VNG. Through intermediation by VNG, contacts were established with East London. After three missions 'to get acquainted with each other', a first project was launched late 1996. In 1999 an official twinning agreement was signed between the two cities. In Leiden a *Stichting Stedenband Leiden – East London* was established, with approximately 750 institutional and private contributors/members.

In 1996, for the first time use was made of GSO co-financing, and the first GI was formulated in 1997 (on housing). Between 1997 and 2001 series of activities took place. East London politicians and/or administrators participated in various MMTP courses, such as on gender (1998), women in local government (2000), Integrated Development Planning (1999), and change management (2000). Dutch administrators visited East London on various occasions, in order to formulate projects and to monitor the Municipal Initiatives (GIs) on housing, integrated development planning and waste management agreed upon.

Between 1995 and 2002 series of horizontal contacts emerged, not only at the administrative level, but also between civil organisations. Without being exhaustive, these contacts were:

At the political administrative level:

- Leiden Municipal Planning Department with the Buffalo City Town Planning Department;
- *Politie Hollands Midden* with South African Police, Dept. East London;
- Leiden Cleansing Department with East London Cleansing Dept.;
- Leiden Municipality with the Housing Association East London;
- Habitat support to the Housing Association East London;
- *COS Haaglanden* involvement with small projects;

At the level of private stakeholders:

- The *Leidse Volkshuis* (welfare) with the Border Institute for Primary Health Care;
- The *Diaconessenhuis* with East London Hospital;
- The Chamber of Commerce *Rijnland* with Border Key Chamber of Commerce;
- The *Hervormde Diaconaal Centrum De Bakkerij* with the Uniting Reformed Church;
- The *Leidse Hogeschool* and *Regionaal Opleidingen Centrum Leiden* with colleges in East London;
- Leiden Organisation for Care for the Elderly with the Gompo Welfare Society for the Aged;
- *Afrika Studie Centrum* with East London Museum;
- Contacts between sportclubs.

Not all these contacts are of same intensity and magnitude. For example, the contacts in the area of social housing have been intensive as a result of the Habitat project supported by the Netherlands' Ministry for Housing (VROM) and GSO, while contacts between the police departments have been rather 'thin' from the start on.

## 2.4 Research components

The evaluation of the GSO-programme consists of four stages:

- a) a preparatory phase, in which the methodology was developed and a literature study was conducted. Based on the literature, the Inception Report presented three analytical models that are intertwined: an input model that sets the critical areas for the strengthening of capabilities of local governments (the 'what' question), an intervention model (the 'how' question) and a context and receptivity model (the 'when' question);
- b) a study covering the Dutch municipalities, consisting of a survey among Dutch municipalities; interviews with Dutch municipalities and civil servants; interviews with policy makers and a file study;
- c) field missions in three selected countries (South Africa, Nicaragua and Tanzania): consisting of interviews with policy makers in the sampled municipalities; interviews with civil servants and people directly involved in the projects;
- d) data processing, analysis and reporting.

For each of the field missions, country specific Terms of Reference (ToR) were elaborated in advance, based on a standardised model, basically leading to five kinds of output (see Annex 3):

- a) a context paper;
- b) an inventory of the activities and the corresponding persons involved;
- c) an analysis of the input, output, efficiency, effectiveness and relevancy of the activities;
- d) a description of special cases;
- e) a country specific working paper containing the main conclusions.

### *Context papers*

The context papers were, in part, elaborated prior to the field missions. The content of the papers was theoretically fostered in the context and receptivity model, as well as Dunn's input model (see Annex 3 and figure 7.1). In accordance with that model, a distinction was made between:

- the political administrative and legal environment;
- the financial-economic environment of local governments, and
- the socio-cultural environment.

A description of the current mandate, structures of local government, as well as the current central government policies regarding local government (decentralisation, good governance, participation) was made, as well as a description of the main problems encountered by local governments.

In each country an inventory was made of the external support and interventions aimed at strengthening local governments, as well as the relative position of the Dutch programme within the total international support to that end.

### *Inventory of activities*

For the selected municipalities, an inventory was made of the activities that received GSO funding. Main source of information was the IOB database. Information was

added through file study at VNG-I in The Hague. Each activity was linked to the names of specific political authorities and civil servants. Prior to the field studies, substantial time was devoted to trace the whereabouts of the people who were once involved in the activities (in all three countries not only local politicians, but also civil servants change after each election).

#### *The analysis of the input, output, efficiency, effectiveness and relevancy of the activities*

Since the GSO-programme comprises a wide array of heterogeneous activities, a standardised registration form was developed and subsequently used to describe both input and output. The same registration form enabled the evaluator to register judgements on each of the evaluation criteria. The arguments used to come to that judgement were underpinned separately.

A different standardised registration form was used for the interviews with current officials in the municipalities. These officials may or may not have been involved in GSO subsidised activities, but bear current responsibilities for the twinning or friendship relations.

In addition, open interviews were held with Ministries, foreign donors, grassroots organisations linked to the programme, such as housing co-operatives (South Africa), umbrella organisations (Nicaragua) and development oriented non-governmental organisations (Nicaragua and Tanzania).

#### *Case studies*

The country specific ToR had identified two special case studies in advance. The case studies concerned selected Municipal Initiatives (GIs). The selection, based on information from the file study, aimed at achieving a variety in activities. During field missions these selected cases could not be analysed in all cases, due to the fact that the people directly involved could not be traced anymore (or had passed away).

#### *Country working paper*

For each of the field studies a country working paper was elaborated. Abstracts of these papers were presented as Debriefing Notes to the Royal Netherlands Embassy and directly involved stakeholders in each country.

#### **Evaluation criteria and matrix**

The field studies focussed on the evaluation criteria relevance, efficiency and effectiveness. Each of the evaluation criteria was broken down into a number of pre-determined elements. The evaluators' judgement on each of these components (if applicable) was registered by activity. Judgements were expressed in a range of four: very positive (very satisfactory), positive (satisfactory), negative (unsatisfactory) and very negative (very unsatisfactory).

Efficiency compares output with input. Output is the direct product of input. In practice, in the GSO-programme the output is sometimes hard to distinguish from the input, unless only the financing is considered as such (e.g. in the case of participation in a seminar).

In essence, efficiency is a concern of the financier. It addresses the question whether the same output could have been achieved quicker or more economically using less input or whether more output could have been obtained using the same input? Efficiency refers to two levels: the activity level and the programme level.

Effectiveness is the extent to which input, through output, contributes to the achievement of the expected results. This requires that the effects can be attributed to the activity with reasonable certainty. Sustainability is supposed to form part of the effectiveness (in the case a result has not been sustainable, it has not been very effective either). Since most activities were small, direct attribution of effects is hard to assess. Use has been made of the following indicators:

- changes in the personal working methods;
- changes in institutional methods or structures;
- interaction (networking);
- career development of civil servants trained;
- changes in participation (-structures) of the citizenry.

Relevancy is the extent in which an activity has been pertinent with respect to:

- the identified main problems of local government development in the three countries;
- the policy of the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- the policy of the recipient organisation (municipality, other);
- the extent to which an activity has the potential to strengthen democratic local governance. That potential was assessed by comparing the activities against an 'input' model for local governance strengthening (see figure 7.1).

The relations among the evaluation criteria are presented in the evaluation matrix (table 2.1).

**Table 2.1 Evaluation Matrix Municipal International Co-operation with developing countries (GSO)**


Objectives and expected results	Indicators	Sources and technique	Evaluation
<p><b>Input: Financier</b> Financial resources (subsidies) Policies</p> <p><b>Input: Programmes and Instruments</b> Programme Dutch advisory missions (PUGA) Training courses (MMTP) Apprenticeship periods (STAGE) Small Municipal Initiatives (GI) Small Local Projects (KPA – Nicaragua) General Activities (AA) Support Activities</p>	<p>Formal Agreements Policies reflected in agreements Financial allocations</p> <p>Number of missions / apprenticeship periods / training courses Number and kind of activities Budgets and expenditures Accessibility of the subsidy to Dutch municipalities</p>	<p>Policy documents Ministry of Foreign Affairs Documents to Dutch Parliament Financial reports VNG-I</p> <p>Standardised registration of GSO files Survey among Dutch Municipalities Structured interviews with Dutch municipalities, linkage foundations and civil servants</p>	
<b>Comparison of output with input</b>			<b>Efficiency</b>
<p><b>Output</b> Civil servants in partner municipalities trained individually or in groups Small local projects implemented (Local government and civil society)  (Awareness activities implemented)</p>	<p>No. of civil servants trained formally or on the job in recipient countries No. and sectors of projects implemented Process-time Duration and intensity of contacts</p>	<p>Survey of Dutch Municipalities Desk study (VNG-I files) Structured Interviews with selected municipalities in the Netherlands Field visits to municipalities in the three countries Interviews with managers of the programme: VNG-I</p>	
<b>Extent to which input via output contribute to expected results</b>			<b>Effectiveness</b>
<p><b>Outcome: Expected results</b> Enhanced capacities for local government planning and service delivery Enhanced interaction between local government and civil society Increased number of city linkages</p>	<p>Institutional interaction in time series Changes in participation (-structures) Motivation of civil servants Increased participation in networks, Structural changes in working conditions Institutional change</p>	<p>Structured interviews with municipalities in the Netherlands Structured interviews with partner municipalities in three countries Interviews with civil servants/organisations</p>	
<b>Extent to which input via output and outcome contribute to specific objectives</b>			<b>Relevance</b>
<p><b>Impact: Specific objectives –</b> Governance capacity of local governments strengthened at institutional level Local planning and implementation capacity strengthened Citizen's participation in local governance enhanced  Increased involvement of Dutch citizens in development co-operation (not evaluated)</p>	<p>Institutionalisation of participation of civil society/ private sector in local government Improved policy formulation capacity (political) and service delivery (civil service) Improved public accountability  Targeting (potential contributions)</p>	<p>Field study in partner municipalities in three countries Interviews with policy makers Publications on the national level Project and programme evaluations</p>	
<b>Overall objective:</b> Strengthening of local governance in recipient countries			

## 2.5 Population and sample

The various co-financing programmes in support of inter-municipal co-operation are depicted in figure 2.1. Over the decade, financial allocations and disbursements to the programmes aimed at developing countries (1991-1994 *Programma Gemeentelijke Ontwikkelingssamenwerking* – PGO; since 1994 GSO-programme) increased gradually (figure 2.2).

During the period 1997-2001, the total disbursements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for co-financing programmes and independent projects through VNG totalled NLG 54.479.521 (€ 24.721.729), of which half, being NLG 25.200.000 (€ 11,4 million) was spent on the GSO-programme.

Figure 2.2 Expenditures on subsidy programmes PGO and GSO, 1991-2001



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs' registration system MIDAS.

The population subject to evaluation consisted of all activities funded with GSO subsidies during the period 1997-2001 (activities completed up to December 31, 2001). Each Dutch municipality (and other local government entity) is entitled to submit a subsidy proposal to VNG-I. Formally, the Dutch municipality applies on behalf of its partner abroad. A permanent city-linkage is no precondition, but usually applications are made within the frame of such a city-linkage. During the period 1997-2001, this has resulted in requests for subsidies for activities in local governments in 41 different countries. During that period, 89 different Dutch municipalities and 20 other eligible local government entities and umbrella organisations applied for GSO subsidy, totalling 109 different applicants (see Annex 5).


**Table 2.2 Number of Dutch municipalities that applied for GSO subsidy, 1997-2001**

Modality	Total	South Africa	Nicaragua	Tanzania
PUGA	61	16	16	8
STAGE	41	15	4	2
GI	39	10	7	1
MMTP	59	22	13	11
General (AA)	11	1	0	10
<b>Total applicants</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>16</b>

Note: numbers of municipalities cannot be totalled, since one Dutch municipality may have contacts with various local governments abroad.

The 89 Dutch municipalities represent 18 percent of the total number of municipalities<sup>2</sup> in the Netherlands. Out of the approximately 60-70 eligible countries, relations exist with Dutch municipalities in 41 countries. In 55 percent there have been contacts between only one or two Dutch municipalities and partner local governments. There are ten countries in which five or more Dutch municipalities keep up contacts: Albania, Indonesia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Peru, Zambia, Benin, Tanzania, Nicaragua and South Africa. By far the most contacts exist between Dutch municipalities and local governments in Nicaragua and South Africa, with each over 15 more or less structural relations (see figure 2.3).

**Figure 2.3 Number of inter-municipal contacts in eligible countries**




The GSO-programme defines 'developing countries' as countries that qualify for Official Development Assistance (ODA). Next to developing countries are eligible to the programme 'countries with a special relation with the Netherlands', such as Morocco, Tunisia and Surinam (policy frame attached to the 1998 GSO Agreement). This 'additional group' happens to be important within the total of recipients of the GSO-programme.

Of the 41 countries referred to above, 14 (34 percent) did not qualify for ODA, but pertained to the 'additional group'. In terms of number of Dutch municipalities that

<sup>2</sup> This percentage is consistent with the figure of approximately 20 percent of all municipalities that are active in developing countries, as was derived from the survey among Dutch municipalities.

applied for funds from the GSO-programme, 46 percent did so for contacts in non-ODA countries. Dutch municipalities that make use of GSO resources, mainly applied for the African continent (60 percent of all municipalities), in particular Southeast Africa (45 percent). Within that group, the contacts with South Africa are by far the most important (see figure 2.4).

**Figure 2.4 The regional distribution of municipal co-operation that made use of GSO subsidy**



Note: Based on records of 35 countries.

Over the period 1997-2001, the number of foreign partners in the GSO-programme was 182. This is more than the number of Dutch municipalities, since a single Dutch municipality may keep up contacts with several partners at the same time. A list of all sampled municipal contacts by country during the period 1997-2001 is presented in Annex 6.

**Sampling**

IOB selected countries for field study based on the following criteria:

Level	Criteria
Country	1. Magnitude of the contribution by the GSO subsidy; 2. Number of activities implemented; 3. Diversity of GSO instruments used; 4. The security situation in the recipient country.
Regional spread	5. Geographical spread over the continents.

The selection did not pretend to be statistically representative. No distinction was made between ODA eligible countries and the group of 'additional countries', but both groups are represented in the sample.

Considering time constraints both the total number of activities and the number of municipalities involved was too numerous to evaluate them all. The selection was



further refined to:

- structural relations between municipalities in the Netherlands and partner local governments, defined by a co-operation during at least two years;
- having used GSO subsidies at least twice for the same partnership.

In principle, all activities implemented in these municipalities were subject to evaluation.

The municipalities selected on these criteria in the three countries are presented in Annex 6, table 2. Not all activities selected could be evaluated in practice. In South Africa no interviews could be held in Highveld Ridge and Johannesburg, since in both municipalities no one could be traced who had knowledge about the relations with Vlissingen and Enschede respectively. In the case of Nicaragua a selection of municipalities was made, eliminating those local governments that had been subject to evaluation by VNG-I (2001) since some of these municipalities had been visited as well during the 2001 NEWS evaluation by ACE Europe (2001). A third evaluation visit within two years was considered disturbing.

Sixteen Dutch municipalities applied for GSO subsidies on behalf of a partner in Tanzania during the period 1997-2001. Eight of them made use of subsidy funds at least twice. The evaluation team visited 6 out of these 8 partnerships: Monduli, Mwanga, Same, Songea, Dodoma and Kondo. In the case of Kondo, the relation is at village level (Kiteo). The other two are the remote districts of Ngara and Biharamulo. These were not visited, since the Dutch municipalities had indicated that no activities were going on. Table 2.3 presents the local governments visited in the three countries.

**Table 2.3 Local governments visited**

Municipality in the Netherlands	South Africa	Nicaragua	Tanzania
Aa en Hunze			Monduli
Alkmaar	Uitenhage		
Alphen a/d Rijn	Oudtshoorn		
Arnhem	Kimberley		
Beuningen			Mwanga
Culemborg	Villiersdorp		
Delft	Pretoria (Mamelodi)	Estelí	
Den Haag	SALGA	Juigalpa	
Dordrecht		Granada	
Eindhoven	Lekoa Vaal (Emfuleni)		
Gennep		San Pedro de Lóvago	
Groningen		San Carlos	
Hoorn			Songea
Leiden	East London	Juigalpa	
Loenen			Kondo
Rotterdam	Durban		Dodoma
Tilburg	Lekoa Vaal	Matagalpa	Same
Utrecht		León	
Provincie Gelderland			ALAT
VNG	SALGA	AMUNIC, INIFOM	ALAT

<sup>3</sup> The municipalities involved in the Netherlands are: Aa en Hunze, Aalten, Beuningen, Hoorn, Lingewaal, Loenen aan de Vecht, Rotterdam and Tilburg.

The activities implemented in the local governments visited represent a selection of one third (31.2 percent) of all GSO supported activities world-wide during the period 1997-2001. For the Municipal Management Training Programmes (MMTPs), this is even more than half. Table 2.4 shows the number of activities funded with GSO resources world-wide, by instrument. For each country, the number of activities funded, the number of activities selected according to the criteria mentioned in the ToR and the number of activities during the field study are shown.

**Table 2.4 Total population of activities supported by the GSO-programme and sample by instrument, 1997-2001**

Activity	Country	South Africa			Nicaragua			Tanzania		
	Total GSO	Total	Sample 1	Sample 2	Total	Sample 1	Sample 2	Total	Sample 1	Sample 2
PUGA	159	23	18	17	45	43	25	10	9	8
STAGE	37	10	7	7	4	3	1	2	2	2
GI	72	9	6	6	20	16	10	1	1	1
MMTP	23	9	8	8	6	6	3	4	2	2
General Activity	7	3	3	3	0	0	0	2	2	2
Total	298	54	42	41	75	68	39	19	16	15

Activity	Total GSO	Three countries			Visited as percentage of total GSO-programme
		Total	Sample 1	Sample 2	
PUGA	159	78	70	50	31.5
STAGE	37	16	12	10	27.0
GI	72	30	23	17	23.6
MMTP	23	17	15	13	56.5
General Activity	7	5	5	5	71.4
Total	298	146	125	95	31.9

Notes:

Sample 1: sample of municipalities on the basis of the ToR criteria.

Sample 2: sample of municipalities that were visited during field missions.

Note: MMTPs are considered a single activity. Since participants from municipalities in various countries may participate in a single MMTP, the sum of courses per country does not equal the total number of courses in the GSO-programme.

Source: IOB database.

The analysis does not distinguish between the two objectives of the GSO-programme, since all activities were assumed to aim simultaneously at the strengthening of capacities of local governments and the support of the Dutch population for development co-operation.

## 2.6 Organisation

The association SEOR BV with ECORYS-NEI subcontracted services of local consultancy firms or universities for conducting jointly the field studies. Prior to the start of the field missions, the local firms had contacted the selected municipalities and had started to trace the whereabouts of persons that once were involved in the activities supported by the GSO-programme.

In each country, the field research started with a one-day workshop in order to discuss the approach, to train the local researchers in the subject, in the evaluation criteria and in the use of the standardised forms for interviews. See annex 4 for an overview of the researchers involved.

The complete team paid a pilot visit to a particular municipality. Based on that first experience, checklists were adjusted, if necessary. Further visits to municipalities were made in two groups, each group covering three to five municipalities. After finalising the visits, conclusions were drawn jointly during team meetings based on the standardised assessment forms. After completion of the field studies in South Africa, Nicaragua and Tanzania, the standardised forms supplied the data for a quantitative analysis.



### 3 MUNICIPAL INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND THE INTERVENTION LOGIC

#### 3.1 Municipal International Co-operation

The 'colleague-to-colleague' approach is the backbone of the GSO-programme. This approach requires the existence of direct contacts between functionaries, and builds on a relationship of trust, equality and reciprocity. VNG-I indicates: "the approach works best by way of long-term city-links as the development of reciprocity in relationships takes time. Furthermore, the city-links root the programme in civil society by raising the awareness of the population and by working side by side at aid projects based on community initiatives"<sup>4</sup>.

VNG-I and the Union of Centres for International Co-operation<sup>5</sup> (COS) perceive the term 'city link' as either a formalised linkage, a friendship linkage or a project-based co-operation between a Dutch and a foreign municipality, region or any other local government entity. The Dutch municipality, the foreign local government or the civil society of these cities may have taken the initiative to this linkage. City linkages experienced a revival in the aftermath of World War II, when linkage or twinning between communities was seen as a means to build bridges of understanding and confidence between nations that had been at war. Twinning was aimed at bringing about social and cultural exchanges between officials, schools, community organisations, sport clubs etc.

Since then, linking has branched out in various directions: such as north-south, east-west-south, east-west and south-south. The independence process in the African continent and the slow process of democratisation in the Latin American continent triggered the north-south community based relations. Communities did not always identify themselves with the policies and stands of their national governments with respect to Independence wars or relations with dictatorial regimes. For example, in the Netherlands the movement 'Lower Governments Against Apartheid' (*Lagere Overheden Tegen Apartheid* – LOTA) expressed defiance from the national policies regarding South Africa. Comparably, various Dutch municipalities showed explicit solidarity with the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua in the mid 1980s. Various types of linkages can be distinguished:

##### (i) *Twinning*

Twinning is usually characterised by a formal Agreement or Letter of Understanding aiming at a society-wide co-operation (public sector, private sector and civil society) in a broad array of subject matters. In many cases these twinning relations are based on a common history, are of an undefined duration and are based on equity and reciprocity.

Resolution 2861 of the United Nations General Assembly states: "International co-operation among communities is a natural complement to the co-operation of states and non-governmental organisations". According to the document 'The Challenges of

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<sup>4</sup> Source: [www.vng-international.nl](http://www.vng-international.nl)

<sup>5</sup> Source: [www.stedenbanden.nl](http://www.stedenbanden.nl)

Linking' (UNDP, 2000) there are basically four characteristics for successful links:

- commitment (in time and resources);
- community-wide participation;
- mutual understanding (leading to trust and respect for one another); and
- reciprocity.

The Habitat organisation refers to that as a 'city-wide approach', being the fostering of linkages between the public sector and the civil society and the private sector in all layers of society (see box 2.1). The city-wide approach is not restricted to cities, it can be applied to small towns and villages as well. There are, however, conditions for success. Among the most important conditions figure the co-ordinating role of the local governments (orchestrating the linkage), the continuous generation of new initiatives and ideas, and investment in mutual understanding. If one of the two partners is not willing or not able to invest in ideas or to accept the idiosyncratic particularities of the partner, the options for sustained contacts become bleak. In some reports the term twinning is reserved for city-wide relations between economically and socially equal partners, for example, between two European cities (European *jumelage*).

#### *(ii) Friendship relation*

Although there is no clear demarcation between twinning and a friendship relation, in general a friendship relation is less far-reaching. A friendship relation does not necessarily comprise all sectors of society, nor is it between equal partners. Ambitions may be different (for example, to express solidarity) and relations may be of a temporary character only. Good examples of friendship relations are most of the contacts between Dutch civil society organisations and grassroots organisations and municipalities in Nicaragua. Here, solidarity is (or was) more important than equity and reciprocity in the relationship. That friendship relations can be temporary only, is demonstrated by the fact that in 2003 the municipal council of Amsterdam decided to discontinue its formal support to the capital of Nicaragua, Managua.

#### *(iii) Project-based or thematic relations*

Local governments may opt to collaborate on a project base only, either for one particular project or for a series of projects. Project-based relations do not necessarily imply a predetermined intention to come to a broader friendship relation. For example, the relation between Rotterdam and the city of Dodoma in Tanzania is limited to a single project on waste management. Similarly, thematic relations are limited to one particular theme of collaboration. Such contacts may originate from sharing a common feature (for example being a university city) or from natural circumstances (for example, being cities along the same river).

#### *(iv) Network relations*

Network relations are not based on one-to-one contacts, but on relations among partners within a certain thematic frame or network, such as the Sustainable Cities initiative of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP).

The GSO-programme was designed in support of the Municipal International Co-operation, one particular form of so-called 'decentralised co-operation'. This comprises the relations between local governments in the Netherlands and 'elsewhere'. Dutch local governments, mainly municipalities, may destine allocations from their municipal budget to that end. In the Netherlands there are 251

municipalities (approximately half of all municipalities) that together maintain 438 city linkages (excluding the linkages with European partners). Apart from a classification by type of city linkage (as presented above), inter-municipal relations can be distinguished as well by the way they are organised:

- the city linkage can be managed entirely by the municipal employees as a task of their assignment;
- the city linkage can be managed by a foundation, or any other legal form of organisation, as collaboration between the public sector and civil society. Usually the municipality provides a subsidy to the foundation in order to cover its operational costs;
- the city linkage may be kept up by a predominantly private organisation, whereas certain projects are funded with public resources. The municipal government may play either an advisory or a supportive role. Public resources may, or may not, be used for operative expenditures;
- an advisory committee of the municipal council composes the management of the city linkage; or the municipal council appoints individuals who take care of the city linkage.

The term 'decentralised co-operation' does not only refer to the fact that relations are fostered horizontally between local governments, it also refers to the degree of organisational decentralisation and the autonomies of stakeholders. Civil society organisations and the public administration may participate, or not, in the foundations, as indicated above, while the larger cities may decentralise their international activities to the administrative departments. This may lead to the absence of a central co-ordination point of all international activities. At the level of the municipality/city in the Netherlands, the variety in organisational form is rich and complex. That complexity increases whenever the network relations are taken into consideration; networks like the South Africa Platform and LBSNN. Partly overlapping networks exist on thematic issues, such as the Habitat Platform that groups together almost all Dutch municipalities active in South Africa<sup>6</sup>. This complexity is illustrated by the membership of LBSNN (table 3.1).

The GSO Agreement 1998 between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG defines exactly what should be understood by a 'municipality' in the Netherlands. The same agreement is less explicit when it comes to defining 'local government' in the recipient countries. In practice, however, the partners abroad are either municipalities or district governments. Dutch municipalities applied for GSO funding on behalf of municipalities or districts in 93 percent of the cases. The seven percent exceptions usually dealt with consists of provinces or associations of municipalities.

The relations between Dutch cities and local governments in Nicaragua illustrate the complexities of the organisational ties. From the bottom up horizontal contacts exist between individuals and groups (i.e. linkages between two schools). In 16 cities in the Netherlands there are Foundations that manage the relations with their partners in

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<sup>6</sup> The Habitat Platform South Africa was set up on 21 September 1999 by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), VNG-I, Aedes (a federation of housing corporations) and the Dutch Habitat Platform (SHP). These organisations share the costs of the South Africa Platform, while the SHP secretariat is responsible for implementation. The reason for setting up the Habitat Platform South Africa was to promote exchanges of knowledge and information between Dutch organisations active in the Habitat sphere in South Africa. This covers issues such as housing and urban development, and broader aspects of how people live in terms of safety, services, community involvement, good governance, etc.

Nicaragua. Foundations not only co-ordinate activities, but also generate revenues for common activities. Grassroots groups may form part of the Foundation, but not all of them want to do so.

**Table 3.1 Membership of LBSNN**

Municipality in the Netherlands	Partner Municipality in Nicaragua	Membership of the local government	Membership of the Foundation
Amsterdam	Managua	yes	Yes
Rotterdam	Corinto	No	Yes
Den Haag	Juigalpa	Yes	Yes
Utrecht	León	Yes	Yes
Eindhoven	Chinandega	Yes	Yes
Groningen	San Carlos	No	Yes, but only civil society
Tilburg	Matagalpa	No, but makes use of services provided	Yes, but only civil society
Haarlem	Rivas	No	Organisation is no member, but makes use of the services provided
Nijmegen	Masaya	Yes	Yes
Maastricht	Rama	No	Yes
Delft	Estelí	Yes	Yes
Dordrecht	Granada	No, but makes use of the services provided	No foundation
Zoetermeer	Jinotega	Yes	Yes
Schiedam	Somoto	No	No foundation
Leiden	Juigalpa	Yes	Yes
Helmond	San Marcos	No	Yes
Doetinchem	La Libertad	Yes	Yes
Zutphen	Villa Sandino	No	No foundation
Diemen	Nandaime	No	Yes
Gennep	San Pedro de Lóvago	Yes	Yes
Rijswijk	Condega	Yes	Yes

Note: Partner municipalities are not members of LBSNN. However, 14 of these Nicaraguan municipalities have formed their Association of Municipalities with twinning relations Nicaragua-the Netherlands (AMHHN).

The Dutch municipality may channel its contribution through such a foundation, but some prefer to keep the public funds separate from the private resources. Fourteen of those foundations and 11 municipal governments in the Netherlands have joined the umbrella organisation LBSNN. Not all foundations and not all municipal governments with city linkages in Nicaragua are a member of LBSSN.

LBSNN has its representative in Nicaragua, known as the Consejo Nacional de Hermanamientos Holanda - Nicaragua (CNHHN). LBSNN generates revenues and co-ordinates the joint implementation of programmes, such as in the aftermath of hurricane Mitch. LBSNN also presents bids to tenders in order to acquire external funds. As a result it currently (2003) implements a European Union programme aimed at strengthening municipal strategic planning and improvement of the local cadastres. LBSNN is also the manager of the Small Local Initiatives (Kleine Plaatselijke Activiteiten -KPA) programme in Nicaragua. KPA is administratively an integral part of the GSO Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG.

In the Netherlands all municipalities are members of VNG. In Nicaragua, almost all municipalities are members of the Nicaraguan association of municipalities, AMUNIC. Within AMUNIC a subset of municipalities composed the association of municipalities



with inter-municipal relations with the Netherlands, *the Asociación de Municipios con Hermanamiento Holanda-Nicaragua* (AMHHN). The Nicaraguan counterparts of the civil society organisations in the Netherlands used to be either non-governmental organisations or community-based organisations (and in a few cases economic grassroots organisations). Some of these organisations have grouped together in a federation, called the *Federación de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo* (FODEL).

Networks of European cities that keep inter-municipal relations are active in eight cities in Nicaragua. Members are those European cities that keep up linkages with the same municipality in Nicaragua. In the case of León there are eight European twinnings, in Estelí six, in San Carlos five. Other networks are active in Masaya, Jinotega, Chinandega, and Rama. Usually, these networks meet once a year in order to co-ordinate their activities, or to implement joint activities. Dutch cities play an important role in these networks. The different kinds of linkages are graphically pictured in figure 3.1.

In general, it can be stated that decentralised co-operation is managed - almost by definition - in a decentralised and diversified manner, for various reasons:

- as a condition to avoid centrally imposed strategies and procedures;
- to foster local appropriation of the activities;
- to promote local capacities 'on the job, by doing';
- to restrict transaction costs.

Figure 3.1 Linkages and networks in the case of Nicaragua

	Netherlands	Nicaragua
Level of Aggregation		Networks of municipality / city with its European partners (7 networks)
	VNG ↔	National association of municipalities AMUNIC
		Association of municipalities that count with city linkages with Dutch municipalities. <i>Groups 14 municipalities.</i>
	Local Government ↔	Local Government
	<i>Landelijk Beraad Stedenbanden Nederland-Nicaragua.</i> ↔ Groups 11 local governments and 14 Foundations.	Representation of LBSNN in Nicaragua (CNHHN).
		Federation of Organisations for Local Development (FODEL). <i>Groups some NGO's, grassroots organisations and Co-ordination Committees.</i>
	Foundation ↔	<i>In some municipalities:</i> Co-ordination Committees
	Civil society and grassroots organisations ↔	Community based and a few economic grassroots organisations

City linkages tend to be stable and are of an open-ended nature. Nevertheless, not all relations are indefinite. Relations may be discontinued due to:

- decreasing political support for international co-operation at the municipal level in the Netherlands;
- budget constraints in the Dutch municipality;
- a rather shallow base of active carriers of the programmes in the partner communities. These contacts depend mainly on local politicians and /or civil servants. Municipal elections may imply the interruption of all contacts (some cases in South Africa and Tanzania);
- lack of means of communication and/or intermediaries.

Interviews in the Netherlands revealed the following reasons for Dutch municipalities to establish and maintain inter-municipal relations:

- to express the ongoing sentiments of solidarity with a population that has liberalised itself from dictatorship (Nicaragua);
- to express the political stand against apartheid and to be actively involved in the establishment of a new democratic society (South Africa);
- to be co-responsible for the development of societies that still lack the achievements of democracy at the local level, including the proper functioning of the local public administration;
- to enrich their own organisation by exposing civil servants to challenging international functions;
- to encourage the direct involvement of the public in international co-operation.


Approximately 70 percent of the Dutch municipalities indicated that didactic aspects as well as the encouragement of popular support for development co-operation are the main motives for international activities. Economic motives play a minor role. Of all Dutch municipalities involved only 11 percent of the Dutch municipalities considered economic motives a determining factor.

### **3.2 Intervention logic**

The intervention logic of the GSO-programme is not directly geared towards the city linkages. The existence of such a linkage is not even a condition or requisite to apply for GSO subsidy. Nevertheless, municipal twinning is a kind of background objective, disguised in the second objective of the programme.

The GSO-programme does not support *all* activities within the frame of a city linkage, but focuses explicitly on the strengthening of local democratic governance. The intervention model can be summarised as follows: The Ministry contributes financially to the strengthening of democratic local governance through capability development, as well as through small investments. The implicit assumption is that the transfer of knowledge and skills by means of exchange of personnel, as well as by the funding of small tangible activities contribute to the strengthening of capacities. And that subsequently the strengthening of capacities leads to improved *performance* of the local government. That model is depicted in figure 3.2.

**Figure 3.2 Intervention logic**



The intervention model assumes that *performance* will be improved in the planning and management capacity, the implementation capacity in service delivery and in the increased participation of the citizenry in governance.

There are a number of perceived advantages of the inter-municipal co-operation, as summarised in table 3.2. VNG-I indicates: “the approach works best by way of long-term city-links as the development of reciprocity in relationships takes time” (website VNG-I).

**Table 3.2 Selection of assumed advantages (and disadvantages) of municipal international co-operation**

Advantages
High effectiveness as a result of collaboration based on equity and reciprocity
Well focussed on demand and needs (demand driven, 'ownership')
Ability to speak the same technical-administrative language, being in the same professional situation
A tool to strengthen 'good governance' at the local level
Cost-effective, quick, tailor-made assistance
A means to mobilise existing municipal expertise for the benefit of others
The option to come to structural and durable relationships
Local governments are more open to direct participation
Disadvantages
Insufficient authority, no mandate, therefore based on voluntary action only
Insufficient specialised professional capacity to provide advice (a civil servant is not a consultant)
Continuity depends on the supplier's resources
(Dutch) civil servants lack knowledge of local circumstances and public administrative culture
Paternalism
Too short, too small, too punctual

Source: Based on Schep, Angenent, Wismans en Hillenius (1995: 53).

Not all municipalities in the Netherlands focus their MIC-programme on capacity building of local government. Of Dutch municipalities that keep city linkages in South Africa, Nicaragua and Tanzania, 30 percent indicated not to be interested in developing activities aimed at strengthening the local government in the partner city. In some cases, the policy of the Dutch municipality restricts the co-operation to contacts between civil society groups.

### **3.3 Context factors and receptivity**

Success or failure of an activity (input) is not only determined by the potential contribution the activity could make to strengthen capacities, but also by the specific context in which it is implemented. This context can be (sub)divided into two interrelated components. First, the activities are implemented within the frame of more or less structural relations between municipalities and are neither 'ad hoc' nor incidental, but fit in a sequential order of a process of longer duration. Second, activities are implemented not only in the municipal frame, but indirectly within the national context, since local government is embedded in a national political, administrative and financial context.

The effectiveness of each activity is influenced by the context (or 'environment'). Three categories of factors can be distinguished here. The main factors are the political, administrative and legal ones that directly determine the structure and mandate of local governments. A second group of factors is composed by the financial and economic context of local government. The resource endowment and the capacities to generate income determine the extent to which policies can be implemented and service can be delivered. A third group of factors comprises unique background phenomena, such as history, and socio-cultural characteristics.


In addition, there are so-called receptivity factors, determined by:

- the expectations with respect to the potential effectiveness of the activity;
- the organisation of the recipient structure.

The extent to which these receptivity factors really impact on the effectiveness depends on a 'filter' that consists of lines of communication and forms of participation. This enabling environment is illustrated in figure 3.3:

The context factors have been described in separate reports. The next chapter provides a brief summary of these reports. During field missions not all the above-mentioned factors could be analysed in detail or with sufficient reliability, due to time constraints and the complexity of the assumed relations.

**Figure 3.3 Context – receptivity model**



Source: Based on WRR, 2001.

## **4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, NICARAGUA AND TANZANIA**

This chapter describes briefly the situation of local government in the three countries visited and groups together the main problems in accordance with the context model (figure 3.3).

### **4.1 Local government development in South Africa**

#### **During Apartheid**

The Apartheid system left South Africa with a distorted system of local governance. The Group Areas Act, the key piece of Apartheid legislation, instituted strict residential segregation and compulsory removal of black people to 'own group' areas. Through spatial separation, influx control and a policy of 'own management for own areas', Apartheid aimed to limit the extent to which affluent white municipalities would bear the financial burden of servicing disadvantaged black areas and townships.

#### **Local government in transition**

By the late 1980s most townships and homeland rural areas were lacking any effective government. The crisis in local government was a major force leading to the national reform process, which began in 1990. National debate took place in the Local Government Negotiating Forum, alongside with the national negotiating process. The resulting Local Government Transition Act of 1993 did not provide a blueprint for a new local government system, but sketched a process for change. This change from a racially based and fragmented local government to a non-racial, democratic local government was mapped out in three phases, summarised in figure 4.1.

#### **The current environment**

##### ***The political, administrative and legal environment***

A crosscutting process started with the 1996 Constitution, and a range of new local government Acts adopted afterwards, that provided the legislative framework for the transformation of local government in South Africa.

The Constitution provided for the establishment of three categories of municipalities:

- Category A (Metropolitan Municipalities): a municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area;
- Category B (Local Municipalities): a municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with a category C municipality in which it is situated;
- Category C (District Municipalities): a municipality that has municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality.


To give effect to the Constitutional provisions the Municipal Demarcation Board was established on 1 February 1999. This Board rationalised the existing 843 municipalities into 6 Metropolitan Municipalities<sup>7</sup> (category A), 47 District

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<sup>7</sup> According to the Constitution, a category 'A' municipality (Metropolitan Municipality) can only be established in metropolitan areas. The Municipal Demarcation Board determined that Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria, East Rand and Port Elizabeth are metropolitan areas.

Municipalities (category C) and 231 Local Municipalities (category B).

**Figure 4.1 The transition process in South Africa**



In geographical extension these municipalities are very large according to Dutch standards. Most municipalities exceed the surface of a Dutch province indeed and may comprise a large number of geographically scattered villages and townships.

Emanating from the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, national government created an enabling legal framework. The main pieces of legislation are the Municipal Systems Bill, the Municipal Structures Act and the Demarcation Act. In November 2000, the Local Government Municipal Systems Act was published to establish a framework for planning, performance-management systems, effective use of resources and organisational changes in a business-like context. Each elected council must, within a prescribed period, adopt a comprehensive plan that links and coordinates the various schemes and proposals for an area's development. This plan forms the policy framework and a basis on which annual budgets must be drawn up. This integrated development plan must reflect the council's vision for the long-term development of a municipality with emphasis on developmental and internal transformation needs.

***The financial-economic environment of local governments***

Under Apartheid, local governments had no significant revenue base and therefore lacked financial resources to make any real difference to the quality of life of their constituents. Most current District Councils are still characterised by a narrow revenue base. They depend largely on transfers from the central level. Section 214 of the Constitution requires that 'an act of Parliament must provide for the equitable division



of revenue raised nation-wide among the national, provincial and local spheres of government'. Despite this, local governments receive only 3 percent of the national budget on average.

### ***The socio-cultural environment***

Apart from the three distinct layers of local government (Province, District and Local), South Africa has approximately 800 ruling chiefs supported by 10,000 headmen, who are key to local government for more than 18 million people (about 40 percent of the population). Plans for new boundaries have angered many traditional leaders who fear that this will reduce their functions, influence and power.

### **Main problems encountered by Local Authorities**

The system and structures of the new local government are meticulously laid down in the various acts, bills, regulations and white papers. The major challenge for South African government is translating the policy into practice at the local level. This requires co-operation between the different stakeholders involved: national government, provincial government, local government, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs), traditional leaders and the private sector. However, the parties are not working together in a coherent manner and the interaction between different parties is still haphazard.

Due to the backlog in education amongst a great number of South Africans, caused by the Apartheid regime, the local governments find themselves faced with a lack of well-trained staff. There are many initiatives on training, most of them supported by the international donor community.

Since the year 2000 amalgamation of municipalities, most Local Governments are in a process of restructuring their systems, both in political and in administrative terms. The newly elected councillors are not always fully aware of the contents of their functions, while the administrative amalgamation implied the change of many civil servants and the creation of different functions. This was at the expense of the institutional memory. Competencies and mandates of service delivery entities are still to be determined. The Integrated Development Plan (of which the elaboration was supported by GSO funded activities) is one of the main tools applied to determine and clarify these competencies and mandates.

Municipalities are far from being fully equipped to implement the revenue collection that law entitles. Incomplete or obsolete administrative tools, such as cadastral records and population registers hamper the implementation.

### **Central Government support to local government development**

Central Government has formulated various programmes aimed at supporting the local governments in developing their structures, functions and service delivery capacity as envisaged in the new legal framework. National and provincial government departments are continuously formulating programmes that constitute a support for local government.

Among those programmes the following are the most distinctive ones:

- The Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme: to enhance the development impact of the delivery process by focusing on the transfer of skills, the promotion of small, medium and micro-sized enterprises.
- The Social Plan Fund: 102 municipalities received grants for local economic regeneration studies and programmes.

- The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit was established to encourage private-sector investment in municipal services and to establish a market for such investments.
- The Local Government Transition Fund assists municipalities in designing and implementing appropriate institutional and service delivery arrangements.
- The Municipal Systems Improvement Programme assists in establishing the new municipal systems, including the development of Integrated Development Plans, performance management systems and related municipal management reforms.
- The Local Economic Development (LED) and poverty alleviation programme has supported up to 200 projects that aimed at generating employment since 1999.

### **Donors' support to local government in South Africa**

Contrary to other African countries, external donor support in South Africa has merely a symbolic value; it is not of great financial significance. Less than two percent of the country's capital budget is externally funded. In consequence, donors have only limited influence on policy decisions and there is little need to co-ordinate donor assistance. So far, the South African government has not taken initiatives to co-ordinate donor support. This stems (partly) from the fact that there is no central agency or department that co-ordinates overseas development assistance flowing into the country. The Ministry of Finance just monitors overall aid flows to South Africa.

Apart from the Netherlands, also Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Sweden are active in the area of local governance development. The UNDP focuses on local capacity building. Donors run their projects and programmes in consultation with the national or provincial departments. Denmark and the Netherlands are the only two donors that are not active 'in the field', but only finance programmes at the provincial or local level.

Municipal international co-operation programmes do exist. Programmes supported by Norway, Sweden and Canada are implemented in some South African Districts and cities. Part of the Swedish programme coincides with local governments supported with GSO funded activities (Kimberley and Nelson Mandela Metro).

### **The Dutch support to local government in South Africa**

During Apartheid, the Dutch government aimed at keeping the diplomatic relations open with the South African government, while supporting anti-apartheid activities. Some local governments in the Netherlands considered that policy as insufficiently rejecting Apartheid. They organised themselves in the movement 'Local Governments Against Apartheid'. After the regime change, the Dutch government granted immediate support to the democratically elected government of Nelson Mandela, i.e. by a grant of NLG 60 million (€ 27.2 million; 1995) to the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP). This grant in the form of budgetary support was used for programmes in the areas of education, youth, rural development, good governance and human rights (1995 -1997). Apart from these contributions to the RDP, the Netherlands funded projects in the same areas of attention and in gender, environment and cultural development for an amount of approximately NLG 160 million (€ 72.604.800; 1994-1999).

The current (2003) Dutch policy concerning local government aims at supporting the establishment of a democratic, transparent and accountable local sphere in South

Africa. In 1999, it was decided to grant support for a limited period of five years. NLG 250 million (€ 113.4 million) was made available for the years 2000 - 2004, with a preference for budgetary support. In 2002 however, the Minister for Development Co-operation decided to extend the aid to South Africa for the post-2004 period, considering the historical ties and the sharp division in the South African society. In the post 2004 programme the 'local government' component will be discontinued as a sector, and will be embedded in a broader 'good governance' approach.

The current Dutch bilateral support is approximately € 20 million per annum. This does not include the GSO-programme. There is no formal linkage between the GSO-programme and the sectoral approach of the bilateral aid. In practice they happened to be complementary to each other.

Central Dutch government ministries (Housing) and departments (Environment and Water) are active in South Africa. The Dutch Ministry of Housing (VROM) is engaged through Memoranda of Understanding in the field of integrated town planning and social housing (SALGA/VNG-I financed by VROM; Habitat Platform) (see also box 5.2). As from 2001, a bursary programme in the frame of international co-operation in education can be accessed for training and education in the water sector. Target groups are the national and local governments.

## **4.2 Local government development in Nicaragua**

After forty-two years of dictatorship and corruption by Anastacio Somoza and his cronies, violent opposition spread to all classes by 1978 and resulted in a short-lived civil war that brought the socialist oriented Sandinista movement to power in 1979. Subsequently, the United States of America sponsored anti-Sandinista guerrillas who provoked a civil war. In combination with mistaken economic policies leading to hyperinflation, declines in exports, output and incomes brought the country to the edge of economic disaster.

Free elections in 1990 displaced the Sandinista movement and brought Violeta Chamorra into power, leading a heterogeneous political pact of 14 political parties. Also in 1996 and 2001 non-Sandinista governments were elected. During the 1990s, the government's efforts were devoted to the restoration of peace, the development of a representative democracy, the abatement of hyperinflation, and the transition of a plan and command economy to one based on a private sector and open markets (Government of Nicaragua, 2001: ix). Nevertheless, poverty in Nicaragua continues to be pervasive and acute.

### **The current environment**

#### ***The political, administrative and legal environment***

In Nicaragua, the concepts of decentralisation and decision-making at the local level are not deeply rooted. Historically, the country has been a vertically structured, hierarchical society. Decentralisation and participation of the population in government at the local level originated in the Sandinist government (1979-90).

In 1988, the Municipal Law (Ley 40) was formulated and in 1990 municipal governments were elected for the first time. In that same year, the *Instituto Nicaragüense de Fomento Municipal* (INIFOM) was established (Decreto 497). INIFOM is responsible for the strengthening of the administrative capacities of local

governments. In 1998, the Law 40 was reformulated and replaced by the new Municipal Law (Ley 261).

Law 261 regulates the mandates of municipalities in terms of service delivery and as catalyst and as manager of local development. The local government has formal mandates in the areas of socio-economic development, the protection of the natural environment and the exploitation of natural resources. Local government is supposed to enable and to provide incentives for participation in local governance. One of the elements reintroduced by the Sandinistas was the public hearing at community level, the *cabildo abierto*. Local governments are obliged to call for a *cabildo* each year.

Although 'governance and institutional strengthening' is one of the four pillars of the Strengthened Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Government of Nicaragua, 2001), no coherent policy exists that translates the PRS into a process of decentralisation and development of local governance.

The *Comisión Sectorial de Descentralización* (CSD), composed of various public entities, formulated a Proposal for a National Policy on Decentralisation in 2001. The government never presented the proposal to Parliament for legislation. Hence, it never obtained a legal status. The same happened to other important legislative proposals, such as the Law on Central Budget Transfers, the Municipal Tax Systems Law, the Law on Popular Participation and the Law on the Administrative Career<sup>8</sup>.

### ***The financial and economic environment***

The main bottleneck for municipalities in Nicaragua is the limited financial resource endowment. Apart from the district capitals, all municipalities in Nicaragua operate under precarious financial conditions. There are four reasons for this situation:

- The Fiscal Reform reduced drastically the income generating capacity of the municipalities by standardising the Value Added Tax. Prior to the fiscal reform, municipalities were entitled to charge levies on consumer products, such as beer. Abolition of this entitlement implied a reduction of municipal revenues by at least 15 percent.
- The absence of a law on fiscal transfers implies that the budgets have to be negotiated with central government every year. During the period 1997-2001, the municipalities received only one percent of the national budget (excluding 43 municipalities that receive resources through a World Bank loan)<sup>9</sup>.
- The majority of the public entities in Nicaragua is involved in a process of what in name is called decentralisation, but what in practice happens to be deconcentration. In that process several functions are being 'handed over' to the local governments, however, without making the necessary funds available. In practice, part of the decentralisation is a cover up for budgetary austerity measures.
- Due to a lack of trained personnel, equipment and enforcement mechanisms the options to generate revenues at the local level (mainly the tax on immovable and real estate) have not been fully exploited. At the same time, new opportunities for revenue generation have introduced new forms of corruption as well.

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<sup>8</sup> Late 2003, the new government passed some of these laws through Parliament.

<sup>9</sup> Late 2003 a new law was approved that entitles local governments to four percent of the national budget.

One of the newly developed strengths of municipalities is their capacity to attract external donor resources by means of projects and twinning arrangements. INIFOM has a central register of city linkages that counts over 160 linkages, of which 151 with European municipalities.

### ***The socio-cultural and specific environment***

The model of political polarisation has been characteristic for Nicaragua over the last twenty years. The polarisation is present at the municipal level, which implies that it is hard to come to coalitions, or even to agreements on basic municipal necessities. The introduction of strategic planning has improved the options for a common understanding on the most fundamental aspects of the municipal development.

One of the features of the polarisation is the *Pacto Político* of 1998 between the leaders of the liberal *Partido Liberal Cristiano* (PLC; party in power) and the sandinist *Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional* (FSNL, opposition party) that ended up by dividing the main public administrative functions between the two parties, formally with the objective to maintain political stability. In fact, it implied that the economic and political elite appropriated themselves of the public administration.

Under these circumstances, the organisational and institutional structure of the public sector is not based on terms of efficiency and effectiveness, but on considerations of appropriation of political power and patronage.

### **The main problems encountered**

The main problems encountered (as per first quarter 2003) can be listed as follows:

- the public entities are in a process of deconcentration, in which service delivery tasks have been transferred to the local governments, without making the necessary resources available<sup>10</sup>;
- local governments lack the instruments and knowledge to exploit their legal mandate for taxation;
- local governments cannot plan their budgets, since transfers from the national budget have to be negotiated annually;
- Nicaragua lacks an approved national policy on decentralisation. The policy proposal by CDS was retained by the government;
- there was no law on administrative career<sup>11</sup>. This implies that the civil servants change frequently and are appointed based mainly on the basis of political affiliation;
- although municipalities are obliged to elaborate Strategic Plans, for implementation they depend largely on ministries and public entities;
- many donors are involved in the strengthening of local governments. So far, government has shown little capacity to streamline their support. In consequence, different methods and procedures have been introduced on for example planning and budgeting.

### **Central Government support to local government development**

In 1995, the local governments of León and Estelí started to elaborate Master Plans. That paved the way to the elaboration of Strategic Plans. With the assistance of external donors, such as the World Bank and the Danish Prodemu, the INIFOM

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<sup>10</sup> For example, street lighting is a municipal task now and local governments have to pay the electricity bill, previously paid for by the Ministry of Public Works.

<sup>11</sup> This law was approved by Parliament late 2003.

became a key player in training and strengthening of capacities of local governments. It successfully introduced a national system for the cadastres, SISCAT. However, INIFOM lacked technical capacity in the field and became subject to criticism by donors and AMUNIC. In consequence, donors started to 'do it their way' in the area of strategic planning and cadastre improvement. Amongst them figure the Dutch umbrella organisation of city linkages, LBSNN<sup>12</sup>.

### **Donor support to decentralisation and local government development**

Nicaragua is amongst the countries with the highest external aid per capita in the world. About half (51 percent) of the external support of USD 400 –500 million per year consists of grants. The support has decreased over the last five years. After the United States, Japan and Taiwan, the Netherlands –together with countries like Germany, Denmark and Sweden- are amongst the most important bilateral donors.

According to data obtained from the Nicaraguan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SREC), the country receives support by 19 bilateral and 21 multilateral sources. Contrary to generally agreed upon procedures in development assistance, only 40 percent of the bilateral grants between 1997-2001 figure in the National System of Public Investments (SNIP). There are 7 multilateral and 10 bilateral donors that contribute to the process of decentralisation and strengthening of municipal capacities. Finland, Denmark, Germany and Sweden are the bilateral donors that allocate most resources to the strengthening of local governments.

Apart from the bilateral donors, there is a large number of NGOs, development organisations (such as the Dutch SNV) and city linkage agreements that contribute to the strengthening of local governments.

### **Dutch support to local government development**

Within the Dutch development programme with Nicaragua, decentralisation is considered a 'cross-cutting' issue. There are neither specific programmes to support decentralisation, nor to support local government development.

Within the Dutch international aid programme, there is one complementary project aimed at strengthening the capacities of local government organisations. It is a multi-country exercise managed by the International Union of Local Authorities, IULA. The component in Nicaragua consists of six projects (budget USD 150,000), under the "Programme for Training and Development of Associations AMUNIC-VNG".

After the linkages with Spanish cities, the 20 registered twinning and friendship relations between Dutch municipalities and Nicaraguan local governments are the most numerous. Apart from the Netherlands, only Germany and the European Union provide resources for municipal international co-operation in Nicaragua.

## **4.3 Local government development in Tanzania**

The concept 'local government' is not something new to Tanzania and can be traced back to the period of colonial administration. After Independence, however, local government has gone through different phases of respectively abolishment, re-establishment, reform and (currently) implementation.

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<sup>12</sup> At a later stage LBSNN signed an Agreement with INIFOM in order to standardise procedures.

The Decentralisation Policy (1972) implied the abolition of local authorities inherited from colonial times. The colonial system was replaced by a system of deconcentrated administration. In practice, development was managed at the regional level and co-ordinated at the central level. The decentralisation on paper implied only deconcentration from the central to the (regional) bureaucracy. After the failure of the deconcentration policy, the Local Government Authorities were re-introduced in 1984, in order to pursue the participation of the population at the local level, to mobilise human and financial resources for development and to ensure efficient and effective service delivery. The Zanzibar Declaration (1991) introduced a multi-party system, whereas liberalisation of the markets, privatisation and openness to direct investment revealed the policy recommendations of the international financing institutions. A different administrative governmental structure was introduced.

## **The current environment**

### ***The political, administrative and legal environment***

The performance of most public sector organisations, including the Local Authorities has not been very successful (Moshi, 1993 and Kiragu, 1998), mostly due to inherited colonial structures, poor management and low technology.

The 'Local Government Reform Agenda' (1996) stated that local government capacity and efficiency to deliver services to the people would be the *raison d'être* for the devolution of roles and authority by the central government. The 'Policy Paper on Local Government Reform' (URT, 1998) stated that the "local government system is [to be] based on political devolution and decentralisation of functions and finance".

Government in Tanzania is characterised by a central level (encompassing the President's and Prime Minister's Offices, central ministries, sector ministries and Regional Secretariats), and a local level that is rooted at sub-village level. The overall responsibility for co-ordination and implementation of government's decentralisation policy lies with the President's Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG).

The Tanzanian Constitution Article 146 provides that "Local Government Authorities exist for the purpose of consolidating and giving more power to the people". According to the Constitution, Local Government Authorities "assist central government". The organisational structure of local authorities is either urban or rural based. In urban areas there are City / Municipal / Town Councils, while in the rural areas there are District Councils. Councils constitute Standing Committees that meet on a regular basis to address matters arising from Ward Development Committees (WDCs) and the community at large for the detailed business of the council.

Village governments are the lowest administrative units in rural areas. The Village Assembly is the highest decision-making organ at that level. It constitutes all people in the village. The Village Chairperson is directly elected. *M'taa* (a kind of neighbourhood institutionalised organisation) constitutes the administrative grassroots level in urban areas, and the *Kitongoji* committee in rural areas.

Government's broad concepts regarding the future are laid down in the Development Vision 2025 document. That document pays remarkably little attention to local government and states only that "deliberate efforts must be made to empower the people and catalyse their democratic and popular participation. The strategy should entail empowering local governments and communities and promoting broad-based

grassroots in the mobilisation of resources, knowledge and experience with stimulating initiatives at all levels of society” (URT, 1999: Chapter 4, iii).

Over the last two decades, government has introduced some specific policies on local governance and democratisation:

- the re-establishment of the Local Government Authorities in 1984;
- the restructuring of the Regional Administration in 1997;
- the establishment of the Local Government Reform Programme in 1996.

**The financial economic environment**

Local authorities depend on harmonious working relations with the PO-RALG. In daily practice, communication between the local governments and line ministries is not easy and PO-RALG serves as an intermediary. The National Treasury sets the financial ceiling for recurrent costs, while the local authorities depend largely on national transfers. Approximately 70-80 percent of the budgets of local authorities are funded through national transfers. Over the period 1997-2001, on average 17 percent of the national budget has been transferred to the Local Authorities. Nevertheless, the resources available for investments are modest, since 82 percent of the total revenue of local authorities goes to the wage bill (77 percent of the national transfers). The own revenue generation by the Local Authorities represents about 23 percent of the Local Authorities’ budgets. The effective local revenue collection persistently stays behind the estimations.

**Table 4.1 Revenue collections by Local Authorities in Tanzania**

	Percent
Local Government expenditure as percentage of total public expenditure	17
Central Government grants as percentage of Local Government revenues	72
Local Government own revenue as percentage of total Local Government budget	23
Wage bill as percentage of total Local Government expenditures	82
Local Government expenditure per capita in United States Dollars	9

Data based on the year 2000.  
 Source: Report of the Joint Government/Donor Review of the Local Government Reform Programme, Tanzania (June 2001).

The high percentage of central level transfers indicates a political willingness to finance local governments, but the share of resources required to pay the wage bill has constrained the opportunities for investment by local authorities. In absolute numbers, the resource base at local level is very small (only USD 9 per inhabitant per year).

**The socio cultural environment**

Seppälä (1998) described that local governments involved with external donors are frequently faced with one or more empowered civil society organisations or non-governmental organisations. Most donor-driven approaches are based on the dominance by the public sector, assuming that local governments will take the lead in the process. While in western societies there are different lead-actors orchestrating different spheres, in Tanzania the leader’s role in all spheres is largely reserved to the public sector.



### **The main problems encountered by local authorities**

Local authorities in Tanzania face serious problems:

- Although the transfers expressed in terms of percentage of the national budget are high as compared to most developing countries, the absolute value of that transfer is low. The hierarchical nature of the mind-set of the average civil servant does not contribute to the sharing of power, resources and decision-making. There is a persistent tendency to take decisions at a central level, even if formal mandates have been passed on to the local authorities (Wunsch and Olowu, 1998).
- In addition to lack of funds, lack of sufficient and qualified manpower and necessary equipment made local authorities unable to deliver services. They were blamed by both the central government and citizens (Ngware, 1997). As a result the legitimacy of the local authorities is at stake.
- Local / community level institutions (levels inferior to the district, municipality or city council) are often fragile and steadily undermined by some central-state politicians and bureaucrats.
- As a result of poor performance, local authorities receive little moral and material support from registered political parties, NGOs, or the private sector.

### **Central government support to local government development**

The central government has committed itself to reform the public sector in general and local government in particular. That is evidenced by the adoption of the Local Government Reform Agenda (URT, 1996). The local government reform in Tanzania focuses mainly on four policy areas:

- the political decentralisation involves the devolution of power and the creation of regulatory frameworks for rules and procedures of local government;
- the financial decentralisation ensures that councils get financial discretionary powers, including local taxes;
- the administrative decentralisation implies de-linking council technical staff from their respective parent ministries and bureaucratic procedures (i.e. delinking from the common Public Service Commission);
- a new perspective on the relations between central and local governments. This implies a shift from hierarchical relations towards inter-governmental relations. Though central government will retain the over-riding powers in line with the Constitution, the Regional Administration Act Number 19 of 1997 and the Local Government Laws Act of 1998 stipulate relations as co-actors between the central government and the councils on the one hand and the council and sub-council entities on the other.

The current core of the government's efforts toward decentralisation is the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP).

### ***The Local Government Reform Programme***

Decentralisation was introduced together with the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSR) of 1991 in the form of the Local Government Reform. A Local Government Reform Agenda 1996-2000 was approved and presented to donors in a round-table meeting in 1997. Government and donor partners agreed to establish a management unit, within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Within the PMO the overall co-

ordination of the reform lies with the PO-RALG. The Local Government Reform Agenda 1996-2000 consisted of six components:

- 1 Institutional and legal framework;
- 2 Restructuring of local authorities;
- 3 Governance;
- 4 Finance;
- 5 Human resource development and management;
- 6 Programme management.

One of the two sub-components of the Governance component of the Local Government Reform Agenda is the strengthening of the Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT).

### **Donor support to local government development**

While total bilateral and multilateral donor support represents well over 11 percent of GDP (1999) and averages USD 900 million per year (URT, 2002: xi), the donor contributions to local government development have been relatively modest. By far the most important activity aimed at strengthening local governments has been the Local Government Reform Programme. Several external donors through sectoral basket-funding support the LGRP. The basket fund is supported by, apart from the Netherlands, the European Union and the governments of Denmark, United Kingdom, Ireland, Finland and Norway, and the UNDCF. Some donors made earmarked pledges, amongst them the Netherlands that set aside a part of its contributions for the strengthening of ALAT.

As far as we know, apart from the Netherlands, only USAID supported a regional MIC-programme in Southern Africa in the past, but has discontinued this support<sup>13</sup>. The Norwegian government subsidised contacts between the Regional Commissioner for Tanga and some Districts in Norway. The Norwegian programme for municipal co-operation is not active in Tanzania.

### **The Dutch programme for municipal co-operation**

The Dutch bilateral support to Tanzania amounts up to approximately € 70 million (budget 2003). Of that amount, the contributions to local government development are made through the basket funding mentioned above. All donors involved in the reform programme provide support at the central level.

The Dutch programme for municipal international co-operation does not form part of its bilateral programme, but fits well in the overall policy of the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) to support local government in Tanzania. As part of its national programme, the RNE also aims at strengthening ALAT.

## **4.4 Generalisation on context**

There are two reasons for paying attention to the context of the inter-municipal relations. First of all, it refers to the main problems encountered in each country, which is important for judging the relevance of the activities carried out with GSO funding. Second, the model presented in figure 3.3 suggests that context factors

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<sup>13</sup> The reason to stop the support was that USAID is obliged under USA Law to demonstrate the impact of its activities. USAID considered it impossible to prove the impact of twinning relations.

influence the effectiveness of the activities implemented. To assess that influence a broad knowledge of the key issues related to local government development is required.

In none of the three countries a well-settled and mature system of distribution of powers and functions exists between the central government and the local government. In South Africa, the changes of the municipal system have been volatile, including a drastic spatial organisation of the municipalities. In Nicaragua, the structure of local government has been established earlier than in South Africa, but the political support to decentralisation is considerably less. In Tanzania, local governments are not new, but have gone through a varied change process over the last decades. In fact, the local governments were reintroduced in 1984, but due to all kinds of weaknesses they lack confidence from their constituencies. More than in South Africa and Nicaragua, in Tanzania the local government is subordinate to central government decision-making. The political willingness to come to a more decentralised public sector and to a devolution of powers at the local level is more apparent in South Africa than in Nicaragua and Tanzania. While in Tanzania, the central government actively promotes decentralisation through donor-funded programmes; it has made slow progress only.

Compared to other countries in the African continent, the South African local government legislation is modern and highly detailed. The fruitful use of international experience and expertise has enabled the legislators to elaborate a sound frame for local government.

A second group of factors is composed by the financial and economic context of local government. Resources transferred from the central level in combination with the capacity to generate own income in order to implement the local policies are of importance to both the autonomy and service delivery capacity of local government. Although the specific circumstances are different, there is a clear distinction between South Africa on the one hand and Tanzania and Nicaragua on the other. Without neglecting the financial constraints of the local governments in South Africa and without denying that the transfers from the central budget are very low, at least the basic financial conditions are in place enabling the functional operation of a municipality. That is hardly the case in Nicaragua and definitely not in Tanzania, where the financial constraints block the regular day-to-day operations. The Tanzanian case is different, since national transfers are higher in terms of percentage, but local governments lack the ability to generate own revenues.

A third group of context factors is compounded by special circumstances. These are the most outspoken in Nicaragua, where the two leading political parties have appropriated the public sector and where several laws aimed at improving local government were deliberately retained by cabinet and were (up to mid 2003) never passed on to Parliament for legislation. Under these circumstances, the organisational and institutional structure of the public sector is not based on efficiency and effectiveness, but on considerations of appropriation of political power and patronage.

In general, one would assume that the environmental conditions in South Africa are the most conducive to local government development, while the conditions in Nicaragua are the least enabling and in fact hinder the effectiveness of external interventions.



## 5 INPUT AND OUTPUT OF THE GSO-PROGRAMME

### 5.1 Input


The Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes resources available (subsidy) within a policy framework. The Ministry has contracted out the management and administration of the GSO-programme to the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG). In its turn, VNG has delegated this task to its International Projects Unit and, since 2001, to its independent Organisation for International Development VNG International (VNG-I). These financial subsidies are 'converted' into instruments in order to achieve the stated objectives. These instruments, or modalities, were introduced in section 2.2. Table 5.1 provides a further overview of the modalities.

**Table 5.1 Overview of GSO modalities**

Activity	Input	Remarks
MMTP	A one week formal course usually conducted in the Netherlands by VNG-I, followed by 1-2 weeks internships in the Dutch host municipalities.	Number of participants 15-25. Expenditures are based on fixed amounts per participant and administered by VNG-I directly. VNG-I enters into separate contracts with host municipalities for daily subsistence allowance of the visiting officers and for translation costs.
PUGA	Mission by one or more persons from the Netherlands municipality to the partner municipality.	Eligible for subsidy are local political authorities, civil servants and civilians directly involved in the city link activities. The subsidy covers travel expenses, costs for preparation courses, insurance, daily subsistence allowance and translation costs. In addition, it covers part of the salary costs for civil servants (only).
STAGE	Internship by one or more persons, usually civil servants in the Dutch host municipality.	Travel costs and subsistence allowance of the partner officials, including insurance and translation costs.
GI	Combinations of several PUGAs and/or STAGEs, in some cases with minor financial investments.	A maximum of 50 percent of the estimated real costs are covered, including the tangible investment, if applicable. There is a maximum per Dutch municipality, as well as an indicative ceiling for Nicaragua.
General Activity	Mainly used by VNG-I for the organisation of seminars in the partner countries.	Restricted to three percent of the disbursements for the GSO-programme (on an annual basis).
Support Activities	For the organisation of training courses to Dutch civil servants (CUGA) and seminars.	Restricted to three percent of the disbursements for the GSO-programme.

The first five modalities have been applied in all three countries visited (there were no General Activities in Nicaragua). Graph 5.1 depicts the distribution of activities by modality (in terms of numbers), 1997-2001.

**Figure 5.1** Distribution of activities supported by the GSO-programme, by modality, 1997-2001



*Note: The graph excludes the Support Activities.  
Source: IOB database.*

As can be derived from the figure, in terms of numbers 54 percent of all activities were missions by Dutch officials, local politicians, representatives of city linkage foundations and technical experts to the partners abroad (PUGA). The counter visits (STAGE) are considerably less frequent. Only in 12 percent of the total activities, civil servants from the partner local governments visited the Dutch host. Dutch persons visited their partners 4.5 times more frequent than the other way around.


Municipal Initiatives (GIs) used to comprise both visits and counter-visits, highly comparable to the PUGAs and STAGEs. A count based on the 17 GIs in the sample shows that visits from Dutch municipalities are 3 times more frequent than counter visits by the partner abroad. So inclusion of visits and counter visits, as part of the GIs would not have changed the image presented above.

In terms of expenditures, the distribution becomes different. Of all GSO supported activities over the period 1997-2001, 60 percent of the subsidies were used for 72 Municipal Initiatives, while the PUGAs required only 13 percent of the expenditures. The STAGE modality becomes even more insignificant: only 4 percent of the expenditures is used to enable visits from the partners to the Netherlands<sup>14</sup>

The distribution of the modalities applied in the selected countries (figure 5.2) coincides with the overall distribution of activities in the GSO-programme.

<sup>14</sup> Real expenditures are not known for all the activities. In those cases the budgeted amounts have been taken as a proxy.

**Figure 5.2 Input in number by modality in South Africa, Nicaragua and Tanzania**



Source: IOB database.

In terms of average cost per activity, the Municipal Management Training Programmes are the most expensive, as shown in table 5.2.

**Table 5.2 Average costs of modalities, 1997-2001**

Activity	Average in NLG	Average in €	Total in NLG
PUGA	15,667	7,109	2,397,051
STAGE	21,890	9,933	722,370
GI	159,893	72,556	11,192,510
MMTP	170,214	77,239	3,914,922
General (AA)	42,170	19,135	295,190
Total	64,762	29,388	18,522,043

Source: calculated based on IOB database.

Except the GIs, the activities are characterised by their short duration. While GIs have a longer total duration, these are usually not continuous activities, but short actions implemented in series with time intervals. Within a single GI, usually two or three activities per year are carried out. The average duration of a PUGA is almost 18 days, of a STAGE 14 days. Most MMTPs do have the same structure, being a one-week formal course organised by VNG-I, followed by an apprenticeship period of one to two weeks in the host municipality. The average duration of a MMTP is 17.3 days. The average duration of a General Activity is 7.3 days. The duration of a GI oscillates between one and 40 months. The average duration of a GI in the selected countries was 21 months.

The only more or less continuous input found during field studies was long-term technical assistance. The deployments of long-term experts are, however, exceptional (there are some long term experts in South Africa), but the GSO funds used to cover a minor share in the co-financing agreements only.

Whether the time intervals in between activities harm the continuity in the project-cycle or not depends on the options for communication during the interim periods. In those rural areas where communication is difficult, for example since there are no telephone lines, the activities themselves are (almost) the only contact.

### **PUGA**

In general, three kinds of PUGAs can be distinguished:

- PUGAs whose main function is to establish or reaffirm the linkages between partners. Civil servants and politicians visit their partner in order to agree upon (continued) co-operation. A Letter of Intent or a Memorandum of Understanding might be the 'product', or new areas of co-operation are identified;
- PUGAs launched to keep up contacts, to monitor progress of projects or to review activities. The main motive of this kind of PUGA is the accountability towards the constituency in the Netherlands;
- PUGAs for delivery of short-term technical assistance.

Technical assistance is frequently mentioned to be the cornerstone of the GSO-programme. Nevertheless, the share of technical assistance among PUGAs is remarkably low: only 24 percent of the total number of PUGAs delivered technical assistance. If technical assistance missions within the frame of GIs are taken into consideration as well, the share of technical assistance missions is approximately one third of all visits made by Dutch civil servants and administrators to their partners abroad.

VNG-I does not approve applications for 'fact-finding missions'. However, various missions did have a high fact-finding content. For example, PUGAs have been used "to become acquainted with new authorities" after municipal elections (South Africa, Nicaragua), or "to identify new areas for future co-operation" (all three countries). In one case fact-finding was the explicit thrust of the mission (Oudtshoorn – Alphen aan de Rijn).

### **STAGE**

Apprenticeship periods in the Netherlands enable civil servants from partner local governments to be exposed to Dutch conditions and knowledge. In the sampled STAGEs in one case only politicians were invited to become acquainted with the Dutch understandings of people's participation in local government. In one other case, the visitors had no public function at all, but were female beekeepers, members of a women entrepreneur's organisation from the small village of Kiteo in Tanzania (see box 8.1).

In the case of South African municipal partners most apprenticeships dealt with urban development, housing and housing associations, a subject matter selected by VNG-I to streamline the decentralised co-operation activities between South African local governments and their Dutch partners. In one exceptional case representatives from partner municipalities in Sudan, Nicaragua and others were invited to give advice to the Dutch municipal government (Eindhoven).



### **MMTP**

The administrator of the programme, VNG-I, directly implements MMTPs. MMTPs can be either country specific (in the three countries selected, most MMTPs were country specific) or 'international', aimed at representatives from various countries. Usually, these multi-country MMTPs deal with a technical subject matter, such as waste management. Country specific MMTPs can only be organised whenever there are sufficient inter-municipal relations. That means that in countries with only few municipal contacts (54 percent of the partner countries count on one or two inter-municipal contacts only) no country specific MMTPs can be organised. In some cases, municipalities join MMTPs in neighbouring countries (participants from Namibia joining MMTPs in South Africa). Table 5.3 lists the MMTPs relevant to the selected partner municipalities.

**Table 5.3 MMTPs, number of participating municipalities**

MMTP	Costs (NLG)	Costs (€)	South Africa	Nicaragua	Tanzania
Training Programme Local Governance (1997)	285,350	129,486		11	
Strategic Planning and Cadastre (1999)	202,168	91,740		13	
Local Agenda 21 (1999)	191,097	86,716		1	
NEWS seminar, project monitoring and reconstruction (1999)	120,994	54,905		5	
Rural Development (1999)	173,283	78,632			8
Waste Management (2001)	215,370	97,731	4		1
Social Housing (1997)	93,569	42,460	7		
Integrated Development Planning (1998)	125,691	57,036	9		
Integrated Development Planning (1999)	147,250	66,819	10		
Integrated Development Planning (2000)	189,550	86,014	14		
Women in Local Government (2000)	198,807	90,215	3		
Municipal Management (2000)	194,470	88,247	4		
Integrated Development Planning and Community Participation (2001)	201,775	91,516	8		

*Source:* Based on VNG-I files.

### **GI**

Municipal Initiatives are the most tangible form of activities, the real 'projects'. GSO resources can either be the main source of funding or just a component within a broad multi-party financing agreement. The GI can be one single activity between two local governments, or can be integrated in series of multi-activities with community-based organisations, consultancy firms, international development organisations (NOVIB, SNV) and Universities (Delft, Leiden).

In the three countries selected, there were 23 GIs implemented during the period 1997-2001. Tanzania had only one GI: a co-operation between Rotterdam and the political capital Dodoma in the area of waste management (see box 5.1). South Africa had 6 GIs, all directly related to social housing and housing co-operatives (Uitenhage, Villiersdorp, Pretoria, East London and Durban). In South Africa the GIs are closely linked to the Habitat programme of the Netherlands' Ministry of Housing (VROM) and the Federation of housing associations in the Netherlands AEDES (see box 5.2).

Most GIs have been implemented in Nicaragua. The majority of the GIs were related to environmental topics, such as Local Agenda 21, reforestation, treatment of sewerage water, solid waste management and drainage of rainwater. In the partnership between Utrecht and León most activities are related to an urban extension (León Sureste) and cover an array of subjects, from a cycle-track to an anti youth-prostitution project.

**Box 5.1 Project based relation: Waste management Rotterdam - Dodoma**

In 1997, the mayor of Tanzania's political capital Dodoma visited the Netherlands, where he got into contact with, amongst others, Rotterdam. He presented Dodoma's problems regarding solid and liquid waste management and suggested support by the Rotterdam Cleansing Services Roteb, to analyse the waste collection and solid waste deposit system. Rotterdam promised support, but contacts got lost afterwards.

In the meantime Dodoma had embarked upon the Sustainable Cities Approach of the UNDP. Within the context of that approach, the Town Planning Department started to organise environmental (cleansing) groups in the sub-urban areas, the wards.

Meanwhile, Roteb formed a commercial support group, Roteb Consultancy. Roteb Consultancy got into contact with Dodoma. Roteb formulated a proposal and Rotterdam presented it to VNG for GSO subsidy. A Roteb consultant visited Dodoma three times for two weeks and elaborated an analytical report.

The Town Planner went to the Netherlands for studies. He was invited by VNG (not by Rotterdam) to join the October 2001 MMTP on waste management. During that course the Apollo Truckbouw (Aalten) company was visited. This company manufactures cleansing equipment. The Town Planner contacted Roteb Consultancy and VNG in order to formulate a follow-up project. However, the procedural requirements for a subsequent GI could not be fulfilled at short notice, due to political turmoil in Dodoma. Roteb Consultancy requested the Amsterdam Consultancy Group to elaborate a project proposal according to the Senter (Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs) requirements and formats. Senter approved a pilot project for the delivery of various kinds of equipment to the Dodoma wards. The first deliveries of equipment took place early 2003.

**General Activity (AA):**

VNG-I made use of three General Activities (AA) to co-ordinate with the South African association SALGA on the planning and preparation of MMTPs in that country. By far the most comprehensive use of the AA modality was in Tanzania in the year 2000. The aim was to accompany six Dutch municipalities in their first visit to Tanzanian Rural Districts.

Until 1999, the Union of Centres for International Co-operation (COS) of the Gelderland Province in the Netherlands had been active in education and awareness campaigns mainly. In 1998, COS Gelderland received the mandate by the province of Gelderland to elaborate a programme in the area of rural development in developing countries, taking into consideration the rural characteristics of the Gelderland province itself. The intention was to get medium-sized and smaller municipalities in the province involved in a joint effort to establish linkages with a developing country, preferably in Africa, with the aim to provide opportunities for contacts at civil society level (e.g. farmer organisations, schools).

COS Gelderland approached VNG-I. VNG-I suggested Tanzania, since it had contacts through a VNG-I implemented project for the strengthening of capacities of

the Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT). A two-year programme was launched by COS Gelderland, VNG-I, SNV, NOVIB (an international co-financing NGO) and ALAT. Over 50 municipalities in Gelderland were approached, but very few showed interest. Since the minimum number of participants was set at five, VNG-I looked for other municipalities from outside the province. The programme started off with a visit / training / internship period by Tanzanian Local Government representatives to the Netherlands (1999), followed by a counter visit of the Dutch municipalities to Tanzania (2000). The 1999 visit included a Municipal Management Training Programme (MMTP) on rural development organised by VNG. Since the initiative was taken in the Netherlands, VNG-I requested ALAT to select matching Rural Districts in Tanzania. ALAT identified 26 interested Rural Districts, made a selection based on predetermined criteria and forwarded the priorities to VNG-I. However, these priorities were not considered by VNG-I, which preferred to rely on existing Dutch experience and presence in Tanzania. Thereto it contacted NOVIB and SNV. The combined NOVIB-SNV experience determined the choice of Districts. During the 1999 MMTP the Tanzanian Rural Districts were matched with the Dutch municipalities that had shown interest. Afterwards, one Dutch municipality expressed its disagreement with the matching procedure and did not pursue the relation after having been in Tanzania. The Tanzanian Districts had little choice in the matter, but they all expressed to feel at ease with the results.

The year 2000 counter-visit was aimed at becoming acquainted with the circumstances, operations of local government in Tanzania, the presence of non governmental organisations and grassroots organisations, as well as the kind of ongoing projects in the various rural districts involved. In reality, the AA was a massive fact-finding exercise.

### **Characteristics by country**

Linkages between municipalities in the Netherlands with local governments in Nicaragua and South Africa emerged mainly through special circumstances, such as the solidarity movement with the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua and the Local Governments against Apartheid movement as far as it concerns South Africa. Several of these relations have existed well for over 20 years. The GSO-programme has no explicit objective to match municipalities. Nevertheless, there is an implicit objective that aims at contributing to the increase of the number of linkages. To that end VNG-I has two instruments at its disposal: the MMTP and the AA. MMTPs have been used to invite Dutch municipalities and other local government organisations to become acquainted with the programme. Or to convince municipal governments to focus on the strengthening of local government. In South Africa and Nicaragua the programme developed with some particularities that in part reflect the history of the relationships and in part are the result of deliberate choices made by VNG.

### **South Africa**

Highly intertwined relations existed between GSO funded activities and the Habitat supported activities that operate under the Netherlands' Ministry of Housing (see box 5.2). Out of the total GSO allocations, NLG 6 million (€ 2.7 million) was used for South African municipalities during the period 1997-2001. The parallel financial input by Dutch municipalities over the same period ranged between NLG 1.7 and 2.2 million (€ 770,000 and 1 million) over a five-year period for 10 municipalities<sup>15</sup>. Some South

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<sup>15</sup> This excludes the remittances transferred by civil organisations and private companies. The survey among Dutch municipalities indicates that, on average, a municipality allocates a budget of € 53,000

African municipalities reported the receipt of substantial financial assistance, such as a grant of NLG 250,000 (€ 113,445) to Villiersdorp, a grant of NLG 800,000 (€ 363,024) for social housing in Durban and a low interest loan by the municipality of Leiden to the East London Housing Association of approximately NLG 1.4 million (€ 635,290). In sum, the Dutch financial input ranged between € 700,000 – 800,000 per annum (excluding loans and transfers by civil society organisations).

The input by South African municipalities to the joint activities could not be quantified, in particular not in those cases where activities would have been implemented anyhow, such as in the Integrated Development Programme exercises. A special case is the municipality of Durban that doubles every financial contribution made by the city of Rotterdam.

The focus on urban development and social housing is rooted in the contacts that existed with the civics (townships) during Apartheid. It was VNG's policy to further promote the issue of urban development and social housing. This took further momentum with the Habitat project of the Dutch Ministry for Housing.

### **Nicaragua**

During the period 1997-2001, the total of subsidies by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached NLG 5 million (€ 2,268,900) for the GSO-programme and NLG 3.5 million (€ 1,588,230) for other subsidies (NEWS and KPA). Based on the survey and interviews among the municipalities in the Netherlands, it has been estimated that the contribution by the Dutch municipal governments sums to NLG 1.7 - 1.9 million (€ 0.8 million) per year, including contributions by civil organisations.

Apart from the activities implemented between the partner municipalities in both countries, there are activities managed by LBSNN. LBSNN was entrusted with the implementation of a substantial part of the funds raised by private initiative and in grant (NLG 16 million; € 7,260,480) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the aftermath of hurricane Mitch.

In addition, LBSNN has contracted resources from the European Union to assist the municipal governments in Nicaragua in the area of Strategic Planning and cadastre. These activities are highly intertwined with activities subsidised by the GSO-programme. A MMTP was organised on the subject of Strategic Planning, while various PUGAs and one GI had Strategic Planning as their main objective.

**Table 5.4 Subsidies by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997-2001**

Source	Amount in NLG	Amount in €	Estimated average per year (NLG)	Estimated average per year (€)
GSO subsidies	5,122,700	2,324,580	1,024,500	464,898
KPA and NEWS subsidies	3,495,500	1,586,189	699,000	317,192
Municipal governments in the Netherlands			1,800,000	816,804
LBSNN, excl. Mitch			450,000	204,201

The environmental issues were strongly stressed during the first year of co-operation and shifted gradually towards strategic planning.

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per annum for international relations. On average, a Dutch municipality has 2.5 twinning agreements, so € 20,000 per agreement per year.

## **Tanzania**

The total amount of GSO subsidies issued during this period amounted to a modest NLG 545,500 (€ 247,310). Only one municipal project (GI) was implemented. Overall the financial input has been modest only. During the period 1997 – 2001, the Dutch municipalities invested about NLG 100,000 (€ 45,380) from their own resources.

### **Box 5.2 Social Housing in South Africa**

Social Housing is a relatively new concept in South Africa. The aim of Social Housing is to provide affordable, good quality, subsidised housing in a viable and sustainable manner. The Housing Associations are a widely known form of social housing. Social Housing Associations differ in terms of legal status (company, co-operative) and tenure options (co-operatives, rental, rent-to-buy, instalment sale). Housing Associations can have either public sector or private sector 'owners' of the housing stock. Housing co-operatives are different from associations. Housing co-operatives are popular in the United States, Canada, France, and Scandinavia. This form is currently promoted in countries like Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Most are of the "rent-to-buy" kind.

In South Africa, the poorest strata of the population may obtain a single room house free of charge (Reconstruction and Development Programme). Social housing is aimed at persons and families with an income in the lower to middle income brackets up to R 3,500 [€ 350]). Since government is providing houses free of charge to the poorest strata, the willingness to pay to public institutions is relatively low. Public sector management of a social housing programme is vulnerable to political manipulation at the detriment of the viability and sustainability criteria.

The Social Housing Foundation of South Africa assists in the establishment of social housing associations and promotes the model of private sector ownership and management. Subsidies are mainly provided through provincial loans. The current financial criteria set by government makes a viable exploitation extremely difficult. Late 2002, there were 40 associations established nationwide, of which 16 managed a housing stock. The SHF provides support to these associations.

A programme of support to the social housing emerged out of the activities of the PlanAct in the mid 1990s. Dutch support is provided since 1996 by means of a long term advisor, sponsored for 85 percent by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 15 percent by the *Nationale Woning Raad*. The Social Housing Foundation is a direct result of that (established in 1997). Later this was reformulated with the Netherlands Ministry for Housing, VROM. The partners are:

#### **South Africa**

National Department of Housing  
Social Housing Foundation

SALGA

#### **Netherlands**

Ministry of Housing (VROM)  
AEDES (the federation of housing associations in the Netherlands)

VNG

One of the objectives is to establish new twinning relations between housing associations in the Netherlands and local associations and governments in South Africa. Examples of those relations are: Durban with Rotterdam, Uitenhage with municipalities in Noord Holland, Kimberley with Arnhem, Pretoria (Tshwane) with Delft and East London with Leiden.

GSO subsidised activities are mainly supplementary to the social housing programme. GSO enables visits by civil servants, organises MMTPs on Social Housing (1997) and Integrated Development Planning (1998-2001, annually).

## **5.2 Other input: NEWS and KPA-programmes**

### **NEWS-programme**

The 'Trilateral East West South Co-operation on a municipal level for countries in Eastern Europe, the Netherlands and Nicaragua' (NEWS) was a trilateral co-operation programme (i.e. the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Nicaragua). The implementation of NEWS started in 1996 and concluded in 2001 (financially closed in 2002). It was embedded in the East-West-South programme developed in

1992. The programme received financial support from the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NLG 11 million; € 4.99 million) and from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NLG 1 million; € 453,780). In the Netherlands, VNG was responsible for the implementation of the NEWS programme.

The programme was primarily based on a political vision to create a societal base for development co-operation and global awareness in Eastern Europe (the Czech and Slovak Republics) through the involvement of municipalities in concrete projects in the South (Nicaragua). NEWS projects were seen as a means to achieve broader political-institutional changes at three inter-related levels: establishing a structural exchange of experiences on the themes of good local governance and civic participation, enhancing a base for development co-operation and global awareness on a municipal level in participating Eastern European countries and obtaining effective and democratic local governance and a strong civil society in Nicaragua.

The activities of the programme included: meetings, seminars and workshops; thematic trilateral co-operation between municipalities; co-operation and exchange programmes between NGO's; stimulating economic contacts and co-operation between the countries; capacity building and promotion of expertise for awareness raising activities in the Czech and Slovak Republics; capacity building for project management; information and awareness raising campaigns in the Czech and Slovak Republics; increasing the number of trilateral links with Nicaragua and disseminating experiences.

In the four years of its implementation, NEWS contributed to the establishment of eight city links; and 57 projects. Twelve special NGO projects were launched and one NGO seminar was organised at the national level. One seminar on economic co-operation was organised in the Czech Republic, while nine training workshops were organised on information and awareness, project cycle management and policy document development.

In a number of cases projects were co-financed between NEWS and the GSO-programme, such as a 1999 seminar in Nicaragua and the Dutch advisory component (PUGAs) of a number of NEWS implemented projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched an evaluation of the NEWS programme in 2001 (ACE, 2001). The evaluation concluded that the programme had been over-ambitious and lacked adequate implementation strategies; that the actors involved had quite different views on the purpose of the programme and on the results to be achieved; that the formula had been too complex to manage and that the collaboration between the funding agency (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the implementing agency (VNG-I) had been poor (ACE, 2001: 3-7).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs discontinued the programme, a decision taken prior to the announcement of the evaluation results.

## **KPA**

KPA projects have not been evaluated within the context of the present study. However, during field visits in Nicaragua various projects were visited in order to assess the relations between GSO and KPA subsidised activities.

The 'Small Local Initiatives' programme (KPA) started in 1991. Its objective was and still is to support and provide incentives for activities organised by local and regional private organisations that seek to contribute to international co-operation efforts. It is a duplication fund. This means that a civil organisation could apply for a subsidy up to a

maximum of the amount raised by the organisation itself in support of activities with a local partner in a developing country. Subsidy is only given when through the activity information is disseminated among the public in the Netherlands. This objective of the 'Small Local Initiatives' programme coincides with the second objective of the GSO-programme and is supposed to contribute to the awareness of development problems and to encourage the support for international co-operation among the population in the Netherlands. While the activities supported by the GSO-programme are in the first place supposed to contribute to the strengthening of the capacities of the local government, KPA has a direct focus on poverty alleviation at the local level.


KPA for Nicaragua has a singular administrative position within the entire KPA-programme. In April 1993, the Minister for Development Co-operation in the Netherlands handed over the administration and management of KPA for Nicaragua to LBSNN. LBSNN started to administer KPA in January 1994. The management of the KPA-programme of all other countries remained with the NCDO. World-wide the NCDO released approximately € 4.6 million per year (2001) in support of KPA activities. At the request of the Minister and for administrative reasons only, KPA Nicaragua was inserted as a separate component into the contract on the implementation of the predecessor to the GSO-programme. Later on it was passed on to the GSO Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG. KPA Nicaragua is 10 percent of the total allocation for KPA. In the Agreement 2001-2002 between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG, NLG 700,000 (€ 317,646) was set aside for KPA activities in Nicaragua.

KPA and GSO subsidies are often used in a complementary way within the frame of a single project. KPA favours tangible output, like infrastructural works. During the period 1997 - 2001, 19 Dutch municipalities have used KPA resources for activities with their partners in Nicaragua. Figure 5.3 shows the disbursements of KPA subsidies for activities in Nicaragua.

The conditions for the release of funds were agreed upon between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NCDO and VNG (on behalf of LBSNN). Since 1996, KPA has been implemented according to a 'rolling plan'. That refers to the pluriannual character of most activities. KPA Nicaragua was also used to double the funds raised by Twinning Foundations (NLG 675,000; € 306,300) after hurricane Mitch ravaged the country.

The KPA-programme was evaluated in 1994 and once more in 1997 in the frame of the evaluation of the GSO-programme by DHV (DHV, 1997). Over the last years LBSNN has insisted that KPA subsidised initiatives should match the municipal Strategic Plans. That procedure is adhered to by, for example, the inter-municipal relations between Utrecht and León; Leiden and Juigalpa; and Tilburg and Matagalpa.

**Figure 5.3 KPA funding Nicaragua**




Note: Rolling plan; allocation by starting year of the activity.

### 5.3 Input by the local governments

The main stakeholders in the activities supported by the GSO-programme are the local governments at both sides. Both partners contribute to the activities in terms of manpower, time and sometimes cash. Figure 5.4 shows the rather comparable pattern of contributions from own resources by both partners. The contributions by the Dutch partner are higher, mainly due to the salary component (of which part is reimbursed by GSO funds).

**Figure 5.4 Financial contributions by Dutch municipalities and their partners (as percentage of the total costs of the GSO subsidised activities)**



Source: Survey and interviews.

In those cases where Dutch municipalities indicate to contribute financially, in 77 percent they did so for the salary component. In over 50 percent Dutch municipalities



claim to have made cash outlays for the implementation of projects in the partner community. In well over half the cases the partners' own contribution is less than 25 percent of the monetarised value of the input. Most of the local governments argue that twinning relations are not about finance, but about solidarity, friendship and mutual understanding. Nevertheless, of all partner municipalities interviewed, 43.6 percent considered the financial input important, mainly in Nicaragua. In Tanzania there were very few activities anyhow, while in South Africa, the municipalities have relatively more financial means at their disposal.

#### **5.4 Output**

The present evaluation is restricted to the output produced by the activities that were supported by GSO subsidies. In practice, that output is in many cases the combined product of simultaneously provided different kinds of input (such as those by the NEWS programme and KPA).

In South Africa, GSO subsidies have been complementary to the activities funded through the municipal budgets and/or funded with resources from the Habitat project with the Netherlands' Ministry of Housing. Most Dutch municipalities support the housing sector, urban spatial organisation and social housing co-operatives. Of the 12 municipalities assessed in the evaluation, seven supported specific activities related to the housing sector, while another three supported activities indirectly related to housing, such as town planning. Most of the STAGEs and GIs, as well as an annual MMTP in South Africa dealt with town planning and housing.

Most PUGAs were either project formulation missions, or missions with a political - formal content, such as visits by mayors and councillors culminating in the signing of Agreements or alike. The subject matter of 18 PUGAs studied in South Africa can be classified as follows:

- to reaffirm the linkage, general project formulation and monitoring: eight;
- specific project formulation and monitoring: Housing and Integrated Development Planning: eight;
- advisory missions on other subjects (such as waste management): four.

In Nicaragua, no specific subject matters were focused on, although during the years 1997-1999 environmental subjects received special attention. A MMTP was organised on Local Agenda 21 (1999), while various GIs were implemented on environmental issues. Between 1999 and 2001, GSO subsidised activities supported Strategic Planning and Cadastre improvement. At a later stage this became highly intertwined with a LBSNN implemented project on that subject. After an evaluation mission in 2001, VNG-I decided to discontinue the funding of activities in the area of Strategic Planning.

In Tanzania, the output of GSO subsidised activities could not be easily identified. There were (and still are) only few structural relations between Dutch municipalities and Tanzanian District Councils. Apart from the project-based relation between Rotterdam and Dodoma, there is a structural relation between Loenen aan de Vecht and a village, Kiteo, in the Kondoa District (see box 8.1). The GSO support in the frame of that relation has been thrifty: some visits by the Foundation of Loenen, participation in a MMTP and the visit of three persons (amongst them two female bee-

keepers) to Loenen in order to be exposed to Dutch beekeeping practices and cheese making.

In four out of the six Districts/Towns visited in Tanzania, close to nothing got off the ground. With exception of Loenen – Kondoa, the activities by the civil society (not subject of this evaluation) have been equally sporadic or even non-existent or not known<sup>16</sup>. In Same there were tangible activities through contacts between the dioceses of Tilburg and Same.

In the Tanzanian case, the main output produced was in the context of the Gelderland Initiative. Exchange visits were made and a MMTP on rural development was conducted in the Netherlands. To both parties, these visits were seen as exploratory and to get to know each other. While the MMTP did produce output in the form of exposure, the exchange programme itself mainly produced meetings, reports, seminars and training courses for the Dutch participants. A professional video of the visit to Tanzania was made to inform the Dutch constituency.

## **5.5 Generalisation on input and output**

Good local governance calls for special skills, expertise and talents, which cannot always be learnt from the past or be obtained within the limits of national boundaries. In this regard, development co-operation may fill gaps in skills and competencies and decentralised co-operation is a particular form of providing such assistance.

Decentralised co-operation is possibly best equipped to link government with the population at the grassroots level. In the Netherlands ample experience exists in tapping initiatives from the people at the grassroots level and translating these into proper actions that can be implemented by local governments. Exposure of local politicians and civil servants from other countries to this kind of capacities may contribute to their planning, management and service delivery capacities (the three secondary objectives of the GSO-programme).

PUGAs happen to be difficult to assess at the recipient end. Most interviewed officials remembered the visits, but not the precise reason of these visits. The visits are mainly understood as 'contact maintenance' and 'supervision and monitoring' on the use of 'their money'.

In most cases project formulation has had a very traditional form. It is the Dutch visiting team that identifies and formulates the project in a few days. Even if Objectives Oriented Project Planning workshops were held, projects were formulated in record time (4 projects with the Evaton West Community Forum in two days' time). Only in exceptional cases (Juigalpa, Kondoa) are there projects elaborated by the partner community that subsequently become appraised by the Dutch municipality.

It should be noted that contacts were concentrated in a few key actors on both sides. In Nicaragua, contacts may exist well over 20 years, but still rest with the same active persons in the Netherlands. Also at the Nicaraguan side the 'inner circle' of directly

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<sup>16</sup> For example, VNG reports the relation between the De Hoeksteen school in Hoorn and the Sokoine primary school in Songea. In 2003, however, the headmaster, teachers and administrative personnel of the Sokoine primary school were not aware of any relation with Hoorn. One teacher could recall that a number of years ago two class-rooms had been constructed with financial assistance from the Netherlands.

involved persons happens to be rather small. In the case of South Africa, various contacts have existed since the period of Local Governments Against Apartheid. Gradually, more contacts become institutionalised.

Table 5.5 lists the number of persons that have been directly involved in the various activities. Since there are several duplications (the same civil servant visiting the partner abroad more than once, for example), the total number of persons directly involved in the three countries will not exceed 400.

**Table 5.5 Number of directly involved persons in sampled activities**

Instrument		number
PUGA	Total number of civil servants, political authorities, councillors and representatives from city linkage foundations	157
PUGA	Total number of special subject matter experts	14
STAGE	Total number of civil servants, political authorities, councillors and representatives	27
STAGE	Total number of others (farmers, women organisations)	8
MMTP	Participants from partner municipalities	241
	Participants from Dutch municipalities	Not known
AA	Participants from partner municipalities	Not known
AA	Participants from Dutch municipalities	26
Total		473

Source: VNG files of sampled activities.

Frequently, the continuation of municipal international co-operation depends on the enthusiasm of a few key stakeholders on both sides. Such a dependency has certain dangers:

- contacts do not spread out over different layers of the society or over different entities within the local public administration. This dependency was more noticeable in South Africa than in Nicaragua, where contacts did spread out (Juigalpa, Matagalpa, León);
- the contacts are insufficiently embedded as an institutional feature. When key players change functions or posts, the activities become easily dormant. Examples of that were found in the relations between Hoorn and Songea (Tanzania) and Dordrecht and Granada (Nicaragua).

Based on file study, interviews with Dutch municipalities and field studies (interviews with local authorities and directly involved persons) in the three selected countries, activities have been assessed on various characteristics. For 42 activities (31 PUGAs, STAGEs and GIs; and 10 MMTPs) standardised registration forms have been used. The evaluators judged performance judgements from the partner's perspective. Thereto local consultants contracted in each country made most of these assessments.

As a first step, the quality and quantity of the input delivered was judged, the timeliness (correct moment in time) and the duration of the input. In all standardised forms a distinction was made between activities or variables for which no information could be obtained (for example, because the person who attended a course had been transferred to another city) and variables on which no evaluative judgement could be made by the evaluator. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present the evaluative assessments on the quality and quantity of input delivered.

**Table 5.6 Generalisation on input PUGA, STAGE and GI**

n = 31	Very negative (n)	Negative (n)	Positive (n)	Very positive (n)	No assessment (n)
Quantity of input delivered	3	5	14	8	1
Quality of input delivered	3	6	7	13	2
Timeliness of input delivered	1	5	11	10	4
Duration of input delivered	6	5	7	6	6

Note: n = 31

**Table 5.7 Generalisation on input MMTP**


n=10	Very negative (n)	Negative (n)	Positive (n)	Very positive (n)	No assessment (n)
Quantity of input delivered	0	0	5	2	3
Quality of input delivered	0	0	2	6	2
Timeliness of input delivered	0	1	4	2	3
Duration of input delivered	0	2	3	1	4

Note: n = 10, but data available vary from 7 to 10.

As can be observed from the tables 5.6 and 5.7, the assessment of both the quantity and the quality of the input is positive. This is particularly the case for the MMTPs. Both in South Africa and in Nicaragua, local governments considered a frequency of one MMTP per year as adequate, if and when combined with an apprenticeship period in the Netherlands. One general monitoring mission (PUGA) every 12 to 18 months was considered adequate. Less consensus existed with respect to the GIs. Various local governments would have preferred the option of long(er) term technical assistance. The most frequent comment on the timing of activities was that these adhered to the Dutch timetables and convenience (including the Dutch budget cycle) and did not always match the partners' requirements in time. Some considered the MMTPs too short, and would have preferred a longer formal course component (the part organised by VNG-I).

As far as it concerns the output, judgements were made with respect to the quality and quantity of output (as compared to the input), as well as the share of verifiable output and the relation between software and hardware (GIs only). The assessment is summarised in figure 5.5.

**Figure 5.5 Generalisation on output PUGA, STAGE and GI**



To distinguish input from output happened to be hard in practice. In many cases respondents in the field could not separate the two. This was particularly the case with the MMTPs. The evaluators could separate the two, largely based on the Personal Plan of Action as indicator. This is an individual action plan on how to ‘translate’ what was learned during the MMTP into daily practice.

The evaluators made some negative judgements with respect to hardware delivery and the quality of that hardware. In a few cases hardware was delivered that could either not be used at all, or could not be maintained in the partner country (for example a shredder machine for compost making in East London for which no spare parts could be obtained; irrigation equipment in Juigalpa of which the installation and instruction manual is written in the Dutch language only, while spares can only be obtained from the supplier in the Netherlands, and the delivery of plotters [printers] for mapping to San Carlos for which no stationery, nor cartridges can be obtained in Central America).



## 6 THE ACTIVITY PROCESS

### 6.1 The project cycle

Once the idea for an activity has emerged either from the partner abroad or from the Dutch municipality, an application for subsidy can be formulated. The Dutch local government, making use of a standardised form in the Dutch language, issues the application. MMTPs and AAs are formulated by VNG-I.

After having received the application, VNG-I appraises and decides on the smaller activities, such as PUGAs, while the larger projects (GIs) are forwarded to the GSO Advisory Committee for appraisal and endorsement. VNG-I has the mandate over final approval of the application for subsidy. During the formulation process, VNG-I staff provides advice to the Dutch municipality regarding formats and procedures. In the case of GIs, VNG-I also advises on subject matters.

The applicant is aware of all criteria set for approval, since that information is easily accessible at the VNG-I website. VNG-I first step after receipt of the application is checking compliance with those criteria. During the period 1997 – 2001 few proposals were either returned to the applicant or rejected by the Advisory Committee. In case of rejection, the main reasons were:

- the subsidy requested exceeded the limits, either as a project or as the indicative allocation per municipality, or the indicative ceiling in the allocation to Nicaragua;
- the request did not meet the VNG-I format;
- the request did not comply with the subsidy criteria.

Although at several moments in time VNG-I requested the Ministry for additional funds, the financial allocations seem to have matched the demand from the municipalities. VNG-I did apply some ceilings, such as in the maximum subsidy to one GI (NLG 100,000; € 45,378) or per inter-municipal relationship (NLG 300,000; € 136,134 per year). An annual maximum was set in the subsidies to Nicaragua. VNG-I never imposed any system of thematic or regional priority-setting or any other system of competition for resources among the applicants. To a certain extent the matching between applications and resources was assured beforehand. VNG-I presented an Annual Workplan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the available resources. So, funds were not requested based on the requirements identified in the Annual Workplan, but the plan was based on minor amendments over the previous years. This kind of budgeting is known as incrementalism. In consequence, the programme did increase during the period 1997 - 2001, but never really expanded to a substantially larger scale (see figure 2.2).

Once approved, VNG-I informs the Dutch municipality that the subsidy will be made available. There is no communication from VNG-I to the partner abroad that the subsidy has been approved. Subsequently, a contract is signed between VNG-I and the Dutch local government. In most cases an advance payment is made to the Dutch local government. There is no contractual relation between either VNG-I and the partner municipality or (in most cases) between the Dutch municipality and its partner abroad.

Implementation is the responsibility of the Dutch municipality in co-ordination with its partners abroad. VNG-I cannot hold the partner municipality accountable for the proper use of resources. Obviously, the 'partner abroad' is not a monolith, but is comprised of series of actors and target groups. It is the Dutch municipality that deals with those actors, not VNG-I. Once having completed the subsidised activity, the Dutch municipality or other local government organisation presents a report and final invoice.

### **Demand or Supply Driven**

In theory 'ownership' and 'appropriation' of development activities are best guaranteed when the recipient partner takes the initiative. In a change process, however, externally triggered changes may be needed to enforce either a break-through or to generate a demand that did not exist before.

In terms of demand and supply, VNG-I considers the Dutch municipalities as its clients. Requests by Dutch municipalities are considered as the 'demand'. In this evaluation, however, the 'demand' has been defined as originating from the partners abroad. In consequence, 'supply' to VNG-I means those activities initiated by VNG-I itself, such as some AAs and MMTPs, whereas this evaluation considers 'supply' as those activities initiated by either the Dutch municipalities or VNG-I.

VNG-I does not 'steer' or manage individual projects. It does try to 'push' the total package towards the main issues outlined in the Annual Plan. For example, when VNG-I put in its annual plan to pay more attention to francophone African countries, it started to organise MMTPs for the western African region, to promote contacts and to match local governments. This 'steering' is not without frictions. In theory the first contacts have to be established between the municipalities, and the demand for GSO subsidies should come from the partner abroad, but in practice VNG-I intermediates and matches local governments and uses the GSO subsidy as the 'carrot' to lure Dutch municipalities into certain activities.

As far as MMTPs are concerned, the subject matter is usually discussed beforehand between VNG-I and the Dutch partners and reflected in the Annual Plan. The procedure assumes that the Dutch municipalities consulted their counterparts, or at least are very knowledgeable about the needs and interests of their partners. By the same token in the case of Nicaragua, VNG-I co-ordinates with LBSNN and it is assumed that LBSNN represents the needs and interests of the partner municipalities in Nicaragua.

In the case of GIs, STAGEs and PUGAs, the question who decides on what is easy to raise, but difficult to address. In the case of South Africa, the Dutch Foundations in the Habitat Platform meetings etc developed many ideas. A complication was the lack of continuity on the part of the partner local governments, since elections implied a massive change of functions and positions held. So the stability in the inter-municipal contacts came either from the public-private organisations (mainly Nicaragua) or from the public administrative machinery at a lower level (South Africa). Politicians and higher municipal administrators were changed frequently.

Since South Africa has an explicit policy on external municipal relations, many local governments started to establish Public Relations Offices, or appointed international liaison officers. These offices gradually assume more ownership over the municipal international contacts.



Such structures hardly exist in Nicaragua. First of all, there is no policy on municipal international co-operation and secondly there is a tendency to organise municipal linkages along the structures of the civil society. Some Development Committees, composed of stakeholders from both the civil society and the public administration, are active in some places (Juigalpa). In Nicaragua, inter-municipal projects tend to be longer term and are developed in various stages (for example the ProVerde Reforestation project in Juigalpa, the Market and wharf project in San Carlos, the Rio Chiquito and urban extension Sureste projects in León). All these projects were initiatives taken by the Nicaraguan partners. The Dutch counterparts did contribute, but often as only one among many stakeholders.

In Tanzania, in particular with regard to the Gelderland Initiative, the situation was different. The two-year programme to get small rural Dutch municipalities matched with Tanzanian rural districts was an example of a supply-driven activity. It was overly optimistic to assume that a broad array of objectives at the Dutch side would be immediately understood and shared by Tanzanian partners. The selection process to identify Tanzanian partners showed some flaws. Prior to the Dutch initiative, Tanzanian Districts had been invited by their Association ALAT to express interest. The reactions by Districts as well as the recommendations made by ALAT were not taken into account by the Gelderland COS. At the end, some of Tanzanian Districts were invited to join the programme that had not reacted to ALAT's invitation. They were invited only since the Dutch development organisation NOVIB was active in these Districts. Same (Tilburg) and Songea (Hoorn) were invited since they kept ongoing relations, either through the church (Same) or through civil society groups (Songea).

An entirely different story is the one about the contacts between Loenen aan de Vecht and Kondoa. This relation started as an initiative by Loenen, but developed into a model in pocket size of a participatory approach with shared responsibilities. The relation between Loenen and Kondoa is rather exceptional. The link was established after a careful selection process based on well-determined criteria. In practice, the current relation is limited to a single village (Kiteo). At both sides, the ideas and concepts of inter-municipal co-operation are perfectly understood. There is a mutual understanding of what a friendship-based relation is all about. Both Loenen and Kiteo invested in that. Since 1996, GSO subsidies have been used to keep contacts going through exchange visits, courses and internships. GSO funds have not been used for project implementation.

During interviews with policy makers and co-ordinating officers in partner local governments questions were raised regarding the ownership and appropriation of the activities. Based on 34 interviews, a quarter (25.6 percent) considered the activities entirely demand driven. Most of that opinion was expressed in Nicaragua. Others considered the activities mainly supply driven (61.5 percent). But to most of the partner municipalities this question was of no concern at all. On the contrary, many appreciated a kind of 'menu of options' out of which they could select. Only in the case of Tanzania, three municipalities (Monduli, Mwanga, Same) complained about the supply drivenness of the programme.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

The application form contains a paragraph on performance measurement. File study and interviews with the municipalities in the Netherlands revealed that the use of verifiable indicators is considered a difficult task. In 2001, VNG-I launched a consultancy study ('het resultatenhuis') in order to get external advice on the use of

performance indicators (Beelaerts en van Waegeningh, 2002). The results of that consultancy could not be traced yet in the activities comprised in this evaluation (period 1997 – 2001). Monitoring of projects by the Dutch municipality implies in about half of the cases registration of progress against the Annual Plan or multi-annual plan. More attention is paid to accountability and the rightful use of resources than to effectiveness. Within the Dutch municipality, the institutional responsibility for monitoring and evaluation is not always clear. Eleven of the 19 Dutch municipalities that answered questions on monitoring, made reference to the performance indicators listed in the application form for GSO subsidy. Only in four of the 19, the Dutch municipalities actually used these indicators (all four in relation to housing projects in South Africa).

During field visits the monitoring and evaluation systems were registered at the level of the municipal government, for all GIs and for some other activities (e.g. the AA of the Gelderland Initiative in Tanzania). Only in 3 cases performance indicators were agreed upon in advance with the Dutch partner, that means prior to starting a project. In fact, many PUGAs claim to monitor progress on ongoing activities, whereas the partner local government monitors progress, in particular if projects are implemented by groups of citizens using municipal funds. Overall, systematic monitoring was registered in 18 percent of the municipalities visited (26 percent of the activities).

Beforehand, the evaluators assumed that the older the relations between the Dutch municipalities and partners abroad, the more activities are developed simultaneously, the more the need would exist for monitoring. This assumption was false. Cross tabulation reveals that the younger the relations are, the more use is made of monitoring. The use of own municipal funds does not change that: the more use is made of either own funds of the Dutch municipality or funds of the partner municipality in the joint activities does not mean that progress is better monitored.

Only a few South African municipalities have conducted internal evaluations (although in practice these were audits). In Nicaragua this was only the case in Estelí. In few cases only Dutch municipalities launched evaluations of their external activities. The city of Amsterdam carried out such an evaluation of its relations with Managua (and Beira, 2003) and Groningen described rather than evaluated its relation with San Carlos. The fact that so few relations have been evaluated possibly stems from the fact that both in Nicaragua and in South Africa the city linkages were established from a 'solidarity and friendship' point of view. It was 'not done' to put stress on performance and results. More recently established linkages have taken a more 'business-like' attitude.

## **6.2 Administration and Accountability**

### **VNG Administration**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has entrusted VNG the administration of the GSO subsidy fund. Thereto the Ministry entered into Agreements (1994 and 1998) with VNG and later issued a ministerial decree (2000) to that end. VNG's implementing department was the International Project Unit and since 2001, VNG-I. VNG-I develops Annual Plans and Reports to the Ministry; it suggests procedures and criteria for implementation and keeps up the contacts with the constituency, the Dutch municipalities.

Thematic subject matters were suggested annually, in particular for the MMTPs. VNG-I had no direct implementation tasks as far as the PUGA, GI and STAGE modalities were concerned. Regarding these components, VNG-I did have a monitoring task at the programme level, mainly in financial terms and in terms of adherence to the Annual Plans. VNG-I described its role as 'educative and advisory' towards the Dutch municipalities. It accompanied the less experienced ones in the elaboration of project proposals and it acted as an intermediary in establishing contacts with local governments abroad.

VNG-I directly implemented the MMTPs, some General Activities (AA) and organised preparatory courses for Dutch civil servants (CUGA). In addition, VNG-I organised regular progress meetings, whereas one particular country or thematic issue is evaluated each year (in 2001: Nicaragua and South Africa). VNG-I stays in touch with the VNG members through annual meetings and a well-developed website.

The GSO-programme did not make resources available for screening the reliability of potential partners. VNG-I did screen participants in MMTPs in advance. Within VNG-I, there was no full time personnel appointed to the GSO-programme. Tasks were divided among office-holders per Dutch municipality. This enabled to establish and maintain personal contacts with the responsible officials in these municipalities. There was no formal distribution of workload by country, although each of the five persons directly involved developed their own regional or thematic 'specialism'. Each person was charged with the organisation of one MMTP per year. To these 5 persons, the GSO-programme implied approximately 20-25 percent of their workload. Excluding the annual evaluations and management time, the GSO administration and handling required 1.2 full time equivalents (fte) per year. Including supervision, management and evaluation, this was in the order of 1.5 fte per year. VNG-I uses a time registration system.

The administrative fee (*Algemene Kosten Vergoeding – AKV*) over the period of evaluation (1997-2001) was 7.5 percent of the amount disbursed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The administrative fee was increased to nine percent in 2003. The 7.5 percent was at the bottom end, whereas nine percent is well within the margins for these kinds of programmes. The World Bank applies for labour intensive small activity programmes a range from eight till 13 percent (for example in social investment funds). Over the last years the total budget of the GSO-programme was not increased, while salary levels did, so the AKV did not keep up with the cost level. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' administrative system is based on real expenditures (cash base) and not on commitments, strict financial monitoring is of vital importance to VNG-I.

### ***Relation VNG - LBSNN***

LBSNN was established in 1986. Over time, it has gained ample experience in Nicaragua. In 1993, the Minister for Development Co-operation suggested that LBSNN would be the implementing organisation of the Nicaragua component of KPA. Since the KPA component for Nicaragua was brought within the frame of the GSO agreement (and in 2000, the decree), VNG-I has been administratively responsible for KPA, whereas the implementation rested with LBSNN. The relation between VNG-I and LBSNN is not a voluntary one. It is neither a relation of subcontracting or subordination, but one of partnership by obligation. Both parties found a 'modus operandi' in that situation. This contractual relation implied that LBSNN was never present in policy discussions regarding KPA, while VNG-I is held accountable during the 'décharge' with the Ministry. To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is only one

contract partner, VNG, and the Ministry considers LBSNN a kind of subcontractor of VNG-I. Formally, this is not the case. To the Dutch municipalities VNG is not the only contractual partner. Whenever a Dutch municipality applied for both GSO and KPA subsidies in the frame of a single inter-municipal contact in Nicaragua, it had to enter into two different contracts, notwithstanding the fact that the resources came from the same source and notwithstanding the same organisation is held accountable.

In turn, LBSNN has succeeded in contracting resources from the European Union to assist the counterparts of their member municipalities in the area of Strategic Planning and the improvement of the cadastre. To the local governments in Nicaragua this is a highly confusing situation, the more since LBSNN has its own representative in Nicaragua, the CNHHN. For example, Nicaraguan municipalities were invited by the LBSNN on behalf of VNG-I to participate in a MMTP on Strategic Planning (note that the Dutch municipalities did not issue the invitation). Potential participants were screened (at the request of VNG-I) by the local representation of LBSNN. At a later moment in time, some of these participants to the MMTP happened to be ineligible for the European funded project on Strategic Planning, since the partner in the Netherlands did not register with LBSNN.

VNG-I and LBSNN pursue different objectives. After the 1994 evaluation of the KPA-programme, LBSNN made Strategic Planning the core of its activities in Nicaragua. This in order to embed the broad array of activities at the local level in a wider frame. It also paved the way for the civil society to monitor policy makers at the local level. The conceptual pivot of LBSNN is the relation between the communities of two partner cities, which is different from the relation between two local governments.

## **7 RELEVANCE**

### **7.1 Introduction**

Relevance is the degree to which the rationale and objectives of an activity are, or remain pertinent, significant and worthwhile, in relation to the identified priority needs and concerns. Usually, relevance is meant to be an overall assessment of whether interventions are in support of the donor and partner policies, as well as fit with local needs and priorities:

- relevant vis-à-vis the problems perceived;
- relevant vis-à-vis the recipient's policies;
- relevant vis-à-vis the donor's policies.

In practice, this implies that *relevance* is judged by the consistency with policies, needs and priorities. The interventions are supposed to adhere to the conditions set by these policies, so most interventions will be relevant compared to the donor's policies. In order to avoid that all activities would just be assessed as 'relevant' as compared to the policies, a fourth element has been introduced into this evaluation, being relevance as targeting (*doelgerichtheid*). This refers to the potential contribution an activity could make to the strengthening of local government capacities. This potential was assessed based on an input model by William Dunn (1994) (figure 7.1).

### **7.2 Relevance with respect to the problems encountered**

#### ***South Africa***


In various municipalities, the link between the main problems encountered, the Integrated Development Planning and the activities subsidised by the GSO-programme seems to be almost non-existent. In places like Kimberley and Emfuleni, the co-ordinators and planners were not able to match the inter-municipal relations with their municipal plans. The activities supported by the GSO-programme were not integrated into other development efforts in order to ensure the provision of a comprehensive package of services (Kimberley, Oudtshoorn, Emfuleni).

In a number of cities (Kimberley, Pretoria, Durban) the concern was expressed that the housing programmes target middle income earners, leaving indigent persons to the merit of the Integrated Development Programme (IDP) Housing schemes. The housing sector is so predominant as a subject matter (also as a result of the Habitat project funded with resources from the Dutch Ministry of Housing) that various respondents thought that the programme was about housing associations and that the inter-municipal contacts were used only as an instrument to that end.

#### ***Nicaragua***

Most activities implemented with GSO funds did address the main problems and priorities identified by the municipalities. Increasingly, these priorities form part of Master Plans and Strategic Plans. Through CNHHN, the Dutch municipalities provided assistance to the elaboration of these plans and strengthened the capacities to apply them as rolling plans and frameworks for budgeting.

**Figure 7.1 Input model for the strengthening of capacities in local government**



Source: Based on W. Dunn (1997).

Most GIs did respond to main economic and social concerns, but many were over-ambitious in view of what a MIC-programme could offer. A redimensioning of some of those projects would match the opportunities better.

In all municipalities visited there was a certain bias in favour of the social sectors, sectors that have been favoured by Government over the last two decades. In Nicaragua, the poor economic performance, the lack of financial means, the deficient management and revenue generating systems of local government are serious problems, hardly attended to by GSO supported activities. It is the EC supported umbrella project implemented through CNHHN that contributes most to these areas.

**Tanzania**

In Tanzania there still exists a significant gap between the intended mandate, as stated in the Policy Paper on Local Government Reform (1998) and the effective mandate of the local governments.

Except for a waste management project in Dodoma, and to a lesser extent the efforts to improve the policy formulation capacities of some municipal officials from Songea (sports and education), the activities were hardly relevant in addressing the main problems of local authorities in Tanzania.

### 7.3 Relevance in relation to the national policies

#### **South Africa**

South Africa is the only of the three countries sampled that developed its own policy on municipal international co-operation. The Department for Provincial and Local Government encourages municipalities to establish twinning relations. In 1999, a Municipal International Relations policy was elaborated. Three municipalities started to develop their own policy for international co-operation. A few were in an advanced stage of elaboration (Emfuleni, Pretoria). The concept of inter-municipal co-operation becomes more and more important in South Africa. The Tshwane (Pretoria) policy document stressed the importance of establishing partnerships with cities on the African continent as a contribution towards the 'African Renaissance'. The linkage with the city of Delft was not among the priorities set by Tshwane.

Except for Durban, none of the municipalities visited assigned a special budget to their inter-municipal relations. In some cases, the Dutch municipality was the only active municipal partner (Emfuleni), while in others there were various (Pretoria has 6 municipal twinning and friendship relations).

Of the 34 activities sampled in South Africa, 70 percent was directly related to the housing sector and to town planning. Between 1995 and 2001, the GSO-programme supported with € 2,5 million activities in the housing sector (85 percent of all GSO disbursements in South Africa). There are pragmatic justifications for opting for a thematic specialisation in housing within the GSO-programme: housing and town planning are serious problems in South Africa; it makes the organisation of thematic MMTPs feasible; and there are potential synergy effects with the Habitat programme. The potential synergy also exists since both VNG-I and South African Local Government Association (SALGA) are involved in both programmes. The new Memorandum of Understanding (2002) on the Habitat programme of the Ministries of Housing explicitly refers to the promotion of twinning relations.

What argues against this particular focus on housing is that, according to the Municipal Structures Act housing is not a core activity of local governments in South Africa. According to the Housing Act, Art 107 of 1997, Local Governments are entitled to play a facilitating role in supporting the establishment of housing initiatives and to assist housing development. From that perspective housing is a competency of local government (Housing Division Tshwane, 17<sup>th</sup> January 2003), it does not pertain to the core tasks. In Tshwane, housing was identified as priority problem number one in the Integrated Development Plan. Usually, housing policies form only a minor component of the municipal Integrated Development Programmes (IDP) and relate mostly to town planning only. The subject of social housing receives little attention in the IDPs and did not figure among the highest priorities of municipalities (VNG International, 2002:12).

From the perspective of strengthening the capacities of local government, support should have focused on the municipal political and administrative cadres in order to enable them to manage housing systems through policies, instruments, contract management, town planning and monitoring. The identified support to social housing associations, in particular by linking Dutch and South African housing associations (and with additional funding under a Memorandum of Understanding between the South African government and the Netherlands' Ministry of Housing VROM), concerns an 'outsourced' activity and not directly the capacity of the municipal government.

### **Nicaragua**

Up to the moment of evaluation (early 2003), the central government of Nicaragua had not approved the Policy on Decentralisation and Local Development, a document prepared several years ago and reviewed almost annually. Nicaragua did not have any policy on inter-municipal co-operation. The only norm applied was that local governments were not allowed to contract external debt. They were free to receive grants. As one of the collateral effects of the NEWS programme, a Unit in INIFOM was established charged with the task to promote linkages (mainly with cities in the United States and Canada). This Unit elaborated a number of procedures that were recommended to local governments. In absence of a national policy, none of the local governments visited had any explicit policy on international relations.

However, networks of international partnerships were active. There were seven cities that meet annually with their European partners and elaborate jointly norms, plans, co-financing procedures etc and the implemented joint activities. A similar network at world-wide level operated for San Carlos. The Dutch municipalities played an active role in these networks.

### **Tanzania**

The general policies of the Government of Tanzania with respect to external aid were laid down in the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (URT, 2002). This Strategy was directly based on the Tanzanian long-term document Vision 2025 and the more recent Poverty Reduction Strategy. Volume II of the Assistance Strategy set the priority areas for international co-operation. Six sectoral subject matters were identified (agriculture and food security; rural development; infrastructure and roads; education; health; and rural water supply) and eleven (11) cross-cutting issues. Local government development did not figure among the subjects identified.

There is no special reference to inter-municipal co-operation in the Local Government Reform (URT, 1998) policy document. Local Authorities were free to engage in any external relation as long as they obey the Tanzania Assistance Strategy and other relevant laws and policies. No District or Township has elaborated a specific policy for municipal international co-operation.

## **7.4 Relevance with respect to the Dutch development policy**

### **South Africa**

The GSO-programme does not form part of the Dutch bilateral development programme. However, the GSO-programme fitted well in the overall Dutch policy to support local government in South Africa. The bilateral programme aimed at building capacity, as did the GSO supported activities. The GSO-programme directly supports municipalities, while the bilateral programme supports local governments via the national level. Hence, the GSO-programme was complementary to the bilateral programme. Social housing, or even housing in more general terms, has never been a subject matter identified as a priority area in the bilateral programme with South Africa.

Compared to the objectives of the GSO-programme, the activities developed in the areas of IDP and waste management were highly relevant. Activities developed in the area of social housing gained too much weight. Respondents thought that the municipal relations were about housing only.



Activities in support of IDPs slowed down over time. From the perspective of the GSO-programme, IDPs are highly relevant. Support to financial management and accountability would have been logical successor areas, but no activities in these fields were identified or elaborated into proposals for subsidy.

### ***Nicaragua***

Decentralisation is considered a cross-cutting perspective in the bilateral co-operation programme of the Netherlands with Nicaragua. During the period 1997-2001 there were no specific policies with respect to local government development in Nicaragua. Compared to the policies of the GSO-programme, almost all activities can be considered as relevant. All international donors, including the Netherlands, believed that INIFOM would be the well-equipped vehicle for local government development. But the assumption that central government would be the most appropriate conductor to develop the capacities of local governments is a highly debated issue in Nicaragua. After various governments that paid lip-services to local government development only, the 2002 government curtailed the functions and mandates of INIFOM and delegated some attributes to the municipal governments (without allocating the corresponding financial resources).

### ***Tanzania***

In Tanzania, the GSO-programme was complementary to the policies of the Dutch bilateral assistance (although there is no obligation that the programmes should match anyhow). Compared to the GSO objectives, the activities developed in the areas of waste management (Dodoma) and policy development (Songea) were relevant. The activities in Kondoa were relevant from the perspective of fostering the relations between the civil society and local government (and moreover from the perspective of contributing to the awareness and sensitisation of the population in the Netherlands).

## **7.5 Relevance vis-à-vis the input model for strengthening of local government**

Relevance cannot always be measured or observed in the case of small activities, so 'relevance as impact' is hard to judge. As a support tool, the potential contribution of an activity to the stated objectives has been assessed. The model of William Dunn distinguishes four areas in which external actors could interfere in order to strengthen the capacities of local governments:

- The policymaking and implementation capacity. The activities supported by the GSO-programme were largely geared towards this component.
- Local democracy and citizen participation. Although less pronounced than the previous component, various activities implied incentives to a closer relation between the population and the local government.
- Interaction and communication. Remarkably few activities were supported to improve communication networks, or the interaction between the municipal government and administration and the citizenry.
- Transparency and accountability. No activities were supported in this area. This is a sensitive point to the partners abroad. However, when implementing activities, the inter-municipal co-operation should stress the transparency and accountability of the activities. In particular in Nicaragua, there is a concern that the Dutch support was insufficiently aware of the dangers of corrupt behaviour (housing project Juigalpa, corrupt use of cadastres, San Carlos).

In total, from a theoretical point of view, the relevancy of the activities to strengthen local governance were partly relevant, but weighed positively.


## 7.6 Generalisation of relevance

For each of the sampled activities the relevance was assessed based on:

- the relevance with respect to the problems identified;
- the relevance with respect to the policies of the GSO-programme;
- the relevance with respect to the potential contribution to capacity development (input model);

The assessment on relevance of the activities has been summarised in figure 7.2:

**Figure 7.2 Relevance of GSO funded activities**



Note: Excl. MMTP.

The relevance with respect to the identified problems of local government was high. Approximately 80 percent addressed problems of local government. The relevance with respect to the objectives of the GSO-programme was also high, but less pronounced (about 60 percent). It should be observed, however, that the relevance was assessed against the yardstick of strengthening local governance only. An application for subsidy cannot be approved exclusively on the second objective of the GSO-programme, but to some projects this second objective did have substantial weight. For example: the training of female beekeepers in the Netherlands (Kondoa) had little to do with the strengthening of local government, but was relevant with respect to the objective of raising awareness among the Dutch population.

Relevance regarding local policies could best be assessed in South Africa and Tanzania. In Nicaragua it was been judged against the non-official Policy on Decentralisation.

Figure 7.2 does not include the assessment of the MMTPs since MMTPs may have been open to various countries and do not necessarily refer to a country specific kind of problem or policy. A few MMTPs in Nicaragua mostly addressed NEWS objectives rather than the policy of the GSO-programme.

## **8 EFFICIENCY**

### **8.1 Introduction**

Efficiency compares output with input. Could the same output be achieved quicker or more economically? Or could more output be obtained using the same input?

Efficiency is largely a financier's concern. That applies both to the Dutch municipality and to the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Efficiency has been assessed at two levels:

- First, efficiency of the individual activity, for example exposure to Dutch know-how and experience by means of a STAGE;
- Second, the efficiency of the GSO-programme and its instruments.

The importance of distinguishing these two levels can be illustrated by the case of Loenen aan de Vecht – Kondoa (see box 8.1). If the objective of the STAGE for two female farmers would have been to train women in beekeeping and cheese-making, it would have been more efficient to offer them either a specialised course in Tanzania or one of the courses provided by Honey Care in Kenya. But the aim was not only to get the women trained in a subject matter. It also concerned the fostering of friendship ties; to provide the opportunity to organise events in Loenen that could raise (additional) funds to the linkage. The local (and even national) media covered the presence of Tanzanian farmers in Loenen. This was well understood by the Kondoa – Loenen co-ordinator (the District Community Development Officer) who actively carried out fundraising activities in Loenen. From that perspective the STAGE was efficient.

From the perspective of the GSO-programme, the judgement is different. Since it is known beforehand that a small municipality with a budget of some € 2,000 per year for development activities will never be able to sustain the inter-municipal activities without the national subsidies, the efficiency of promoting this kind of relations is at stake. It was not relevant, but also not efficient to provide subsidy to an activity that did not contribute to the strengthening of local government.

### **8.2 Efficiency at the activity level**

In the case activities are considered as 'stand alones', the relation between input and output (hence the efficiency) of STAGES and PUGAs was what could have been expected beforehand. Since most of the activities were of a short duration only, they are easy to plan and budget for and subsequently easy to implement within the budget and time schedules set. File research confirmed this match between planning and implementation: the financial contingencies were used only in exceptional cases. The short-term activities remained within their respective budgets and time schedules.

With few exceptions, such as Durban, the partner municipalities do not count with any special budget for inter-municipal projects. The efficiency is not their main concern. Most partners argued that the friendship ties and civil contacts prevail over the cost-benefit relation of the activities.

### **Box 8.1 Friendship relation between Loenen aan de Vecht and Kondoa**

The small Dutch municipality Loenen aan de Vecht allocates € 1,100 – 1,200 per year for international co-operation. In 1988, the municipal government established a Commission for Development Co-operation (COS). Members were representatives of the municipal government, civil organisations and individual citizens. The Committee received a small subsidy from the Council. In the early nineties the Committee decided to foster a linkage with a country in the southern hemisphere. In 2000, out of the Committee emerged a foundation: SISAL (Stichting Internationale Samenwerkings Activiteiten Loenen).

Loenen had no preference for any country or municipality at all. The linkage with Kondoa District in Tanzania was established after an active search and the 'match' was made through the intermediation of SNV. The first Agreement between the Kondoa District Council and the Loenen Municipal Council was signed in 1995 for three years. Subsequently, the Agreement was extended three times for three-year periods. The objective of the linkage is, according to the Agreement, "exchange of information to influence each other in development processes on social, cultural and economic level". The Agreement states: "The relation is mainly with the village government of Kiteo within the District Kondoa".

Apart from the awareness and sensitisation subsidies that were made available by the Dutch NCDO, Loenen applied for subsidies from the GSO-programme in order to keep the relations ongoing and for training purposes (internships in the Netherlands – STAGE- in 1996 and 2000 and visits by the Loenen coordinators and councillors in 1997 and 2002).

In Kiteo nine economic groups with 45 members received seed money to boost their capital. In 2003, the capital had quadrupled. In addition, five women groups involved in small businesses received seed money as well. As a direct product of the internship by two female farmers to Loenen (2000), 30 persons kept improved milk goats in 2003, while the practice of modern beekeeping was being extended. Twenty modern beehives were purchased with resources from Loenen, while young male beekeepers were (and still are) being trained by the two female beekeepers. In 1997, Loenen received 2 acres of land from Kiteo with the aim to construct a guesthouse for visitors from Loenen. This was more than a gift, it was also a token of Kiteo's keen interest in a lasting relationship. Loenen supports the construction of a multipurpose centre on the site donated.

The output of the GSO subsidised exchange visits was the mutual understanding of how this kind of co-operation operates at both sides. The Tanzanian partner understood well how use can be made of fundraising in the Netherlands, whereas the Dutch partner respects the decision-making process at the various levels of local government (*Kitongoni*, village government, ward, district). The co-operation fostered relations between civil society and the local government even at the level of the smallest activities. The tangible output is at micro-scale only: a number of persons exposed to Dutch systems of local government; a linkage committee, a well understood and agreed upon plan of action, embedded in the Annual Plans at village, ward and District levels and some women trained in beekeeping.

The efficiency of various PUGAs was rather doubtful. In particular the monitoring and planning PUGAs frequently did not produce any other product than the intention to come to future action and a mission completion report. During field research, the evaluators traced the possible follow-up on initiatives referred to in the PUGA end-of-mission reports. In many cases no follow-up could be traced at all, neither on the inter-municipal activities, nor on those by civil society organisations. In some cases

the potential beneficiaries were even not aware of the intentions expressed in the PUGA reports (Hoorn-Songea).

Compared to the large number of PUGAs (in the total of activities supported by the GSO-programme, well over 50 percent), remarkably few STAGEs took place. In Nicaragua, STAGEs (although few in number) were considered much more efficient than PUGAs, producing tangible output.

GIs are more difficult to plan and some projects exceeded both the time limits and the budget. But on average, GIs suffered from minor budget overruns (three to five percent) only. In Nicaragua, more than in South Africa, GIs may have financially complex structures. One of the reasons is that projects may be implemented within the frame of networks of twinning relations with European cities (i.e. San Carlos, Estelí), or be linked to the Strategic Planning and Cadastre project of LBSNN. The following example is not real, but all the elements were observed in the case of Juigalpa, Nicaragua. Imagine a civil society organisation in the Netherlands raising funds for a project in the partner city in Nicaragua. The amount raised is considered eligible for the 'duplication modality' by the Dutch municipality. Subsequently, the civil society organisation presents the project as a proposal to LBSNN for KPA subsidy. KPA is a duplication fund as well. Once approved, the next step is to present the total amount as if it were 'the financial input by the Dutch municipality' in the application for a GI subsidy under the GSO-programme. The GSO-programme limits its contribution to 50 percent of the capital input. In the end, the initial amount raised by the civil society organisation was multiplied by a factor eight through various subsidy mechanisms. In turn, the partner municipality may present the GI as its 'own contribution' in application for national resources, such as a special investment fund. The Nicaraguan system of Special Funds (for example the social investment fund *Fondo de Inversión Social de Emergencia* -FISE) invites to such a leverage (in Spanish called *palanqueo*). From the perspective of both donor and recipient, this is an efficient use of resources, since much more output can be produced using the same (own) input.

In general, the participation in a MMTP with a connected internship was an efficient method to become exposed to new experiences, conditions and knowledge. Repetition is a form of efficiency as well. VNG-I invests time, effort and resources in developing MMTP. Each year the MMTPs were subject to internal evaluation by the VNG-I team. The course on Integrated Development Planning was repeated annually in South Africa (with amendments and improvements), but courses were hardly subject to repetition in Nicaragua. VNG-I organised the MMTPs, seminars and other events very well. The costs were kept within the limits of predetermined budgets.

In Tanzania, the output of the 1999/2000 General Activity initiated by the Gelderland Province, NOVIB and six small municipalities consisted of many meetings, a course on rural development, a seminar on local governance in Tanzania. The output was efficient as compared to the input.

### **8.3 Efficiency at programme level**

For organising a MMTP, VNG-I received a fixed amount of NLG 4,500 (€ 2.042) per participant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In practice, the costs for organising MMTPs for Nicaragua and South Africa exceeded that amount, if only participants from the partner municipalities are counted. But even if all participants are taken into

consideration (including those from e.g. development organisations), the compensation did not cover all costs. Table 8.1 shows that the average cost per participant from either Dutch municipalities (PUGA) or partner municipalities is more or less the same. There is a certain logic to that: STAGE and MMTP participation are more or less of the same duration, whereas PUGAs are slightly shorter. But PUGAs cover salary costs of Dutch municipal employees; STAGEs and MMTPs do not cover those costs for the visitors from the partner municipality.

**Table 8.1 Average costs per participant**

	Lowest cost per participant	Highest cost per participant	Average cost per participant	Average cost per participant in €
PUGA	975 (ticket only)	12,266	7,340	3,330
STAGE	2,174	12,906	9,288	4,214
MMTP	4,830	11,762	8,580	3,893

Source: files of sampled projects.

If efficiency were judged in terms of the first objective of the GSO-programme (strengthening of local government) only, it would not have been efficient to make use of Dutch expertise. For example: it was not efficient to fly in Dutch engineers to design infrastructure works in Nicaragua, since skilled engineers could have been contracted in the region as well. On the other hand, the GSO-programme does not provide funds to contract local expertise. By the same token, it was not efficient to organise courses for local officials from a single country in the Netherlands, since those courses could have been organised more economically in the recipient country. Such inefficiencies can only be explained by taking into consideration the second objective of the GSO-programme. Or by municipality’s perspective of fostering city linkages.

Distance in itself causes inefficiencies. In some cases the physical communication was extremely difficult (Tanzanian Districts, San Pedro de Lóvago in Nicaragua), but apart from the physical communication, in some relations the lack of sound intercultural communication was a major obstacle, as was evidenced in Tanzania. ‘Solutions’ for problems that may occur as a result of distance have been either appointing representatives (Leiden, Utrecht, Groningen) or using the services of third parties (in the past frequently SNV, now CNHHN in Nicaragua). In most cases this tended to increase the transaction costs.

The GSO-programme focuses on the Dutch municipalities and suits the Dutch requirements in the first place. The Dutch partner administrates the financial resources, stressing a patron-client relation instead of a relation among equal partners. There is no obligation to the Dutch municipality to respect its partner’s planning, administrative procedures or other normativity, as was evidenced by various infrastructure works (San Pedro de Lóvago, Songea). In Nicaragua, funds from the GSO-programme were used to support the elaboration of Strategic Plans. These Plans intended to provide the framework in which external contributions to development were supposed to be embedded. However, Nicaraguan partners were either not informed about GSO subsidised activities in advance (and hence these contributions were not taken into consideration in the plans [San Carlos, Juigalpa, San Pedro de Lóvago]) or the Strategic Plans were not respected by the Dutch organisations (San Carlos).

#### **8.4 The efficiency of strengthening capacities of local governments through municipal co-operation**

The distinguishing feature of strengthening local governance through municipal international co-operation is that it delivers development assistance through (mainly) municipal public servants in the Netherlands. Municipal officials are no development specialists, but have the advantage that they know and understand the 'ins and outs' of the municipal operations. In a number of Dutch cities, the co-ordinators of international co-operation, as well as volunteers in the city-linkage foundations have gained ample experience over the years. But the follow-up structures behind these key persons are rather thin<sup>17</sup>.

A few larger Dutch municipalities adhere explicitly to the so-called 'city-wide approach' that encompasses all strata of society. This approach has been stressed by Habitat and is aimed at fostering broad friendship ties between two communities. More than by Nicaraguan local governments, the approach is pursued by South African partners. The difference is expressed by the fact that in South Africa all sectors of society are involved: private sector (although modestly), public sector and civil society, while in Nicaragua most relations comprise of only the public sector and civil society. The city-wide approach is not applicable to the still fragile and incipient relations between Dutch municipalities and their partners in Tanzania. Although the city-wide approach contributes to the political and social willingness between both constituencies, there are disadvantages as well. Disadvantages are:

- An 'anything helps' attitude, since developmental concepts intermingle with charity. Few 'bottom line' conditions have been set at the Dutch side. Even extreme small support activities slip in (e.g. the support to the street children project in Emfuleni) and rather basic errors have been made, such as the supply of equipment that cannot be maintained locally (waste project in Buffalo City; nursery in Juigalpa; waste collectors in San Carlos). Rather 'idealistic ideas' were pursued (e.g. furnaces in San Carlos).
- Nothing impedes that activities are started even without proper co-ordination with the counterpart, or without having tested the appropriateness of technical assistance offered (Uitenhage, Oudtshoorn). Since the activities take place within the frame of the city-linkage, Dutch civil society organisations may develop activities that legally pertain to the public domain in the partner city. In pursuing their objective (e.g. the construction of a school) they may bypass the local legislation, procedures, normativity, planning and budgeting arrangements (San Carlos, Songea, San Pedro de Lóvago, Kimberley);
- The Dutch side offers public sector knowledge and volunteerism, even when private sector knowledge, professionalism or business-like agreements are required (León water purification plant; Eerste Fabriek Station centre, Mamelodi).

#### ***Understanding of municipal international co-operation in the partner cities***

While in the Netherlands ample information about city linking can be obtained, and all municipal governments are well aware of the features of the programmes designed to support municipal international co-operation, this is not the case in the recipient

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<sup>17</sup> After more than 20 years of co-operation with Nicaragua and over a decade with South Africa, some of these leading persons are approaching retirement age.

countries. A full understanding of the concepts, opportunities and restrictions of municipal co-operation contributes to efficiency. It was observed that in South Africa the understanding of municipal international co-operation was high, also thanks to the existence of the national policy on international co-operation among local governments. Most municipalities did have international co-ordinators, or public relation officers knowledgeable about international contacts. In Nicaragua the understanding of what municipal international co-operation is all about varied from place to place. Over twenty years of city linking and the local presence of LBSNN (CNHHN) had – apparently – not resulted in a full understanding. In particular, the competencies and mandates of the various actors involved (CNHHN, municipal government, foundation, autonomous organisations<sup>18</sup>) were not understood (Granada, San Pedro de Lóvago, Matagalpa). An inventory of the knowledge of partner municipalities about municipal international co-operation in general, shows that about sixty percent of all local governments visited had full or some knowledge of the subsidy programmes, whereas about a third did not (see table 8.2).

**Table 8.2 Understanding of municipal international co-operation**

	Frequency
Full knowledge	5
Some basic knowledge	18
No knowledge at all	13
No record	3
Total	39

***Strengthening local capacities through municipal co-operation***

Strengthening the capacities of local government through municipal international co-operation should have advantages. Otherwise there would have been no merit in providing central government subsidies to that end. Schep, Angenent, Wismans and Hillenius (1995) spelled out the advantages and disadvantages of municipal international co-operation (table 3.2).

Various of those perceived advantages refer to efficiency factors, such as ‘speaking the same technical-administrative language’. In interviews with local government authorities and directly involved officials, these perceived advantages and disadvantages were compared to other forms of external assistance aimed at improving the capacities of local governments. The comments made have been summarised in table 8.3.

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<sup>18</sup> For example, in the case of Groningen – San Carlos, there is an autonomous foundation called ‘Niños Sancarleños’ that operates parallel to the City Linkage Foundation and independent of the municipal government. Representatives of ‘Niños Sancarleños’ presented themselves in San Carlos ‘in the frame of the city linkage’. To the municipal authorities in San Carlos, all organisations pertain to ‘Groningen’.



**Table 8.3 Perceived advantages and disadvantages of municipal international co-operation for capacity building**

<b>South Africa</b>	
<b>Advantages</b>	<b>Disadvantages</b>
Continuity in contacts; stability provides confidence	Continuity depends on political willingness in the Netherlands; it cannot be controlled by South Africa
	Language and cultural differences
Making use of 'real experience' shortens South African learning curve	Size of municipalities is entirely different. Poor Dutch understanding that this has implications for participation of the population; service delivery and centralisation / decentralisation. "The Dutchmen are slow adaptors" to new circumstances
Municipal advisors are less expensive than consultants	No use can be made of professional knowledge from the private sector
Motivation by direct contact	Contacts too personalised and hardly institutionalised
Easy to access	Time consuming contacts; assistance is provided with long time intervals
	No exposure to regional experiences. No regional networking
<b>Nicaragua</b>	
Provides continuity and confidence	Contextual differences are not always understood by both sides
Direct contact stimulates and motivates The co-operation has a face and a name	Contacts too personal, not institutionalised
Focus on target group	No contact with civil society. Private sector absent in city linkage
Easy to manage; management without involvement of central government	Time consuming contacts; complex organisational structure in the Netherlands
Professional experience counts	
Exposure to 'real life' experience in the Netherlands	
	No regional contacts and networking
<b>Tanzania</b>	
Easy and direct contact. No bureaucracy	Language and cultural differences Difficult physical communication Physical and psychological distance
Both general management capacities and technical specialist know-how in a single advisory system	Assistance not targeted
Sharing experience	Doubtful 'matching' of communities. Unclear whether large Tanzanian Districts can learn anything from small municipalities in the Netherlands and the other way around
Motivation of those directly involved	
	MIC is unknown in Tanzania. It will take time before national and local politicians and civil servants become acquainted with such a system

## **8.5 Generalisation on efficiency**

There are no indications that efficiency of either the activities or the GSO-programme was among the main concerns of the Dutch stakeholders. There are three reasons for that:

- During the first years of the GSO-programme, the financial resources allocated by the Ministry were sufficient to match the demand of the Dutch municipalities. Over the years, VNG-I requested several times for budget increases and the amounts made available gradually increased. In practice,


- there has been no need to compete for resources (although some restrictions were imposed on, for example a maximum amount per municipal linkage).
- There was no need to either auction the subsidies, to set leverage requirements or to introduce other competitive mechanisms. As a result there were few incentives to constantly improve the efficiency of the resource allocation and hence the efficiency of the proposals elaborated by the Dutch municipalities.
  - The absolute amounts involved were very small in the context of the Dutch budget for development co-operation. Dealing with small amounts does not automatically imply an unwound resource utilisation; neither does it contribute to efficiency. Small amounts are 'easier' to spend; costs and benefits are not always carefully compared (as is the case in the expenditure pattern of an individual person). At the same time the relative transaction costs are higher for small amounts of subsidies than for larger amounts.

Of each of the activities studied in the partner local governments in South Africa, Nicaragua and Tanzania a record was made on the following efficiency aspects:

- whether the various components of the activity were implemented according to plan (proposal);
- whether the activity was implemented within the envisaged time schedule;
- whether the activity was implemented within the envisaged budget;
- whether the activity made use of local expertise, if and when applicable.

The information is based on file study and verified during field interviews. Figure 8.1 shows the assessment of the efficiency of PUGAs, STAGEs and GIs. Figure 8.2 shows the assessment of the MMTPs on the same criteria and includes a judgement on the use of local expertise.

**Figure 8.1 Efficiency of GSO supported activities (PUGA, STAGE and GI)**




(N=38).

Excluding the MMTPs, about two-thirds of the activities can be qualified as efficient. Various partner municipalities commented that Dutch partners hardly made use of local expertise. Some partner municipalities added that the Dutch technical assistance missions (PUGA) were too eager to start and to produce immediate results after arrival. This drive to produce results hampered the exploration of existing local knowledge and sometimes produced results that could not be applied under the local circumstances.

The efficiency of the MMTPs was very high. The assessment of the seven MMTPs as presented in figure 8.2 is based on 26 registered interviews with participants of one or more MMTPs. All respondents qualified the organisation and management by VNG-I as 'very positive'

**Figure 8.2 Efficiency of MMTPs**



(N = 7).

## 9 EFFECTIVENESS

### 9.1 Introduction

Effectiveness is the extent to which input via output contributes to the expected results. In this evaluation, effectiveness refers to the stated, known and agreed upon expected results as indicated:

- at the activity level: *the subsidy contract* between the Dutch municipality or other local government organisation and VNG-I;
- at the programme level: *the GSO-programme agreements* (and since 2000 the ministerial decree) between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG.

Assessing effectiveness presumes that the expected results are unambiguously and realistically defined as to make verification possible. With GSO subsidised activities this is not always the case. In this evaluation, effectiveness is used in a narrow sense and focuses on the *planned* expected results. Side effects (not planned) and spin-offs (not known in advance) have been registered separately.

Apart from the expected *positive effects*, there may have been negative effects as well. These effects do not contribute to the achievement of the objectives and form part of the *impact*. The *impact* comprises the positive and negative changes produced by a programme or a component, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. In practice, however, these distinctions are hard to make. Sustainability has been considered a feature of effectiveness (an activity cannot be effective if it is not sustainable). Sustainability factors have been registered separately.

During field studies, a major evaluative problem has been the attribution of effects to the GSO activity, the more so in complex projects; the GSO supported activity has only been a minor contribution. In particular in Nicaragua, GSO subsidised activities are frequently only collateral and support larger municipal projects. This can be illustrated by the case of the capacity strengthening in the area of Strategic Plans and Cadastres in Nicaragua. Strategic Plans and Cadastres are highly intertwined topics in Nicaragua. Only the improvement of the cadastre enables a municipality to generate local revenues. And only with a Strategic Plan municipalities may access national funds, whereas the national exchequer approves the application for financial resources on the basis of the revenues generated by the municipality. The central government institution *Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal* (INIFOM) provides assistance to improve the municipalities' capacities in planning and cadastre. INIFOM is supported by various international donors and financing institutions (World Bank, InterAmerican Development Bank, Sweden, Denmark). With international support the Municipal Cadastre System was successfully introduced (SISCAT) in most urban municipalities. Nevertheless, important Legislative Initiatives were put on hold by the Central Government and in absence of such legislation, donors introduced different management and tax systems. One of the external actors is CNHHN that supports municipalities by means of project resources from the European Commission since 2000. CNHHN signed an Agreement with INIFOM late 2002. A single municipality may receive support from different donors on the same subject of strategic planning and cadastre. For example in Estelí, the municipal government receives support from INIFOM, a Danish project, CNHHN and the Dutch municipality Delft. In consequence, the current status of the planning capacity of the municipal government of Estelí is the

combined result of all those efforts out of which the specific Dutch contribution cannot be judged in isolation.

The effectiveness of PUGAs aimed at project formulation or monitoring was assessed by comparing the Activity Reports (or end-of-project reports) of the missions with the current stock and quality of the activities. In interviews with participants of STAGEs and MMTPs, the effectiveness of their participation was assessed by:

- the change in personal motivation of the participant;
- the activities undertaken to disseminate the knowledge acquired (e.g. organisation of meeting with colleagues, a workshop);
- the establishment of durable contacts at the professional level (e.g. membership of professional associations, networks);
- the changes in working procedures and/or the structural organisation of the working environment.

The Personal Work Plan is a product of each MMTP and challenges the participant to visualise how the course material could be applied in the participants' daily work. Since these intentions were registered during the course, these plans happened to be a good tool to assess effectiveness, since participants could indicate to which extent the intentions materialised in practice.

## **9.2 Effectiveness by instrument**

### **(i) PUGA**

For South Africa, 11 out of 18 PUGAs were missions with either a representative character, such as visits by mayors and councillors, or missions for project formulation and review. Since 1998 the PUGA modality is open to representatives of civil organisations, such as the city linkage foundations. In consequence, PUGAs used to deal with the broader municipal twinning, rather than exclusively with the activities aimed at the strengthening of local government. PUGAs did produce most of the expected output, such as reviews, project formulations etc. Reports by the Dutch officials vary in quality. Seven out of the 18 PUGAs studied were deployments of technical advisors. These PUGAs aimed at either on-the-job training or direct problem solving. South African counterparts remembered the technical missions, but could hardly recall the remaining 11 visits.

A similar pattern was observed in Nicaragua. Only six of the 24 PUGAs studied concerned the deployment of technical advisors. The remaining 75 percent was for project formulation, monitoring, or 'to become acquainted with' new officials etc. A 'political' mission may be effective to the partner municipality. For example, the mayor of The Hague, at that time President of VNG, visited Juigalpa. Media coverage put Juigalpa in the spotlight and various national authorities visited the city afterwards. Series of activities emerged from those visits. Since the formulation and monitoring missions encompassed the activities by the civil society, in five of the seven municipalities these civil society initiatives, usually supported with KPA resources, were assessed as well (Juigalpa, Estelí, León, San Pedro de Lóvago and San Carlos). One of the weaknesses detected was that projects were formulated and monitored by the same person. With few exceptions, the Dutch municipal officials

deployed for project formulation and monitoring produced over-optimistic reports. Even in the case of failure of projects, or in cases of corruption (San Carlos) the reports remained optimistic and did not mention the failures (although afterwards actions were taken in the corruption case). The reason to inform positively is that both the city councillors and the public in general only make resources available for successful activities and not for failures.

In Nicaragua, technical assistance missions used to be of longer duration, but municipal governments observed that these missions were effective only for troubleshooting or punctual advisories. They were less effective for on-the-job training of local professionals. 'One shot' technical missions were less effective than series of missions by the same expert.

In Tanzania, with a few exceptions (Kondoa and Songea), PUGAs were launched in the frame of the programme with the Gelderland Province. PUGAs to Kondoa were effective, whereas post year 2000 PUGAs by Hoorn to Songea remained without any tangible effect.

### **Generalisation**

PUGA is the basic instrument to establish and maintain contacts between the municipal partners. In absence of such personal contacts the municipal relations would possibly crumble. In addition, PUGAs are indispensable from an accountability point of view towards the Dutch constituency. However, PUGAs were hardly effective as a monitoring instrument. Reports by co-ordinating municipal officials tended to be utterly optimistic, both concerning GSO funded activities and small projects implemented through civil society linkages.

PUGAs were used for technical assistance in only 25 percent of the cases. These technical advisory missions were effective as far as quick and short advisory services were concerned, but not for on-the-job training. PUGAs did have a positive effect on motivation. The simple fact that someone at the other end of the globe is interested in your professional work has a motivating effect, and various respondents in the partner local governments mentioned this.

Since PUGAs are well over 50 percent of all activities in the GSO-programme, the relation between technical missions and 'general mission' has lopsided, using the modality too much as means of communication in stead of a tool for transfer of knowledge.

### **(ii) MMTP - STAGE**

The effectiveness of MMTPs, in particular in combination with an apprenticeship period (STAGE), was high. In some cases, even extraordinarily high. In almost all cases the exposure to different systems, techniques and experiences in the Netherlands triggered changes in either the personal or the institutional working methods in the partner municipality. Except for some Tanzanian participants in a MMTP on rural development, all the participants of MMTPs were very positive about their experiences. A successful instrument introduced in the MMTP is the Personal Work Plan.

Satisfaction is a criterion of the so-called logic of appropriateness (March, 1994). It is not equal to effectiveness. Respondents may feel satisfied with an activity, but that is

not necessarily a reaction to the effectiveness of the activity. During field research, effectiveness was assessed in terms of:

- positive motivation;
- extension of networks;
- institutional changes, and
- changes in working methods.

Well over 70 percent of the participants interviewed had introduced changes in their daily work situation that could be attributed to the course–apprenticeship period. This is a remarkably high percentage indeed.

Changes were those introduced in the organic structure of the organisation or in working procedures. Even new departments or units within the local government were established (i.e. single window facility South Africa; outreach programme Nicaragua) as a direct result of the participation in a MMTP or an apprenticeship period in the Netherlands. Numerous examples of practical changes were shown, such as the system of combining cultural events with trade fairs (Emfuleni), the change from responsive to pro-active town planning (Tshwane) and the activities in the area of social housing (a concept hardly known in South Africa prior to the Dutch interventions). All kinds of effects were mentioned by respondents. Some remarkable quotes about the effects are presented in box 9.1.

An example of a major change process was found in East London. After municipal professionals had participated in two different MMTPs, combined with visits to Leiden, the Cleansing Department of East London was convinced that the city's waste collection and disposal system had to be overhauled completely. The Department changed from an open pit dumping into a system of recycling and composting. In 2003, the municipality of East London invested five million Rand in a transfer station with recycling facilities. It was a disappointment to the Cleansing Department that follow-up assistance needed (for example for studies on water treatment, cost-benefit analysis, etc) was not provided by Leiden.

**Box 9.1            Quotes about effects of the courses**

- ▶ I always thought, that as a Mayor I had to take decisions; that I had to show my constituency that I could act firmly. The course taught me to be a leader in the sense of being a conductor enabling others to make the music (ex-mayor San Carlos).
- ▶ The tangible effect is the establishment of the office of Attention to Communities. We learnt that participation does not mean simply to wait for people to come. Participation implies going out to the communities to discuss matters (mayor Juigalpa).
- ▶ The course in the Netherlands was the only training I got to act in local government (Kimberley, San Carlos).
- ▶ In the Netherlands we learnt that cadastre was much more than we did with it, so we established a network among colleagues in Nicaragua. Personally I pressured the municipality to purchase a more powerful computer and a plotter. I joined other courses (technician in cadastre, Granada).
- ▶ Here in East London a local entrepreneur had to wait six times in six offices in order to be able to pay his taxes. In Holland that would be considered an offence to the public. Based on the Dutch example we introduced a single-window facility (East London).
- ▶ In the past we just took office; in the course in the Netherlands we learnt that it is important to ensure continuity and institutional memory. So now, the secretary keeps record of all important issues and commitments made. After the next election these records will be handed over to my successor (Oudtshoorn).



In the case of Dodoma (Tanzania), the MMTP on waste management generated new ideas about solid waste collection at *ward* level. Based on a GSO supported initiative, a project was subsequently elaborated and implemented in Dodoma with Senter funding (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs).

Overall, only few professional network relations emerged (Cadastre Nicaragua) and only in exceptional cases did the dissemination of information take place in an organised manner (such as on waste management in East London; Integrated Development Planning in Pretoria). In general, dissemination seems to take place in an informal manner.

All but one MMTP were considered to have been effective. Only the MMTP organised on rural development for Tanzanian Districts was an unfortunate choice as subject matter and was not effective. Participants in Tanzania wondered why they had to travel to the Netherlands to a course on a subject that has been in the centre of attention of all development efforts in that country during a period of well over 40 years. Of that MMTP Tanzanian participants could only recall the efforts made to come to a matching with a Dutch municipal partner.

STAGEs were very effective. Exposure to different conditions was an inspiration for new ideas. STAGEs on environment (Juigalpa), social housing (various South African partners) and even beekeeping (Kondoa, Tanzania) all produced tangible effects. Only in exceptional cases, such as an apprenticeship on sports and education (Songea, Tanzania), no effects were registered.

### **Generalisation**

MMTPs in combination with apprenticeship periods have proven to be effective mechanisms to trigger change in working procedures and even in institutional organisation. Exposure generated new ideas about implementation in the direct work conditions. Direct dissemination of knowledge within the organisation did hardly take place. As a result there was little dissemination of knowledge.

### **(iii) GI**

Municipal Initiatives were usually embedded within larger programmes agreed upon between two municipalities. In South Africa, four out of six GIs studied were container projects comprising PUGAs and STAGEs. The distinguishing feature was that long-term assignments were co-financed (e.g. in agreements with Dutch housing associations). The effectiveness of the long-term assistance could not be determined. Several long-term advisors were active in the frame of the social housing programme funded by the Netherlands' Ministry of Housing (VROM); only three long-term advisors were co-financed with GSO resources. One of those three experts would assist the municipality of Uitenhage for six months (with the option for an extension for up to twelve months), but left after three months due to cultural adaptation problems. Durban hosted a long-term advisor on housing for three years (funded largely by the Rotterdam Maaskoepel co-operatives), whereas the third long-term advisor (in Tshwane, Pretoria) was paid for one third out of resources from the GSO-programme. In Uitenhage and Tshwane frictions occurred between the external advisors vis-à-vis the national policies pursued by the Social Housing Foundation (Housing Division, 17th January 2003).

In Durban, one employee trained by the long-term advisor became Chief Executive Officer of the First Metro Housing Company. Also in Durban, a survey was conducted to assess how the quality of people's lives had changed over time as a result of the

interventions in the housing sector. The results were impressively positive. Nevertheless, the programme could not achieve the targets set in time. Of the planned 3,000 houses, only 800 were constructed. While in Durban the capacity building focussed mainly on one person, in Kimberley some 10-12 officials and councillors were trained in social housing matters. At the moment of evaluation (2003) however, only one junior official (who had never been exposed to training under the programme) managed the project.

GIs in Nicaragua formed part of larger municipal projects. One project that passed through various stages was ProVerde in Juigalpa. Once concluded, individual components were scaled down and further sustained without further external support, such as a municipal nursery and an environmental information centre to school youth (*'mediateca'*). ProVerde was effective since its overall objective, the sustained reforestation by farmers, was fully achieved. Annually private farmers reforest 10-12 hectares of bare hills. Other effective GIs were the establishment of the Environmental Commission and implementations of Local Agenda 21.

In three GIs in León (partner of the Dutch city of Utrecht) the objectives of the projects were rather ambitious (Río Chiquito, Urban Plan León Sureste [see box 9.2] and a cycling track). In a fourth GI concerning an anti-youth prostitution project the objectives were realistic, but key personnel left the organisation and the activities could not be sustained.

**Box 9.2**                      **GI: Project León Sureste**

The León Sureste project is a direct product of the Urban Master Plan for León, elaborated between 1994 and 1996 with support from the Dutch partner Utrecht. After hurricane Mitch ravaged the country, urban physical planning and housing became even more urgent. The main objective of the project was to establish an integrated approach for planned urban development instead of spontaneous urban expansion and squatting.

To that end, the municipal government introduced a special institutional structure. The support from Utrecht focused on the planned and integrated growth of the Sureste suburb. Among the joint activities figured the implementation of land surveys, accessibility studies, and the design and implementation of a pilot project for 700 plots for sale (out of a total plan of 5,000 plots). The project's target was the formal registration of plot owners in the cadastre (the improvement of the cadastre received parallel support) and the establishment of a rotating credit fund for land acquisition.

Utrecht supported León in technical studies and with financial resources for land acquisition. A GSO subsidy was allocated to that end. Series of preparatory studies were conducted. However, the effectiveness as compared to the objectives was modest only. Notwithstanding the efforts made, the concept of coming to an integrated approach with physical and social services in place in a single neighbourhood largely failed. The pilot project did offer plots for sale and owners did register formally, but the plots lacked basic services (water, electricity, sewerage) and the neighbourhood lacked almost all community services envisaged (education, urban transport). In practice, most of the plots happened to be too expensive for the target group. The effective demand was lower than envisaged. The municipality had to recover its investment by selling plots to Non Governmental Organisations for their post-Mitch housing programmes at a price about the tenfold of the amount envisaged for the target group (USD 400).

The project was highly relevant as compared to the problems in León, but also ambitious. To come to an integrated approach required many more institutional innovations and co-ordination than could be achieved in a short period of time. Since in Nicaragua institutions for service delivery mainly depend on central lines of command, it was rather optimistic to believe that voluntary co-ordination would be sufficient to achieve the expected results. In addition, the municipal government became involved in functions for which it was not prepared (e.g. rotating credit systems).

A special story was a project for the reallocation of a bus terminal, a municipal market and the rehabilitation of the wharf of San Carlos (partner of the Dutch city of Groningen). Although formally never any GI was implemented within the frame of that project, series of PUGAs were related, whereas different NEWS projects were devoted to the same plan as well. Long-term technical assistance was deployed by Groningen and SNV provided technical assistance as well. The project lasted more than a decade (1989-2000) but ended with SNV accusing the mayor of San Carlos of corruption. Although San Carlos paid Groningen back, the relations were incensed and the government of San Carlos chose to destroy deliberately part of the ambitious designs and maps for the project. The city of Badalona (Spain), knowledgeable about the plan as participant in San Carlos' network with its European partners, offered to assume responsibility over the project. Architects from Badalona modified the plan and for less than 10 percent of the budget required for the Dutch design, the project was implemented. Badalona also started the rehabilitation of the historical central wharf of San Carlos. With Dutch NEWS resources two piers were constructed and respectively rehabilitated. Over a decade of municipal co-operation ended up in - at best - studies that contributed to a swift action by Badalona.

The most effective activities in Nicaragua were those related to municipal planning and cadastre (MMTP general in 1999, some PUGAs). In 1997, VNG-I identified the Strategic Planning as the pivot of its activities in Nicaragua. However, the GSO-programme could not fund supra-municipal activities (currently, a General Activity could be used to that end). In addition, sound technical support would require a lot of time and presence by the Dutch municipalities. A MMTP was organised in 1999 on Strategic Planning, while in addition various NEWS activities were embedded in the first drafts of Municipal Plans. In 2000, LBSNN-programme could bring what was impossible to do with GSO funds: a simultaneous and permanent activity with various Nicaraguan municipalities. This marked a shift in VNG-I's strategic choice: the internal Evaluation mission to Nicaragua (VNG-I, 2001) concluded that too many external donors had become involved and that too many plans were made. In 2002, VNG-I informed the Dutch municipalities that it would not approve applications for support to Strategic Planning anymore and that time had come for implementation of these plans. Considering the resource envelope system in Nicaragua, as explained in section 9.1, this recommendation was rather detrimental to the local governments' access to national budget resources.

The only GI in Tanzania was a waste management programme Rotterdam-Dodoma. This project was effective in the sense that it succeeded in producing a new project. It is currently (2003) under implementation.

In general, there is no statistically significant relation between the maturity in terms of years of a inter-municipal relation and the number of GIs in implementation, since there is a kind of natural limit in the number of projects an inter-municipal co-operation programme can deal with simultaneously (manpower and budget). In general, GIs in South Africa were effective if assessed against their own objectives. If judged at the programme level, the effectiveness was less clear, since not all activities contributed to the strengthening of the capacities of local governments, but more to outsourced activities (social housing). In Nicaragua, the effectiveness of GIs was harmed by ambitions that did not match with either the amount of resources available or with the time a Dutch municipality could make available. In Tanzania, the few activities that got off the ground can be considered effective, but at the programme level no results could be registered.

Notwithstanding a decade of experience (South Africa, Nicaragua) it is still difficult for municipalities to formulate a project that exploits both the opportunities of the inter-municipal relation and recognises the limitations at the same time. What inter-municipal co-operation can offer in practice is short-term advisory services, or series of subsequent small and precise input. Change process management requires such a spacing in time, but is still hardly practised.

#### **(iv) General Activity (AA)**

The first part of the year 1999/2000 exchange programme between Dutch and Tanzanian municipalities contained a preparatory General Activity (AA) by VNG-I in combination with a MMTP for Tanzanian officials on rural development. In the following year, the counter-visit by Dutch municipal authorities to Tanzania was an AA combined with PUGAs. The AA consisted of a seminar organised in Arusha as a starter activity prior to visits by Dutch municipal officials to the Rural Districts. During the Arusha seminar details of the Tanzanian public administration were exposed to the Dutch visitors and both the Dutch representatives and the Tanzanian counterparts were invited to do practical exercises based on the interpretation of governance by Osborne and Gaebler ('Reinventing Government')<sup>19</sup>. However, once the visits to the Rural Districts started, the Dutch teams worked through a rather unfocused programme of visits to places, projects, and activities. The relation of these visits to the secondary objectives of the GSO-programme (planning, implementation and management tasks of the Local Authorities) became rather distant or blurred.

Tanzanian officials stated that the Dutch municipal officers came rather unprepared and were mainly shown around. Although prior to the visit to Tanzania, VNG-I had organised two preparatory meetings in the Netherlands and had handed over lots of information. Reports by the Dutch municipal delegations, as well as the videos made of the visits to Monduli, Mwanza and Same confirm the impression of unpreparedness. The unpreparedness was mainly shown by the lack of focus: too many goals and objectives were pursued at the same time. While to the Dutch municipal officials the visits were fact-findings, to the international development organisation NOVIB, that accompanied the visit, the main thrust was to show NOVIB activities with civil society organisations in order to get the municipal partners 'on board' for these projects. VNG-I's goal was to get Dutch municipalities interested in providing technical assistance to district local authorities. The theme introduced in Arusha, being the general assessment of the quality of local government (based on Osborne and Gaebler's 'Commandments' for good governance) was additional.

The AA had no lasting effect, apart from the intentions for further co-operation by the Dutch municipality Aa en Hunze (Monduli).

### **9.3 Side effects**

Side effects are unplanned, usually positive, effects. Spin-offs are unforeseen forward or backward linkages or spread effects. Since the direct interventions of the GSO-programme are small, the envisaged spin-offs or spread effects are an important justification for the programme.

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<sup>19</sup> In the opinion of the evaluation mission the choice for Osborne and Gaebler was rather unfortunate in the Tanzanian context of incipient administrative structures. More appropriate material on local public administration in developing countries is available, for example on the website of the World Bank.

Local authorities and policy-makers in the partner municipalities mentioned side effects, such as the improved political respect paid to local authorities after having been exposed to international experience (South Africa, Tanzania). The most frequently mentioned side effects at the programme level are presented in table 9.1.

**Table 9.1 Side effects**

<b>South Africa</b>
International contacts enable to get other international financing sources interested
Inter-municipal contact leads to an increasing number and variety of linkages with Dutch entities, including financing sources and private sector
Capacity building of local politicians happens to be a trampoline for the national political arena
Technical capacity building provides access to professional networks
Increasing (but still incipient) contacts with the private sector. Examples: tourism development through Dutch operators in the Southern Cape Province. Port and trading contacts Rotterdam – Durban
Municipalities become involved in subjects that were previously not considered the domain of the municipal government. This has stretched the playing field, although no additional financial resources were allocated (pro-active town planning; social housing)
Waste scavengers lose their sources of income (East London)
<b>Nicaragua</b>
Access to other Dutch sources of funding (SNV, NOVIB, others)
Multiplier effects of enhanced capabilities and skills
Exchange programmes in place: nurses, police, reporters, fire-brigade
Change of attitude: from an 'all power rests with government' attitude to a 'client consciousness'
Tourism promotion in the Netherlands (Rio San Juan)
Art from the Solentiname islands found an international outlet through an art gallery (Groningen)
Increasing number of local politicians is elected as district representatives in national parliament
Some GSO funded activities (e.g. housing scheme Juigalpa) were subject to political manipulation
Some GSO funded activities opened up new opportunities for blunt corruption at local level (cadastre)
<b>Tanzania</b>
Improvement of the operations of regional Association of Local Authorities (ALAT) in the northern part of the country
Acceptance of women as entrepreneurs and as trainers of (young) male farmers in a Muslim rural environment (Kondoa)
Personal benefits (prestige, material)

#### **9.4 Sustainability**

Continuity in inter-municipal programmes is an uncertain factor. Most inter-municipal contacts are open ended and no precise commitments between the partners have been defined. To partner municipalities, or more precisely, the departments or units within local governments, it was frequently not clear whether joint activities were still on-going or not (East London, Songea, San Carlos, San Pedro de Lóvago).

Whether a joint activity or project is 'on' or 'off' may depend on a single person in the Dutch municipality. An example is the support by the Dutch municipality Leiden to the Cleansing Department of East London in South Africa. After a period of intense collaboration, comprising two PUGAs, various STAGEs and two MMTPs, the East London Cleansing Department decided to embark upon a massive overhaul of the solid waste management of the city. During the change process specific technical knowledge was required (e.g. a cost-benefit analysis of different transportation options; the determination of the required recycling efficiency) but Leiden did not support that change process anymore. In the eyes of the Cleansing Department of East London this was a kind of abandonment or negligence from the Dutch side. In practice, the official in charge of the programme in Leiden had left the municipality; the support to East London had never been handed over. In addition, in the meantime, a new co-operation programme had been formulated between Leiden and East London, in which the priorities for co-operation had changed. The Cleansing Department of

East London had never been informed about the fact that further support could not be expected anymore.


A comparable situation was observed in the relation between Hoorn and Songea (Tanzania). In 1999 VNG-I portrayed this partnership as a successful model (VNG, 1999a), but in 2003 no one in Songea (local authorities, the Songea – Hoorn Association) could ensure that the inter-municipal relation was still on-going or not. After Hoorn’s participation in the Gelderland Initiative, no further communication had taken place and also the contacts between civil society groups in both places had come to a standstill. Since early 2001, the Foundation in Hoorn had not transferred any financial resources anymore to the Hoorn – Songea Association (in Songea).

The evaluators made an assessment of the sustainability of the effects of GSO funded activities. Sustainability was assessed on four characteristics:

- technological sustainability;
- managerial sustainability;
- financial sustainability; and
- the expectation that the impact would be continued over time.

In many of the activities the sustainability aspects were far from crystal clear, hence assessments were made only if possible and applicable. The assessment of the sustainability is pictured in figure 9.1.

**Figure 9.1 Sustainability of the effects of GSO supported activities**



(N = 39).

The financial sustainability of the activities implemented with resources from the GSO-programme is the most vulnerable. Partner municipalities in Nicaragua expressed financial concerns more frequently than their colleagues in South Africa. In South Africa, the evaluators’ assessment of the financial sustainability is lower than the one by the municipal officials interviewed. This refers mainly to the (envisaged) financial sustainability in the social housing activities.

## 9.5 Effectiveness to augment the number of municipal relations

One of implicit expected results, hidden in the second objective of the GSO-programme, is to get more Dutch municipalities involved in international co-operation. The survey among Dutch municipalities revealed that the GSO-programme was effective in keeping inter-municipal relations active, as well as in pushing the subject matter of the inter-municipal co-operation into the direction of capacity building, but that the GSO-programme did not have an impact on the municipality's decision to establish or not inter-municipal relations.

In South Africa, most twinning relations originated from the contacts between Dutch municipalities and *civics* (organisations in the townships) prior to 1994. After the abolishment of Apartheid, some of these contacts became dormant. The GSO-programme enabled to revitalise some contacts. Some 'new' partnerships, such as the relations between Alphen aan den Rijn and Oudtshoorn, Zaanstad and Kaapstad and more recently an agreement between Dordrecht (NL) and Dordrecht (SA) were established as well. These contacts can be attributed to the GSO-programme. Also the involvement in international co-operation of the Dutch provinces of Groningen and Drenthe can be attributed to the GSO-programme.

Twenty city linkages of Dutch municipalities with local governments in Nicaragua existed in 2003. Of these 20, 16 could be considered as active contacts. Ten out of those 16 were established well over twenty years ago. In the past, both the GSO-programme and the NEWS-programme did attract new Dutch municipalities, such as Doetichem, Rijswijk, Gennep, Dordecht and Helmond. However, during the period 1997-2001 no new contacts were established. At the Dutch side political pressure existed on the inter-municipal relations with Nicaragua. Late 2003, the Dutch capital Amsterdam announced that it would discontinue its relation with Managua, the capital of Nicaragua. In the inter-municipal contacts with Nicaraguan (more than with South African) municipalities, the GSO-programme was instrumental to get more municipal departments or units within the Dutch municipalities 'on board' to develop activities with the partner city.

The objective of the main activity with Tanzania was exactly to match local governments. However, the Gelderland Initiative was not effective to that end. No structural relations were established. Dutch municipalities blame the difficulties in communication for that, but communication should be understood as more than letters, faxes, phone calls, and e-mails. Reports by Dutch municipalities state that the Tanzanian partners were slow to react, hardly interested in an inter-municipal linkage and lacked plans of action. But in practice the cultural gap was too wide for local governments' officials at both sides. Both sides were not familiar with municipal international co-operation (although Aalten and Beuningen had experience with pre-accession countries). The signals transmitted by the Dutch municipalities were confusing to the Tanzanian partners: was it about rural development (the MMTP), about local government (the seminar), about community based organisations (NOVIB), about training (as explained during the MMTP and seminar) or about financing projects? The Tanzanian District authorities were deeply puzzled by the Dutch intentions and preferred a 'wait and see' attitude. At the same the Dutch municipalities were waiting for proposals for co-operation from the Tanzanian side (Monduli, Mwanga, Songea). Proposals that were not forthcoming.

For establishing lasting municipal relations more is required than just providing information to local governments and organising visits and counter-visits. This was recognised by VNG – SNV Logic Programme (see box 9.3).

**Box 9.3      Logic programme**

The Logic Programme was a combined effort by VNG and SNV to accompany municipalities both in the Netherlands and in identified African countries in their efforts to establish sustainable inter-municipal linkages. Logic stated that establishing structural relations would require a period of four years. The programme focused on small and medium sized municipalities. VNG estimated that approximately 60-70 Dutch municipalities would be interested in the programme. In practice, VNG could identify only seven municipalities, whereas later only three joined the programme. The Logic programme started off in Tanzania on 1<sup>st</sup> September 2001, but due to a lack of 'clients', the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to discontinue the programme late 2003.

Table 9.2 presents the partnerships that joined the 1999/2000 Gelderland Initiative in Tanzania. To the Dutch municipalities Aa en Hunze, Beuningen, Aalten and Lingewaal this was the first contact with Tanzania. Prior to the launch of the initiative contacts existed between Hoorn and Songea and between Tilburg and Same.

Overall, support by the GSO-programme was not effective for establishing new inter-municipal contacts. However, Dutch municipalities indicated that the programme was important for keeping the contacts ongoing and for pushing the co-operation towards institutional capacity building.

## **9.6 Effectiveness and the context factors**

Section 3.3 and chapter 4 described the context factors for each of the three countries involved. It was concluded that the external factors in South Africa were the most suitable to local government development, whereas the ones in Nicaragua were the least enabling. In this section the impact of the context factors on the effectiveness of the GSO supported activities is further explored.

In terms of public administration, and local government development both South Africa and Nicaragua are more advanced than Tanzania. In South Africa, the swift and stressful change process both created new challenges, but also ruptured institutional memory. The frequent changes of personnel and authorities had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the inter-municipal co-operation. Apart from the negative impact of the change process itself, there are no indications that context factors in South Africa had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the municipal co-operation.

The environment in Nicaragua was less conducive. In Nicaragua professional capability training (the main thrust of the GSO modalities) is not the first requirement, considering the population's relatively high level of education. Lack of management capacities and financial resources are serious constraints. While on paper the various governments up to 2002 were highly committed to decentralisation and local government development, the political reality was one of appropriation of power and centralised control.



**Table 9.2 Partnerships in the 1999/2000 Tanzania programme**

Municipality in the Netherlands	District in Tanzania	Continuation post 2000
Aa en Hunze	Monduli	Aa en Hunze did not commit itself to Monduli, but looked for openings through the Logic project. In 2001, Aa en Hunze returned for assistance in water management. However, no projects were identified. Since the Logic programme was discontinued, a new PUGA was proposed for 2003. A VNG-I expert accompanied the Aa en Hunze mission.
Aalten	Biharamulo	Aalten made € 12.500 available on its year 2001 budget for activities in Biharamulo. Implementation was envisaged through the Mondiaalten Foundation. The evaluators' interviews in Aalten indicated that two projects started: an educational project and a potable water project, co-funded by the electricity company NUON. However, the latter project was put on hold due to management changes within NUON. The municipal government of Aalten has no intention to continue the contacts with Biharamulo, but leaves the final decision to Mondiaalten
Beuningen	Mwanga	At the end of the 2000 visit to Mwanga a Letter of Intent was signed between the partners. Beuningen was waiting for proposals by Mwanga and hoped that the 'ownership' would rest with Mwanga. No proposals were ever presented.
Hoorn	Songea	Prior to the 1999/2000 programme Hoorn had relations with Songea. In Songea there was even a Hoorn-Songea Association. In 2000, it was agreed that the Songea District Council would submit proposals for municipal co-operation. No proposals were ever submitted and the relation came to a standstill.
Lingewaal	Ngara	After the year 2000 visit to Ngara, Lingewaal was interested to proceed, but no activities were ever developed. According to Lingewaal this was due to the distance, the change of local authorities and the precarious security situation in Ngara.
Tilburg	Same	Prior to 2000, Tilburg had relations with the Same Diocese through the civil Tanzania Working Group. Post year 2000 these activities continued, but the 1999/2000 programme did not result in any activity with the District Authority of Same.

In Nicaragua, the change of personnel after local elections was a serious constraint. Of all professional staff trained in cadastre management and SISCAT software by INIFOM, 60 percent left or was forced to leave ("*la escobita*") after the 2002 municipal elections. This also applied to professionals trained by the Dutch inter-municipal co-operation programme. In San Carlos literally all professionals trained through MMTPs, STAGEs and other activities had left the municipal government. Lack of stability in addition to the absence of a law on administrative career<sup>20</sup>, implied that qualified personnel had a short professional career in local government. The rampant tradition of corrupt behaviour in Nicaragua was another constraint to effective inter-municipal co-operation. Improved cadastral systems, also in part the product of GSO supported activities, opened doors to new forms of corruption by local leaders and politicians.

The negative national context factors in Nicaragua are noteworthy, since a third of all GSO resources were allocated for activities in that country. VNG-I argued that local governments are 'actors of change'. Hence supporting local governments within a country with negative national context factors may trigger or enforce changes at the national level. The results of this interference were disappointing over the last decade. The second view, shared in this evaluation, is that although the local capacities might be strengthened through external programmes, this capacity cannot flourish or deploy itself, since it is hindered in doing so by national circumstances.

<sup>20</sup> This law was approved late 2003.

## 9.7 Impact on capacities

According to the intervention logic presented in figure 3.2 the following elements contribute to strengthening capacities:

- financial means;
- competence and know-how;
- capacity to interact;
- motivation.

### **Finance**

The inter-municipal co-operation, supported by the GSO-programme, does not aim at capital-intensive projects. But in the perspective of small municipal budgets in partner cities, the contributions through inter-municipal co-operation may be relatively important. Forty-two percent of the partner local authorities considered the contributions through inter-municipal co-operation (broader than the GSO-programme) financially important. This was mainly the case in Nicaragua and less in South Africa. In only 37 percent, the authorities in the partner local governments considered the municipal international co-operation as financially unimportant.

### **Competence, transfer of knowledge**

The main thrust of the GSO-programme is the transfer of knowledge and the exposure to international experience. As indicated before, the MMTPs and STAGEs seem to have been effective in that aspect, PUGAs were less effective in that sense.

Most activities focus on public administration. In South Africa, more could have been done for the political echelon, in particular since many councillors still have little experience in public administration. The reluctance to include the political echelon in GSO funded activities is explained by the frequent changes over time, as well as by the fact that most city councillors will be replaced after the next elections. Although this might be frustrating to a Dutch municipality, the objective of the GSO-programme (strengthening management capacities) refers to the political level as well.

In all municipalities in the three countries visited, local authorities perceived the importance of GSO funded activities mainly in the area of human resource development (strengthening of capabilities). Of all municipal authorities interviewed, 84 percent considered human resource development the pivot of the GSO-programme.

### **Capacity to interact (networks)**

Extensive networks related to inter-municipal co-operation exist in the Netherlands. In South Africa the contacts at a national level are to a large extent intertwined with the Habitat platform. In the case of Nicaragua, LBSNN has a representative in Nicaragua, CNHHN. In the course of time, several initiatives were taken to achieve the establishment of 'mirror' organisations in Nicaragua, but the effort was rather donor-driven.

Networking at the professional level between Dutch civil servants and their colleagues abroad is an important instrument for motivation. However, the professional networking has not been sustainable over time, with the exception of an informal network of technicians in cadastre in Nicaragua.

In Nicaragua some municipalities established networks with all their European municipal relations.

### **Motivation**

Municipal co-operation was effective to motivate people. The simple fact that someone at the other end of the world pays an interest in your professional work motivates. The opportunity to be exposed to other experiences and to be stimulated to apply these experiences motivates as well. STAGEs were the most effective modality for motivation. STAGEs used to have a technical professional content and one-to-one relation with Dutch technicians<sup>21</sup>.

Motivation can also be found in spin-offs, such as the award of the First Metro Housing Company being the KwaZulu-Natal Housing Developer of the Year for 2002, a prize awarded by the Institute for Housing of South Africa. The award reflected the recognition of the Company's achievements in housing provision and pioneering in lower segments of the rental market.

## **9.8 Generalisation on effectiveness and sustainability**

Policy makers and other local authorities in partner municipalities expressed their views on the effectiveness of the inter-municipal co-operation with the Dutch partners, in particular as far as capacity building of the local government is concerned. Based on 19 systematised records of partner municipalities visited, the perceived judgements on effectiveness were as follows (table 9.3):

**Table 9.3 Perceived effectiveness on local government of inter-municipal co-operation**

Perceived effect	Frequency (N = 19)
Triggered structural and institutional changes	11
Contributed to changes in attitude (openness, client friendliness)	12
Dissemination of know how	7
Other effects (e.g. access to international funds and networks)	8
No other effects	10


*Note:* More than one answer possible.

As a control question, it was asked what would have happened in absence of the Dutch municipal co-operation. About half of the interviewees mentioned that the activity would not have been implemented at all, whereas less than a quarter of the interviewees stated that the activity would have been funded with other resources.

Effectiveness refers to the contribution of the activities to the achievement of the objectives. The GSO-programme counts with two objectives of equal weight (strengthening of local government capacities and support of sensitivity and awareness on development co-operation among the Dutch population). But that does not imply that in each individual activity there should be an equal balance between the two objectives as well. No project proposal was approved only and exclusively based on the second objective. The GSO funds cannot be used for sensitisation and awareness raising. Hence all GSO resources were used for activities aimed at the strengthening of capacities of local governments. The effectiveness of the activities funded by the GSO-programme is summarised in figure 9.2.

<sup>21</sup> For example, a Nicaraguan expert in AutoCad application software (used for the cadastre) maintains a one-to-one relation with a Dutch municipal professional. The Dutchman acts as a kind of personal help desk and forwards whatever news related to the use of that software.

**Figure 9.2 Effectiveness of GSO funded activities**



**Civil society activities**

The second objective of the GSO-programme is to create awareness for development co-operation by enabling initiatives from the civil society. The activities of civil society were no specific subject of evaluation. However, these activities were frequently subject of planning and monitoring through PUGAs. The assessment of the effectiveness of PUGAs implied a rapid assessment of initiatives by the civil society that were subject to monitoring by PUGAs. GSO subsidised PUGAs were hardly successful in identifying suitable projects for the civil society or in safeguarding the sound implementation of these activities. In fact, the share of disappointing results (see box 9.4) was relatively high.

**Box 9.4            Examples of civil society initiatives showing deficiencies notwithstanding monitoring through PUGAs**

- The introduction of fuelwood saving furnaces in the forest area of San Carlos (Nicaragua) was launched as an environmentally friendly and income generating activity. A mini manufacturing enterprise was established, managed by a group of women. In 2003, one woman still produced furnaces on request, at her own expense and for donation only. No furnaces were ever been sold and hence no income was generated.
- In the remote rural township San Pedro de Lóvago (Nicaragua), a pig rearing plant went bankrupt, since no cost-benefit analysis had ever been carried out. It happened to be too costly to market the animals.
- An additional school block was erected in an isolated village in the San Juan area (Nicaragua) without proper co-ordination with the municipal authorities and the Ministry of Education. The Ministry's technical requirements for social infrastructure were not respected. No teachers were appointed to the school.
- A "chemistry laboratory" was granted to a secondary school (Songea, Tanzania). The washing tubs drain straight at the surface. Fortunately no equipment was granted and the laboratory was not used, since all chemical liquids would end up two meters behind the building in the vicinity.
- Several examples of delivery of (second hand) equipment that cannot be used under the partner country's conditions. Waste trucks that were too low, 220 V typewriters for 110 V electricity supply, irrigation tubes with sprayheads only available in the Netherlands, equipment delivered with manuals only available in the Dutch language.
- Extremely small projects (the smallest single project was for € 70) with full administrative requirements. In a project for street children bi-annual progress reports were required for an annual grant of € 200.



## 10 ISSUES

During the field study various overarching issues emerged that merit attention:

### **No consensus with respect to the objectives**

The stakeholders directly involved in the GSO-programme, being the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, VNG(-I), and the Dutch municipalities all express different views regarding the objectives and aim of the programme, as well as the expected results to be achieved. During the period 1997-2001 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG-I had regular meetings, discussed the differences of opinion, but did not reach any consensus. During the governmental period 1998-2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the predominance of sensitisation and awareness raising among the Dutch population as being the most important objectives of the GSO-programme, but failed to reformulate the Agreement (and in 2001 the ministerial decree) in that sense. On the other hand, VNG-I stressed the role of inter-municipal co-operation in the international process of decentralisation and strengthening of local governments. From their own perspective, Dutch municipalities focussed on the importance of city linking with all its horizontal relations, involving strongly the civil society.

### **Design from a Dutch perspective**

Each of the implementation modalities counts with its own detailed procedures. The total of 'rules of the game' is rather complex, implying that certain implementation modalities cannot, or hardly, be funded by the programme. The GSO-programme does not make resources available for sensitisation and awareness raising in the Netherlands, neither for supra-municipal co-ordination and programmes, nor for south-south networking, the contracting of consultants or training in other countries than in the Netherlands. In addition, the modalities have been designed from the Dutch perspective; these modalities have a donor-recipient design and do not offer any menu of options to the partner.

### **Co-ordination and autonomy**

The Agreement on the GSO-programme (and since 2000, the ministerial decree) between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG determines what has to be understood by a 'municipality' in the Netherlands, but is not precise in defining what should be understood by 'local government' in a partner country. Various stakeholders operate at both sides of an inter-municipal relation. Most of these stakeholders are autonomous entities in legal terms. The responsibility over a city linkage is nobody's exclusive right or obligation. The linkage foundations in the Netherlands intend to co-ordinate the efforts by the various actors, but no stakeholder can be obliged to 'be co-ordinated'. Hence, different stakeholders may implement activities in the name of the city linkage. Sound co-ordination at municipal level pays off, whereas also co-ordination at supra-municipal level pays off (e.g. South Africa Habitat network; Nicaragua LBSNN). There is a trade-off between respecting full autonomy of stakeholders and the synergy effects of 'steering' the inter-municipal activities. So far, VNG (-I) has been rather reluctant to actively 'steer' GSO funded activities, while Dutch municipalities find it hard to 'steer' activities of civil society.

### **The absence of the private sector**

In all partner municipalities visited the absence of the private sector in the inter-municipal activities is notorious. Even after 20 years of co-operation in Nicaragua, the

twinning programmes had not identified any ‘niche’ for the private sector. The GSO-programme is not very tempting either for incorporating the private sector. On the contrary, the programme explicitly excludes its involvement.

**The boundaries of inter-municipal co-operation**

Municipal International Co-operation counts with its own inherent restrictions, not only in financial terms, but also in terms of time that can be made available to the partner. Usually, a Dutch municipal civil servant may offer a few weeks per year. Although other entities may dispose of more time (universities, civil society organisations), there is no sense in planning for technical advisory services that require a substantial time input. Various GIs were characterised by over-ambitious goals as compared to what could be offered in practice. A sound inter-municipal project (with or without GSO funding) makes optimal use of the opportunities of municipal international co-operation (e.g. entirely managed by the partner) and identifies how best use can be made of short-term services with relatively long time intervals. From that perspective, change process management could be more significant than a focus on strengthening individual capabilities.

**The concepts of institutional strengthening**

The concept of decentralised co-operation is still relatively unexplored, but it does gradually attract more attention from financiers (European Union, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Canada). The concepts for institutional strengthening used within the Dutch model (project based capability training) seem to have been overtaken by new insights on institutional development through change management, as promoted by e.g. the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (see table 10.1).

**Table 10.1 Concepts on institutional strengthening**

GSO practice	Change management approach
Project induced change	Change management
Capacity building is transfer of knowledge and means	Capacity building is a change process comprising of people, organisations and their concepts and attitudes
Means: Transfer of knowledge	Providing access to knowledge
Knowledge offered: North – South	Knowledge offered from anywhere
Assumption: Knowledge is universally applicable	Knowledge is context specific in its application
Means: Access to a single line	Access to Networks
Focus on capabilities of individuals	Focus on capacities of organisations



## **ANNEX 1**



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## **ANNEX 2**

## ANNEX 2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	General Activity
AKV	Compensation Overhead Costs (Algemene Kosten Vergoeding)
ALAT	Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
AMHHN	Asociación de Municipios con Hermanamiento Holanda - Nicaragua
AMUNIC	Association of Municipalities in Nicaragua (Asociación de Municipios de Nicaragua)
CBO	Community based Organisation
CNHHN	National Advisory Board for the City-twinning the Netherlands - Nicaragua (Consejo Nacional de Hermanamientos Holanda Nicaragua)
COS	Union of Centre for International Co-operation (in the Netherlands, at various administrative levels)
CSD	Sectoral Commission for Decentralisation (Comisión Sectorial de Decentralización, Nicaragua)
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Programme (Tanzania)
CUGA	Course for Dutch Civil Servants (Cursus Uitzending Gemeente Ambtenaren)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DGIS	Directorate General for International Co-operation
EU	European Union
€	Euro
FISE	Social Investment and Emergency Fund (Nicaragua)
FODEL	Federation of Local Development Organisations (Federación de Organizaciones de Desarrollo Local, Nicaragua)
FSLN	Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional (Nicaragua)
GI	Municipal Initiatives
GSO	Municipal co-operation with developing countries (Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden)
GST	Municipal co-operation with accession countries (Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Toetredingslanden)
GSWT	Municipal Co-operation for the Reconstruction of Turkey (Gemeentelijke Samenwerking voor de Wederopbouw van Turkije)
IDP	Integrated Development Planning (or Programme)
INIFOM	National Institute for Municipal Strengthening (Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal)
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
IULA	International Union of Local Authorities
KPA	Small Local Initiatives programme (Kleine Plaatselijke Activiteiten)
LBSNN	National Advisory Board for the City-twinning the Netherlands - Nicaragua (Landelijk Beraad Stedenbanden Nederland - Nicaragua)
LGRC	Local Government Regional Component (Tanzania)
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme (Tanzania)
LED	Local Economic Development (South Africa)

LOTA	Lower Governments against Apartheid
MIC	Municipal International Co-operation
MMTP	Municipal Management Training Programme
NCDO	National Commission for International Co-operation and Sustainable Development
NEWS	Trilateral East West South co-operation on a municipal level for countries in Eastern Europe, the Netherlands and Nicaragua
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIDCP	Netherlands Inter-municipal Development Co-operation Programme
NL	The Netherlands
NLG	Netherlands guilder
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economical Co-operation and Development
PGO	Programme for Municipal Development Co-operation (Programma Gemeentelijke Ontwikkelingssamenwerking)
PLC	Partido Liberal Cristiano (Nicaragua)
PMO	Prime Minister's Office (Tanzania)
PO-RALG	President's Office Regional Administration and Local Government (Tanzania)
PRS(P)	Poverty Reduction Strategy (Paper)
PUGA	Programme for Technical Assistance by Dutch civil servants
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme (South Africa)
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SISAL	Foundation for International Co-operation Loenen (Stichting Internationale Samenwerking Loenen)
SISCAT	Nicaraguan system of municipal registration of cadastres
SHP	South African Habitat Platform
SNV	Netherlands Organisation for Development Co-operation
SNIP	National System for Public Investment (Sistema Nacional de Inversiones Públicas, Nicaragua)
SREC	Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for International Co-operation (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores para la Co-operación Externa, Nicaragua)
STAGE	Internship in the Netherlands
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VNG	Dutch Association of Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten)
VNG-I	VNG - International
VROM	Netherlands Ministry of Housing (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu)
WRR	Academic Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid)





## **ANNEX 3**



## ANNEX 3 TERMS OF REFERENCE (SHORT VERSION)

### South Africa

#### Part 1: General

##### 1. Background

The Directorate General for International Co-operation (DGIS) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to gain insight in the area of municipal international co-operation. In particular in those activities administered and/or implemented by the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG).

The independent Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will conduct the evaluation. The evaluation report will be submitted to the Dutch Parliament. IOB has formulated the evaluation's objective as follows:

*The analysis and assessment of the policy relevance, the effectiveness and efficiency of activities financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of municipal international co-operation, that are administered and/or implemented by VNG, for which VNG was a contract partner of the Ministry.*

These activities cover both the broad area of good governance aspects, such as democratisation, decentralisation and accountability of governance and the strengthening of technical capacities for service delivery by local governments.

##### 2. Context of the Study

The formal co-operation between DGIS and VNG in the area of municipal international co-operation (more specific in the field of development co-operation) started in 1991 and has developed into several distinct programmes.

Relevant for this evaluation are the following programmes:

- **GSO (Municipal<sup>22</sup> Co-operation with Developing Countries) - 1994-2002**

The objectives of this programme are twofold:

- Strengthening local governance in developing countries, through precise collaboration programmes between municipalities 'here and there', which consists of:
  - Strengthening the administrative capacity of local governments;
  - Strengthening local capacity for planning and implementation;
  - Strengthening the participation of the citizenry in local government.

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<sup>22</sup> Although the name refers to 'municipalities', in practice the target group is much wider and comprises provinces, umbrella organisations, independent entities for public service delivery (water, electricity, social care etc).

- Broadening local support for international development co-operation in the Netherlands:
  - Increasing involvement of Dutch municipalities in international co-operation;
  - Increasing involvement of the Dutch citizens in international co-operation through public information activities and awareness raising.

and

- **GST (Municipal Co-operation with Countries in Transition) - 1998-2004**

(The GST-programme is of no importance to South Africa)

For accessing GSO resources, Dutch municipalities have to submit a request for financial support under this programme, based on an explicit request by the recipient municipality. This is predominantly a subsidy by the central government to local government initiatives. The GSO-programme consists of four modalities:

1. PUGA: Programme for temporary deployment of Dutch civil servants (missions for advisory services or training).
2. STAGE: Apprenticeship for public servants/administrators from developing or transition countries in the Netherlands.
3. Municipal Initiatives (GI): This programme is aimed at municipalities, provinces and public utilities that have a long-term relationship with a partner in the South. Besides transfer of knowledge through training and internship missions, this programme also finances small investments.
4. Municipal Management Training Programme (MMTP): Organising group-training activities for trainees from developing and transition countries, which have a similar background or work in a similar sector. These programmes normally consist of a week of lecturing for a (international) group of participants, followed by one or two weeks of individual internships in Dutch municipalities.

GI is especially focusing at longer-term relationships between municipalities in South Africa and the Netherlands. In practice however, also STAGE, PUGA and MMTP often take place in the framework of so-called twinning or friendship relations. These links are lasting relations between municipalities, involving cultural, economic and other exchanges. The initiative for a STAGE, PUGA or GI is taken by the municipalities, whereas VNG is responsible for the organisation of the MMTPs.

- **NEWS**

Other programmes falling under the denominator of municipal development co-operation, such as the trilateral programme **NEWS** (discontinued in 2002) in which South Africa also participated, are not specific subject of analysis, but reference will be made in a descriptive manner.

- **Independent projects**

Apart from the GSO and NEWS programmes, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs also (co-) finances independent projects in South Africa, executed by VNG on behalf

of the Ministry. VNG may implement these projects either with own staff or through co-ordination with municipalities or other public entities. In the case of South Africa these projects are implemented through or with SALGA.

The evaluation will be policy oriented. The population subject to evaluation comprises all activities funded in the period 1997-2002 by the GSO-programme, and in addition, the independent projects for which VNG has been the administrating or implementing agency.

The population subject to evaluation in South Africa comprises all those activities funded in the period 1997-2002 by the GSO-programme. A sample has been drawn from that population. One single independent project will be evaluated.

### *3. Objective and purpose of the study*

The objective of the evaluation study is to describe and analyse how various projects that fall under the GSO-programme and the independent projects were implemented and to what extent they have contributed to the strengthening of local governments in South Africa.

In particular the study should answer the following questions:

- How relevant has the municipal international co-operation been to the South African policy objectives concerning the strengthening of local governance (*policy relevancy*)?
- How effective have the realised interventions been in strengthening local governance (*effectiveness*)?
- How efficient has the input been in order to achieve the desired results (*efficiency*)?

### *4. The activities of the evaluation study*

The activities of the total evaluation study, of which the field mission in South Africa is part, consists of four stages:

- 1) Preparatory phase, comprising:
  - Literature study of existing evaluation studies;
  - Developing the methodology.
- 2) Study covering the Dutch municipalities, consisting of:
  - Questionnaire among Dutch municipalities;
  - Interviews with Dutch civil servants;
  - Interviews with policy makers.
- 3) Field missions in five selected countries: consisting of:
  - Interviews with selected municipalities;
  - Interviews with civil servants and people actively involved in the projects;
  - Case-study of a number of municipalities in each country (in detail: relevancy, effectiveness and efficiency);
  - Context study of the specific features that characterise the process of local government development in each country.

#### 4) Final analysis of municipal co-operation:

- Final report

The remainder part of these Terms of Reference refers to the third stage: Field missions in selected countries.

## **Part 2: Field Mission South Africa**

### **Approach**

#### *The intervention model*

The GSO intervention model is the contribution to the strengthening of democratic local governance by the funding of knowledge and skills development, as well as by making small investments implemented through lasting relations between local governments (mainly municipalities) in the Netherlands and in South Africa.

In the Agreements between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG the implicit assumption is that transfer of knowledge and skills by means of exchange of personnel, as well as by the funding of small tangible activities contribute to the strengthening of capacities. And that subsequently the strengthening of capacities leads to improved *performance* of the local government.

The external input that are supposed to have a potential to strengthen capacities have been identified by Dunn (1994).

The *performance* is supposed to be improved as far as it concerns planning and management capacity; implementation capacity in service delivery and increased participation of the citizenry in governance (derived from the objectives). That implies that according to the input model the means aimed at improving the quality of local governance should be destined to:

- Improve either the capacity to formulate and define policies or the implementation capacity of the local civil / public service (management and *skills*);
- Improve the transparency and accountability of local governance (political and civil service area);
- Improve the interaction and communication (with the civil society and private sector); and
- Improve civil participation (in defining the political agenda, in formulating policy and in monitoring the implementation of policies).

#### *Context factors and receptivity*

Success or failure of an activity (input) is not only determined by the potential contribution it could make to strengthen capacities (the input model), but also by the specific context in which it is implemented. The activities of the GSO are all implemented within two levels of such a context. Firstly, they are implemented within the frame of more or less structural relations of municipal co-operation, in most cases formal twinning relations. So most activities are neither 'ad hoc' nor incidental. They may be exploratory, but most activities fit in the sequential order of a process.

Secondly, all activities are implemented within the national context: the specific processes that characterise the general political, administrative and financial embedding of local government in South Africa.

The effectiveness of activities (input) is influenced by their specific external context (or 'environment'). Among the context factors three categories can be distinguished: The most important context factors are the political, administrative and legal factors that determine directly the structure and mandate of local governments.

A second group of factors is composed of the financial and economic context of local government. The resources made available and the capacities to generate own income in order to implement the local policies are of importance to both the autonomy and service delivering capacity of local government.

A third group of factors comprises the set of background phenomena, like history, and socio-cultural characteristics. These are rather unique factors.

In addition to the above-mentioned environmental factors, there are so-called receptivity factors, determined by:

- The expectations regarding the eventual effectiveness of the activity (does the activity 'match' the expectations?);
- The organisation of the recipient structure (can the activity be embedded into the recipient's organisational structure?).

### *Evaluation Criteria*

The linkages between these criteria and the activities subject to evaluation are reflected in the following evaluation matrix, based on the logical framework applied throughout the evaluation.

The evaluators should specify both input and output for each externally supported activity (sample), according to a standardised registration system.

### *Input*

Examples of input are the number of visiting missions/apprenticeships/trainers and trainees per activity; the description of the activities and the sectors involved, the identification of the number and kind of civil organisations involved, the duration of the activities, etc.

Most GSO funded activities have been small and of short duration only. However, many of these GSO supported activities are related to existing twinning relations (structural city or town links) and may form part of larger programmes funded directly by the Dutch municipalities. So the function of the GSO 'input' in the co-operation process should be identified.

Special attention should be paid to the origin of the 'input'. Who suggested the eventual areas of municipal co-operation (demand or supply driven)? What is the intensity of the support in practice? Why were these input chosen and not others?

Obviously in specific identifiable activities 'input' are not only externally funded, but are also funded or made available by the recipient municipality. If possible, these should be distinguished from the externally funded input.

Formally, the GSO-programme has no thematic focus for its co-operation with South Africa. In practice however, and more or less institutionalised in 2001, most activities of the programme support the housing sector, urban spatial organisation and low-cost housing co-operatives.

To which extent has this subject matter been identified or requested by the South African Partners? Has there been any role for SALGA in this identification process? Why has this thematic focus been chosen? What is expected from Dutch municipalities and is practice matching the South African circumstances and expectations (the receptivity)?

### *Output*

The 'output' are the direct product of the 'input'. Examples of output are the number of civil servants trained formally or on the job; the number and sectors of projects implemented; the duration and intensity of new contacts and changes in the technical quality of service delivery.

Similar to the 'input', for each activity or project, the 'output' should be identified as precise as possible.

### *Efficiency*

Efficiency compares the output with the input. Efficiency is basically a concern of the financier. Could the same output be achieved quicker or more economically? Or could more output be obtained using the same input?

What are the explanatory factors to consider an activity 'efficient' or not? To which extent do the assumed advantages and disadvantages of municipal co-operation play a role (see Schep, Angenent, Wismans en Hillenius, 1995:53)?

### *Effectiveness*

Effectiveness is the extent to which the input –through the output- contribute to the realisation of the expected results. That requires that the effects can be attributed to the activity with reasonable certainty. The expected or observed sustainability is supposed to form part of the effectiveness (in case a result has not been sustainable, it is not very effective either).

Since most activities have been small, direct attribution might be difficult. If the activities are placed in a process (which is usually the case) more can be said about the effectiveness of the total of activities within that process<sup>23</sup>.

Examples of possible effects are: Institutional interaction; career development of those civil servants trained versus the no-trained; improved personal capabilities; triggered institutional modification; changes in participation (-structures) of the citizenry; expansion of networks (both locally and internationally).

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<sup>23</sup> Note that beneficiary satisfaction is no indicator of effectiveness. So the recipients may be very satisfied and happy, for example with an apprenticeship period, but that is no criterion for effectiveness.



From a thematic point of view, the effects on the local capacity for the planning and management of the housing sector should be analysed, as well as operations of the housing co-operatives.

As indicated above, effectiveness is influenced by context and receptivity factors. Both context factors and receptivity factors should be taken into consideration and –as much as possible- analysed. These factors should be described and relations with the observed effects of the GSO funded activities should be indicated.

#### *Relevance*

*Relevancy* is the extent to which an activity has been pertinent with respect to:

- 1) The identified main problems of local government development in South Africa;
- 2) The policy of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- 3) The policy of the recipient organisation (municipality, housing co-operative);
- 4) A fourth criterion is the extent to which an activity has the potential to strengthen democratic local governance. That potential should be checked against the ‘input’ model presented in Annex 3.

#### **Standardised registration forms**

Since the GSO-programme comprises a wide array of heterogeneous activities, a standardised registration form is used to describe both input and output. The same form enables the evaluator to form an opinion, a judgement, on each of the evaluation criteria. The judgement made by the evaluator is expressed on a scale. The arguments used to come to that judgement should be underpinned separately.

Obviously, special conditions, complaints, side effects, etc, can only be identified and analysed by having open interviews. The registration form should not be used as a questionnaire during the interviews. It is a guideline, a checklist and a form that enables structured registration of information per activity or sets of activities.

#### **Part 3: Implementation and expected output**

The municipalities to be visited have been identified based on a standard sampling method applied. In each of the listed municipalities [annex in main report] interviews should be conducted with those politically responsible (1) and those public servants that were involved in the Dutch municipal co-operation programme. So, in each municipality those individuals that actively joined the activities (for example training courses) should be identified and -if possible- interviewed (2). Furthermore, interviews should be conducted with civil society organisations linked to the programme, such as housing co-operatives (3). Interviews will be held, making use of standardised checklists.

As special cases, the projects with Mamelodi Civic (Pretoria) and East London (Buffalo City) should be studied into more detail. These will serve as illustrative case studies.

The single independent project has been implemented by SALGA. This project will be studied separately and will have to be evaluated based on its own objectives. Details of this project will become available at a later stage.

The expected output to be produced by the evaluators in South Africa are:

### 1. A context paper, reflecting

- The historical development of local government in South Africa, with special attention for the period 1994-2002;
- A description of the current context, while (sub)dividing:
  - o the political administrative and legal environment;
  - o the financial-economic environment of local governments;
  - o the socio-cultural environment;
- A description of the current mandate, structures of Local Government, as well as the current Central Government policies regarding local government (decentralisation, good governance, participation, etc);
- A description and analysis of the main problems encountered by Local Governments, in particular as far as it relates to the housing sector;
- An inventory of the current external support and interventions aimed at strengthening the local governments and the relative position of the Dutch programme within that total.

2. To present **an inventory** of the activities mentioned in the sample, implemented with the municipalities (descriptive, summary overviews, tables).

To analyse the activity process (demand or supply driven; who identifies, administrates and is accountable for the activities, who implements?).

3. To analyse the **input, output, efficiency and effectiveness** of the activities undertaken as well as the sustainability of the activities realised. The analysis will be made at two levels: the level of the individual activity [registration form not attached] and as a summary at a higher level of aggregation. This higher level of aggregation is in the first place the municipality, but -if possible- judgements should be made at the level of all activities in South Africa funded by the GSO-programme.

The independent project will be analysed on the same criteria, but judgements will be based on the project objectives only.

To determine the **relevancy** of the activities, the following will be taken into account:

- Relevance vis-à-vis the Dutch/European policy regarding South Africa;
- Relevance vis-à-vis the local government's policies;
- Relevance vis-à-vis the problems encountered (see chapter 3);
- Relevance vis-à-vis the input model for strengthening of local government.

4. To draw **conclusions** and formulate **the lessons learned**.

#### *Instruments to be used:*

For the elaboration of the context paper use should be made of secondary sources, while in addition interviews should be held with key stakeholders (Relevant Ministries for Decentralisation, Local Governance and Housing, Royal Netherlands Embassy, SALGA, key informants).

For the evaluation of the activities within the context of the twinning relations, visits should be made to the municipalities involved. The activities with Mamelodi Civic and in East London will be used as case studies and may require more time.

Interviews should be held with both those politically responsible and the public servants of the areas involved.

Details of the activities, derived from the files in the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG) will be made available to the consultants (however, note that most information is available in the Dutch language only).

Furthermore, interviews should be held with those persons that actively participated in the activities, such as training courses or apprenticeships in the Netherlands.

### *Organisation*

The Association SEOR with Ecorys-NEI has been contracted by IOB for the implementation of the evaluation studies, with SEOR as leading party. SEOR has subcontracted the services of Upstart Business Strategies as the local partner for the study.

The main consultant of SEOR will be the teamleader in the mission. He will be responsible for the final report according to the list of contents and the lay-out instructions as attached to this ToR [annexes not attached].

A SEOR expert will integrate the team for a period of two weeks and will be responsible for the evaluation of the independent project.

Both experts from Upstart Business Strategies will be responsible for the chapters on the South African context. Both experts from Upstart Business Strategies will visit a number of municipalities and will be responsible for the correct reporting according to the standards and instruments attached to these Terms of Reference.

For the visits to municipalities, the evaluation team will form two groups: one group for the Western and Eastern Cape Provinces and one team for the remainder visits. Precise organisation and logistics will be determined by the evaluation team.

The visits to municipalities imply that Upstart Business Strategies will need to:

- Contact the selected municipalities in advance (and -if possible- the public servants and others that have been involved in the sampled activities);
- Elaborate an itinerary;
- Identify the directly involved officials/public servants/housing co-operatives;
- Arrange logistics (local transport, possibly air transport).

The mission will start with a one-day workshop in order to discuss the Terms of Reference, to clarify the approach, to train the consultants in the terminology of the evaluation criteria and in the checklists for interviews.

After the workshop the joint team will make a visit to at least one municipality. The aim is to get familiarised with the subject of the interviews and with the main issues to be raised.

After the first joint interview(s), the team splits up in order to conduct interviews individually in different municipalities. It is expected that approximately 7-10 days will be required for visits to the municipalities. Relatively more time should be scheduled for visits to Pretoria and East London, since these activities will serve as case studies.

At least one of the Experts of Upstart Business Strategies will require some days at a central place for the elaboration of the context paper, preferably in the form of chapters, as indicated in annex [not attached].

The mission members will return to a central place and will elaborate the draft report as a team in the English language. The Conclusions and Lessons Learned should be fully elaborated before finalising the mission in South Africa.

The mission finalises the study with the presentation and discussion of the conclusions during a meeting with stakeholders. Stakeholders might comprise SALGA and a representative of the Netherlands Embassy, etc.

## **ANNEX 4**

## **ANNEX 4 EXPERTS RESPONSIBLE FOR FIELD STUDIES**

The following persons undertook the field evaluations:

Nicaragua: Willem Cornelissen (SEOR B.V., Erasmus University);  
Enrique Perez Iglesias (Programa Bolivar);  
Ruth Selma Herrera M (Ideas).

Tanzania: Willem Cornelissen (SEOR B.V., Erasmus University);  
Mirco Goudriaan, (SEOR BV; Erasmus University);  
Suleiman Shaaban Abdallah Ngware (Institute for Development  
Studies, University of Dar es Salaam;  
Hassan Hatibu Semkiwa (Institute for Development Studies, University  
of Dar es Salaam).

South Africa: Willem Cornelissen (SEOR B.V. Erasmus University);  
Mirco Goudriaan (SEOR BV, Erasmus University);  
Mrs Nkaro A. Mateta (Upstart Business Strategies; Johannesburg);  
Mrs Noludwe Ncokazi (Upstart Business Strategies, Johannesburg).

## **ANNEX 5**

**ANNEX 5 OVERVIEW OF GSO ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA,  
NICARAGUA AND TANZANIA**



**Annex 5 GSO South Africa**

Municipality	Dutch partner	Years of collaboration	# Projects	General	GI	MMTP	PUGA	STAGE	Contribution Foreign Affairs (NLG)	excluding MMTP (NLG)	Thematic areas
Uitenhage	Alkmaar	97/98/99	4	-	1	1	2	-	300.511	169.453	F/M/N
Mamelodi Civic / Pretoria	Delft	98/99/00	4	-	1	2	-	1	377.642	153.015	F/N
Durban	Rotterdam	97/99/00/01	6	-	1	2	2	1	497.643	146.232	F/N
East London	Leiden	97/99/00/01	8	-	2	3	3	-	497.974	131.488	E/F/G/L/M
Lekoa Vaal*	Eindhoven	97/98/00/01	6	-	-	-	3	3	129.722	129.722	C/E
Villiersdorp	Culemborg	95/96/97/98/00/01	4	-	1	2	1	-	452.501	120.001	F/N
Kimberley (Civic Ass.)	Arnhem	98/01	4	-	-	2	2	-	238.428	13.801	F/G/N
Lekoa Vaal*	Tilburg	97/00	2	-	-	1	1	-	95.743	2.174	F/H
Highveld Ridge	Vlissingen	99/00	3	-	-	3	-	-	567.928	0	A/E/F
Oudtshoorn	Alphen ad Rijn	00/01	2	-	-	1	1	-	213,613	24,734	N
Pretoria	Delft	98/00	2	-	-	1	1	-	138,868	7,810	N/M
Johannesburg	Enschede	00/01	2	-	-	1	1	-	217,085	28,207	H
<b>Co-operation with associations</b>											
SALGA (SA Local Govt. Ass.)	VNG	97/99/00/01	4	2	-	-	1	1	65.188	65.188	F/M
	Leiden	00	1	-	-	1	-	-	161.247	0	F
	Den Haag	99	1	-	-	1	-	-	149.969	0	F
	Arnhem	98	1	-	-	1	-	-	131.058	0	N
NOWELOGA (North-West Local Govt. Ass.)	Stadskanaal/ Emmen	98	1	-	-	1	-	-	131.058	0	N
<b>Total 13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>95/96/97/98/99/00/01</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4.366.178</b>	<b>991.825</b>	<b>A/C/E/F/G/H/L/M/N</b>

\*Lekoa Vaal both with Eindhoven and Tilburg. Note: Financial data subject to review.

### Annex 5 GSO Nicaragua

Municipality	Dutch partner	Years of collaboration	# Projects	GI	MMTP	PUGA	STAGE	Total subsidy (NLG)	Total subsidy minus MMTP (NLG)	Themes
Managua	Amsterdam*	95/96/97/98/99/00	8	3	2	3	-	1.682.124	1.177.823	F/G/N
León	Utrecht**	96/97/98/99/00/01	14	7	2	5	-	1.484.768	952.585	A/D/E/F/G/M/N
Masaya	Nijmegen**	97/98/99/00/01	9	1	2	6	-	929.312	397.129	E/F/J/N
Juigalpa	Den Haag**	97/98/99/00	7	3	1	3	-	711.221	395.218	A/G/N
Chinandega	Eindhoven**	97/98/99/00	8	1	2	4	1	670.685	138.502	A/F/M/N
Rama	Maastricht**	97/98/99	3	1	-	1	1	103.149	103.149	A/H/N
Matagalpa	Tilburg**	97/99/00	4	1	2	1	-	593.468	61.285	H/L/N
Granada	Dordrecht**	97/98/99/01	8	-	2	5	1	584.146	51.963	F/L/M/N
Juigalpa*	Leiden**	97/98/99	4	-	1	3	-	263.894	47.714	A/E/F/N
Condega	Rijswijk**	98/99/00	3	-	-	3	-	32.591	32.591	G/N
San Pedro de Lovago	Gennep**	97/99	2	-	-	2	-	28.915	28.915	M
Estelí	Delft	97/99	5	-	2	3	-	556.705	24.522	F/M/N
San Carlos	Groningen**	97/99	4	-	2	2	-	548.845	16.662	D/M/N
Jinotega	Zoetermeer*	97/99	3	-	2	1	-	535.220	3.037	F/M/N
AMUNIC	Amsterdam*	97	1	-	-	1	-	27.820	27.820	M
	VNG	99	1	-	1	-	-	216.180	0	D/F
INIFOM	Amsterdam*	97	1	-	-	1	-	27.820	27.820	M
	Delft	99	1	-	1	-	-	216.180	0	D/F
	VNG	97	1	-	1	-	-	316.003	0	N
<b>Total</b> 15	15	95/96/97/98/99/00/01	87	17	23	44	3	9.529.046	3.486.735	A/D/E/F/G/H/J/L/M/N

\* Juigalpa has two relations: Den Haag and Leiden.

\*\* = In addition KPA-Nicaragua.

**Annex 5 GSO Tanzania**

Municipality/ District	Dutch partner	Years of collaboration	# Projects	General	GI	MMTP	PUGA	STAGE	Subsidy Foreign Affairs (NLG)	Subsidy Foreign Affairs minus MMTP & Act. 5383-01* (NLG)	Themes
Kondoa	Loenen	97/00	2	-	-	-	1	1	40.121	40.121	G/M
Same	Tilburg	99/00	3	1	-	1	1	-	334.525	21.792	B/M/N
Songea	Hoorn	99/00	3	1	-	-	1	1	155.406	20.413	H/N
Biharamulo	Aalten	99/00	3	1	-	1	1	-	332.606	19.873	B/N
Mwanga	Beuningen	99/00	3	1	-	1	1	-	325.255	12.522	N
Monduli	Aa en Hunze	99/00/01	4	1	-	1	2	-	325.229	12.496	N
Ngara	Lingewaal	99/00	2	1	-	1	-	-	312.733	0	B/N
Dodoma	Rotterdam	00/01	2	-	1	1	-	-	0	0	G
Relations with associations											
ALAT (Ass. of Local Auth. of Tanzania)	Aa en Hunze**	99/00	2	1	-	-	1	-	147.489	12.496	G/N
	Aalten**	99	1	-	-	-	1	-	19.873	19.873	N
	Beuningen**	99	1	-	-	-	1	-	12.522	12.522	N
	Hoorn**	99	1	-	-	-	1	-	975	975	N
	Lingewaal**	99	1	-	-	-	1	-	13.327	13.327	N
	Tilburg**	99	1	-	-	-	1	-	7.011	7.011	N
	VNG	99	2	1	-	1	-	-	205.563	27.823	N
	COS	00	1						134.993		N
	NOVIB		1						0		G
Prov.Gelderland		1						0		G	
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>97/99/00/01</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.367.628</b>	<b>221.244</b>	<b>B/G/H/ M/N</b>



## **ANNEX 6**



## ANNEX 6 OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPALITIES VISITED IN NICARAGUA, TANZANIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

**Table Annex 6.1 Overview of Dutch municipalities that applied for GSO co-financing, 1997-2001**

Applicant (the Netherlands)	Country partner
Aa en Hunze	Tanzania
Aalten	Tanzania
Albrandswaard	Zambia
Alkmaar	South Africa
Almere	Ghana
Alphen aan den Rijn	South Africa
Amersfoort	Ghana
Amstelveen	Peru, South Africa
Amsterdam	Cuba, Ecuador, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Surinam
Apeldoorn	Moldavia
Arnhem	Bolivia, Botswana, Chile, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa
Assen	Namibia, South Africa
Bergambacht	Benin
Beuningen	Tanzania
Beverwijk	Swaziland, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa
Culemborg	South Africa
De Marne	Benin
Delft	Nicaragua, South Africa
Delfzijl	Ghana
Den Haag	Albania, Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, Pakistan, South Africa
Deurne	Cameroon
Deventer	Peru, Zimbabwe
Doetinchem	Nicaragua
Dongen	Tanzania
Dordrecht	Cameroon, Kenya, Nicaragua
Ede	Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia
Eindhoven	Nicaragua, Sudan, South Africa
Emmen	Ghana, Palestinian Territories, South Africa
Enkhuizen	South Africa
Enschede	Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, South Africa
Etten-Leur	South Africa
Gendt	Kenya
Gennep	Nicaragua
Gouda	Nicaragua
Groningen	Nicaragua, Palestinian Territories, South Africa
Haarlem	Zimbabwe
Haarlemmermeer	Philippines
Heerhugowaard	South Africa
Heusden	Zambia
Hoogezand-Sappemeer	South Africa
Hoorn	Tanzania
Leek	Morocco

Leeuwarden	Zambia
Leeuwarderadeel	Benin
Leiden	Egypt, Nicaragua, South Africa
Lelystad	Albania
Lingewaal	Tanzania
Loenen	Tanzania
Maarssen	Namibia
Maastricht	Nicaragua
Menterwolde	South Africa
Middelburg	South Africa
Middenveld	Benin
Monster	Tanzania
Naaldwijk	Albania
Nieuwegein	Namibia
Nijmegen	Nicaragua, Peru, South Africa
Noordoostpolder	Uganda
Obdam	Albania
Oisterwijk	Uganda
Ooststellingwerf	Dutch Antilles, Uganda, Zambia
Oostzaan	South Africa
Opsterland	Zimbabwe, South Africa
Raalte	Albania
Renkum	Zambia
Ridderkerk	Benin
Rijswijk	Nicaragua
Rotterdam	Ghana, Cape Verde, Peru, South Africa, Surinam, Tanzania
Smallingerland	Namibia
Soest	Peru
Stadskanaal	South Africa
Stadskanaal/Emmen	South Africa
Tilburg	Nicaragua, Peru, Tanzania, South Africa
Utrecht	Albania, Nicaragua
Veendam	Botswana, Zambia
Velsen	Sri Lanka
Vianen	Benin
Vlaardingen	Zambia
Vlissingen	Indonesia, South Africa
Vught	Philippines
Wateringen	Tanzania
Weert	Cape Verde
Wieringen	Benin
Wieringermeer	Benin
Winschoten	Ghana
Winsum	Benin, South Africa
Wisch	Benin
Zaanstad	South Africa
Zoetermeer	Ghana, Nicaragua
<b>Total Dutch municipalities</b>	<b>89</b>
BJ Zuid-Holland Zuid	Moldavia



COGAS (Centraal Overijsselse Nutsbedrijven NV)	Bolivia
COS-sen	Tanzania
Duinwaterleidingbedrijf Zuid-Holland	Egypt
Energiebedrijf Noord West	Zimbabwe
Gemeentewaterleidingen Amsterdam	Egypt, Indonesia, Mozambique, Surinam
Hoogheemraadschap van Rijnland	Egypt
NOVIB	Tanzania
Provincie Drenthe	South Africa
Provincie Gelderland	Tanzania
Provincie Groningen	South Africa
Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven	Peru
SNV	Botswana
Uitwaterende Sluizen	Indonesia
VNG-I (GSO)	Albania, Benin, Nicaragua, South Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam
Waterleiding Maatschappij Overijssel	Surinam
Waterleidingbedrijf Noord-Holland	Indonesia
Waterschap Friesland	Nepal
Watertransportmaatschappij Rijn Kennemerland	Indonesia
Woningbedrijf Den Haag	South Africa
<b>Total other local government organisations</b>	<b>20</b>

**ANNEX 6.2 MUNICIPALITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND PARTNER MUNICIPALITIES VISITED DURING FIELD STUDY**

Municipality/Province (Shaded: interviewed during study in the Netherlands)	GSO partner countries (amongst them Tanzania, Nicaragua and South Africa)	Partner municipalities visited during field study
Aa en Hunze	<b>Tanzania</b>	Monduli
Aalten	<b>Tanzania</b>	Biharamulo (not visited, belongs to group of Gelderland initiative)
Alkmaar	<b>South Africa</b>	Uitenhage
Amsterdam	Cuba, Ecuador, Mozambique, <b>Nicaragua</b> , Surinam	Managua (not visited)
Alphen aan den Rijn	<b>South Africa</b>	Oudtshoorn
Arnhem	Bolivia, Botswana, Chile, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, <b>South Africa</b>	Kimberley
Beuningen	<b>Tanzania</b>	Mwanga
Culemborg	<b>South Africa</b>	Villiersdorp
Delft	<b>South Africa, Nicaragua</b>	Estelí (Nic), Tshwane (Pretoria; SA)
Den Haag	Albania, Burkina Faso, <b>South Africa, Nicaragua</b> , Pakistan	Juigalpa (Nic)
Dordrecht	Cameroon, Kenya, <b>South Africa, Nicaragua</b>	Granada (Nic)
Eindhoven	Sudan, Turkey, <b>South Africa, Nicaragua</b>	Emfuleni (Lekoa Vaal)
Provincie Gelderland	<b>Tanzania</b>	Group of municipalities
Gennep	<b>Nicaragua</b>	San Pedro de Lóvago
Groningen	<b>Nicaragua</b> , Palestinian Territories, <b>South Africa</b>	San Carlos (Nic)
Hoorn	<b>Tanzania</b>	Songea
Leiden	<b>Egypt, South Africa, Nicaragua</b>	Juigalpa (Nic), Buffalo City (East London; SA)
Lingewaal	<b>Tanzania</b>	Ngara (not visited, in group of Gelderland initiative)
Loenen	<b>Tanzania</b>	Konoda
Maastricht	<b>Nicaragua</b> , Turkey	Rama (not visited)
Nijmegen	<b>Nicaragua</b> , Peru, <b>South Africa</b>	Masaya (Nic.; not visited)
Rijswijk	<b>Nicaragua</b>	Condega (not visited)
Rotterdam	Ghana, Cape Verde, Peru, Surinam, <b>South Africa, Tanzania</b>	Dodoma (Tan), Durban (SA)
Tilburg	<b>South Africa, Nicaragua, Tanzania</b> , Peru	Matagalpa (Nic), Same (Tan)
Utrecht	Albania, <b>Nicaragua</b>	León

## **ANNEX 7**



## ANNEX 7 INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONS CONTACTED

<b>Name</b>	<b>Function / Organisation</b>
Van der Heijden, R	Director LBSNN ( Landelijk Beraad Stedenbanden Nederland-Nicaragua)
<b>South Africa</b>	
Apleni, Z	Cleansing Services Buffalo City (East London)
Barbir, M.	Chief Urban Designer, Tshwane (Pretoria)
van den Bergh, E.	Town Planner, Tshwane (Pretoria)
Botha, R.	Director Research (Governance), Department Provincial and Local Government
Bothman, G.	Chief Town Planner, Tshwane (Pretoria)
Chamda, Y.	Speaker of the Emfuleni Council; Emfuleni (Lekoa Vaal)
Diephout, A.	Chief Technical Advisor. Social Housing Foundation
van Eechoud, Y. mrs	Policy Officer Development Co-operation. Royal Netherlands Embassy Pretoria
Eriksen, J.	First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Govender, D.	Development Planner, Housing Manager, City of East London Municipality
Khawe, B, mrs	Programme Co-ordinator Good Governance, Royal Danish Embassy
King, P.	Director Social Services, Buffalo City municipality (East London)
Kramer, M.	Technical Advisor of the Nationale Woningraad, the Netherlands, Tshwane (Pretoria)
Kumato, N.	Everton West Forum, Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Lemmens, P.	Development Manager, Housing Association East London, Buffalo City municipality
Leon, B mrs	Project Officer Urban Development. Delegation of the European Commission in South Africa
Liebich, C	Programme Manager, South Africa Programme CIDA, Canada
Madisa, M.	Technika 10 Training Centre, Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Mafontshe Malefetse, M. mrs	Deputy Director Capacity Building, Policy and Co-ordination, Pretoria
Malefo,	Ex-councillor. Advisor to the Executive Mayor, Tshwane (Pretoria)
Mathe-Charlé, Z.	General Manager Tourism, Tshwane (Pretoria)
Matlala, J.M.K., mrs	Office of the Executive Mayor. General Manager Inter-Relation Services, Tshwane (Pretoria)
Marivate, D.	Principal Planner Research (Governance) Department Provincial and Local Government
Mazamisa, P. mrs	Programme Manager Capacity Building for Local Governance. UNDP South Africa
Mdluni, A.	Community worker Local Economic Development, Everton West Extension 11 (Lekoa Vaal)
Mehola, G.	VAHBC Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Metcalfe, B.	Director Cleansing Services, Buffalo City municipality (East London)
Mettler, J.	Manager Intergovernmental Relations, South African Local Government Association
Mhlambe, J.	Chairman of Everton West Forum. Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)

Moeti, W.	International Coordinator Emfuleni Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Molefakgotha, E.P., mrs	Nation Council of African Women, Home base care Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Mofokeng, M.S.	Councillor, Local Economic Development, Tourism and Development Planning, Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Mthimkhulu, D.	Councillor Emfuleni (Lekoa Vaal)
Ndwandwe, J, mrs	Housing and Urban Development Office, USAID
Ndoni, B.	Deputy Mayor. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan, Uitenhage
Noruwa, B.	Buffalo City municipality (East London)
Ntombele, B.	Everton West C.D.F. Emfuleni Local Municipality, (Lekoa Vaal)
Nyström, T.	First Secretary. Embassy of Sweden
Nzotoyi, M.	Deputy Chairman Housing Committee, councillor; Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Uitenhage Housing Association (Nelson Mandela Metropolitan)
Oth, J-D	Regional Analyst, South Africa Programme CIDA, Canada
Plata, Z.	Manager Cleansing Services, Buffalo City municipality (East London)
Pretorius, R. mrs	Co-ordinator International Relations, Buffalo City municipality (East London)
Ramphele, W.	Deputy Director Capacity Building Policy and Co-ordination, Department Provincial and Local Government
Rabotabi, M. mrs	Youth Info Centre Tswelopele Inthuthuku. Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Shongwe, N	Municipal Manager Emfuleni, Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Simelane, B.	Project Manager, South African Local Government Association
Smith, G.	General Manager Community Services, Buffalo City municipality (East London)
Snook, S.	Democracy and Governance Team, USAID
Thabane, T.J.S.	Councillor, Executive Mayor, Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Thomas, B, mrs	Vereeniging Alliance for Street Children; HIV/AIDS Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Thomas, R.	Senior Governance Adviser, DFID
Tslonwani, D.	Community worker Local Economic Development, Everton West Extension 11, Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
Zwane, L.	Headmaster, Matome School Everton-West, Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)
<b>Nicaragua</b>	
Acosta López, O. B.	Cadastre, León
Alemán. V. mrs	Project pig rearing, San Pedro de Lóvago
Ballarades, B. mrs	Project ecological wood stoves, San Carlos
Bodán Pérez, X. mrs	Tax department, Granada
Bravo, A.	Association of municipalities AMUNIC
Cabrera Cruz, M.	Director Planning en International Relations, Matagalpa
Del Carmen Salgado, M.	Member of Parliament
De Castilla Urbina, E.	Mayor Juigalpa
Castillo, J.A.	Representative of LBSNN in Managua (Consejo Nacional de hermanamientos Holanda-Nicaragua)
Cerda, M.T. mrs	Director International Co-operation, Juigalpa
Chamorro Mora, L.G.	Mayor, Granada

Clark, P.	Representative European city linkages, Estelí
Coronel Cuadra, L.	Mayor, San Carlos
Correa, J.	Ex-urban planner, Juigalpa
Dávila, A.	Committee handicraft tanneries, Río Chiquito, León
Delgado García, T.A.	Responsible cadastre, Matagalpa
Delleman, A. mrs	Representative Leiden in Juigalpa
Díaz Rodríguez, M.	Ex-deputy mayor, Estelí
Ena Sarria, M. mrs	Director municipal tax department, León
Espinoza Zavala, B.	Director Planning AMUNIC
Flores, M.	City twinning unit INIFOM
Gadea Sequiera, J. E.	Ex-director Public Works, San Carlos
García, G.	Director planning and local development, León
Gussenhoven, S.	Director Netherlands Development Organisation SNV Honduras Nicaragua
Gutierrez, B. mrs	Cadastre, Granada
Irias, I.	Integrated Rural Development, Estelí
Jardín, J.E.	Financial advisor EDISMAT, Matagalpa
Larios Picado, R.A	Ex-cadastre, Juigalpa
López Sánchez, M.A.	Ex-deputy mayor and current president of the Chamber of Commerce, Matagalpa
Lugo, B.	Director International Co-operation, Granada, Nicaragua
Lumbí Rodríguez, R.	EDISMAT, Matagalpa
Malespin, G. mrs	Town planner, Juigalpa
Matus, L. mrs	Library assistant, San Pedro de Lóvago
Maradiaga, M. mrs	Councillor, León
Medoza, C. mrs	Architect Strategic Planning, Granada
Mena, E. mrs	Ex-councillor, Estelí
Mendoza Cantillo, M.F.	Ex-co-ordinator SISCAT, ex-project INIRA, Director Cadastre project INIFOM
Miranda Arana, S.R.	Ex-planner, San Carlos
Miranda Miranda, M.	Ex-mayor San Pedro de Lóvago
Ñurinda Morales, M. mrs	Director international co-operation, Matagalpa
Osequeda Rodríguez, A mrs	Ex-director strategic planning, Matagalpa
Padilla, M.R.	SNV, San Carlos
De Pasos, M. mrs	Ex-director International Co-operation, Granada
Pérez Acuña, R.U.	Strategic planning, Estelí, Nicaragua
Pérez Ayerdis, D.	Mayor León, Nicaragua
Pérez, L.P.	Ex-mayor, León
Pilarte, S.J.	Ex-mayor, San Carlos
Rade, K.P.	Chargé d'affairs Royal Netherlands Embassy, Managua
Ramos, J.A.	Ex-councillor, San Carlos
Raskosky, T. mrs	Ex-mayor Granada, Nicaragua
Romero, M.	AMUNIC
Sampson Granera, R.	Ex-mayor, Delegate in the Asamblea Nacional
Sánchez, J (sr)	Chairman Comité de Vínculo Den Haag-Juigalpa
Sánchez, J (jr)	Ex-responsible strategic planning, Juigalpa
Sequiera, M.E. mrs	Ex-councillor León, current Member of Parliament
Solís, O.	Co-ordinator strategic planning, Juigalpa
Somarriba, L.	Cadastre and Municipal Tax Department, San Pedro de Lóvago
Somarriba, N.	Manager INIFOM
Stadler, D.	Director Casa de los Tres Mundos, Granada
Suazo, T. mrs	Director external relations, INIFOM
Torrez, E. mrs	Member of Parliament. Commission Legal Affairs Local Governments
Urbina, S.	Ex-mayor, Granada
Valdivia, D.	Ex-mayor, Estelí

Valenzuela, R.F.	Mayor, Estelí
Vega González, Cruz A.	Mayor, San Pedro de Lóvago
Vega Gonzalez, mrs	President Rotating Credit Fund, San Pedro de Lóvago
Velázquez, J.M.	Director International Co-operation, Matagalpa
Velázquez, V. mrs	AMUNIC
Wolters, M.C.	First Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Managua
Zamorra, F.	Director Projects, San Carlos
Zeledón Rocha, Z.	Mayor, Matagalpa
Van Zwieten, B.	Specialist micro- and small-enterprise development, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Managua
<b>Tanzania</b>	
Achiula, J.	Sports and culture Officer Songea
Bingi, S.	Kondoa-Loenen-Kiteo Link Officer/Community Development Officer, Kondoa
Chwango, N. mrs	Health Officer; Songea Health Centre, Songea
Foka, D.S.L.	Deputy Permanent Secretary, Presidents' Office Regional Administration and Local Government
Francis, A	District management advisor (SNV), Monduli
Hamidu	Member of the Village Executive Committee and the Liaison Committee, Kondoa
Hasibu	Accountant. Ruvuma Secondary School, Songea
O'Hea, M.	Management advisor (SNV) to the Secretary of the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
Hiriwa	Headmaster Ruvuma Secondary School, Songea
Hyera	Principal, Ruvuma Secondary School, Songea
Issa, Zaidina, mrs	Member of the Village Executive Committee and the Liaison Committee, Kiteo, Kondoa
Issa, Zakia, mrs	Member of the local bee-keepers association, Kiteo, Kondoa
Jumbula, I	Village Executive Officer, Kiteo, Kondoa
Kabagire, A.L.R.	Programme Manager, Local Government Reform Programme, Presidents' Office Regional Administration and Local Government
Kabeja	Municipal Town Director, Songea
Kangwa, P.	Ex-District Commissioner Same, ex-NGO Pamoja, Moshi
Kidau	Town Economist, Songea
Kihwele. P	Songea - Hoorn Association, Town Planner, Songea
Kimaro	Research and Development Officer. Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
Koda	Same Diocese, Same
Kwiluhya, M.P.Z. mrs	Municipal Director, Dodoma
Lendiy, J.	Councillor, Monduli
Linuma, S. Mrs	Ex-District Executive Director Same
Lungi, B.	Member of the Village Executive Committee, Kiteo Kondoa
Makonela, Dr	Acting Medical Officer of the Health Department, Dodoma
Makwaia, mrs	Editor of the Journal at the Secretariat of the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
Mapunda, G mrs	Communication Officer (SNV) at ALAT
Masele, F.M.	Acting District Executive Director, Kondoa
Matunda, S. Mrs	Member of the Village Executive Committee and the Liaison Committee, Kiteo, Kondoa
Mbaga, H	Alderman, Same
Mchomvu	Regional Commissioner, Same
Mduya, A.	Secretary of the Kiteo-Loenen Liaison Committee, Kiteo, Kondoa



Mikina, J.	Chairman of the Kiteo-Loenen Liaison Committee, Kiteo Kondo
Mlele Z. mrs	Member of the association of bee-keepers, Kiteo, Kondo
Mohammed, I	Kiteo Village Chairman, Kondo
Molo, P	Member of the Village Executive Committee, Kiteo, Kondo
Musingi, R.	Director of Regional Co-ordination, Presidents' Office Regional Administration and Local Government
Muro, R.K.	Town Planner, Dodoma
Munisi, E.A.	District Executive Director. Monduli
Mushi	Town Planning Economist, Dodoma
Msoffe	District Executive Officer, Same
Mwenda, H	Chairman Kondo District Council, Pahi Councillor Kondo
Nafuna, J. mrs	Development team Same Diocese
Nchimbi, B.R.	Secretary General of the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
Noordholland deJong, J.	Senior Programme Officer SNV Tanzania
Ntomola, P.	Member of the Village Executive and Liaison Committee, Kiteo, Kondo
Nyheliga, D.	Pahi Ward Executive Officer, Kondo
Ramadhan, R.	Member of the Village Executive Committee, Kiteo, Kondo
Roell, M. mrs	SNV Advisor Institutional Development at the Regional Administrative Secretariat (RAS), Dodoma
Rwenzungura, A.S.M.	Programme Officer Local Government, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Dar es Salaam
Shilisya, E. mrs	Chairperson Songea Hoorn Association, Songea
Skaunki, L	Education officer, Songea
Singano	Planning officer, Same
Singo	SAIPRO (NGO)
Tempelman, G.J	Counsellor Head of Development Co-operation, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Dar es Salaam
Tholen, P.M.	First Secretary Rural Development, Royal Netherlands Embassy Dar es Salaam
Ulaya, M.	District Commissioner, Kondo
Umbulla, M. mrs	NGO, Monduli
Yessayah, A.	Principal Economist, Presidents' Office Regional Administration and Local Government



## **ANNEX 8**



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**EVALUATION OF THE  
NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS'  
INTER-MUNICIPAL CO-OPERATION PROGRAMME  
FOR THE ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION  
GST**

**WILLEM CORNELISSEN (SEOR BV, ROTTERDAM)**

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**WORKING DOCUMENT | NOVEMBER 2003**

This working document is a contribution to an evaluative study of the Municipal International Co-operation as conducted by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a product evaluation of the co-financing programme in support of inter-municipal co-operation between Dutch local governments and those in accession countries (Gemeentelijke Samenwerking Toetredingslanden - GST). Willem Cornelissen (SEOR B.V., Erasmus University) elaborated the report based on country studies in Poland and the Czech Republic written by Mart Nugteren and Maaïke Oosterbaan (Ecorys-NEI). The authors express their gratitude to the local authorities in the Netherlands, Poland and the Czech Republic, who all have been forthcoming in providing information and opinions, and highly appreciate the comments made by the IOB Reference Group on earlier drafts.

*The report is the sole responsibility of SEOR BV and Ecorys-NEI and does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of either IOB or the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*



## FOREWORD

Inter-municipal co-operation is a kind of multiple *twinning*. At both ends of the city linkage public and private organisations are involved. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports Dutch municipalities and other local governments in their efforts to strengthen the governance capacities of their partners abroad through decentralised co-operation. The Ministry co-finances inter-municipal activities through subsidy programmes. In addition, the Ministry supports specific independent projects aimed at strengthening local government capacity in partner countries. These together are known as municipal international co-operation.

One of the subsidy programmes is targeted at the Central and Eastern European accession countries to the European Union (Gemeentelijke Samenwerking Toetredingslanden - GST). The day-to-day administration of the co-financing funds has been delegated to the Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten - VNG).

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an independent department, responsible for the evaluation of the policies and activities of this Ministry. IOB embarked upon an evaluation of the municipal international co-operation. In the framework of this overall evaluation, it contracted the association of companies SEOR B.V. and ECORYS NEI, both from Rotterdam, to conduct sub-studies.

The present report, written by Willem Cornelissen, covers the assessment of the results of the GST-programme. To that end, teams composed of Dutch and local experts, led by Mart Nugteren, carried out field studies in Polish and Czech municipalities.

A draft of this report was presented to the Reference Group and was discussed on 14 May 2003. The study took place under overall responsibility of Francis Kettenis, evaluator of IOB. IOB's evaluation of municipal international co-operation is published in the series of evaluation reports of IOB. This study is of interest to those involved in inter-municipal co-operation in Eastern Europe and published as an IOB Working Document. The authors are solely responsible for the contents of this report.

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## 1 SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS

The objective of the inter-municipal co-operation programme for the accession to the European Union -GST- is to contribute to either the adoption of measures at the local governance level resulting from the *acquis communautaire*, or to strengthen the capacities of local governments to implement regulations and services that may emerge from the adoption of the *acquis* at the national level. GST is a co-financing (subsidy) programme started in 1998, which forms part of the broader Matra pre-accession programme for Central and Eastern European countries, funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contracted out the management of GST to the Dutch Association of Municipalities, VNG. The GST-programme is implemented through inter-municipal co-operation (city *twinning* or friendship relations).

Field studies were conducted in order to evaluate the policy relevance, the efficiency and the effectiveness of the activities implemented with GST-resources during the period 1998-2001. The sample in Poland and the Czech Republic comprised 34 activities in 18 municipalities, two regional level governments and two associations of municipalities.

### *Relevance*

GST-funded activities do address actual problems encountered in the partner local governments. GST-activities have been hardly relevant with respect to the policy of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the strengthening of capacities of local governments for the adoption of the *acquis*. Only five out of the 34 activities assessed in Poland and the Czech Republic could be considered as relevant to that end. The activities were more relevant from the perspective of the broader Matra programme of which GST forms part. The Matra programme has stressed the relations between the public sector and the civil society.

Only 55 local governments in Poland and the Czech Republic have received support from Dutch partners that made use of GST-resources. Of those 55 local governments, 31 participated in only one activity during the period 1998-2001. Although GST does not pretend to have any effect at a national level, the programme is small, in particular if compared to the sizeable funding made available for the strengthening of local governments by other sources, such as the European Union. The distinguishing feature of GST has been that it is made available through decentralised co-operation. But even at the level of a single municipality, the programme is quite modest. Even in the few cases where more than two activities were implemented with the same partner municipality, only in exceptional cases, these activities targeted at the same subject matter or at the same municipal department or unit.

### *Efficiency*

With one exception, interventions were of a short duration only and subject to long time intervals in between them. Individual internships (STAGE) and advisory

missions by Dutch administrators or civil servants (PUGA) had an average duration of five days. Efficiency losses have occurred due to the fact that GST financed preparatory missions that subsequently never were followed up by any activity or project.

During the initial years of the programme, the financial resources made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sufficient to positively address all applications for subsidy. No mechanisms or procedures which would be more demanding on the applications (for example on subject matters) have ever been put in place. There has been no competition among Dutch municipalities to obtain subsidy funds (for example on the base of best proposals or the highest leverage of resources). Since the activities used to be low cost, some larger Dutch municipalities applied for GST only whenever they found it convenient to do so. If not, they assumed the costs from their municipal budget for international co-operation. VNG-I and the Advisory Committee on GST might have been more critical in appraising the applications for subsidy on their relevance for *acquis* related matters.

While overall, the administrative management was well organised by VNG International (the implementing international organisation of VNG), it has been reluctant to develop conceptually how best GST could be used to achieve the programme objectives.

Dutch municipalities happen to monitor the progress of the inter-municipal activities against annual or multi-annual plans. In most inter-municipal relations, friendship ties have prevailed over a business-like attitude. Few Dutch municipalities agree with their partners on performance indicators and none apply sanctions based on efficiency or effectiveness criteria. No milestones were set in the larger projects.

Although GST provides resources for initiatives that would not have been taken place otherwise, it can only do so thanks to existing inter-municipal relations. GST provides an input that can only produce output whenever added to input provided by municipal partners. The programme does not support the mechanism (inter-municipal relations) it requires for its own implementation.

Overall, the efficiency of both the activities and the programme has not been the main concern of Dutch municipalities, VNG and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All parties focused on the rightful use of financial resources in the first place, not on efficiency. Over time, procedures became more and more detailed and implementation modalities became more precisely defined, but these were mainly procedural adjustments.

### *Effectiveness*

Approximately one third of the activities (PUGA, STAGE and GIM) could be assessed as effective, in the sense that these activities contributed to achieve their own stated objectives. In addition, all but two MMTPs were effective. Participants indicated how knowledge obtained had been 'translated' into their own working

situation, such as by modifying the organisational structure, changing procedures, or participation in professional networks.

The technical missions by Dutch civil servants were effective as a reflection board and for swift advisory services, but they were not effective for on the job training, due to their short duration.

The majority of the activities, did not, or in part only, contribute to their own stated objectives. The main reasons detected were:

- a lack of follow-up on starter activities;
- the Dutch knowledge and information provided were not applicable or relevant in the local context;
- the stated objective of the activity was either formulated too much in general, or was too ambitious to be realised by the kind of activities that the programme can deliver.

At the programme level, the effectiveness was quite modest. The GST-programme has not been effective in transferring knowledge on the implications of the *acquis communautaire* for the local government level. This was due to three factors: first, the National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) follow standard guidelines by the European Commission. These standard guidelines do not contain explicit references to the local government level. Second, since European regulations are 'translated' into national legislation and regulations, Dutch municipalities are not always aware of the European origin of Dutch legislation and regulations. Municipal civil servants are not the specialists by definition in this field. Thirdly, the administrating VNG-I and the GST Advisory Committee approved applications for subsidy on the base of the activity's contribution to strengthen local government in general. There was only a marginal test whether the contents of the application was related to *acquis* matters.

If argued the other way round, the effectiveness at programme level was modest, due to the fact that the stated programme objectives were far from being realistic in relation to the problems they were supposed to address. And ambitious in relation to the kind of instruments it had at its disposal to achieve the expected results. Compared to the broad objectives, some of the activities were of a trivial nature only, e.g. a participation in a conference or a one-day meeting.

At a later moment in time (2002) the GST-programme added a specific modality to focus more on the *acquis*: the Municipal Accession Training Conference that informs local authorities about the consequences of membership of the European Union.

#### *General remarks*

City *twinning* aims at community wide contacts. The limited amounts of human resources in combination with restricted financial resources require a special design of activities for their optimal use. The strengthening of local government is frequently only one out of the many inter-municipal co-operation activities. The GST-programme did achieve to draw more attention to the performance of local governments within the frame of those inter-municipal relations. Nevertheless, even within a single relationship, the activities embarked upon showed fragmentation.

Respondents in general had a high appreciation for GST-activities. The apparent contradiction between low effectiveness and high appreciation is explained by the fact that decentralised co-operation in general is highly appreciated.

The strengthening of local government refers to a change process that may require external assistance in process management (De Bruijn, ten Heuvelhof, in 't Veld, 1998). The current implementation modalities of GST provide hardly any opportunity to do so. On the contrary, the modalities aim at individual capabilities rather than institutional change. A review and simplification of the implementation modalities should be considered for future actions.

Dutch municipalities did pay attention to the rightful use of resources for inter-municipal co-operation, but have been reluctant to identify performance indicators for efficiency and effectiveness. Taking into consideration the Law on Dualism in Local Government (March 2003), the municipal council may require a more precise accountability on matters of international co-operation. And that implies more attention to the effectiveness of the activities in the frame of inter-municipal relations.

The number of eligible countries to the GST-programme will drop substantially after January 2004, due to the accession of eight Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union. The continuation of a separate programme for only a small number of eligible countries merits renewed justification.



## 2 INTRODUCTION

### 2.1 Municipal International Co-operation

An international 'city link' is either a formalised relation, a friendship linkage or a project-based co-operation between two municipalities, regions, provinces or any other local government entity. The initiative may have been taken either by the Dutch municipality, the local government abroad or by civil society organisations in these cities, towns or places.

The first city-links were established in the aftermath of World War II, when linkage or *twinning* between communities was seen as a means to build bridges of understanding and confidence between nations that had been at war. *Twinning* was aimed at bringing about social and cultural exchanges between officials, schools, community organisations, sports clubs, etc.

Since then, linking has branched out in various directions: north-north, north-east, north-south and south-south. *Twinning* is usually characterised by a formal Agreement or Letter of Understanding aimed at a society-wide co-operation (public sector, private sector and civil society) in a broad array of subject matters. In many cases these *twinning* relations are based on a common history, they are of an undefined duration and based on equity and reciprocity.

Resolution 2861 of the United Nations General Assembly states: "International co-operation among communities is a natural complement to the co-operation of states and non-governmental organisations". According to the United Nations (UNDP, 2000) there are basically four characteristics for successful links:

- commitment (in time and resources);
- community-wide participation;
- mutual understanding (leading to trust and respect for one another); and
- reciprocity.

Although there is no clear demarcation between *twinning* and a friendship relation, in general a friendship relation is less far-reaching. In some reports the term *twinning* is reserved for city-wide relations between economically and socially equal partners, for example, between European cities (European *jumelage* fund). A friendship relation neither comprises necessarily all sectors of society, nor is it between equal partners. Ambitions may be different and relations may be of a temporary character only. Although equity and reciprocity between the partners may be an explicit goal, in practice this is hardly the case.

Local governments may decide to collaborate on a project base only, either for one particular project or for a series of subsequent projects, without starting a broader friendship relation. Similarly, thematic relations are limited to one particular theme of collaboration without aiming at broader contacts. Such thematic relations may

originate from sharing a common feature (e.g. being a university city) or from natural circumstances (cities along the same river).

Other kinds of relations are the so-called network relations, not based on one-to-one contacts, but on various partners within a certain network, such as the Sustainable Cities initiative of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP).

In 2002, in the Netherlands there were 251 municipalities (51 percent of all municipalities) that maintained 438 city linkages (excluding the linkages with West European partners). The city linkages can be distinguished by the way they are organised:

- the city linkage may be maintained entirely by the civil servants of the municipality being part of the local government's functions;
- the city linkage may be maintained by a foundation, or any other legal form of organisation, as public-private collaboration mechanism. Usually the municipality supports such a foundation by assuming (part of) its operational costs;
- the city linkage may be maintained by a predominantly private organisation. Public resources may support certain projects, or the municipal government may play an advisory role. Public resources may -or may not- be used to support the operational expenditures;
- an advisory committee of the municipal council composes the management of the city linkage, or the municipal council appoints individuals to assume responsibility over the city linkage.

The term 'decentralised co-operation' does not refer only to the fact that the relations are maintained at horizontal levels between local governments, but also to the degree of organisational decentralisation and respect for the autonomies of stakeholders within the context of such city links.

Since 1998, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been providing subsidies to strengthen local governments in pre-accession countries through municipal international co-operation. The support programme is called *Gemeentelijke Samenwerking Toetredingslanden* - GST. The objective of GST is as follows:

*"to support the local governments of the Eastern and Central-European countries in their efforts to be prepared for the membership of the European Union. This refers to both the adoption and the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*, as well as the institutional capacity required for such an adoption and implementation"*  
(Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1998).

GST is a co-financing fund that supports initiatives taken by local governments. The resources are made available through a broader Dutch programme in support of societal transformation in the previous plan economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, called Matra. One of the sub-programmes of Matra is destined to support the public sector at the local level in

pre-accession countries. GST provides a subsidy on top of investments made by the Dutch municipality (or another local government entity) on behalf of their partner abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has delegated the day-to-day management of the fund to the Dutch association of municipalities, the *Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten* - VNG. In turn, VNG had assigned this task to its independent company for international affairs, VNG International Ltd (VNG-I).

Apart from GST, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also provides co-financing for other programmes implemented through inter-municipal relations, such as for developing countries (GSO), trilateral co-operation (NEWS) and a special programme for Turkey. In financial terms the relative importance of the GST-programme among these co-financing instruments has been 12 percent (figure 2.1).

**Figure 2.1 The relative importance of GST among the co-financing programmes for inter-municipal co-operation**



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MIDAS.

### **The inter-municipal co-operation programme for the accession to the European Union - GST**

The GST-programme started in 1998 initially for a period of three years. In 2001 GST was extended to December 2004. GST has been open for Dutch municipalities, provinces, public utility companies and district water boards and their umbrella organisations in co-operation with their counterparts from ten accession-states (Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Turkey, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania).

The programme will be closed for those countries that enter the European Union as per 2004.

The main objective of GST has been to advise the local and regional authorities of EU accession states, on the necessary preparations for EU-membership. This has resulted in five sub-objectives:

- implementation of EU laws and regulations of direct and indirect effect to the local authorities of EU accession-states;
- transfer of knowledge about the European Union to the local authorities of the ten accession-states;
- sufficient administrative capacity of the local authorities of the ten accession-states necessary to realise the sub-objectives;
- sufficient local planning and enforcement capacity necessary for the implementation of EU laws and regulations;
- to strengthen the public support for EU-membership among the local population of the ten accession states.

GST enables municipalities of EU accession-states to develop project activities (internships, advisory missions, seminars, brochures, etc.) with their Dutch counterparts in the above mentioned fields. Activities were supposed to focus on the meaning of EU membership for a municipality, on the implementation of relevant EU legislation, on building up local capacity to improve the quality of the public sector, on writing proposals for EU finance and how to monitor and administer the execution of EU financed programmes and on strengthening local support for EU-membership.

GST is based on the 'colleague-to-colleague' approach, as applied in other institutional *twinning* arrangements as well. This approach requires direct contacts, building a relationship of mutual trust, equality and reciprocity. VNG-I indicates: "the approach works best by way of long-term city-links as the development of reciprocity in relationships takes time" (website VNG-I).

However, an existing long-lasting city link is no condition *sine qua non* to allocate GST-subsidies for strengthening local governments, since resources can be applied for incidental events and single projects only.

## **2.2 The intervention model and implementation modalities**

GST is based on city linkages between a Dutch municipality and a partner in an accession country. From a development perspective, there are a number of perceived advantages of this kind of relations, as summarised in table 2.1.


In the Agreement (1998) between the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG on the GST-programme, the implicit assumption was that transfer of knowledge and skills by means of exchange of personnel, would contribute to strengthen capacities. And that subsequently the strengthened capacities may lead to improved *performance* of the local government, in particular an improved performance as far as it concerns adoption of the *acquis* at the level of local government. This logic can be illustrated in figure 2.2.

**Table 2.1 Selection of assumed advantages (and disadvantages) of municipal international co-operation**

<p><b>Advantages</b></p> <p>High effectiveness as a result of collaboration based on equity and reciprocity</p> <p>Well focussed on demand and needs (demand driven, 'ownership')</p> <p>Being in the same professional situation enables to speak the same technical-administrative language</p> <p>A tool to strengthen 'good governance' at a local level</p> <p>Cost-effective, quick, tailor-made assistance</p> <p>A means to mobilise existing municipal expertise for the benefit of others</p> <p>The option to come to structural and durable relationships</p> <p>Local governments are more open to direct participation</p>
<p><b>Disadvantages</b></p> <p>Insufficient authority, no mandate, therefore based on voluntary action only</p> <p>Insufficient specialised professional capacity to provide advice (a civil servant is not a consultant)</p> <p>Continuity depends on the supplier's resources</p> <p>(Dutch) civil servants lack knowledge of local circumstances and public administrative culture</p> <p>Paternalism</p> <p>Too short, too small, too punctual</p>

Source: Based on Schep, Angenent, Wismans en Hillenius (1995: 53).

**Figure 2.2 Intervention logic**



The GST-programme contains five implementation modalities that are predominantly geared towards competence and capability, as well as the capacity to interact:

1. *Programma Uitzending Gemeente Ambtenaren* (PUGA): Programme for temporary deployment of Dutch civil servants to local governments in transition countries (missions for advisory services or training);
2. *STAGE*: Apprenticeship in the Netherlands for public servants/administrators from local governments in transition countries;
3. *Gemeentelijke Initiatieven Matra* (GIM): A modality is aimed at municipalities, provinces and public utilities that do have a long standing relation with a partner local public entity in a transition country. GIM usually combines a number of PUGAs and STAGEs in a single multi-annual project. Besides transfer of knowledge through training and internships, this modality also finances (to a certain extent) the costs of external expertise;
4. Through Municipal Management Training Programmes (MMTP) group-training activities are provided by VNG-I for trainees from partner local governments, which have a similar background or work in a similar sector. These MMTPs consist of one week of lecturing for a group of participants, followed by one week of individual internships in Dutch host municipalities;
5. General activities in support of the PUGA-, STAGE-, GIM- and MMTP-activities (such as preparation missions). The training of Dutch civil servants prior to the deployment to the transition countries (*Cursus Uitzending Gemeente Ambtenaar* - CUGA) is one of the complementary supporting activities.


The local governments take the initiative for STAGE, PUGA or GIM and apply for subsidy, whereas VNG-I is responsible for the organisation of the training courses MMTP and CUGA.

**Box 1 A successful introduction of the front desk approach**

The co-operation between Mikołów (Poland) and Beuningen was aimed at the development of a more efficient functioning of the council and town office through the introduction of project oriented management (a GIM project). Within this project a front desk approach was elaborated and applied in the Town Hall of Mikołów. The evaluators could verify the physical presence of the front desk. The mayor and town clerk reported that thanks to this approach, efficiency had increased as noted by the fact that some 50 percent less citizens now wandered through the corridors of the Town Hall, distracting employees from their work.

Figure 2.3 shows the GST-expenditures by implementation modality, during the period 1998-2001.

**Figure 2.3 GST-expenditures by modality, 1998-2001**



Source: VNG-I files.

### **2.3 Objective of the evaluation and research methodology**

The objective of the evaluation of the Municipal International Co-operation programme, of which GST forms a part, is:

“The analysis and assessment of the policy relevance, the effectiveness and efficiency of activities financed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of municipal international co-operation, that are administered and/or implemented by the VNG, for which VNG was a contract partner of the Ministry” (for ToR, see Annex 4).

The specific objective of the evaluation in both Poland and the Czech Republic has been:

“To describe and analyse how various projects that are part of the GST-programme were implemented and to what extent they have contributed to the strengthening of local governments and in particular have contributed to the adoption and implementation of the *acquis communautaire* by local governments in Poland and the Czech Republic”.

More specifically, the study has endeavoured to address the following questions:

- How relevant has the municipal international co-operation been to the Polish and Czech policy objectives concerning the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* (policy relevancy)?
- How effective have the realised interventions been in strengthening local governance (effectiveness)? How efficient has the input been in order to achieve the desired results (efficiency)?

The relation between the criteria, as well as the indicators used for each criterion is presented in an evaluation matrix (see Figure 2.4).

Other programmes falling under the denominator of Municipal International Co-operation (such as the trilateral programme NEWS) in which municipalities in the Czech Republic were involved, were no subject of the present evaluation.

## **Research components**

The evaluation of GST has consisted of four stages:

- a preparatory phase, in which the methodology was developed and a literature study was carried out. Based on the literature, the Inception Report presented three intertwined analytical models: an intervention model, a context - receptivity model and an input model;
- a study covering the Dutch municipalities, consisting of a survey among them; interviews with Dutch municipal authorities and civil servants; interviews with policy makers and file study;
- field missions in two selected countries: consisting of interviews with policy makers in the sampled municipalities; interviews with civil servants and professionals directly involved in the activities and projects;
- data processing, analysis and reporting.

This document does not report on the results of the preparatory stage, nor on the study among the Dutch municipalities, since that information forms part of the IOB Main Report on Municipal International Co-operation. This document reports on the field missions to Poland and the Czech Republic. Each field mission produced four products:

- 1) an inventory of the activities and the persons directly involved;
- 2) an analysis of the input, output, efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the activities;
- 3) a description of special cases;
- 4) a country specific working paper including context factors and containing the main conclusions.

### *Inventory of activities and tracing*

For the sampled municipalities, an inventory was made of the activities that received GST-funding. Main source of information was the IOB database, derived from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs central database MIDAS. Information was added based on file study at the VNG-I headquarters in the Hague. Each activity was linked to names of specific administrative authorities or civil servants. Prior to the field studies, substantial time was devoted to trace the whereabouts of the persons that were once involved in GST-activities.



*The analysis of the input, output, efficiency, effectiveness and relevancy of the activities*

Since GST comprises a wide array of heterogeneous activities, a standardised registration form was developed in order to describe both input and output. The same form enabled to register an assessment (judgement) on each of the evaluation criteria.

A second standardised registration form was used for the interviews with the actual local authorities. These administrative authorities may or may not have been involved directly with GST-activities, but they do have responsibilities for the current performance of the municipal partnership.

In the Netherlands, interviews were held with key informants of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, VNG-I and persons of, for example, foundations that have been directly involved in the activities. In Poland and the Czech Republic interviews were held with Ministries, foreign donors and associations of municipalities.

In the country specific ToR (see Annex 4) two special case studies were identified per country in order to obtain more in depth information on the common activities.


*Country working paper*

A country working paper was elaborated. Abstracts of these papers were presented as Debriefing Notes to the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Prague and Warsaw and to the directly involved stakeholders. The country papers comprised a context analysis, theoretically fostered in a context and receptivity model (see figure 2.5). The model distinguishes between:

- the political-administrative and legal environment;
- the financial-economic environment of local governments;
- the socio-cultural environment.

A description was made of the current mandate, the structures of local government, as well as the current central government policies regarding local administration (decentralisation, good governance, participation, etc.). The main problems encountered by local governments in each country were described.

**Figure 2.5 Context – receptivity model**



Source: Based on WRR, 2001.

## 2.4 Population and sample

During the period 1998-2001, GST financed applications for subsidy from 74 Dutch municipalities (and 11 other local government organisations) on behalf of their partners in the ten eligible countries for a total of NLG 4.549.500 (€ 2.064.473).

IOB selected Poland and the Czech Republic as countries for field study based on the following criteria:

- number of subsidised activities implemented;
- total amount of subsidies allocated per country;
- the diversity of the instruments used.

Poland and the Czech Republic ranked highest with respect to the number of GST-activities, the total amount of subsidy provided, as well as the number of participating municipalities (see table 2.2).

**Table 2.2 Number of activities, expenditure and number of participating municipalities per eligible accession country, during the period 1997-2001**

GST-country	Number of activities	Total amount (NLG)	Number of participating municipalities	Number of Dutch partner municipalities
Bulgaria	6	234,891	10	11
Czech Republic	21	811,085	30	30
Estonia	3	73,751	2	2
Hungary	15	572,970	9	16
Latvia	15	379,077	15	8
Lithuania	9	195,009	3	3
Poland	32	768,552	25	30
Romania	11	510,371	13	14
Slovenia	3	24,980	3	2
Slovakia	11	291,415	4	5
Turkey	1	-	0	0
Uzbekistan	1	11,306	1	0
Total	128*	3,873,407**	115	121

Notes: \* Some activities have been double counted due to the fact that municipalities from different countries may have been involved in the same activity.

\*\* Total NLG 4.6 million. A number of activities cannot be attributed to a specific country.

Source: VNG-I files.

### Sample selection

The sample represents 40.3 percent of all activities and 32.6 percent of the GST-co-financing made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A total of 18 municipalities (nine in each country), one Marshall office (in Poland the Marshall is the head of the region nominated among directly elected representatives to the regional parliament *Sejmik*) and two Associations of Municipalities (the Association of Polish Cities - APC and the SMO in the Czech Republic) were visited. This group comprised together a sample of 51 GST funded activities. Some of these activities were Municipal Management Training Programmes, where more than one of the sampled local governments participated in the same programme. Since the MMTPs have been used by VNG-I to promote the programme during its initial stages, the number of MMTPs was relatively high. Counting MMTPs as single events, the sample consists of 44 different activities. In terms of municipalities, the sample represents 40 percent of all Polish local governments and 33 percent of the Czech municipalities that have ever made use of GST-resources between 1998 and 2001. The sample represents 75 percent of all activities financed out of the GST-budget for Poland and 69 percent for the Czech Republic during the evaluation period. An overview of the activities by municipality is provided in Annex 5.

Of the 44 sampled activities, 34 different activities could be traced in the partner municipalities and be assessed on all evaluation criteria. One activity could be assessed only on relevance. Together these represent 30 percent of all GST-activities finalised during the period 1998-2001 (see table 2.3).

**Table 2.3 Overview of GST-activities assessed (1998-2001)**

GST-activities	Poland	Czech Rep.	All GST-countries
PUGA – Advisory or project formulation mission by the Dutch municipality	9	5	44
STAGE – Apprenticeship mission by delegates from the partner municipalities	7	1	26
GIM – Support to municipal initiatives (project)	3	3	26
MMTP – Combination of training and exposure in the Netherlands	4	2	13
(Number of participants MMTPs)	(11)	(12)	
Total activities	23	11	109

Notes: In Poland, one GIM was not yet completed (although finalised as far as the GST- contribution was concerned), and could be assessed only on relevance. The North Bohemia regional authority had participated in a three-day visit to the province of South Holland (classified as a GIM) but none of the current authorities could remember this activity. No assessment has been made of this activity.

## 2.5 Organisation

For the realisation of the field studies, the IOB contracted the services of the association SEOR with Ecorys-NEI through a public tender. The association made use of either its own representations (Poland) or subcontracted the services of local experts (Czech Republic) to incorporate local expertise. Prior to the start of the field missions, the local firms contacted the selected municipalities in order to trace the whereabouts of individuals that had been directly involved in GST supported activities.

In each country, the field research started with a one-day workshop in order to discuss the approach. Local researchers were trained in the subject, in the evaluation criteria and in the use of standardised forms and checklists for interviews. All members of the team jointly made a first visit to a municipality. Based on that first experience, checklists were reviewed adjusted to local circumstances. Further visits to municipalities were paid in two groups, each group covering four to five local governments. After having finalised the visits, tentative conclusions were drawn during a workshop by the team. Upon return in the Netherlands, data derived from the standardised forms were analysed quantitatively.

Poland was visited from 4 till 22 November 2002 and the Czech Republic from 2 till 14 February 2003. The following persons undertook the field evaluations:

Poland:

- Mart Nugteren (ECORYS-NEI);
- Radosław Piontek (ECORYS-Polska);
- Wojciech Daniel (independent expert on regional and municipal administration).

Czech Republic:

- Mart Nugteren (ECORYS-NEI);
- Tomáš Růžička (independent expert on regional and municipal administration);
- Jan Vojtek (independent expert on regional and municipal administration).

Final reporting was done by Maaïke Oosterbaan and Willem Cornelissen.  
The draft report was commented upon by the IOB Reference Group in May 2003.

## **2.6 Structure of the report**

The report is structured as follows. The report began with the main conclusions and findings. The first introductory part describes the development of local government since the post 1989 transformation of the societies in Poland and the Czech Republic. The existing external support to strengthen local government in both countries is briefly summarised. From chapter 5 onwards, the report focuses on the GST-activity process and reports subsequently on each of the evaluation criteria: relevance (chapter 6), efficiency (chapter 7) and effectiveness (chapter 8). At the end of each chapter generalisations are made on the evaluation criteria.

**Figure 2.4 Evaluation Matrix Inter-municipal Co-operation for the accession to the European Union**

<b>Objectives and expected results</b>	<b>Means</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Sources and technique</b>	<b>Evaluation</b>
<b>Input Financier</b>	General Development Policies Programme policies	Status policies Policies reflected in agreements	Policy documents Ministry FA Documents to Dutch Parliament	
	Financial resources (subsidy)	Allocations, disbursements Dutch Municipalities' access and use of subsidy	Desk study: data base Survey Dutch Municipalities	
<b>Input Programme</b>	Technical assistance (PUGA), Training (MMTP) Apprenticeship (STAGE) Technical support to projects (GIM) Support activities (CUGA)	No. of missions / apprenticeship / trainers and trainees No. and kind of activities and financing Duration of input delivery	Desk study (data base VNG; dossiers) Survey Dutch Municipalities Structured Interviews with selected municipalities	
	<b>Comparison output with input</b>			
<b>Output</b> Civil servants in recipient countries trained individually or in groups Small local govt. projects implemented	Monitoring	No. of civil servants trained formally or on the job in recipient municipalities No. and sectors of projects implemented Structures according to NPAA / Logon list Institutional change	Desk study (VNG files) Structured interviews selected municipalities in the Netherlands Field studies in Czech Republic and Poland	<b>Effectiveness</b>
<b>Extent to which input via output contribute to expected results</b>				<b>Effectiveness</b>
<b>Outcome:</b> Expected results improved capabilities at individual level for local govt. performance and preparedness for implementation of the acquis communautaire at local level	Evaluation	Institutional interaction Career development trained versus untrained Changes in institutional structures Process improvement	Field studies in Czech Republic and Poland Structured interviews partner municipalities and directly involved civil servants	<b>Relevance</b>
<b>Extent to which input via output and outcome contribute to specific objectives</b>				<b>Relevance</b>
<b>Impact:</b> Governance capacity of local governments strengthened Adoption / implementation acquis at local level Citizen's participation in local governance		Institutionalisation of participation Changes in problem solving capacity Improved public accountability	Field study in municipalities NPAA / Logon analysis	
<b>Overall objective:</b> Adoption of and implementation of measures and legislation of the acquis communautaire relevant at the local level				
<b>Final objective:</b> Societal transformation as preparedness of membership of the European Union				

### 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

#### 3.1 Introduction

Both Poland and the Czech Republic experienced major local government reforms in the nineties. The first step of reform in Poland was made by the adoption of the Act on Local Self-government in March 1990. Also in the Czech Republic, the year 1990 marked a new era in local government with the adoption of the Act on Municipalities.

Poland's public administration system is based on four levels:

- municipality (so called *gmina*);
- county or district (so called *powiat*);
- regions (so called *voivodship*);
- the national level.

In Poland there are 16 *voivodships* and 2,424 *gminas*.

The Czech public administrative system subdivides the nation into regions, so called *kraj* (higher units of territorial self determination) and municipalities (territorial grassroots level of local government). The district offices were abolished in 2001. Their tasks have been passed on to 205 special municipalities. These municipalities now perform, in addition to the municipal tasks, also duties for a group of smaller municipalities around them. Among the municipalities there are 19 so called 'statutory towns', that have the right to establish lower levels of government (at neighbourhood level). So far, only seven statutory towns made use of this entitlement. In the Czech Republic there are 14 regions and 6,250 municipalities.

**Table 3.1 Local administration in Poland and the Czech Republic**

Level	Poland	Czech Republic
Municipalities	2,424 <i>gminas</i>	6,250 municipalities, of which 19 statutory towns
Districts	373 <i>powiats</i>	205 municipalities out of the 6,250, delivering district level services.
Regions	16 <i>voivodships</i>	14 <i>kraj</i> (regions)

In both countries, the generic tasks at the municipal level comprise, amongst others:

- land use and local development;
- management of local roads;
- waste management;
- local public transport;
- social services;
- housing;
- pre-schools and primary education;

- culture and sports;
- maintenance of public spaces and buildings;
- maintenance of cemeteries;
- local public security and fire protection.

On some of the above-mentioned tasks, devolution has taken place (cemeteries, waste management) which implies that the local governments have full command over these tasks and are solely responsible. Other tasks are shared or delegated responsibilities (education, social services). In Poland, the municipalities have the right to take up any additional task which it considers in the interest of its citizens and which does not conflict with the mandates of other levels of government.

In both countries, the Central Government has delegated tasks to the municipal level. The fundamental problem of local governments in both Poland and the Czech Republic is the fact that the continuous process of delegation and decentralisation increases the local governments' duties, without a corresponding expansion of the resource envelop from either the central budget and/or the system to generate local revenue. In general, local governments lack the financial means to perform the tasks delegated to them satisfactorily.

The following sections present some detail on local government development in both countries.

### **3.2 Local government in Poland**

In Poland, the Act on Local Self Government states that the jurisdiction of the local council extends to any public task of local significance, in this way connected with the satisfaction of collective needs of the community and covering its territory or its distinct part (not reserved to or excluded by statutes and mandates of other entities). Two basic types of responsibilities can be distinguished: obligatory functions (autonomous tasks) and those delegated by the central government. The municipal councils deal with the autonomous tasks only. The national administration may delegate some of its responsibilities to a local government through legislation or by mutual agreement, in which case it must cover the costs for such delegated activities. In practice, this is not always the case.

A 'three-tier system' was introduced on 1 January 1999, replacing a system with more (49) *voivodships* that were directly answerable to the central level. The *powiat* (county) was introduced as an entirely new level of government. Governments at all three levels (or four, including the central level) are directly elected. Since 2002, the Mayor is also directly elected. The Marshall is the head of the *voivodship's* government nominated by directly elected representatives to the regional parliament (*sejmik*). The central government appoints a governor (*voivod*), representing the national government at regional level. The governor's main task is to verify whether regional legislation adheres to and obeys the Constitution. The Marshall, for example, negotiates the funding of regional development activities from the central budget with the *voivod*.



The system is characterised by a high degree of legal decentralisation, which in practice however, is not yet fully understood and endorsed, in particular not at the central government level. The main problem of local governments in Poland is their lack of financial resources to realise the increasing number of duties. Many *gminas* are economically weak and barely satisfy the residents' needs for public services. In 2002, the budgets of local governments in Poland were lower than during previous years. Also the geographical distribution of revenue generated by local governments in Poland is far from being distributed equally. Almost 50 percent of the local revenue generated is concentrated in 250 municipalities.

An important issue in Poland is the effective and efficient utilisation of EU pre-accession funds (and from 2004 onwards, the EU structure and cohesion funds). The strengthening of the absorption capacity is a bare necessity for most local governments in order to cope with an increasing load of functions under different fiscal funding and external financing mechanisms.

### **3.3 Local government in the Czech Republic**

Modern history of local government in the Czech Republic (CR) can be divided into three phases. The post November 1989 democratic turnover has been the starting point of the first one. The other two stages are represented by two different events in the reform of the public administration. In 1990, the system of local government was reorganised by the adoption of the Municipal Act. In the same year municipal councils were democratically elected, replacing the previously existing National Committees at the local level. District national committees were transformed into district offices and were charged with implementing functions delegated by the national administration. The previously existing Regional Committees were abolished and their mandates and functions were distributed among municipalities, district offices and the state.

The second stage started after the establishment of an independent Czech Republic, after the separation from Slovakia, on 1 January 1993. The 'higher territorial self-governing units', i.e. regions, were fostered in the newly adopted Constitution. Once the Constitution had been approved, a lengthy and polemic national debate started on the need and functions of regions. This debate dragged on until the adoption of a Constitutional law on the establishment of higher-level territorial units in 1997. The law became effective on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2000. The corresponding implementation laws, in particular the Act on Regions, were approved in 2000.

The third stage of the reform was triggered by the first elections for the regional councils (2001) and the establishment of the regional offices. This marked the abolishment of the previous District Offices and implied the transfer of their mandate to other public entities, i.e. the new municipal and regional bodies. Currently, there are 14 regions and 6,250 municipalities. In principle, all municipalities have the same competencies and duties. However, the so-called 'statutory towns' (usually the regional urban centres) form a special group, while the capital Prague, is governed by a special law, and has an exclusive position.

The main weakness of the administrative reform in the Czech Republic has been the minor change in the share of autonomous municipal tasks as compared to the delegated tasks from the central level. While many functions were deconcentrated, they were not delegated. In other words, these functions are outside the mandate of the municipal councils and are mostly regulated by special laws, that establish the lines of command (Ministerial Decrees). Municipalities are rather implementing agencies of such tasks. Little change has taken place in the redistribution of public funds, or in fiscal decentralisation. In addition, the lack of qualified civil servants at the local level has been another problem affecting the performance of local governments negatively.

## 4 EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INTERVENTIONS

In the accession countries, the efforts to decentralise both the public administration and the political system in order to achieve a closer link between the citizen and government (democratic local government) are not only triggered by the internal forces of a society that transforms itself from a central plan economy into a democratic pluralistic society. The efforts are also motivated by the aspiration to become a respected member of the European Union. A democratic society with a government accountable for its acts and answerable to its population is a condition for this membership. In order to speed up the transformation of the society and the corresponding reform of the public administration, external agents support those efforts, amongst them the European Commission and bilateral donors.

### 4.1 External support in Poland

The most noticeable external support programmes to local government development in Poland are the following:

- European Union-Phare. The Phare programme has been the main instrument of the EU support to regional and local governments in Poland. In its very early stages this programme was aimed at Poland and Hungary only. Later it was extended to all pre-accession countries. Since 1990 many activities were implemented. Examples are the 1991 Programme for Local Initiatives (€ 7.6 million), the STRUDER Regional Development programme (€ 76.7 million), the Rural Areas Programme for Infrastructure and Development (€ 20 million) and the 1997 Regional Development Programme (€ 15 million). A major support to local governments in border areas was the Cross-Border-Co-operation programme that financed projects in municipalities and *powiats* in border areas for an amount of € 500 million. Although most of this funding went into tangible infrastructural projects, local authorities received ‘hands-on’ training in project preparation, implementation, management, and public procurement procedures according to EU – guidelines, etc.;
- European Union-ISPA. The ISPA<sup>1</sup> aims at supporting the transport and environmental sectors, and the SAPARD programme provides support to agriculture and rural development. Under ISPA mainly *gminas* applied for co-funding large-scale investments (minimum € 5 million, while so far the largest investment was € 146 million). Under SAPARD rural municipalities (next to private farmers and agro-processing firms) may apply for finance. Although these programmes concern project finance only, their magnitude is of such an

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<sup>1</sup> ISPA: *Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession* finances environmental and infrastructure projects. The annual budget exceeds € 1 billion. Poland receives approximately € 5 billion during the period 2000-2006 from the various EU programmes, such as Phare, ISPA, Agenda 2000, and the Cohesion Fund.

- extent that it spins off to the management qualities of local governments and to planning, project management and procurement procedures in particular;
- World Bank. Since 2000 the Government of Poland implements the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan-funded Rural Development Programme, that includes the strengthening of local governments (€ 10 million);
- USAID. Assistance to local government development and decentralisation was one of the key components of the United States Agency for International Development assistance programmes to Poland. Many projects were implemented, including those aimed at strengthening human capabilities through training and exposure trips;
- The British Know-How Fund. This fund financed, amongst others, the Local Government Assistance Programme, the Lubelski Rural Development Initiative and the Silesia Community Development Project 'Wspólnota', all aimed at improving the capabilities and capacities of local governments.

Bilateral donors that have provided support to Polish local governments are France, Germany, Japan and Denmark.

## **4.2 External support in the Czech Republic**

The Czech Republic has received external support to local government development as well. The most important programmes have been:

- European Union. The Phare programme has been the main external programme in support of the fundamental changes of the political, economic and social system of the country. Phare has provided advisory services, training, equipment and direct investment in virtually all areas of the economy and society. During the decade 1990-2000, € 752 million was allocated to the Czech Republic. Many of the Phare programmes have had a substantial regional development dimension, while several also contained the municipal level. The Cross Border programme allocated well over € 200 million for municipal investments in border areas. In the Czech Republic, a very extensive geographical area was classified as being 'border area', and this made the programme one of the major ones for regional and local development. Apart from the Phare programmes also the SAPARD (€ 22 million) and the ISPA (€ 71 million) provided substantial support at the local government level;
- Bilateral programmes. Several donors (USAID, Germany and Austria) directed their bilateral programmes to decentralisation, by providing special assistance to the regional and local levels.

### 4.3 The Dutch programme for municipal co-operation in the context of external support to local governments

The support of the Dutch Government to the accession countries, amongst them Poland and the Czech Republic was not aimed at the local governments in particular. In fact, the support to local governments has been part of a broader programme for societal transformation (in Dutch *maatschappelijke transformatie*: Matra) only. Matra is a substantial, wide-ranging programme of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, designed to promote social transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. It supports *existing* private initiatives, focusing on activities that contribute to the development of an open, pluralist and democratic society, securely embedded in the rule of law. Matra seeks in particular to strengthen the fabric of civil society, stressing the importance of co-operation and interaction between private and public bodies. While focussing in its origin mainly on building a civil society, in which the civilians will feel responsible for what their society is all about, in a later stage more attention was paid to the strengthening of the public sector. This was in particular the case for the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for which a special sub-programme was developed: Matra pre-accession.

GST is one of the components of the (pre-) accession programme and supports the co-operation between Dutch municipalities and local government partners in the Central and Eastern European countries on activities aimed at the strengthening of local governance. 'Governance' is broader than 'government' and refers to the relation between public sector and the citizenry.

There is a fundamental difference between the bilateral assistance from other donors aimed at strengthening the local governments and the Dutch GST-programme. The GST-programme is not channelled through the central government, but through Dutch municipalities: it is a decentralised co-operation programme.

Comparing multilateral and bilateral assistance programmes with inter-municipal co-operation is unfair, but it does show the relative importance of the Dutch GST-programme as compared to other external flows in support of the same objective: the strengthening of the capacities of local governments. Table 4.1 illustrates the modesty of the Dutch programme as compared to others.

**Table 4.1 External support for strengthening the capacities of local governments**

Programme	Poland	Czech Republic
EU Phare programmes 1990-2000	Over € 1,000 million	Approx. € 200 million
ISPA/SAPARD	Approx. € 400 million	Over € 25 million
Other multilateral donor programmes	World Bank, € 10 million	
Bilateral donor programmes	USAID, British Know-How Fund, France, Germany, Japan, Denmark, Netherlands (MATRA, PSO)	USAID, Germany, Austria, Netherlands (MATRA, PSO)
GST-programme 1997-2001	€ 0.8 million	€ 0.8 million

#### 4.4 *Twinning* relations and GST

The programme to support the capacities of local governments to adopt the implications of the *acquis communautaire* at the local level, are implemented within the context of an existing relation between a municipality in the Netherlands and a local government in either Poland or the Czech Republic. Formally such a relationship or *twinning* is not a condition, but in practice programme activities can hardly be implemented without such a linkage. GST-subsidies cannot be used to establish relations between Dutch municipalities and their partners in Poland and the Czech Republic, but it uses these relations to implement the programme activities.

The number of registered *twinning* or friendship relations between Polish and Czech local governments on one side and Dutch municipalities on the other are shown in table 4.2.

**Table 4.2** *Twinning* and GST-relations

Relations	Poland	Czech Republic
Registered <i>twinning</i> or friendship relations	109	55-58
GST-relations	25 municipalities and 1 <i>voivodship</i>	23 municipalities and 1 regional authority

Some of these *twinning* relations are very active in a broad range of activities: social, cultural, entrepreneurial, educational activities, etc. These activities are not always initiated by the public sector institutions, but are often the product of initiatives taken by civil society or private sector, such as NGOs, sports clubs, or enterprise associations.

The municipal governments may, or may not, decide to develop activities aimed at strengthening the capacities of the partner within the frame of such an inter-municipal relation. And if they mutually decide to do so, the Dutch partner may, or may not, apply for GST-subsidy for these activities. There is not always a sharp line distinguishing GST-funded activities from those funded by the local governments themselves, which is not surprising: GST is a subsidy that adds resources to those made available by the partners. Nevertheless, well over eighty percent of the municipalities that do have lasting relations, do develop joint activities aimed at strengthening local governance. And of all those that do develop activities in that field, about ninety percent make use of GST-subsidies.

#### 4.5 GST-activities

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocates funds within a policy framework. The Ministry has delegated the management and administration of the GST-programme to VNG by means of a contract. VNG has assigned its organisation for international relations VNG International to manage the programme. The subsidies

are allocated only in the form of certain implementation modalities in order to achieve the stated objectives. Table 4.3 provides an overview of these six implementation modalities.

**Table 4.3 Overview of GST-implementation modalities**

Activity	Input	Remarks
MMTP	A one week formal course usually conducted in the Netherlands by VNG-I, followed by 1-2 weeks internships in the Dutch host municipalities	Number of participants 15-25. Expenditures are based on a fixed amount per participant. VNG-I organises the course part and enters into GST-contracts with host municipalities for daily subsistence allowance of the visiting officers, for translation costs and other costs to the Dutch municipality
PUGA	Mission by one or more persons from the Netherlands municipality to the partner local government	Eligible for subsidy are Dutch local political authorities, civil servants and civilians directly involved in the city link activities. The subsidy covers the travel expenses, the costs for preparation courses, insurance, daily subsistence allowance and translation costs. In addition, it covers part of the salary costs for civil servants.
STAGE	Internship by one or more persons, usually civil servants in the Dutch host municipality	The subsidy covers travel costs and daily subsistence allowance of the officials from the partner local governments, including insurance and translation costs.
GIM	Combinations of several PUGAs and/or STAGEs for a single predetermined project	Under certain conditions use can be made of external expertise.
General Activities	Support for e.g. seminars, publications	In Poland and the Czech Republic no General Activities have taken place.
Programme Support	Aimed at general activities in support of GST, such as the training of civil servants CUGA	To a maximum of 3 percent of the total budget for GST

The distinction between GIM and STAGE and PUGA is often rather arbitrary and of an administrative nature. The PUGA is frequently used to prepare a GIM. The GIM may consist of series of both PUGAs and STAGEs on a single theme, or in support of the same department of the partner local government.

Table 4.4 depicts the number of activities by modality in Poland and the Czech Republic till the end of 2001.

**Table 4.4 Number and type of activities in the sample in Poland and the Czech Republic (1998-2001)**

Activities by modality	Number of local governments Poland	Number of activities Poland	Number of local governments Czech Republic	Number of activities Czech Republic
STAGE	10	13	3	3
PUGA	8	11	5	6
GIM	3	3	4	4
MMTP	15	4	23	3

Source: VNG-I files.

#### 4.6 Profiles of the participating municipalities

GST is implemented within the context of city linkages. The structural, and usually lasting, relations between two local governments have been almost a *conditio sine qua non* for the implementation of GST-activities. There are few exceptions, such as project-based relations. GST does not invest in the relations between local governments; it only uses them to implement the envisaged programme activities.

Proper matching between local governments (and the communities) is of importance for the success and sustainability of the relations (Schep, Angenent, Wismans and Hillenius, 1995: Chapter 6). 'Proper matching' may be based on one or various features shared in common, such as a main economic activity (i.e. industry, university), geography (port); history or cultural background. The size of cities/towns in terms of number of inhabitants is usually not considered a strong criterion for matching. Nevertheless, unequal partnership is often seen as an impediment for success. Table 4.5 illustrates that in practice there happens to be a certain match in terms of size (expressed by the number of inhabitants) between the municipalities. In the sample, there were no extreme inequalities between the size of the Polish and Czech cities and their Dutch partners.

**Table 4.5 Correlation in the partnership between size-classes (in sample)**

Polish and Czech municipalities	Dutch municipalities				
	> 500,000	250-500,000	100-250,000	25-100,000	< 25,000
> 500,000 inh.		1			
250-500,000 inh.			2		
100-250,000 inh.			2		
25-100,000 inh.			3	4	2
< 25,000 inh.				5	5

Since the MMTP is organised by VNG, it is used as a mechanism to get municipalities on both sides interested in the GST-programme. Local governments may have lasting relations, but may not have developed activities in the area of strengthening of local



government before. Other relations may have become dormant in the course of time and GST may imply an impetus to revitalise these contacts. There is a tendency that the MMTPs mainly attract smaller municipalities (72 percent of the participating municipalities have less than 25,000 inhabitants), but this might be the result of the skewed distribution of municipalities according to the size of groups (expressed by the number of inhabitants) in the selected partner countries, in particular in the Czech Republic, where the majority of the local governments happen to be very small.



## 5 THE ACTIVITY PROCESS

### 5.1 Demand or supply driven

The objective of GST refers explicitly to the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* at the local level and/or to the support of institutional strengthening with the aim to facilitate or enable the implementation of *acquis* related regulations. The eligibility for subsidy of an activity was, according to the agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG, implicitly determined by the contents of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (or any other comparable document) of the partner country (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1998, Beleidskader). The weight of the *acquis* within the second objective of the programme (institutional strengthening) has never been spelled out precisely by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in consequence has been subject to different interpretations over time.

An important feature for subsidy eligibility was the demand driven character (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1998, Beleidskader: 9), but also this criterion has been subject for debate. The department of the Ministry responsible for the programme argued that the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* is an external obligation anyhow and therefore by nature a supply driven condition. In practice, the appraisal of the applications by Dutch municipalities and VNG against the NPAA's has been almost impossible. Any NPAA is elaborated against a format determined by the European Commission and contains 15 chapters. The European Commission monitors the progress made and adherence to the NPAA. None of these chapters refers explicitly to the consequences at the local administrative levels. A second reason was that the Dutch partners usually do not possess any documentation on the NPAA's (although they are published by the European Commission on a special internet site). In absence of clear indications in the NPAA's on local level government, the implications of the *acquis* for local governments have been analysed and listed by the Logon Working Group Vienna and the Local and Regional Phare Partnership Working Group of Eurocities. This so-called 'Logon list' refers to approximately a hundred European guidelines in the areas of (predominantly) environment, public procurement, utility enterprises, anti-discrimination and social security to which legislation at the local government level has to adhere to.

VNG-I, as well as its Advisory Committee on GST, claim that they have appraised applications for subsidy against this Logon-list. But this has been a marginal test. From the perspective of availability of financial resources, there was no need for more rigid scrutiny. In addition, the threshold to Dutch municipalities for applying for subsidy was supposed to be kept as low as possible. And the autonomy of the partner local governments to determine the content matter of their collaboration was to be respected. In consequence, VNG-I did not impose strict conditions on content matters. The potential of the proposed activities to contribute to the strengthening of local government in general prevailed.

Within the enormous range of 31 different thematic areas (2002) of *acquis* adoption measures, there was ample room for the Czech or Polish partners to set their priorities. During the field studies, the evaluators have registered on whose initiative the various activities were undertaken. Thereto it was verified:

- who took the initiative for or the lead of the intervention (Dutch or Polish, Czech municipality);
- whether the Polish, Czech municipalities considered the proposals ‘demand’ or ‘supply driven’;
- and as ‘cross-checking’ question: whether the Polish, Czech municipalities were familiar with the criteria set by the GST-programme.

The last question aimed at assessing whether the partners abroad were aware of the existence of the GST-subsidy facility and whether they were familiar with the criteria used, so that they could have formulated activities in accordance with GST.

Here, a distinction should be made between MMTPs and the other three modalities. The general Programme Support activities and MMTPs are organised by VNG-I. A MMTP is organised around a selected subject matter. According to VNG-I these themes were selected on the basis of exchange of information with both the Dutch municipalities and the associations of municipalities in the partner countries. While Dutch municipalities confirm to have been consulted in selecting topics for a particular year, the Polish and Czech associations of municipalities (ACP and SMO) do not remember to have ever been approached at any stage on this issue.

The Polish and Czech partners consider the first week of MMTP (central lecturing) as fully supply-driven. This does not affect their high degree of appreciation for the courses. Neither do complaints exist about the subjects chosen. In most cases the second week could be adjusted to the specific demands of the participants (in practice a STAGE). Thereto MMTP participants notify their preferences to their host municipality in advance. However, in practice, this advance notice was issued on the Thursday prior to the internship week and such short notice impeded to offer a real tailor-made programme. Despite this option to adjust the second week to personal preferences, all but one MMTP participants interviewed considered the programme entirely supply driven.

In case of the other modalities (PUGA, STAGE and GIM), activities used to be arranged around a single subject matter or project. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the main subject matters of activities in the sample. The last column presents who, according to the partner municipality, took the initiative or the lead in the activity.

**Table 5.1 Overview of subject matters and initiatives**

<b>Polish (PI)/Czech partner (CR)</b>	<b>Dutch partner</b>	<b>Type of intervention</b>	<b>Theme</b>	<b>Initiative</b>
ława (PI)	Tholen	PUGA and STAGE	Waste management	Joint
Warsaw (PI)	The Hague	PUGA and STAGE	Communication	Dutch
Mikołow (PI)	Groningen	PUGA and STAGE	Housing	Dutch (private partner)
Białystok (PI)	Eindhoven	GIM	Waste management	Joint
Lubelskie voivodship (PI)	Gelderland province	GIM	Waste management	Dutch
Mikołow (PI)	Beuningen	GIM	Project oriented working	Polish
APC (PI- association)	Amsterdam	PUGA (conference)	City marketing	Polish
Leszno (PI)	Deurne	STAGE	Finance and Accounting	Dutch
Toruń (PI)	Leiden	PUGA (conference)	Drug addiction	Polish
Mieścisko (PI)	Maartensdijk	STAGE	Finance, spatial planning, social affairs	Polish
Lubelskie voivodship (PI)	Gelderland province	STAGE	HRM and Organisation	Joint
APC (PI- association)	Gelderland province	PUGA	Preparation of GIM	Not known
Příbram (CR)	Hoorn	PUGA and STAGE	Europe	Dutch
Semily (CR)	Driebergen	PUGA and STAGE	Roma minority employment policy	Dutch
Moravska Trebova (CR)	Vlaardingen	2 PUGAs	Citizens' participation	Dutch
Kláštorec nad Ohří (CR)	Baarn	GIM	Citizens' participation	Agora NGO
Cheb (CR)	Rheden	GIM	Citizens' participation	Agora NGO
Liberec (CR)	Amersfoort	GIM	Development of long-term vision plan	Joint

Source: Field missions.

Within Poland the majority of the respondents was aware of GST in general, but this was not the case in the Czech Republic. It was not always clear whether the activities were externally co-financed, and in most cases respondents thought that VNG provided the funds. Since the financial means are channelled through the Dutch partner only, the recipients have little knowledge of the modalities and criteria of GST. During MMTPs VNG-I provides information about the programme to the visiting participants. Since the subsidy is made available to the Dutch municipality and the original ideas and proposals might have been re-elaborated by the Dutch partners, this automatically makes the latter the leading partner.

About 80 percent of all PUGAs do contain an element of project identification or formulation, whereas one would have expected that PUGAs were used to appraising project proposals, rather than formulating them. In seven out of 18 *twinning* relations (39 percent), the initiative for selecting the subject matter of the activities was taken by the Dutch partner. In four cases (all Polish partners) the partner took entirely the initiative. Another four themes were joint initiatives. A Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), named Agora, was the initiator of two activities in the Czech Republic.

In practice many topics are being discussed between the partners in the context of the broader city linkage programme and these are not restricted to the co-operation in the area of capacity strengthening. But whenever this field is concerned, the final decision usually rests with the Dutch municipality.

## **5.2 Administration and accounting**

Once an application for GST-support is approved by VNG-I, all administration and accounting rests with the Dutch partner only, or, in the case of MMTP, VNG-I itself. The partner municipalities keep record of their own expenditures as required under the local law and their internal accounting system. These financial contributions remain outside the financial monitoring and reporting system of the GST-programme.

Whereas the financial support by Dutch municipalities is being accounted for in different ways (the municipal budget and VNG-I), the contribution by the partner is hard to assess. This is due to the fact that many of the joint activities belong either to the day-to-day operations of the partner or concern projects co-financed by many partners at the same time.

## **5.3 Implementation**

In essence, municipal co-operation follows a 'colleague-to-colleague' approach, whereby the main instruments to achieve the objectives are the exchange of experience between officials from both sides, and exposure to Dutch experiences. In practice, the 'colleagues' are not always civil servants. Also the relevant NGOs (i.e. those involved in environmental issues and social policy implementation) or semi-public institutions can be categorised as 'peers' in this respect. In some cases, Dutch municipalities have contracted external experts and have even contracted out projects (in Poland) to commercial companies. Table 5.2 lists implementing organisations or commercial enterprises that were active in the sampled activities that cannot (or hardly) be classified as 'colleagues'.

The NGO Agora is of origin a Dutch NGO that has specialised in promoting transparency of local administration and the role of citizen's participation. Some years ago it established Agora Central Europe (CE) in Prague, which is now a fully autonomous Czech NGO. Agora CE started in 1999 a pilot project with two Czech municipalities on promoting citizens' participation. The University of Plzen played a

role in it. At a conference in Plzen the results of these pilots were exposed to other municipalities, amongst them some (Cheb and Klášterec) with a Dutch municipal partner. In 2000, these municipalities embarked upon a follow-up Agora project. Subsequently, the Dutch municipalities applied for a GIM for their respective partners. GST-finance covered the participation of Dutch civil servants to a mid-term conference, as well as a final conference. It also covered a lump sum payment to Agora, enabling the NGO to implement the project.

**Table 5.2 Implementation of GST-activities through third parties**

Polish (P) / Czech (CR) partner	Dutch partner	Theme	Implementing organisation or company
Mikołów (P)	Beuningen	Project oriented management	Ernst & Young College (mainly)
Mikołów (P)	Groningen	Housing	DAGIN
Mikołów (P)	Groningen	Housing	Thorbecke Academy (partly)
Lubelskie v.v.ship (P)	Gelderland	Preparation	Arcadis (organised workshop)
Cheb (CR)	Rheden	Citizens' participation	Agora Central Europe
Kláštorec nad Ohří (CR)	Baarn	Citizens' participation	Agora Central Europe
Liberec (CR)	Amersfoort	Spatial planning	DHV Liberec
Semily (CR)	Driebergen	Roma policy	NGO dealing with Roma

In addition, Agora was invited by VNG-I to take the lead for the 2001 MMTP on citizens' participation. As a result more municipalities (in the sample: Zlin and Moravska Trebova) became interested and started activities with the NGO funded with GST-resources (outside the evaluation period). One Czech municipality felt that it was forced by VNG to accept Agora as a partner. This was strongly denied by Agora, the Dutch municipality and VNG-I, but was, most likely, caused by the way the Dutch municipality initially had interpreted the VNG-I - Agora linkage.

#### **5.4 Monitoring, role of the Embassy**

VNG-I monitors the implementation of GST on the basis of reports, meetings with Dutch municipalities and unstructured information by their partners. The partner local governments elaborate the reports on STAGEs and MMTP (individual evaluation sheets), while Dutch partners present reports on PUGAs and GIMs.

Dutch municipalities carry out some monitoring through reviews (usually in the form of a PUGA), but there is no monitoring by the partner municipality on the Dutch performance. In general, there has been little process monitoring. Partners did not agree on certain performance indicators in advance. Written reports (PUGA, GIM) do not adhere to any predetermined format, although VNG-I introduced a recommended format in 1999. In about 40 percent of the cases reviewed, the reports hardly addressed the issues raised during the application for subsidy. This made evaluative judgements on effectiveness rather difficult, since the activities were frequently formulated in a rather general way, lacking the definition of pre-established milestones in the process.

The rather poor or absent progress monitoring by the Dutch municipality is surprising. First of all, it is the Dutch municipality that is administratively accountable to VNG-I for the financial resources. Secondly, the municipal council closely monitors the municipal performance on most policy areas, but apparently, the effectiveness of the international relations was hard to assess, also by councils.

Up to mid 2003, neither VNG-I, nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had conducted or contracted an external evaluation of the GST-programme, as envisaged in the Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1998).

The Royal Netherlands Embassies in Poland and the Czech Republic did not have any direct responsibility for the implementation of GST. In both countries, representatives of Dutch municipalities usually do not visit the Embassy when involved in GST-activities. VNG-I claims that information on the GST-programme has been provided to all embassies in the ten eligible accession countries. The embassies in Poland and the Czech Republic could not confirm this and have never been consulted on the relevance of specific activities afterwards. Although one may differ in opinion whether embassies should be consulted at all in the case of decentralised co-operation, they do have an information task on the use of public resources outside the Netherlands. And they have to be answerable for bilateral relations in general. Embassies should have been better informed about the procedures of the programme and, with regular frequency, be informed about the activities funded with GST-resources.



## **6 RELEVANCE**

### **6.1 Introduction**

Relevance is the degree to which the rationale and objectives of an activity are –or remain- pertinent, significant and worthwhile, in relation to the identified priority needs and concerns. Usually, relevance is meant to be an overall assessment of whether interventions are in support of the donor and partner policies, as well as in support of local needs and priorities, hence whether an activity is:

- relevant vis-à-vis the problems perceived;
- relevant vis-à-vis the recipient policies;
- relevant vis-à-vis the donors' policies.

In practice, this implies that relevance is judged by the consistency with policies, needs and priorities. From an evaluation perspective, relevance can also be understood as the extent to which input via output and outcome have contributed to specific (programme) objectives. In that case relevance is understood as impact (see figure 2.4). But the impact of very small activities, such as the GST-activities can hardly be determined. As a proxy the potential impact has been judged based on a theoretical model. Activities have been assessed on their relevance to contribute to strengthening local government, according to a model by Dunn (1994). Dunn identified external input with a potential to contribute to strengthen the capacities of local governments. According to this model the means aimed at the improvement of the quality of local governance should aim at:

- improving either the capacity to formulate and define policies or the implementation capacity of the local civil / public service (management and skills);
- improving the transparency and accountability of local governance (political and civil service domain);
- improving the interaction and communication (with the civil society and private sector, with the press);
- improving civil participation (in defining the political agenda, in formulating policy and in monitoring the implementation of policies).

### **6.2 Relevance vis-à-vis problems encountered**

The majority of activities address relevant problems in the recipient municipalities, such as:

- communication with citizens, quality of the Town Hall to deliver services;
- general efficiency of the local administration;
- environmental and waste management;
- housing and town planning;
- employment and social policies (two MMTPs).

All respondents in the partner local governments indicated that the topics dealt with were relevant to the problems encountered in the municipality. For all GST-activities, real needs of the municipalities have been taken into account either at the moment of preparation of the project or during its implementation stage.

Two exceptions should be mentioned, both in Poland. These were the contribution by the Public Relations officer from Amsterdam to the conference of the Association of Polish Cities (APC) in 1999 on city marketing (PUGA) and the contribution by Leiden to the Conference on Abatement of Drug Addiction in Toruń in 1999 (PUGA). The topics dealt with were relevant, but the Dutch example was of little use to the Polish situation, according to the respondents. Similar observations were made regarding the MMTP on Employment, where the Dutch examples were considered “interesting”, but not applicable to the Polish context, due to the limited budget available as compared to the high number of unemployed to be attended.

### **6.3 Recipient’s policy relevance**

When the GST-programme was designed, the adoption of the *acquis* at the local level still received little attention in pre-accession countries. The changes in national administration in these countries implied both the de-concentration of public tasks and the delegation or devolution of responsibilities and powers to the local level governments. Citizens’ participation and communication with citizens implies a higher level of transparency of government and is therefore of vital importance to support the overall reforms. Exposure to good practices in the Netherlands, contributes to that process. From that perspective, GST-activities, in potential, can be considered relevant.

Although none of the GST-activities was absolutely essential for the development and implementation of municipal policies, most GST-activities were relevant for the policies aimed at strengthening local governments’ capacities in general. GST-activities contributed as a source of knowledge for policy development and local government service delivery.

### **6.4 Relevance for strengthening of local government**

The Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG assumes that transfer of knowledge and skills by means of exchange of personnel contributes to strengthening of capacities, and that subsequently the strengthened capacities lead to improved performance by the local government. It particularly leads to an improved performance as far as the adherence to *acquis* related regulations is concerned, as well as the preparedness for instrumentalisation and implementation of duties that emerge from the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*.

The main findings concerning the relevance of the sampled activities in Polish and Czech municipalities for the strengthening of local government, can be summarised as follows:

- In general, GST-activities address relevant issues concerning skills, transparency, accountability and civic society participation.
- Not in all cases however, could the Dutch example be considered as relevant or illuminating to the Polish or Czech situation. For example, one MMTP dealt with employment, a topic that does not belong to the domain of local government in the Czech Republic. The participants of the course were from labour offices and not from the local governments. Another project in the Czech Republic did not strengthen local government, but was targeted at the position of the Roma ethnic minority.
- The scale of intervention is rather limited. Activities took place in a dynamic environment, characterised by an autonomous thrive towards adherence to the requirements of EU accession and within a context of significant effort funded by other external agents.
- There are about 8,750 municipalities in Poland and the Czech Republic (2,500 in Poland and 6,250 in the Czech Republic), of which GST reached 55 municipalities. In some cases, there had only been a single intervention or participation (for example in a MMTP). It is obvious that no impact at national level could be expected, but the few municipalities that do count with inter-municipal relations are 'a happy few' and even of these few there were only few interventions, so there was no critical mass of activities.

## **6.5 Donor's policy relevance**

The GST-programme was one of the instruments of the (pre-) accession component of the Matra programme by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In its original design, Matra supported existing private initiatives, focusing on activities that contribute to the development of an open, pluralist and democratic society, securely embedded in the rule of law. Matra seeks in particular to strengthen the fabric of civil society, stressing the importance of co-operation and interaction between private and public bodies. Currently, Matra has two main sub-programmes: civic society, i.e. the building of a civil society, in which the civilians will feel responsible for what is made of their society, and the strengthening of the public sector. The latter element is aimed at supporting Central and Eastern European countries with their preparedness for accessing the European Union (Matra pre-accession - programme). The 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2004, the GST-programme will be closed to those countries that enter the European Union as new member states in 2004.

The GST-activities in the Czech Republic matched the broader Matra objectives very well, since, with only three exceptions (MMTP on employment, Semily, Přebíram), all activities dealt with citizens' participation. But very few activities were relevant as compared to the specific GST-policy on the adoption of the *acquis* at the local level.

In fact, 80 percent of the activities in the sample had very little to do with *acquis* related matters.


In Poland, seven out of nineteen (non-MMTP) GST supported activities had the objective to improve the communication between local government and the citizens. They can be considered as being relevant from the broader Matra perspective, but not from the specific GST-policy perspective. Among the MMTPs, two (on communication and citizens' participation) focused on the public-civil society dimension, while another two (on employment) were less relevant since they dealt with a thematic area that does not pertain to the domain of local government.

The majority of the activities may be classified as being relevant from the perspective of the objectives of the Matra programme, but in 80 percent not as relevant in relation to the specific objectives of the GST-programme, because the focus is on the *acquis*.

## 6.6 Relevance at activity and programme level

The policy relevance of GST-activities in the sample has been assessed based on standardised scorecards. The results are summarised in figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 Policy relevance at activity level of GST



As compared to the billions of Euros that the accession countries receive to prepare themselves for integration in the European Union (EU-Phare, EU-ISPA, World Bank, and bilateral donors), GST is a minuscule programme only. Obviously, unlike the large national programmes, GST does not have any national pretensions. Nevertheless, only few local governments have been reached. Even at the level of the local governments that have been reached, the density of activities was very low. GST contributes to a *happy few* partner local governments, and is, thanks to its decentralised character, highly appreciated. Few comparable decentralised programmes are operational in the accession countries (the European *jumelage* fund, a Danish programme for Poland and the Baltic States).

The critical mass of the activities was low. In approximately half of the partner communities only one single activity was funded with GST-resources. And in those cases where more than a single activity was funded, the activities rarely dealt with the same issue, tackled the same problem, or benefited the same department or unit in the local government.

Most Polish and Czech local governments reported that during the activities no mention was made of the relation to the *acquis*. Since very few activities target the same goal, the expected impact -and with that relevance – has only been minor.



## **7 EFFICIENCY**

### **7.1 Introduction**

Efficiency compares output with input. In this study efficiency takes the perspective of the implementing party. Theoretically, efficiency from the point of view of the recipient party is only of importance if the recipient has full ownership of the input. Efficiency concerns both the delivery of activities or services and, in an aggregate form, the delivery of the programme. It measures how economically input (time, money, manpower) has been converted into products (output).

Not all efficiency indicators can be observed 'in the field' and hence are not known by the partner local governments. For example, the extent to which expenditures remained within the agreed upon budget limits or whether the original time schedule was adhered to are issues usually unknown to the partner. Information on these elements is obtained from the Dutch municipalities and files.

The nature and magnitude of expenditures covered by the Dutch municipalities apart from GST, i.e. salary costs foregone while employees are on mission, could not be assessed in most cases. In all 18 partner municipalities the question was raised how costs (salary costs) could be compared to the expected benefits of the joint activities. All replied that they did not know whether the benefits would exceed the costs. In fact no partner municipality interviewed had ever tried to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. In other words, all partner local governments assume that they reap benefits from the *twinning* relation, but have never analysed that.

### **7.2 Input and output**

The objectives of all activities, grouped by modality and subject to the present evaluation, are presented in Annex 5. A summary of the input and output is presented in table 7.1.

**Table 7.1 Input and output**

<b>Input and output of (six) MMTPs</b>	
Input	Output
One training week in The Hague, organised by VNG One week exposure to practice in a Dutch municipality	Participants trained in theory and practice on a specific theme/subject. In total 100 participants from a total of 40 local governments (including one Association) were trained on four different topics
<b>Input and output of (14) PUGAs</b>	
Input	Output
Visit by Dutch government official(s)	Staff from local governments trained (three cases). Policy makers and other officials aware of the Dutch approach to certain issues (three cases) Plans for future action, to be financed by GST (all other PUGAs)
<b>Input and output of (eight) STAGES</b>	
Input	Output
Visit by Polish or Czech government official(s) to the Netherlands	Transfer of knowledge (five cases) Exposure to Dutch practices for council members and local politicians (two cases) Plans for future action, to be funded by GST (six cases)
<b>Input and output of (five) GIMs</b>	
Input	Output
Combinations of PUGAs and STAGES	People trained (two cases) Demonstration of citizens' participation methods (two cases) Reorganisation plan worked out (one case) A PC-model handed over (one case)

Source: VNG-I files.

PUGAs, STAGES and GIMs may be implemented in either parallel or serial order, aiming at a single objective. In most cases, first a PUGA is realised as a preparatory mission to a subsequent STAGE or GIM. Eleven of the fourteen sampled PUGAs (nearly 80 percent) aimed at formulating and/or preparing proposals for future activities (to be financed under GST).

### **7.3 Duration and size of the interventions under GST**

#### *Duration*

The GST supported interventions used to be of a very short duration only. The average duration of a PUGA is about four days. This average excludes one exceptional PUGA in the Czech Republic, which lasted three months. The average duration of a STAGE is about five days. All MMTPs had a similar organisational pattern: one week of theory and one week of practice in a Dutch municipality, usually the partner city. The MMTP for associations of municipalities consisted only of a one week formal course.

The Municipal Initiatives (GIMs) are of a longer duration and may extend over several years. However, when broken down into the individual components, the pattern is the



same. The individual visits under the umbrella of a GIM (STAGEs and PUGAs) last no longer than five days.

This does not mean that there is no contact at all between the partners during the intervals in between the co-financed activities. In many cases (but not all) there has been an intensive e-mail communication. In others there were ongoing activities, but not funded with GST-support. In general, a permanent communication contributes to the motivation and to the transfer of knowledge. In most cases the Dutch side serves as a reflection board for ideas generated by the partner local government.

The time interval between interventions is on average six to fifteen months. The implication is that the expected output of a series of interventions (GIM) may only be realised some two years after having started the project. Visits to the partner municipalities learned that most of the activities suffered from certain efficiency losses due to:

- the limited financial importance of the GST-funded activities;
- the long ‘lead time’ caused by the intervals between two interventions;
- the financing of preparatory interventions that finally produced little output.

#### *Costing and expenditures*

Expenses are no indicator for efficiency. An indicator for efficiency is the relation between budgeted costs and real expenditures. Theoretically, the GST-contribution forms only part of the total costs, although in practice the subsidy may cover all costs of the activity. Efficiency refers to the relation between input and output. A subsidy does not produce an output in itself. It depends on other input, on other cost carriers. These cost carriers are the Dutch municipality and the partner municipality.

Partner municipalities do invest in time and manpower in the joint activities. Their investments are not precisely known and could not be traced during the field studies. Time investment by Dutch municipalities is known in the case of PUGA and GIM, since salary costs of Dutch civil servants are compensated for (in part) by an allowance of NLG 400 (€ 181) per person/day. The other costs covered by GST are preparation costs, travel costs (tickets, daily subsistence allowance, insurance's, local transport), translation costs, costs for courses, and costs for audits of accounts. The GIM modality contains the option of material investments, but in practice this option was mainly used to finance external experts' input (e.g. professional trainers).

The average expenditure per GST-modality is presented in table 7.2. The average MMTP costs about NLG 154,809 (€ 70,250). The MMTP-expenditure per participant in Poland and the Czech Republic exceeds NLG 7,000 (€ 3,176).

**Table 7.2 Expenditures per GST-instrument (1997-2001)**

Instrument	Average Poland (NLG)	Average Czech Republic (NLG)	Average GST (NLG)
PUGA	11,919 (n=10)	13,085 (n=4)	12,444 (n=41)
STAGE	9,577 (n=12)	6,509 (n=3)	10,904 (n=24)
GIM	46,027 (n=4)	48,351 (n=7)	50,730 (n=25)
MMTP	-	-	154,809 (n=12)

Note: Since several MMTPs may involve more than a single country, no average per country can be calculated.

It can be concluded that on average the GST-subsidies to activities in Polish and Czech municipalities have been low-cost interventions.

#### 7.4 Relative importance of GST-contributions

Considering the spread in nature of the activities developed within the frame of a city *twinning* or friendship relation, the question rose how important the GST-finance had been to the partner local governments to implement joint activities. Out of the 18 municipalities in the sample (excluding a regional office and two associations), 13 stated that GST-finance had been important to them. This is remarkable, since the financial amounts involved were small and GST does not make any cash outlay for project realisation. In particular the smaller municipalities stated that they would not have participated in MMTPs at their own cost.

On the Dutch side, six out of fifteen municipalities interviewed had financed comparable activities making use of their own budget. In other words, these municipalities applied for GST-support only according to the circumstances. From their perspective, GST is an additional source of funding of which use can be made whenever it is considered convenient to do so. The availability of GST- resources did not determine their 'go, no-go' decision.

In three out of thirty-five activities in the sample the additionality of GST-finance could be questioned:

- a STAGE, where Polish officials were introduced to a private developer, who had, according to the application form, also put forward the visit. Considering the turnover on building activities realised at a later stage by this developer, the use of GST-funds was not in accordance with the spirit of the programme;
- a PUGA financing the participation of Dutch officials in a workshop promoting a series of training activities to be provided by a private international consulting firm;
- the GST-activities organised by the NGO Agora.

#### 7.5 Quality of the organisation of the activities

The GST-interventions were generally well organised and managed. The partner municipalities expressed respect and appreciation for the organisational capacity of their Dutch hosts (STAGE and MMTP). In most cases, the lines of communication

during the intervals in between the activities were well established and used. These lines of communication have however been restricted to a few persons only. These tended to be rather personal instead of institutional contacts. This implies that if staff changes occur, these contacts may become rather ailing.

All but two participants in MMTPs considered these as well-organised, accessible, flexible, and the theoretical part of the courses of a high standard. Two respondents criticised the methods used for transfer of knowledge as an “old-fashioned classroom” method.


## **7.6 Efficiency at activity and programme level**

During field visits to the partner municipalities (local governments) in Poland and the Czech Republic all sampled activities have been assessed on their efficiency, based on the following indicators:

- whether the various components of the activity had been implemented according to plan (subsidy request);
- whether the activity had been implemented according to the time path envisaged;
- whether the real expenditures had been according to the budget;
- the organisational quality of the Dutch (host) municipality (or VNG-I);
- the organisational capacity of the partner local government;
- the extent to which the activity had made use of local expertise.

Not all activities could be judged on all criteria, or judgement did not make sense. For example, a MMTP is always scheduled for four or five days, so it makes little sense to register that the MMTP was completed within the time frame envisaged. But in the case of a GIM the time path is a relevant indicator. The indicators have not been used for the MMTPs. Figure 7.1 presents a summary of the efficiency at activity level.

Figure 7.1 Efficiency of GST-activities



Source: field missions. N=24.

It has been concluded that three quarters of all activities were implemented according to plan, budget and time schedule. But this is hardly a finding, since most activities are very small and of short duration only, so planning and budgeting were easy. For the larger GIMs this was not the case. Of the GIMs, about half were not implemented according to plan and time schedule.

At the programme level, the judgement on efficiency depends on the perspective taken. If the objective of GST were only to strengthen the capacities of local governments in accession countries, then GST would not have been efficient. It would not have been efficient to only make use of Dutch civil servants and politicians for guiding and training local government in accession countries on *acquis* related matters. Professional trainers with more specialised knowledge on the *acquis* would have been more efficient and could have reached more municipalities.

In addition, providing subsidies to series of small activities is, almost by definition, not efficient, due to the high transaction costs. But the municipal partners assumed part of the real costs. In fact, the mechanism chosen by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very efficient for them. Use was made of an existing mechanism for which the Ministry never made any investments at all. All investment costs had

been assumed by the municipal partners. In absence of inter-municipal co-operation, the GST-programme could not have been implemented at the same cost.

From the perspective of the municipalities, the strengthening of local governance has never been the main thrust. That is the municipal linkage itself. This explains why Dutch municipalities are not very concerned about the efficiency question. The decision to maintain or discontinue inter-municipal relations is not only a question of costs and benefits. Also to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG-I, efficiency has never been the main concern, since:

- the GST-programme started in 1998 and had to be promoted by VNG. During the first years, the financial means were sufficient to satisfy all demands from Dutch municipalities. There was no need to introduce any mechanism to improve efficiency, such as competition for funds among the applicants;
- the absolute amount of the subsidies was small, sometimes very small. Six Dutch municipalities indicated to make use of the GST-subsidy only whenever they considered it convenient to do so and whenever they had sufficient time at their disposal to apply for subsidy. To them, GST was something 'extra', but not indispensable.



## 8 EFFECTIVENESS

### 8.1 Introduction

Effectiveness deals with the extent to which the interventions contributed to, or achieved, the stated objectives, i.e. the extent to which input, through output, produced the expected results. The effectiveness is expressed at two levels: (i) the level of the individual activities; and (ii) the aggregated level of the programme.

At the activity level, a problem encountered in assessing the effectiveness was the poor definition of the objectives. The objectives were not necessarily described in terms of expected changes or results. The application forms sent by the Dutch municipalities to VNG-I always contained stated objectives. However, in practice in about 65 percent of the cases these objectives were defined at the activity level only, such as 'to participate in the seminar on waste management', or 'to become acquainted with...'. Measurement of the effectiveness against the activity itself would be the same as checking whether the output was produced or not. By contrast, in about a quarter of the cases the objectives were formulated at a high level of abstraction, in fact beyond what could be achieved by the activity (e.g. 'economic growth').

VNG-I, as well as the Advisory Committee on GST, provides services and advice to the Dutch municipalities in order to improve the formulation of the objectives and better determine the expected results. For the period covered by this evaluation the results of this effort could not be recognised yet.

A second problem concerning the measurement of the effectiveness has been the absence of performance indicators. The application forms for GST-subsidy do require from the Dutch municipality to identify indicators to assess achievements, but Dutch municipalities have faced difficulties in doing so. A 2001 central effort by VNG-I to come to more general performance indicators faced the difficulty of heterogeneity (Beelaerts en van Waegeningh, 2002). The absence of, or little use of indicators has not prevented VNG-I from approving almost all applications. Not a single application was turned down with the advice to first determine progress indicators. In the sample, only four applications contained clear performance indicators. In all other cases, the following shortcomings were identified:

- instead of indicating the progress towards an expected result, the indicators referred to administrative progress only;
- the importance or convenience of the proposed activity was described (in terms of the logic of appropriateness [Dunleavy, 1991]) instead of expected results (in terms of the logic of consequence [March, 1994]);
- in the four cases where indicators were used, no sources for verification were mentioned.

## 8.2 Achievement of objectives

All but three interviewed local governments in the sample appreciated the support received from their Dutch partners. They all found the assistance 'positive and useful'. But this appreciation is possibly biased by politeness and influenced by the merits they perceive of the city partnership in general. In any case, the appreciation (logic of appropriateness) does not necessarily reflect the effectiveness.

### *Effectiveness of PUGAs, STAGEs and GIMs*

In all cases the effectiveness of the activities has been assessed against the stated objectives in the application form for GST-funding. In approximately 80 percent of the PUGAs the content of the missions was related to the formulation of new activities. The effectiveness of these missions was tested against the forthcoming process of the activities identified. In the case of STAGE and MMTP, the effectiveness was tested against the following indicators:

- changes in personal work procedure or institutional organisation;
- networking and communication;
- personal career development.

Table 8.1 presents the extent to which activity objectives had been realised, as far as these objectives could be determined or reconstructed.

**Table 8.1 Effectiveness of GST-projects**

	Total no. of projects assessed	Objectives achieved	Objectives partly achieved	Objectives not achieved
Poland	12	2	3	7
Czech Republic	6	3	1	2
Total	18	5	4	9

*Note:* Assessment is based on projects. A single project may contain various GST-supported activities.

(i) In five cases the objectives were clearly achieved.

Two projects involved a STAGE on informing councillors on the consequences of the Common Agricultural Policy (as main component of the *acquis communautaire*) for policy formulation. Another one was a combination of a PUGA and a GIM on project based management. Both took place in the context of the Mikołów (Poland)-Beuningen partnership. The effectiveness was assessed on the basis of the reported change in attitude of the Town Council, where fear and distrust of the implications of EU accession had clearly diminished. In the case of project-based management, a front desk approach was introduced and applied in the Town Hall of Mikołów (see box 1).

In the case of Liberec (Czech Republic)-Amersfoort, the inclusion of citizens' participation in the process of town planning and town development was introduced and safeguarded as a standard procedure.



In two other cases in the Czech Republic (Cheb, Klášterec) where GST-supported activities were implemented by the Agora project, citizens' participation was put on the political agenda. In Cheb, the council and board met this project initially with scepticism, but thanks to the personal efforts of the Mayor, now citizens identify municipal projects, while citizens' committees monitor their implementation. In Klášterec citizens' participation had followed a similar path, although of less magnitude. During the last elections, citizens' participation had become a topic in the local election agenda in both places.

(ii) In four cases the objectives had been achieved in part only.

As a result of the STAGE by two officials and one manager of a Public Administration Training Institute from the Lubelskie *voivodship* (Poland) to the Netherlands a front desk approach was introduced (although at the time of the evaluators' visit it was not staffed). The *voivodship* was not clear whether it had improved the efficiency in its organisational structure and overall performance. Brain drain occurred: one of the officials left (who was actually, as employee of the office of the Voivod, part of the Central Government). The Director of the Public Administration Institute, although positive about the experience, could not remember having learned anything new.

In the case of Mikołów-Groningen support was provided to the housing department and the housing corporation through a PUGA. The only tangible result was building activities by a Dutch real estate developer. The proposed solutions to the municipal housing corporation were not ready for implementation yet (late 2002).

In Leszno (STAGE in Deurne) problems were experienced in adapting Dutch practices to the Polish situation. Although highly appreciated by the local authorities of Leszno, no changes could be indicated or observed.

In Moravska Trebova in the Czech Republic (in co-operation with Vlaardingen) citizens' participation happens to be high on the agenda now. This process was launched, however, with the aim to establish a municipal communication centre, which, after almost three years, had not been established.

(iii) In nine cases the objectives of the activities were not achieved and/or the contributions of the activities towards the achievement could not be determined:

1. In the case of the contact between the Polish Association of Municipalities APC and Amsterdam, the Dutch knowledge was considered not to be applicable to the Polish situation;
2. A proposal for a GIM developed as a result of the APC - Gelderland Province co-operation, did not receive any follow up;
3. Several activities in the partnership Warsaw - the Hague were abandoned due to a lack of commitment to the proposed project;
4. In Białystok (Poland), although a workshop was held with representatives of the local administration and NGOs, neither the Platform nor the City Ecological Centre was established. One of the reasons indicated was a difference of opinion on the involvement of NGOs;

5. In Iława (Poland) the knowledge gathered on communication with the civil society on environment protection was neither diffused, nor put into practice. It did not result in any change in the Town Office's organisation, nor did any pilot project on solid waste collection start;
6. Although the interviewed authorities and civil servants indicated that a PUGA by Leiden to Toruń had led to increased awareness and knowledge of the Dutch approach, in practice this did not result in any follow up action;
7. Comparably, no follow-up took place after a STAGE organised for Mieściško (Poland);
8. A seminar on implications of the EU-accession for local governments was organised in Příbram (Czech Republic). Although this activity fitted well in the GST-objectives and had a substantial potential, no follow up activities were identified;
9. Of the 25 Roma scheduled to be trained and re-employed in Semily (Czech Republic), ten actually entered the training programme, and one completed the training and found employment. This project did not directly aim at strengthening the local government's capacity on employment matters, as had been the intention, but focused on the position of the Roma minority.

**Box 2 Employability for a minority group**

VNG-I had identified the employment policy as one of the thematic subject matters for its GST- programme. A MMTP on Employment was organised. Semily (Czech Republic) and Driebergen identified a project with the objective to improve the employability of the Roma minority group conform the intentions of the EU policies. Officials from Driebergen visited Semily (PUGA) in order to formulate a proposal for a GIM project. The GIM project was implemented in co-operation with the employment office of Semily. Out of the 25 Roma planned to be trained and re-employed in Semily, ten actually entered the training programme. Of these ten persons, one completed the training and finally found employment. The GST-project had no effect on the employment office of Semily.

Factors that determine failure or success are hard to determine in the field, but the following has been observed:

- the distinguishing feature in the five cases where effectiveness was high, was the continuity of the process. For example the continuous presence of Agora in Cheb and Klášterec and in Liberec there was an exceptionally intensive support provided by a Czech speaking civil servant from Amersfoort;
- low effectiveness was due to a weak 'receiving structure', for example the absence of a centrally responsible person in the partner municipality to underpin that external support be used in practice;
- whenever a project was considered effective, GST has played a minor role only. This in itself is positive, since it implies that the partner municipalities have been the main determinants for success. But one may wonder whether GST-support was required at all in those cases.

### *Effectiveness of MMTPs*

MMTPs are a general training instrument at a supra-municipal level. MMTPs support the total of decentralised relations and enable exchange of experience and information. And, in potential, may contribute in fostering new relations and networks. MMTP is an instrument to enable transfer of knowledge based on proven experiences and practices in the field of local government. These experiences are supposed to be relevant for EU accession or the functioning of local governments within a EU environment.

The subject matters of MMTPs implemented in the frame of GST vary widely. Table 8.2 provides an overview of the products produced by the six MMTPs in the sample. In the partner municipalities, the effectiveness was assessed based on predetermined indicators, being: individual working procedures, institutional change, motivation and networking. Judgements on these indicators were derived from interviews with participants.

**Table 8.2 Products of MMTPs**

<b>Number of participants in sample</b>	<b>Products</b>
<b>MMTP 1998</b>	<b>European union and Local Authorities, meant for Associations</b>
Two participants from APC, all Polish participants in this international MMTP.	Information was considered relevant but no follow up as a result of the MMTP
<b>MMTP 1999</b>	<b>Government Communication</b>
Ten participants (out of a total of 18) from four Polish municipalities and the APC.	Follow up through leaflets, campaigns and the front-office approach.
<b>MMTP 2000</b>	<b>Town Clerks</b>
Two participants from two Polish municipalities in this international MMTP.	Products in Toruń, but in Mieścisko lessons not implemented.
<b>MMTP 2000</b>	<b>Employment Policy</b>
18 participants from 12 Czech municipalities trained, five municipalities in sample.	Two cases: no follow-up; two cases: unclear; one case: follow-up
<b>MMTP 2001</b>	<b>Citizens' participation</b>
26 participants from 12 Czech municipalities trained, six municipalities in sample.	Two cases: no follow-up Four cases: follow-up
<b>MMTP 2001</b>	<b>Employment and Social Policy</b>
Nine (out of a total of 30) participants from three municipalities. Also the APC delegated three participants, but only to the theoretical week.	Poznań and Toruń initiated employment policies. In Szczecinek the Dutch example was seen as not applicable for the Polish situation.

Although the MMTP on Employment and Social Policy was highly appreciated by the partner municipalities, the effectiveness has been modest at best. Employment, although an important problem in particular in Poland, belongs only in part to the municipal domain in Poland, while it is not seen as a municipal task in the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic various managers of deconcentrated labour offices participated in the MMTP, but in absence of a local government institutional structure

for employment matters, municipalities delegated participants who had no direct relation to the subject.

### 8.3 Side effects and impact

During interviews with the partner local governments the general appreciation for inter-municipal co-operation might have caused a positive bias as far as the perceived effectiveness of the GST-subsidised activities are concerned. Many interviews started by emphasising the merits of the decentralised co-operation, but most partners could not indicate the effectiveness of the co-operation in the field of strengthening the capacities of their local government. Inter-municipal co-operation is voluntary, not imposed by central government. It implies mutual visits and results in lasting friendships. That relation in itself is motivating. Even a respondent in Semily, who considered the GST-programme a complete failure, was very positive about the contribution by Driebergen (quote: "This project was unfortunately a bad example of an otherwise very fruitful co-operation").

The relations between municipalities produce side-effects. Some can be attributed to the GST-supported activities. Side effects were:

- increased trade contacts;
- relations between local Chambers of Commerce and subsequent private sector contacts;
- relations between public-private organisations, such as social housing corporations.

Bilateral contacts happen to increase rapidly in number if boosted by a direct municipal linkage. So indirectly, GST triggers new contacts. Examples of such contacts are presented in table 8.3.

**Table 8.3 Side effects and spin-offs of municipal co-operation**

Relations	
	Chamber of Commerce (3 linkages)
Investments by the private sector	DAF, Philips and KPMG (Eindhoven) in Poland Czech enterprise in flowers invests in Holland (Hoon) DHV opens office in Liberec (Amersfoort) Initiatives by Bouwfonds in Czech Republic (Amersfoort) Investment sportswear manufacturer in Poland (Assen) Shoe trader Scapino opens retail shops in Poland ABN AMRO financing agreements with Polish municipality (Hoon) Private sector investments in Brno (Utrecht)
Others	Cultural exchange (festivals) (7 linkages) Relations between schools (6 linkages) Sports and Tourism promotion (3 linkages) Exchange of personnel of fire brigades (2 linkages)

Source: Interviews with Dutch municipalities and their partners abroad

## 8.4 Sustainability of activities and contextual factors

Sustainability requires in the first place that (part of) the results have been realised. In the five cases in which the objectives had been achieved, the effects were sustainable as well. In general, sustainability seems to depend on the following factors:

- the political and governmental commitment of the partner local authority;
- the continuity of priorities and available contact persons within the partner municipality or organisation;
- the intensity (expressed in number of institutional contacts) within the *twinning* relation.

For all activities the financial and management sustainability have been assessed.

The effectiveness of inter-municipal activities is influenced by the specific external context (or 'environment'). This is the national setting. Among these factors three categories can be distinguished:

(i) the political, administrative and legal factors that directly determine the structure and mandate of local governments; (ii) the financial and economic context of local government. The resources made available and the capacities to generate own income in order to implement the local policies are of importance to both the autonomy and service delivering capacity of local government; (iii) the set of background phenomena, like history, and socio-cultural characteristics. These are rather unique factors. The context has been briefly described in chapter 3.

In the formulation of projects by the partners, the contextual factors did not play any significant role. Neither the applying local governments, nor the appraising VNG-I paid attention to national contextual factors.

In general, the environmental or contextual factors for the strengthening of local governance have been positive in all accession countries. Politicians, civil servants and civilians alike are eager to learn from their counterparts in European countries. Since the NPAA does not pay any attention to the local government level, in general the information stream on European matters towards that level has been deficient. It is this particular 'niche' that could have been occupied by the inter-municipal co-operation.

In both Poland and the Czech Republic, with their history of being central plan economies, the 'feeling' of local authorities for citizen participation in policy matters and implementation of municipal activities is still modest. The same applies for the understanding of decentralised co-operation that goes against existing concepts of hierarchical organisation. This may explain why the institutional embedding of the inter-municipal relations has been relatively poor in both countries.


## 8.5 Effectiveness at activity and programme level

Figure 8.1 summarises the effectiveness of GST-activities, based on the following indicators:

- the overall achievement of the activity specific objectives;
- the positive and negative side-effects (as far as could be judged);
- the extent to which use could be made of verifiable results;
- the financial and management sustainability.

In order to assess the support of the GST-activities to the adoption and implementation of the *acquis communautaire*, the sampled activities were compared with the Logon list.

Figure 8.1 Effectiveness of GST-activities



### *Effectiveness of GST at programme level*

The GST-programme started in 1998 as part of the Matra programme (Social Transformation programme) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Comparable to the observation that the stated objectives of the individual activities were not always crystal clear, the objectives of the GST at programme level are not without debate either. Although the description of the objectives in the Agreement 1998 is clear, different stakeholders (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, VNG-I, Dutch municipalities) had a different interpretation of these objectives. Here, the objectives as described in the Agreement 1998 have been taken as a starting point.

GST has been a programme with limited effectiveness in relation to its ambitious objectives. Some of the activities are of a trivial nature, e.g. a participation in a conference or a one-day meeting in relation to the objectives of the programme. Interventions are of a very short duration. GIMs, when broken down into individual STAGE and PUGA activities, may last no longer than two weeks. GST-activities have not been effective in preparing local governments in Poland and the Czech Republic for the adoption of the *acquis* or in strengthening the institutional capacities enabling the partner municipalities to implement *acquis* related regulations.

One of the reasons has been that within the Netherlands, explicit knowledge on the *acquis* is not always present in the municipalities, in particular not in the smaller ones.

The GST-Agreement assumes a programme driven by proposals from the partner local governments (*Beleidskader* of the Agreement), but it is unlikely that such a demand would have been produced, because local governments in the accession countries are hardly aware of the consequences of the *acquis* to their own working area. Likewise, Dutch municipalities do not formulate such proposals either, since to them it is hard to distinguish between Dutch and European regulation. Only few MMTPs were directly related to the *acquis*. In 2002, VNG added a modality to the GST-programme, the Municipal Accession Training Conference in which local authorities are being briefed about the consequences at the local level of EU membership.

Considering the fact that from 2004 onwards, GST will be open to few eligible countries only, its continuation as a separate programme, as well as its objectives and implementation modalities require careful reconsideration.





## **ANNEX 1**



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## **ANNEX 2**



## **ANNEX 2    ABBREVIATIONS**

APC	Association of Polish Cities
CR	Czech Republic
CUGA	Course for Dutch civil servants in international co-operation
EU	European Union
GIM	Municipal Initiatives (Matra)
GSO	Municipal co-operation in Developing Countries
GST	Municipal Co-operation in Accession Countries
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ISPA	Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
Matra	Dutch Programme for Social Transformation
MMTP	Municipal Management Training Programme
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NLG	Netherlands guilder
NPAA	National Programme for the Adoption of the <i>Acquis</i>
Phare	European Commission's Assistance programme for Central and Eastern Europe (initially only for Poland and Hungary)
PUGA	Programme for Technical Assistance by Dutch civil servants
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
SMO	Association for Municipalities in the Czech Republic
STAGE	Internship in the Netherlands
ToR	Terms of Reference
VNG	Dutch association of municipalities
VNG-I	VNG International, organisation for international co-operation of VNG





## **ANNEX 3**



## **ANNEX 3    TERMS OF REFERENCE**

The main features of the terms of reference for the field studies in Poland and the Czech Republic were equal. This annex provides the short version ToR for Poland only.

### **Evaluation of municipal international co-operation: Poland**

#### **Part 1 General**

##### *1.        Background*

The Directorate General for International Co-operation (DGIS) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to gain insight in the area of municipal international co-operation. In particular in those activities administered and/or implemented by the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG).

The independent Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will conduct the evaluation. IOB has formulated the evaluation's objective as follows:

*The analysis and assessment of the policy relevance, the effectiveness and efficiency of activities financed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of municipal international co-operation, that are administered and/or implemented by the VNG, for which VNG was a contract partner of the Ministry.*

These activities cover the broad area of good governance, decentralisation, transition and (pre-) accession in the context of the European integration.

The evaluation of the municipal international co-operation between the Netherlands and Poland is a component of the above-mentioned world-wide evaluation.

##### *2.        Context of the Study*

The formal co-operation between DGIS and VNG in the area of municipal international co-operation (more specifically in the field of development co-operation) started in 1991 and has developed into several distinct programmes.

Relevant for this evaluation are the following programmes:

- **GSO (Municipal<sup>2</sup> Co-operation in Developing Countries), 1994-2002**

and

- **GST (Municipal Co-operation in Accession Countries), 1998-2004**

This programme is embedded in the (pre-)accession programme of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is aimed at supporting Central and Eastern European countries with their preparatory activities for accessing the European Union in the future (financed under the Matra programme). GST is aimed at supporting local governments of these countries both in complying with the requisites of the *acquis communautaire*, as well as in institutional capacity building that is needed for this.

For accessing GST-resources, Dutch municipalities have to submit a request for financial support under this programme, based on an explicit request by the recipient municipality. This is predominantly a subsidy by the central government to local government initiatives. The GST-programme consists of four modalities:

- PUGA: Programme for temporary deployment of Dutch civil servants in Developing or Transition countries (missions for advisory services or training);
- STAGE: Apprenticeship for public servants/administrators from transition countries in the Netherlands;
- Municipal Initiatives (GIM): This programme is aimed at municipalities, provinces and public utilities that have a long-term relationship with a partner in a transition country. Besides transfer of knowledge through training and internship missions, this programme also finances small investments;
- MMTP: Municipal Management Training Programme: organising group-training activities for trainees from transition countries, who have a similar background or work in a similar sector. They normally consist of a week of lecturing a group of (international) participants, followed by one or two weeks of individual internships in Dutch municipalities.

GIM is especially focusing on longer-term relationships between municipalities in Poland and the Netherlands. In practice however, also STAGE, PUGA and MMTP often take place in the framework of so called 'city or town links' (*zwiazek miast*). These links are lasting relations between municipalities, involving cultural, economic and other exchanges. The initiative for a STAGE, PUGA or GIM is taken by the municipalities, whereas VNG is responsible for the organisation of the MMTPs.

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<sup>2</sup> Although the name refers to 'municipalities', in practice the target group is much wider and comprises provinces, umbrella organisations, independent entities for public service delivery (water, electricity, social care, etc).

Other programmes falling under the denominator of municipal development co-operation, such as the trilateral programme NEWS (discontinued in 2002), are not subject of analysis in the evaluation. If relevant, reference will be made in a descriptive manner only.

### **Population subject to study**

The population subject to evaluation comprises all those activities funded in the period 1998-2001 by the GST-programme in Poland. The sample drawn from that population is specified in Annex 4.

### **3 Objective and purpose of the study**

The objective of the evaluation study is to describe and analyse how various projects that fall under the GST-programme were implemented and to what extent they have contributed to the strengthening of local governments in Poland.

In particular the study should answer the following questions:

- How relevant has the municipal international co-operation been to the Polish policy objectives concerning the strengthening of local governance (*policy relevancy*)?
- How effective have the realised interventions been in strengthening local governance (*effectiveness*)?
- How efficient has the input been in order to achieve the desired results (*efficiency*)?

### **4. The activities of the evaluation study**

The total evaluation study, of which the study in Poland form part, consists of four stages:

- 1) Preparatory phase, comprising:
  - literature study of existing evaluation studies;
  - development of the methodology.
- 2) Study covering the Dutch municipalities, consisting of:
  - questionnaire among Dutch municipalities;
  - interviews with Dutch civil servants;
  - interviews with policy makers.
- 3) Field missions in five selected countries: consisting of:
  - interviews with selected municipalities;
  - interviews with civil servants and people actively involved in the projects;
  - case-study of a number of municipalities in each country (in detail: relevancy, effectiveness and efficiency);

- context study of the specific features that characterise the process of local government development in each country.

4) Final Analysis of Municipal co-operation and final report.

## Part 2 Field Mission Poland

### *Approach*

The overall programme to support societal transformation of accession countries to the European Union is financed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs out of the so-called Matra programme<sup>3</sup>. The Programme for Municipal Co-operation with countries in Transition (GST) forms integral part of that package. GST aims at the strengthening of democratic local governance. In the Agreement between the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG reference is made to the requirement that activities should either support directly or be in line with the *National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis* (NPAA). Since in most accession countries the NPAA does not refer explicitly to the consequences for local governance, the implications of the *Acquis* for local governments have been analysed and listed by the Logon Working Group Vienna and Local and Regional Phare Partnership Working Group of Eurocities. Logon lists approximately a hundred European guidelines in the areas of environment, public procurement, public enterprises, anti-discrimination and social security that do have an impact at the local government level.

### *The intervention model*

The GST-intervention model is the contribution to strengthen democratic local governance by funding knowledge and skills development, as well as by making small investments based on lasting relations between local governments (mainly municipalities) in the Netherlands and Poland.

In the Agreements between the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and VNG the implicit assumption is that transfer of knowledge and skills by means of exchange of personnel, and the funding of small tangible activities contribute to strengthening of capacities. And that subsequently the strengthening of capacities leads to improved *performance* of the local government, in particular an improved performance as far as the local 'translation' of the Adoption of the *Acquis* is concerned.

Dunn (1994) identified external input with the potential to contribute to strengthening of capacities of local governments. According to this input model the means aimed at the improvement of the quality of local governance should be destined to:

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<sup>3</sup> Matra, is the Dutch acronym for Social Transformation. The programme also supports activities by the Civic Society, the Environment, Health and other sectors. Matra is active in both the accession countries and parts of the New Independent States.

- improve either the capacity to formulate and define policies or the implementation capacity of the local civil / public service (management and *skills*);
- improve the transparency and accountability of local governance (political and civil service area);
- improve the interaction and communication (with the civil society and private sector, with the press);
- improve civil participation (in defining the political agenda, in formulating policy and in monitoring the implementation of policies).

### **Contextual factors and receptivity**

Success or failure of an activity (input) is not only determined by the potential contribution it could make to strengthening of capacities (the input model), but also by the specific context in which it is implemented. The individual activities within the sample are all carried out within at levels of that context. Firstly, they are implemented within the frame of more or less structural relations of co-operation, in most cases even formal *twinning* relations. So most activities are neither 'ad hoc' nor incidental. Most activities form part of the sequential order of a process.

Secondly, all activities are implemented within the national context: the specific processes that characterise the general political, administrative and financial embedding of local government in Poland.

The effectiveness of activities (input) is influenced by their specific external context (or 'environment'). Among the contextual factors three categories can be distinguished. The most important contextual factors are the political, administrative and legal factors that determine directly the structure and mandate of local governments.

A second group of factors is composed by the financial and economic context of local government. The resources made available and the capacities to generate own income in order to implement the local policies are of importance to both the autonomy and service delivery capacity of local government.

A third group of factors comprises the set of background phenomena, like history, and socio-cultural characteristics. These are rather unique factors.

In addition to the above-mentioned environmental factors, there are so-called receptivity factors, determined by:

- the expectations regarding the eventual effectiveness of the activity (does the activity 'match' the expectations?);
- the organisation of the recipient structure (can the activity be embedded into the recipient's organisational structure?).

During the short field mission all those factors cannot be determined, nor analysed with a sufficient level of reliability. Cause-effect relations will be hard to trace. Nevertheless, the contextual factors can be described, while the evaluators should constantly be aware of these factors, while assessing the effectiveness of the activities, subject to evaluation.

## Evaluation Criteria

The linkages between the evaluation criteria and the activities subject to evaluation are reflected in the following evaluation matrix, based on the logical framework which is presented in the general ToR of the evaluation.

For each externally supported activity both input and output should be specified as much as possible.

### *Input*

Examples of such input are the number of visiting missions/apprenticeships/trainers and trainees per activity; the description of the activities itself and the sectors involved; the identification of the number and kind of civil organisations involved, the duration of the activities, etc.

Most GST-funded activities have been small and of short duration only. However, many of these GST-supported activities are related to existing *twinning* (structural city or town links) and may form part of larger programmes funded directly by the Dutch municipalities. So the function of the GST -'input' in the co-operation *process* should be identified.

Special attention should be paid to the origin of the 'input'. Who suggested the eventual areas of municipal co-operation (demand or supply driven)? What is the intensity of the support in practice? Why were these input chosen and not others?

The GST-programme has no thematic specialisation as far as it concerns its co-operation with Poland is concerned. The multi-municipal courses (MMTP) in which Polish cities have participated had the following thematic subjects:

- a training course to municipal policy makers on spatial organisation, social security and finance;
- a training course on public-private works and financing;
- a training course for Town Clerks;
- a training course on Europe and local governance.

To which extent the subject matter has been identified or requested by the Polish Partners? On what criteria Polish partners have proposed and subsequently selected participants in these courses? Has there been any role for the Association of Polish Cities in such an identification process?

### *Output*

The 'output' are the direct product of the 'input'. Examples of output are the number of civil servants trained formally or on the job; the number and sectors of projects implemented; the duration and intensity of new contacts and changes in the technical quality of service delivery.



Similar to the 'input', for each activity or project, the 'output' should be identified as precisely as possible.

### **Efficiency**

Efficiency compares these output with the input. Efficiency is basically a concern of the financier. Could the same output be achieved quicker or more economically? Or could more output be obtained using the same input?

What are the explanatory factors to consider an activity 'efficient' or not. To which extent do the assumed advantages and disadvantages of municipal co-operation play a role?

### **Effectiveness**

Effectiveness is the extent to which the input -through the output- contribute to the realisation of the expected results. That implies that those effects can be attributed to the activity with reasonable certainty. The expected or observed sustainability is supposed to form part of the effectiveness (in the case a result has not been sustainable, it is not very effective either). Since most activities have been small, the direct attribution might be difficult. If the activities form part of a process (which is usually the case) more can be said about the effectiveness of the total of activities within the process.

Examples of possible effects are: institutional interaction within a certain time span; number and kind of European legislation adopted at the local level; career development of civil servants trained versus the no trained; changes in participation (-structures).

Both contextual factors and receptivity factors should be taken into consideration, and -as much as possible- analysed. These factors should be described and relations with the observed effects of the GST-funded activities should be indicated.

Among the effects to be analysed attention should be paid to the extent to which activities have contributed to a support for -or a growing awareness of- the population with respect to the accession to the European Union and the conditions attached to that accession.

### **Relevance**

*Relevancy* is the extent to which an activity has been pertinent with respect to:

- 1) the identified main problems of local government development in Poland;
- 2) the policy of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- 3) the policy of the recipient organisation (municipality).

In 1999, a new 'four-tier' system of Public Administration was adopted in Poland, with the elected government at central, regional (*voivodship*), county (*powiat*) and municipal levels. Tasks were delegated from the central to other levels of government. To what extent the GST-activities have contributed to a proper

implementation of this system, or to the capacity of local government to adopt its tasks and fulfil its mandate in the new system?

- 4) A fourth criterion for relevancy has been added: the extent to which an activity has the potential to contribute to the strengthening of democratic local governance. That potential can be checked against the 'input' model by Dunn.

### **Standardised registration and judgement forms**

Since in the GST-programme a wide array of heterogeneous activities has been funded, a standardised registration form is used to describe both input and output of the various activities. The same form enables to form an opinion, a judgement, on each of the evaluation criteria. The judgement made by the evaluator is expressed on a scale. The arguments used to come to those judgements should be underpinned in writing.

Obviously, special conditions, complaints, side effects, etc., can only be identified and analysed by having open interviews. The registration form should not be used as a questionnaire during the interviews. It is a guideline, checklist and a form that enables structured registration of information per activity or sets of activities.

### **Part 3: Implementation and expected output**

The municipalities to be visited have been identified based on a standard sampling method applied. In each of the listed municipalities interviews should be conducted with persons with political responsibility (1) and public servants who were involved in the Dutch municipal co-operation programme (2). Interviews will be held, making use of standardised checklists.

So, in each municipality the persons that actively joined the activities sponsored by the Dutch Municipal Co-operation programme (for example training courses) should be identified and -if possible- interviewed.

As special cases, the projects in Lublin and Mikolów should be studied in more detail. These will serve as illustrative case studies.

The expected output to be produced by the evaluators in Poland are:

- 1 To present a context paper, reflecting:
  - the historical development of local government in Poland, with special attention to the period 1994-2001;
  - a description of the current context, while desegregating:
    - the political administrative and legal environment;
    - the financial-economic environment of local governments;
    - the socio-cultural environment;
  - a description of the current mandate, structures of Local Government, as well as the current Central Government policies regarding local government (decentralisation, good governance, participation, etc.);

- a description and analysis of the main problems encountered by local governments, in particular related to the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*;
  - an inventory of the current external support and interventions aimed at strengthening the local governments and the relative position of the Dutch programme within that total.
2. To present an inventory of the activities realised within the municipalities mentioned in the sample (descriptive, summary overviews, tables);
  3. To analyse the activity process (demand or supply driven; who identifies, administrates and is accountable for the activities, who implements?);
  4. To analyse the input, output, efficiency and effectiveness of the activities undertaken as well as the sustainability of the activities realised. The analysis will be made at two levels: the level of the individual activity (see registration form Annex 4 [not included] and as a summary at a higher level of aggregation. This higher level of aggregation is in the first place the municipality, but -if possible- judgements should be made at the level of all activities in Poland funded by the GST-programme;
  5. To determine the relevancy of the activities:
    - relevance vis-à-vis the Dutch/European policy regarding Poland
    - relevance vis-à-vis the local government's policies
    - relevance vis-à-vis the problems encountered
    - relevance vis-à-vis the input model for strengthening of local government
  6. To draw conclusions and formulate the lessons learned.

**Instruments to be used:**

For the elaboration of the context paper use should be made of secondary sources, while in addition interviews should be held with key stakeholders (relevant Ministries, Association of Polish Cities, key informants).

For the evaluation of the activities within the context of the *twinning* relations, visits should be made to the municipalities involved.

Interviews should be held with both the political responsible and the public servants of the areas involved (note that in Poland the public servants at local government level are no 'civil servants' in the narrow sense of the word).

Details of the activities, derived from the files in the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG) will be handed over to the consultants (most information is in the Dutch language only).

Interviews with those persons that actively participated in the activities, such as training courses or apprenticeships in the Netherlands.

### *Organisation*

The Association SEOR with Ecorys-NEI has been contracted by IOB for the implementation of the evaluation studies. The Association assigned Ecorys Poland as the local partner for the study.

The Dutch Ecorys NEI representative will be the teamleader in the mission He will be responsible for the final report according to the list of contents and the lay-out instructions.

The sample of municipalities to be visited implies that Ecorys Poland will need to:

- contact the selected municipalities in advance;
- elaborate an itinerary;
- identify the directly involved officials;
- arrange logistics (local transport, eventually air transport).

The mission will start with a one-day workshop in order to discuss the Terms of Reference, to clarify the approach, to train the consultants in the terminology of the evaluation criteria and in the checklists for interviews. The logistical organisation will be detailed further .

After the workshop the team as a group will make a number of visits to at least one municipality. The aim is to get familiarised with the subject of the interviews and with the main issues to be raised.

After the first joint interview(s), the team splits up in order to conduct interviews individually in different municipalities. It is expected that approximately 7-10 days will be required for visits to the municipalities. Relatively more time should be scheduled for visits to Mikołów and Lublin, since these activities will serve as case studies.

The mission members will return to a central place and will elaborate the draft report as a team in the English language. The Conclusions and Lessons Learned should be fully elaborated before finalising the mission in Poland.

The mission finalises the study with the presentation and discussion of the conclusions during a workshop with stakeholders. Stakeholders might comprise the Polish Association of Local Governments, a representative of the Netherlands Embassy, etc.

## **ANNEX 4**



## ANNEX 4

## OVERVIEW OF GST-ACTIVITIES IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

### Poland

Local government	Dutch municipality	Total # projects	GIM	PUGA	STAGE	MMTP	Theme	Contribution BuZa excl. MMTP (NLG)	Contribution BuZa incl. MMTP (NLG)
Warsaw	Den Haag	3	-	2	1	-	B/K	40.163	
Mikolów	Beuningen	3	1	1	1	-	A/N	39.936	
	Groningen	2	-	1	1	-	F/K	28.984	
Ilawa	Tholen	2	-	1	1	-	N	15.864	
Torun	Leiden	3	-	1	-	2	E/N	15.099	
Lublin	Gelderland Province	3	1	1	1	-	A/K	11.409	
Miescisko	Maartensdijk	2	-	-	1	1	K/N	6.337	
Leszno	Deurne	2	-	-	1	1	D/N	1.440	
Poznan	Assen	2	-	-	-	2	C/N	0	
Szczecin	Bergen op Zoom	2	-	-	-	2	C/N	0	
Bialystok	Eindhoven	1	1	-	-	-	K	59,226	
<i>Co-operation with organisations</i>									
APC	Gelderland Province	1	-	1	-	-	G	3.894	
	Amsterdam	1	-	1	-	-	B	1.908	
Associations (Poland)	VNG	2	-	-	-	2	K/N	0	
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>A/B/C/D E/F/G/K</b>	<b>224.260</b>	<b>765.785</b>

## Czech Republic

Municipality	Dutch partner	Total # projects	GIM	MMTP	PUGA	STAGE	Total subsidy BZ (NLG)	Subsidy BZ excl. MMTP (NLG)	Theme
Klasterec nad Ohri	Baarn	1	1	-	-	-	58.916	58.916	F
Liberec	Amersfoort	2	-	1	1	-	238.500	38.754	C/N
Noord-Bohemen	South Holland Province	1	1	-	-	-	34.925	34.925	K
Cheb	Rheden	1	1	-	-	-	32.610	32.610	F
Semily	Driebergen (Rijsenburg)	2	1	-	1	-	10.538	10.538	C
Příbram	Hoorn	2	-	-	1	1	9.549	9.549	K
Moravska Trebova	Vlaardingen	3	-	1	2	-	207.739	7.993	A/C
Zlin	Groningen	2	-	2	-	-	393,240	0	B/C
Jihlava	Purmerend	2	-	2	-	-	393,240	0	B/C
Brno	Utrecht	2	-	1	-	1	193,494	0	B/K
Nove Mesto na Morave	Waalre	2	-	2	-	-	393,240	0	B/C
Policka	Westerveld	2	-	2	-	-	393,240	0	B/N
<i>Co-operation with associations</i>									
Union of Towns and Communities of the CR	VNG	1	-	1	-	-	97.480	0	K
<i>Total</i> 13	13	23	4	12	5	2	2.456.711	193.285	A/B/C/F/K/N

Note: Financial data subject to review



A	Civil registry / Internal organisation of local government	H	Education / Training / Culture
B	Public Relations & Communications	I	Transit and Public Transport
C	Economic Affairs / Employment / Labour market policy	J	Security / Public Order
D	Finance / Accountancy / Taxes	K	European Affairs
E	Public Health Care/ Social Security	L	Public enterprises and utilities
F	Public Housing and Spatial Organisation	M	Municipal International Co-operation
G	Environment / Nature & Landscaping	N	Not specified



## **ANNEX 5**



## ANNEX 5      OBJECTIVES OF THE GST-ACTIVITIES IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

**Table Annex 5.1    PUGAs organised**

Type/Number	Year	Objective	Polisch (P)/ Czech (CR) partner	Dutch partner
PUGA 5430	1999	Formulation of a GIM project, aiming at informing Polish municipalities on the accession process and its consequences for functioning of municipalities.	APC (P)	Gelderland
PUGA 5455	1999	Support for policy development for local government on communication: approaches shown, concepts and organisation discussed (participation in a conference).	APC (P)	Amsterdam
PUGA 5433	1999	Local government and relevant institutions in Toruń to acquire information and knowledge of the Dutch municipalities, especially Leiden's approach, towards drugs and alcohol addiction, both legally, medically and socially. Attention given to the national and European legislation.	Toruń (P)	Leiden
PUGA 5419	1999	To produce a workplan with the aim to advise Warsaw on the development of a proper communication policy, with involvement of the citizens.	Warsaw (P)	The Hague
PUGA 9123	1999	To arrive at a final, mutually agreed proposal with outlines for the approach, structure and procedures for the project 'Warsaw Interactive'; with attention given, wherever possible, to the European legislation and funding.	Warsaw (P)	The Hague
PUGA 5489	2001	Demonstrate to citizens of Iława municipality possible participation and development of two pilot projects concerning separate waste collection and responsibility for the direct daily environment protection.	Iława (P)	Tholen
PUGA 5424	1999	Planning for introduction of project oriented management in the municipality of Mikołów, with a focus on improving the quality of municipal management towards the EU level	Mikołów (P)	Beuningen
PUGA 5450	1999	Strengthening knowledge both in Groningen and in Mikołów on the policy and organisational aspects of the project Spatial Planning	Mikołów (P)	Groningen
PUGA 5451	1999	Elaborate a plan for a GST- (GIM)- project on the transfer of knowledge on European environmental legislation and its implementation to local and regional government in Poland.	Marshall's Office Lubelskie (P)	Gelderland Province

PUGA		Not in sample	Poznań (P)	North-Brabant
PUGA		Not in sample	Buk (P)	St. Michielsgestel
PUGA 5486	2000	To support the development of a long-term vision for Liberec. Special attention will be given to the development of a long-term vision in relation to a new zoning plan and the building of a new housing estate.	Liberec (CR)	Amersfoort
PUGA T1029	2001	To formulate a project in the field of local minority policy. In this project special attention will be given to education, housing and integration.	Semily (CR)	Driebergen
PUGA T1020	2001	To increase knowledge of the local community about Europe. Specific subjects are: labour market policies, economic development, legal consequences of accession and development in the field of environment and culture.	Příbram (CR)	Hoorn
PUGA 5472	2000	The formulation of a project in the field of local government communication and improvement of the management capacity of the municipality.	Moravská Třebová (CR)	Vlaardingen
PUGA T1055	2001	To support the realisation of a public information centre in Moravska Trebova. Plan for implementation of participation activities.	Moravská Třebová (CR)	Vlaardingen
PUGA	2001	Not in sample	Tabor (CR)	Nijmegen

**Table Annex 5.2 STAGEs organised**

Type/Number	Year	Objective	Polish (P)/Czech (CR) partner	Dutch partner
STAGE 5453	1999	Elaborate on the findings of the previous PUGA, i.e. arrive at pilot project, definition of several phases of the project and target group for each phase, envisaged results per phase, modus operandi and planning. Provide exposure to modern communication policy in the Hague.	Warsaw (P)	The Hague
STAGE 5490	2001	Strengthen local government in involving citizens in shaping the direct living environment. As pilots are selected as to separate solid waste collection and responsibility for the direct daily environment protection.	Itawa (P)	Tholen
STAGE 5465	2000	Transfer of general knowledge in the area of spatial planning, finance, social affairs and general government.	Mieścisko (P)	Maartensdijk
STAGE T1027	2001	Knowledge transfer on European legislation in agriculture and rural development to councillors and advice on the role of Dutch municipalities for agricultural enterprises (environmental legislation, spatial planning, ecological agriculture)	Mikołów (P)	Beuningen
STAGE 5427	1999	Improved knowledge on working and planning methods for local housing policy (special focus on PPP).	Mikołów (P)	Groningen / company DAGIN
STAGE 5448	1999	Enlarging knowledge on finance and accounting and professionalising the finance department of the municipality.	Leszno (P)	Deurne
STAGE 5431	1999	Transfer of knowledge on Human Resource Management and Organisation of the Gelderland Province authorities	Marshall's Office Lubelskie (P)	Gelderland Province
STAGE 5420	1999	Not in sample	Lublin (P)	Tilburg
STAGE		Not in sample	Lublin (P)	Arnhem
STAGE		Not in sample	Krzemienowo (P)	Gaasterland
STAGE		Not in sample	Konstancin – Jeziorno (P)	Leidschendam
STAGE		Not in sample	Opalenice / Jaworze (P)	Moerdijk
STAGE 5461	2000	To improve the knowledge of the municipal staff about the consequences of accession to the EU. Specific subjects are: democracy, labour market policy, economic development and environment.	Příbram (CR)	Hoorn
STAGE	1999	Not in sample	Most (CR)	Meppel
STAGE	2000	Not in sample	Slavkov (CR)	Zeist

**Table Annex 5.3 GIMs organised**

Type/Number	Year	Objective	Polish (P) Czech (CR) partner	Dutch partner
GIM 5440	99/00	Development of a more efficient functioning of council and town office through the introduction of project oriented management - to contribute to the reform of local government as part of the effort supporting EU-accession.	Mikołów (P)	Beuningen
GIM 5442	01/02	The establishment of a City Ecological Centre, to work as a separate entity of the environmental department. The Centre was foreseen to provide information on European, national and local environmental policy and legislation and strengthen awareness of the importance of environment.	Białystok (P)	Eindhoven
GIM T1010	01/02	To involve local municipalities in the creation of a regional waste management programme and through that improve the knowledge on EU legislation and promote implementation of the latter. Sub-objectives: -strengthen knowledge of councillors and public servants on European waste disposal regulations; -promote implementation of a waste management system; -increase awareness on this among citizens; -stimulate government-citizen communication; -stimulate civic society development through involvement of NGOs.	Marshall's Office Lubelskie (P)	Gelderland Province
GIM 5444	2000	The use of existing models and methods for citizens' participation in relation to the spatial planning policy of Klášterec nad Ohří. Citizens' participation contributes to a more democratic local government.	Kláštrec nad Ohří (CR)	Baarn
GIM 5447	2000	The improvement of the employment policy for the Roma minority group conform the requirements of the EU. Questions with respect to the present employment and minority policies have to lead to concrete policy suggestions at the local level.	Semily (CR)	Driebergen
GIM 9105	2000	To support the Czech (and Hungarian) partners with their preparations for accession to the EU through: (i) discussions on regional co-operation and policy development; (ii) analysis of present regional co-ordination and policy development; (iii) study on opportunities for a more democratic organisation for regional decisions and (iv) study of how the partners could come to an integrated policy plan. (Not in sample, but documents were available)	Northern Bohemia (CR)	South Holland Province
GIM 5460	2000	The use of existing methods and models for citizens' participation in relation the housing policy. Citizens' participation contributes to a more democratic local government.	Cheb (CR)	Rheden



**Table Annex 5.4 MMTPs organised**

<b>MMTP 5403</b>	<b>European union and Local Authorities, meant for Associations</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>Inter-national</b>
	<b>Participating organisations</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	
VNG	APC* (P)	2	
VNG	Union of towns and communities – SMO* (CR)	2	

<b>MMTP 5496</b>	<b>Town Clerks</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>Inter-national</b>
<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	
Maartensdijk	Mieścisko* (P)	1	
Leiden	Toruń* (P)	1	
Beverwijk	Ustí nad Labem (CR)	1	
Wûnseradiel	Tabor and Novy Jicín (CR)	2	

<b>MMTP 5497</b>	<b>Employment Policy</b>		<b>Czech</b>
<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	
Amersfoort	Liberec* (CR)	1	
Cuijk	Prerov (CR)	1	
De Ronde Venen	Kolin (CR)	2	
Doetinchem	Pardubice (CR)	2	
Ede	Chrudim (CR)	1	
Groningen	Zlin* (CR)	1	
Utrecht Province	Hradec Králové (CR)	1	
Purmerend	Jihlava* (CR)	2	
Vlaardingen	Moravská Třebová* (CR)	2	
Voorburg	Hranice (CR)	2	
Waddinxveen	Pelhrimov* (CR)	1	
Westerveld	Polička* (CR)	2	

<b>MMTP 5498</b>	<b>Government Communication</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>Polish</b>
<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	
Rotterdam	Gdańsk (P)	2	
Nieuwegein	Puławy (P)	2	
Deurne	Leszno* (P)	2	
Breda	Wrocław (P)	2	
Bergen op Zoom	Szczecinek* (P)	2	
Leiden	Toruń* (P)	2	
Assen	Poznań* (P)	2	
Beverwijk	Wronki (P)	2	
Only theory	APC* (P)	2	

<b>MMTP T2003</b>		<b>2001</b>	<b>Czech</b>
<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	
Amersfoort	Liberec* (CR)	2	
Baarn	Kláštorec nad Ohří (CR)	2	
Barendrecht	Louny (CR)	2	
Brielle	Havlíčkův Brod (CR)	2	
Groningen	Zlín* (CR)	2	
Ijsselstein	Strakonice (CR)	2	
Purmerend	Jihlava* (CR)	2	
Rotterdam	Praha (CR)	4	
Utrecht	Brno (CR)	2	
Vlaardingen	Moravská Třebová* (CR)	2	
Waalre	Nové Město na Moravě (CR)	2	
Westerveld	Polička (CR)	2	

<b>MMTP T2004</b>	<b>Employment and Social Policy</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>Polish</b>
	<b>Participating municipalities</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	
Bergen op Zoom	Szczecinek* (P)	3	
Assen	Poznań* (P)	3	
Leiden	Toruń* (P)	3	
Brunssum	Maków Podhalański (P)	3	
Heunen	Połkowice (P)	3	
Heerhugowaard	Kalisz (P)	3	
Nieuwerkerk a/d IJssel	Chełmża (P)	3	
Westellingwerf	Choszczno (P)	3	
Bunschoten	Mosina (P)	3	
Only theory	APC* (P)	3	

The municipalities marked with an asterix (\*) are part of the sample of the field evaluations.

## **ANNEX 6**



**ANNEX 6****LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC****Poland**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation / Function</b>
Zdzisław Adamczak –	Leszno, Deputy Mayor,
Marek Balcer	Mikołów - Mayor
Andrzej Banaszyński	Mieścisko - Mayor
Mrs Bogusława Bandelewska	Iława - Head of Environmental Protection Department
Tadeusz Bobryk	Szczecinek - Head of Powiat Labour Office
Jeroen Boender	First Secretary Royal Netherlands Embassy
Piotr Całbecki	Toruń - Member of the City Executive Board
Henk G.C. van den Dool	Minister - Counsellor Dept. Head of Mission RNE
Ms. Agnieszka Dybowska	Toruń, Dept. of EU Integration and International Co-operation
Martin van Dijk	Assistant Bilateral Programmes RNE
Marian Goliński	Szczecinek - Mayor
Mrs Alicja Grenda	Association of Polish Cities (APC) - Head of Foreign Relations, Vice-Director
Mrs Anna Grocholska	Warsaw - Head of Foreign Relations Department
Mrs Krystyna Gurbiel	Office of the Committee of European Integration - Under-secretary of State
Andrzej Jaszczur	Szczecinek - Deputy Mayor
Dariusz Jędraszak	Poznań - City Clerk
Marek Kalemba	Poznań - Manager Department of Foreign Relations
Ms. Alicja Kędracka	Mieścisko, Town Clerk
Marek Kowalski	Lublin Marshall's office -
Tadeusz Kozek	Office of the Committee of European Integration - Director
Maciej Kruszewski	Toruń, Dept. of EU Integration and International Co-operation
Mrs Kamala Laghate	Assistant Bilateral Programmes RNE
Ms. Danuta Lemańska	Mieścisko - Promotion and Development
Tomasz Malepszy	Leszno – Mayor
Adam Małysz	Mikołów - City Clerk
Sergei Matjunin	Lublin - Europe House, Man. Director
Jerzy Mazurek	Secretary of State Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (MSWiA)
J. M. Meulenkamp	Man. Director Vestia Beheer Rolde
Mrs Lilianna Mikołajczak	MSWiA
Adam Misiuwianiec	Head of Dept. Local Government MSWiA
Tj. T. Oving	Oving Architekten BV Groningen
Mrs Jolanta Pawlak	Warsaw - Head of Landscape Studies Unit
Jacek Piotrowski	Szczecinek - Spokesman
Andrzej Porawski	APC - Executive Director
Paweł Prokop	Director School for Local Government and Administration - Lublin
Tomasz Sławiński	Białystok - Head of City Promotion Office

Marian Stasiak	Office of the Committee of European Integration - Director
Jan Swadzba	Mikołów - Owner agro-industry, participant in STAGE
Mrs Alicja Szczepińska	Leszno - Head of Public Relations
Wojciech Szymaczak	Toruń, ECWM (NGO) participant of MMTP
Małgorzata Toruńska	Toruń, Health Dept.,
Leszek Wolski	Mikołów - Head of Development Department
Eugeniusz Wycisło	Member Parliament, previous Starosta Mikołów Powiat
Rafał Wysocki	Ilawa - Head of PR Department

## Czech Republic

Name	Organisation / Function
Eric Bergman	Agora Foundation
Mrs. Ivana Bursíková	Agora Central Europe - Project Manager
Mrs Dana Danová	Municipality Zlín - Head Communications Dept., Spokeswoman Loc. Gvt.
František Dohnal	Hejtman (Chairman Reg. Parliament) Vysočina Region - Prev. President SMO
Ivan Fuksa	Municipality Příbram - Mayor
Mrs. Gabriela Hermannová	SMO - International Department
Mrs. Milena Jaburková	SMO - Head of International Department
Václav Ják	Municipality Cheb - Deputy Mayor
Mrs Věra Jourová	Vysočina Region - Director Department for Regional Development
Jirí Kittner	Municipality Liberec - Mayor
Josef Kolařík	Municipality Klášterec nad Ohří - Council member
Mrs. Jana Kondášová	Municipality Liberec - Manager Dept. Town Development
Mrs Vladimira Kupcová	Municipality Příbram - Intl. Relations, previously Mgr. Env. Dept. District
Mrs. Lenka Kynčilová	Municipality Klášterec nad Ohří - Deputy Mayor
Martijn Lambarts	Royal Netherlands Embassy at Prague - Second Secretary - Justice and Home Affairs
Mrs Petra Leinweberova	Municipality Polička - International Relations
Jan Matous	Municipality Polička - head of Information centre
Mrs. Kateřina Mazánková	Municipality Klášterec nad Ohří - Head Department Development and Investment
Pavel Micka	Agora Central Europe
Mrs. Jitka Mrázková	Municipality Liberec - Head of Tourism Department
František Mojžíš	Municipality Semily - Mayor
Miroslav Netolický	Municipality Moravská Třebová - Department of Investment and Regional Development
Mrs. Mileva Sláviková	Municipality Liberec - Head Mayor's Office
Mrs. Jiřina Štanclová	Municipality Jihlava - Head Communication Department, Spokeswoman
Mrs. Vlasta Ulrichová	Municipality Polička - former Head of Financial Department
Mrs. I.L. van Veldhuizen-Rothenbücher	HM Ambassador from the Netherlands to the Czech Republic
Vratislav Výborný	Municipality Jihlava - Mayor

## **ANNEX 7**





## ANNEX 7 REFERENCES

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## **Evaluation of the Dutch Municipal International Co-operation Programme**

### **Three independent projects**

- **Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic to train local public servants and district officers on issues relevant for EU accession**
- **Support to the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania**
- **Strengthening of local government through the South African Local Government Association**

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## Preface

On behalf of the Directorate General for International Co-operation (DGIS), the Independent Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts a worldwide evaluation in the area of municipal international co-operation. The IOB has contracted SEOR BV of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, in association with Ecorys NEI to conduct field studies in selected countries.

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports both developing countries and accession countries in the development of good (local) governance by financing special programmes for municipal international co-operation and independent projects. This report presents the results of the evaluation of one of the components of the overall evaluation, being the so-called 'independent projects'.

'Independent projects' are understood as those projects and activities in support of the development of local government, funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that do not pertain to any specific programme to that end. The distinguishing feature of these projects is that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has entered in a contractual arrangement with the Dutch Association of Municipalities, the VNG, for either the administration or the implementation (or both) of the project.

The evaluation team visited public and private institutions, municipalities and their umbrella organisations in three countries (South Africa, Tanzania and the Czech Republic) with the aim to assess the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the independent projects. These visits were embedded in and related to the simultaneous evaluation of other components, being the programmes for Municipal International Co-operation with Developing countries (*Gemeentelijke Samenwerking Ontwikkelingslanden - GSO*) and with Accession countries (*Gemeentelijke Samenwerking Transitielanden - GST*). The team consisted of the following researchers:

Willem Cornelissen, SEOR BV (team leader),  
Mirco Goudriaan, SEOR BV.

Mrs Francis Kettenis (IOB, Inspector) and Mrs Mariska van Beijnum (IOB, research assistant) accompanied the team and researched the broader policy aspects of the Dutch cooperation with the countries involved.

The mission to South Africa was undertaken in November 2002, to the Czech Republic in February 2003 and to Tanzania in March 2003.

The team expresses its gratitude for the excellent collaboration with all parties involved, and acknowledges in particular the open and frank discussions with the Royal Netherlands Embassies in the Czech Republic, Tanzania and South Africa, the VNG International (VNG-I), the Foundation for Assistance to Local Authorities (FALA) in the Czech Republic, the Association for Local Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT) and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA).

The structure of the report is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the country-specific context of the three selected projects with respect to local governance development as well as the Dutch support to local governance in the countries. Chapter 3

describes the specific features of the three projects. The administration of the projects is analysed in chapter 4, followed by an assessment of the efficiency (chapter 5), effectiveness (chapter 6) and relevance (chapter 7). The report finalises with some conclusions (chapter 8).

***Disclaimer:*** *This report represents the mission's perceptions and opinions. The report is the sole responsibility of SEOR BV and does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions either of IOB, the Royal Netherlands Embassies, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any foreign Authority.*

## List of abbreviations and acronyms

ALAT	Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Programme
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government
DWAF	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
EU	European Union
FALA	Foundation for the Assistance to Local Authorities
GSO	<i>Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden</i> . Dutch subsidy fund for municipal co-operation with developing countries
GST	<i>Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Transitielanden</i> . Dutch subsidy fund for municipal co-operation with accession countries
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ILA	Institute for Local Administration
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LGRA	Local Government Reform Agenda
LGRC	Local Government Reform Component
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
MATRA	Dutch Programme for Social Transformation
PHARE	European Assistance Programme for Central Europe
PO-RALG	President's Office Regional Administration and Local Government
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SMO	Association for Municipalities in the Czech Republic
ToR	Terms of Reference
Tsh	Tanzanian Shilling
VNG (-I)	Dutch Association of Municipalities (International)

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs is supporting both developing countries and transition countries in the development of good (local) governance by financing special programmes for municipal international co-operation, as well as independent projects. This support is subject to evaluation by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The IOB has formulated the objective of the overall evaluation of the municipal international cooperation as follows:

*The analysis and assessment of the policy relevance, the effectiveness and efficiency of activities financed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of municipal international co-operation, that are administered and/or implemented by the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG).*

In the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the study, three components are mentioned:

- the Municipal International Co-operation with Developing countries (Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden - GSO);
- the Municipal International Co-operation with Accession countries (the Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Transitielanden -GST);
- ‘independent’ projects.

‘Independent projects’ are those projects and activities in support of the development of local government that do not pertain to any specific programme to that end. However they may pertain to other umbrella programmes, such as the Programme for Social Transformation (Maatschappelijke Transformatie - Matra) active in the accession countries. The single distinguishing feature is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated the financial resources to the projects and that the programmes and/or projects are administered by and/or implemented by the Dutch Association of Municipalities, the VNG.

The ToR (3.1) specifies that the evaluation of independent projects comprises only those projects that are aimed at contributing to the strengthening of local governance in either transition or developing countries, during the period 1997-2001.

From this general objective of the evaluation mentioned above, three research questions were derived:

- How efficient has the input been in order to achieve the desired results? (efficiency);
- How effective have the realised interventions been in strengthening local governance? (effectiveness);
- How relevant have the independent projects been to the general policy objective of strengthening local governance? (relevance).

## 1.2 Research population and sample

During the period 1997-2001, the expenditures of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs through contracts with the VNG totalled NLG 50.490.716, of which 30 percent was disbursed for independent projects (ToR, 4.1).

During this 5-year period, the Ministry (co)-financed 31 independent projects that were either administered or implemented by VNG (see Annex A). The project registration system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIDAS) does not distinguish between the VNG as the association of municipalities and the VNG International (VNG-I) as a company. The VNG-I is the privatised structure (2002) of the previously existing VNG's International Projects Unit.

Since there is no single programme to which all the projects pertain, the list of independent projects shows a broad array of themes, countries of implementation, as well as extent in which the VNG was involved. Annex A presents an overview of the 31 projects<sup>1</sup>. In 15 of these projects, implementation has been a joint responsibility of VNG with other organisations.

The total amount disbursed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on these projects sums to NLG 16.6 million<sup>2</sup>. The following observations have to be made:

- Expenditures recorded may refer to either commitments or disbursements<sup>3</sup>;
- Since the VNG has not always been the sole implementing agency, the amounts listed do not allow to distinguish the disbursements made to VNG from those to other stakeholders involved.

The 31 projects have been implemented in 19 different countries, mainly in Africa (14 projects) and Eastern Europe (11 projects). The ToR specified the sample of projects subject to evaluation, drawn from the population of independent projects. The following criteria were used for the sampling:

- those projects within the GSO/GST country selection (Nicaragua, Tanzania, South Africa, Czech Republic and Poland);
- those projects that were administered either by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the VNG.

Based on the central project registration system (MIDAS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initially IOB had selected the following projects:

- 1 project in Nicaragua;
- 1 project in Tanzania;
- 2 projects in the Czech Republic;
- 1 project in Poland.

The evaluators' file research on these projects revealed that the MIDAS-information on one project in the Czech Republic, the project in Poland and the project in Nicaragua was not correct. The first two projects had never been contracted to the VNG, and did not deal with subjects related to local government development, while

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<sup>1</sup> The information is based on the MIDAS registration system of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> This amount exceeds by NLG 1.4 million the disbursements listed in the ToR (4.1), since the list was amended after the ToR had been elaborated.

<sup>3</sup> The MIDAS system is rather imprecise in the distinction between commitments and disbursements.

the project registered for Nicaragua did not take place in that country, but in the Netherlands.

Elimination of these wrongly registered projects left over only one project in the Czech Republic and one project in Tanzania. SEOR suggested in the Inception Report a new list by adding one project in South Africa and several projects implemented in the Netherlands. The project in South Africa was contracted directly by the Royal Netherlands Embassy to the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), which, on its turn, had sub-contracted VNG to implement the project. Although this was a deviation from the selection criteria, it did result in selecting a project that was directly related to the area of strengthening local governance. The titles of the projects in the Netherlands suggested that they were directly related to municipal international cooperation<sup>4</sup>.

However, further file research on the projects in the Netherlands revealed that the subject matters of these projects had little to do with strengthening local governments in accession or developing countries, or that implementation had been outside the responsibility of the international department of VNG (IPU or VNG-I). Finally, only three projects remained in the sample (table 1.1).

**Table 1.1 Selected independent projects 1997 t/m 2001**

Project title	Country	Admin. Organisation	Implementing organisation	Contribution DGIS (NLG)
Support to the Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT) – 1 <sup>st</sup> phase	Tanzania	DGIS / RNE Dar es Salaam	VNG	435,987 (1 <sup>st</sup> phase)
Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic to train public servants on EU-accession.	Czech Republic	DGIS	VNG ILA FALA	460,000
Strengthening of local government through the South African Local Government Association (SALGA)	South-Africa	RNE Pretoria	SALGA VNG	240,629

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MIDAS

The above-mentioned selected projects are highlighted in Annex A. For the project in Tanzania, only the first phase of the project was included, budgeted for NLG 435,987, since the second phase fell outside the time period covered by the evaluation.

From a statistical point of view, this sample is too small to be representative for the population of projects administered and/or executed by the VNG during the period 1997-2001. The three selected projects represent only:

- 10 percent of all projects;
- 7 percent of the total expenditures;
- 17 percent of the countries in which the projects were implemented.

<sup>4</sup> The project with the Social Housing Foundation in South Africa was not included in the sample, since neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor the VNG holds administrative responsibility, while implementation is through the Netherlands Ministry of Housing (VROM) and the Association of Housing Cooperatives AEDES.

### 1.3 Research methodology

A first methodological question raised was whether the 'independent projects' could be treated as a group anyhow. And if answered positively whether subsequent conclusions can be drawn that go beyond the level of the individual project.

The independent projects do not belong to a single programme aimed at strengthening local governments in either transition or developing countries. However, they may form part –and in some cases they actually do- of broader umbrella programmes, such as the Programme for Societal Transformation (*Maatschappelijke Transformatie – Matra*) programme. The project in the Czech Republic pertained to the Matra pre-accession programme. The projects show a broad heterogeneity as far as it concerns structure, financing modality, and the instruments used.

The three projects selected do have two features in common: an administration and management aspect and a subject matter aspect.

The administrative aspect shared is that they are either administered by or implemented by the VNG-I, while the subject matter shared is that the objectives of the projects are aimed at strengthening support mechanisms for local government. So the common denominator is the fact that they are dealing with capacity building in relation to local governments. In two cases, national associations of local authorities were strengthened (SALGA in South Africa and ALAT in Tanzania), and in the other case, training institutes for local government (ILA and FALA in the Czech Republic). So, although the projects do not respond to a single set of policies and do not pertain to a single programme, they can be considered a group.

For the evaluation of the projects the following research instruments were used:

#### *In the Netherlands:*

- Prior to the field missions, an extensive file study was conducted, both at the VNG-I, and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IOB). Project proposals, progress reports, final reports, financial overviews and notes of communication between involved parties, were studied;
- Interviews were held with the responsible managers and officers at VNG-I.

#### *Field missions:*

- During the field missions additional documentation was obtained from the Embassies, national public entities and the organisations directly involved;
- In the three countries, interviews were held with the directly involved organisations, their professional staff, their managing governors and other relevant stakeholders at central and local level (see Annex A)

After the fieldwork, information was systematised and analysed, and additional interviews were conducted for feed back.

#### *Analysis*

The analysis method of the evaluation was based on the analysis of the individual projects, using standardised judgement instruments for the main evaluation criteria: efficiency, effectiveness and relevance. The standardised and objectively verifiable indicators have been combined with the subjective perceptions of the persons interviewed. The evaluators' judgements are based on the combination of both.

Main indicators for judging the efficiency have been the time path, the costs as compared to the benefits and the overall management of the activities comprised in the projects.

The effectiveness has been judged by the extent to which the project stated objectives had been achieved in particular concerning organisational structures, service delivery capacity, networks and communication with members ( local governments).

Relevance has been judged as compared to the observed problems of the institutions, as well as the policies of both the Netherlands development co-operation and the recipient country's policy concerning local government development.

Although the project vary widely, the evaluation components can be summarised in the following matrix (table 1.2):

**Table 1.2 Evaluation matrix**

	<b>Means</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Sources and technique</b>	<b>Evaluation</b>
<b>Inputs</b>	General Development Policies Financial resources	Policies reflected in Project Documents Allocations, disbursements	Policy documents Ministry FA Project Documents	<b>Efficiency</b>
<b>Comparison outputs with inputs</b>				
<b>Outputs</b>	Strengthening two national associations of local authorities (SALGA in South Africa and ALAT in Tanzania). Strengthening two training institutes for local government (ILA and FALA in the Czech Republic).	Projects in place and implemented according to Project Documents Progress Reports Financial Progress	Desk study (VNG dossiers) Structured Interviews selected municipalities Interviews implementing agencies	<b>Effectiveness</b>
<b>Extent to which inputs via outputs contribute to expected results</b>				
<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>Expected results</b> improved capabilities for service delivery to local governments enhanced interaction between local governments (SALGA and ALAT) Improved advocacy roles associations (SALGA and ALAT)	No. of professionals trained formally or on the job in recipient institutions Changes in interaction among municipalities Kind and quantity of services delivered by associations Kind and quantity of courses delivered by training institutes	Field studies in three countries Structured and open interviews directly involved recipients Structured and open interviews civil servants/ organisation Desk study	<b>Relevance</b>
<b>Extent to which inputs via outputs and outcome contribute to specific objectives</b>				
<b>Impact</b>	<b>Specific objectives</b> improved capabilities for joint representation and advocacy (SALGA, ALAT) local governments receive more and higher quality services Governance capacity of local governments strengthened Citizen's participation in local government improved	Institutional communication system improved (SALGA, ALAT) Changes in problem solving capacity )SALGA, ALAT) Improved policy formulation capacity (SALGA, ALAT) Budget implementation capacity Civil servants of local governments trained individually or in groups (ILA, FALA) Institutionalisation of participation of civil society	Field study in three countries Rapid organisational assessments Interviews policy makers Interviews local governments Publications	
<b>Overall objective:</b> capacity building in support of local government development.				

## **2 Local government development, the context**

Projects aimed at strengthening local government capacities are implemented within a national context. This national context is the total of general political, administrative and financial characteristics in which the project is embedded. The design, objectives, instruments and administration of a project are not the only determinants of its (potential) effectiveness, but that depends also on its specific context. So, while an institution, like an association of municipalities might be strengthened thanks to external support, it is the context that defines whether this strengthened capacity will prosper in daily practice.

The most important context factors are the political, administrative and legal factors that determine directly the structure and mandate of local governments. A second group of factors is composed by the financial and economic context of local government. The resources made available and the capacities to generate own income in order to implement the local policies are of importance to both the autonomy and service delivering capacity of local government. A third group of factors comprises the set of background phenomena, like history, and socio-cultural characteristics. These are rather unique factors.

During the field missions, a brief analysis was made of the above-mentioned factors. The factors were not extensively analysed, but have been described as the environment in which the activities are being carried out. Without pretending to be exhaustive or even analytically correct, the main features of the context are being described in the following paragraphs.

### **2.1 Czech Republic**

#### **2.1.1 The development of local government in the Czech Republic**

Modern history of local government in the Czech Republic (CR) can be divided into three stages. The first stage started with the post November 1989 democratic turnover, while the other two are represented by two phases in the public administration reform, triggered by the adoption of a new Czech Constitution after the separation from Slovakia on 1 January 1993. Local government in the Czech Republic is frequently labelled as self-government, reflecting the pretensions of high autonomy at the local level. Self-government was re-established in 1990 by the adoption of the Municipal Act. In that same year municipal councils were elected (replacing the previous national committees). District national committees were transformed into district offices and continued implementing the administration tasks delegated by the central level. The regional committees were abolished and their mandate distributed among municipalities, district offices and the state.

The second phase started with the establishment of the independent Czech Republic, when the "higher territorial self-governing units", i.e. regions, were introduced in the newly adopted Constitution. This step was followed by lengthy political discussion on the need for having regions or not. In 1997, a Constitutional law on the establishment of 'higher-level territorial units' was approved. The law became effective from 1st January 2000 onwards. The corresponding by-laws, such as the Act on Regions, were approved in 2000. During that period, a fundamental discussion took place on the future of the public administration in the Czech Republic.



The third stage of the reform was triggered by the elections for regional councils and the establishment of regional offices. That phase implied the abolishment of the district offices and the transfer of their mandates to other public entities in the respective areas, i.e. especially to municipalities.

Currently, the Czech Republic counts 14 regions and 6,250 municipalities. All municipalities have the same mandate, obligations and service delivery tasks. The large number of municipalities is an expression of the –on average- small size of each of them. However, the so-called statutory towns (usually regional centres) form a special group with their own governing bodies. The Capital Prague is governed by special law and has an exclusive position.

The weakness of the administrative reform has been the rather insignificant change in the current municipal activities as compared to the delegated activities performed by the committees in the past. While an increasing number of tasks and activities are being decentralised, they still pertain outside the legal mandate of the municipal councils. These are usually regulated by law, including legislation of subordination (ministerial decrees). The changes that have taken place in the decentralisation of public budgeting and expenditures are modest only. Czech municipalities are small and salaries paid are considered low as compared to national standards. The lack of qualified civil servants is a main problem in the performance of local governments.

### **2.1.2 The Dutch support to local government in the Czech Republic**

Since 1994, the Dutch government provides bilateral support to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, mainly through the Matra-programme. The Matra programme supports the change of a centralized plan economy towards a pluriform democratic state respecting the rule of law. The Matra programme supports activities focusing on the change of public institutions, the organisations of the civil society and the mutual relations between them. Starting point is the idea to assist building a civil society, in which citizens feel responsible for their society. Activities aiming at strengthening legal protection and security, emancipation, private initiative and pluriformity are eligible for support. At the same time, the programme aims to improve the functioning of public institutions, the transparency of its administration, social policy, accessibility and the democratic contents. The emphasis of the Matra programme has been on local authorities and the civil society. Since 1998, also central institutions have been supported through Matra pre-accession projects:

The Matra programme comprises two different instruments:

- Pre-accession: Assistance to ten pre-accession countries in CEE and Turkey in view of their EU accession and the implementation of the Acquis Communautaire. The budget for this programme has been increased from NLG 19.4 million in 1998 to NLG 83.5 million in 2001. The most important sub-programme is the Matra Pre-Accession Projects Programme (MPAP). The GST programme is another sub-programme of the Matra programme.
- Classical Matra: aimed at the development of good governance and the strengthening of civil society. The budget for this programme increased from NLG 138 million in 1998 to NLG 370 million in 2001. The Matra Projects Programme (MPP) is the most important instrument and counts for 51 percent of the total budget.

The main focus of the classic Matra in the Czech Republic was on projects in the field of “good governance and the public sector”, “environment” and “health”. Apart from

the GST programme, several other projects were implemented under the Matra pre-accession programme in the field of (MPAP) health, environment, education, finance and training of civil servants.

## **2.2 Tanzania**

### **2.2.1 Local government development in Tanzania**

The concept of 'local government' is not something new to Tanzania and can be traced back to the period of colonial administration. Since its Independence in 1962, Tanzania has passed through various attempts for decentralisation. Local government has gone through different phases of respectively abolishment, re-establishment, reform and (currently) re-implementation.

Soon after the attainment of political Independence, Tanzania declared to combat "the three development enemies": ignorance, disease and poverty. Plans and programmes were developed to expand and strengthen basic social services such as education and health. Numerous policies were put in place in this endeavour. These were centrally steered and local governments had no other than implementing functions in that respect. Significant progress was made in the social areas during the 1970s, but the socialist development path started to crumble.

The World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put pressure on Tanzania to accept drastic economic, political and organisational reforms (including the civil service reform). This pressure for reform was a reaction to government's incapacity to sustain the achievements of the 1970s. Social infrastructure, such as water supply, education and medical services deteriorated rapidly due to the lack of budgetary resources for maintenance and modernisation.

The Zanzibar Declaration (1991) expressed the government's shift in policies. A multi-party system was introduced, while liberalisation of the markets, privatisation and openness to direct investment revealed the policy recommendations of the international financing institutions. During the 1990s, Tanzania pursued the economic recommendations of its main multilateral financiers and became eligible to the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative.

So far, the performance of most public sector organisations, including the Local Authorities has not been very successful in achieving their respective objectives and expected results, mostly due to ineffective organisational cultures, and partly due to non-cultural factors (e.g., economic, inherited colonial structures, poor management and low technology).

By Constitution, Tanzania is a 'unitary state'. The Constitution recognizes the different governmental structures between the mainland and Zanzibar, but hardly spells out the attributes and mandated of lower governments. Decentralised government in Tanzania implies a central level government (encompassing the President's and Prime Ministers 's Offices, central ministries, sector ministries and Regional Secretariats), and local level government that is rooted at sub-village level. The linkage between the two levels is still rather weak.

Important moments in time with regard to local government were the publication of the "Local Government Reform Agenda' (1996) and the 'Policy Paper on Local Government Reform' (1998). The Reform Agenda stated that local government

capacity and efficiency to deliver services to the people would be the *raison d'être* for the devolution of roles and authority by the central government. Similarly, it is noted that 'local government will be free to make policy and operational decisions consistent with the laws...and government policies'. The later Policy Paper mentions that the "local government system is [to be] based on political devolution and decentralisation of functions and finance".

The overall responsibility for coordination and implementation of government's decentralisation policy lies with the President's Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG).

### *Local Government Reform*

Decentralisation was brought up with the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) of 1991 in the form of the Local Government Reform. Initially, there was no component addressing local government reform in the CSRP, but it was added in 1994. In June 1996, the Prime Minister announced the government's decision to restructure and downsize regional administration with the objective to make local governments more efficient and effective. Local government reform is considered as one of the strategies to achieve the objective of CSRP: to improve service delivery. In October 1996, a policy document on local government reform was presented, advocating the need for transfer of decision-making power and responsibilities from central to local governments (devolution). A Local Government Reform Agenda (LGRA) 1996-2000 was approved by the government and presented to donors in a round-table meeting in March 1997, which was endorsed by the then Steering Committee for the CSRP. Government and donor partners agreed to establish a management unit, within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Within the PMO the overall coordination of the reform lies with the unit for Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG), which was established in Dodoma in 1998 and is led by the Local Government Reform Team in Dar es Salaam. In 1998, the government published its Policy Paper on Local Government Reform, constituting the framework on which the reform of local government in Tanzania is based.

The LGRA 1996-2000 consisted of six components: Institutional and legal framework; restructuring of local authorities; governance; finance; human resource development and management, and programme management.

One of the two sub-components of the Governance component of the LGRA is the strengthening of ALAT.

## **2.2.2 The Dutch support to local government in Tanzania**

While the total bilateral and multilateral donor support to Tanzania represents well over 11 percent of GDP (1999) and averages USD 900 million per year (Tanzania Assistance Strategy, p xi), the donor contributions to local government development have been rather modest. The most important activity aimed at strengthening local governments is the Local Government Reform Programme. After a pilot phase, the 'full' programme started in January 2000. It envisages a phased introduction of decentralised government in successive groups of 38, 45 and 31 districts. Objective of the programme is to 'improve the quality of, and access to public services provided through, or facilitated by Local Government Authorities. Main policy issues in this regard are:

- i) political, financial, and administrative decentralisation;
- ii) changes in central-local relations.

All donors involved in the reform programme provide support to the central level in order to reach the local levels. The donor activities are financed through a common basket fund, which is managed by the Local Government Reform Team and coordinated through a Common Basket Fund Steering Committee and. There does not seem to be a leading donor in the coordination of the LGRP. The primarily multilateral and bilateral donors that have been supportive to the common basket fund include UNDP/UNCDF, the EU, Finland (FINNIDA), Denmark (DANIDA), Ireland (IRISH AID), the Netherlands (DGIS/RNE), Norway (NORAD), Sweden (SIDA) and the United Kingdom (DFID). Some donors have earmarked some of their contributions, including the Netherlands, which has contracted the VNG-I for supporting ALAT and Oxford Policy Management for the Overall Programme Management.

The Dutch bilateral support to Tanzania is approximately €70 million (Budget 2003). This amount excludes the Municipal International Cooperation (MIC) programme that consists of resources from Dutch municipalities and subsidised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This evaluation assesses the results of the project "Supporting ALAT" implemented by VNG-I (the first phase), during the period 1997 – 1999 (see Chapter 3).

## **2.3 South Africa**

### **2.3.1 Local government development in South Africa**

The Apartheid regime has left South Africa with a distorted system of local governance. Apartheid aimed at limiting the extent to which affluent white municipalities would bear the financial burden of servicing disadvantaged black areas and townships. By the late 1980s, most townships and many homeland rural areas were effectively ungoverned; the Apartheid local government system had collapsed. The crisis in local government was a major force leading to the national reform process, which took off in 1990. National debate took place in the Local Government Negotiating Forum. The resulting Local Government Transition Act of 1993 did not provide a blueprint for a new local government system, but sketched a process for change. This change from a racially-based and fragmented local government to a non-racial, democratic local government was mapped out.

The process of legitimising local government began by unifying and de-racialising local authorities and making them more inclusive. This was done through Local Negotiating For a, while Transitional Councils were established. These Councils comprised an equal number of appointed members from the statutory and non-statutory sides, and were therefore more legitimate than the previous local government bodies. The Transitional Councils were to govern until the municipal elections of 1995 took place. The 1995/1996 local government elections replaced the appointed members of the Transitional authorities with elected ones in 843 new local authorities. This lasted until a new system of local government had been designed and legislated upon.

The 1996 Constitution, and a range of new local government Acts adopted after the enactment of the 1996 Constitution, provided the final legislative framework for the transformation of local government in South Africa. The Constitution provided for the establishment of three categories of municipalities:

- Category A (Metropolitan Municipalities): A municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area;
- Category B (Local Municipalities): A municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls;
- Category C (District Municipalities): A municipality that has municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality.

To give effect to the Constitutional provisions the independent Local Government Municipal Demarcation Board was established on 1 February 1999. This Board rationalised the existing 843 municipalities into 6 Metropolitan Municipalities<sup>5</sup> (category A), 47 District Municipalities (category C) and 231 Local Municipalities (category B).

Elections in these new areas were held under the supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission on 5 December 2000.

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<sup>5</sup> According to the Constitution, a category A municipality (Metropolitan Municipality) can only be established in metropolitan areas. The Municipal Demarcation Board determined that Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria, East Rand and Port Elizabeth are metropolitan areas.

The Municipal Demarcation Act, which set out the process and procedures to be followed in the preparing of municipal boundaries has as its object: To provide for the core principles, mechanisms and process that are necessary to enable municipalities to move progressively towards the social and economic lift of local communities; its key aspects are:

- Legal nature and rights and duties of municipalities;
- Municipal functions and powers;
- Community participation;
- Integrated development planning;
- Performance management;
- Local Public Administration and Human Resources;
- Municipal Services;
- Credit Control and Debt Collection;
- Provincial and National monitoring and standard settings;
- Legal Matters.

### **2.3.2 The Dutch support to local government in South Africa**

The current Dutch policy concerning local government in South Africa aims at supporting the creation of a democratic, transparent and accountable local sphere in South Africa. In 1999, the Dutch Government decided to grant bilateral aid to South Africa, notwithstanding the fact that it did not qualify for such aid according to the criteria used for selection (i.e. per capita income below USD 925, the IDA –norm). It was decided to grant support for a limited period of five years. NLG 250 million was made available for the years 2000 – 2004, with preference to budgetary support. The South African government suggested destining the resources to the following sectors education; youth; local government, and justice.

In 2002, the Minister for Development Co-operation decided to extend the aid to South Africa for the post-2004 period, considering the historical ties and the sharp division in the South African society. In the post 2004 programme more attention will be paid to the non-ODA forms of assistance, while ‘local government’ will be discontinued as a sector. It will be embedded in a wider ‘good governance’ approach.

In the 2000-2004 programme to support local government development, the package of bilateral activities is as follows:

- Budget support to the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG): DPLG, together with stakeholders like SALGA, Planact, District Councils, training institutes, etc. has formulated a national support strategy aimed at supporting municipalities in their planning and implementation processes (Integrated Development Planning).
- Budget support to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAFF): Budget support to DWAFF is used for basket funding (co-funding) of the Water Sector Support Programme, which is aimed at building the capacity of all stakeholders involved in (local) water service delivery. The programme is co-funded by the EU, DFID and the Netherlands.
- NCWSTI / IRC: The support to the National Community Water and Sanitation Training Institute (NCWSTI) forms a complementary activity specifically aimed at addressing gender related capacity constraints in the

- Water Sector and will form part of the Water Sector Support Programme of DWAF.
- SALGA / VNG: The Embassy has a contract with SALGA with the aim of building its capacity and assist it in fulfilling its mandate. SALGA has experienced an increasing pressure to represent local government on all kinds of occasions and processes. For SALGA to be able to live up to the high expectations, performance has to improve to maintain credibility. Dutch support mainly entails technical assistance from SALGA's Dutch counterpart, VNG-I. Co-operation focuses on general management support, local gender and youth policy development and exposure to service delivery options.
  - USN / Planact: The Urban Sector Network (USN) is the main national NGO grouping in the field of local governance. The Network plays an important role as service provider for capacity building in local government. The Network has wide experience in IDP training and community participation. It assists both municipalities and communities in achieving developmental local government.

The Dutch bilateral support is approximately €20 million per annum. This excludes the GSO programme.

**Table 2.1 Financial overview estimates 2000-2002 (x NLG 1,000 for the sector local government)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Budgetary Support DWAF</b>	<b>Budgetary Support DPLG</b>	<b>NCWSTI</b>	<b>SALGA</b>	<b>USN</b>	<b>New</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>2000</i>	3,530	4,411	284	<b>240</b>	174	22	8,667
<i>2001</i>	5,300	4,769	304	<b>388</b>	300	600	5,310
<i>2002</i>	5,340	5,000	273	<b>117</b>	130	600	5,200
<i>total</i>				<b>745</b>			

This evaluation is restricted to the component of strengthening SALGA.

## **3 The projects**

### **3.1 Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic to train local public servants and district officers on issues relevant for EU accession**

In view of the Czech Republic's envisaged membership of the European Union (on 17 January 1996 the Czech Republic filed its application for membership of the EU; the country is candidate for accession in 2004), the adoption of EU regulations and directives as laid down in the National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) are considered of fundamental importance, also for local and regional governments. However, knowledge among local and district<sup>6</sup> level authorities and their civil servants is limited in this area. The NPAA is a policy document, that specifies the various policy areas in which a country has to reach a certain "quality standard" by complying to EU regulations. Adoption of the *acquis* at national level has implications for the local and regional administrative levels (mainly in the field of the environment, procurement guidelines and social sectors). The NPAA chapters neither contain specific requirements, nor provide concrete information on the implications of EU regulation to local level governments. In order to assist local and regional governments in the Czech Republic on their preparedness for EU accession, the government of the Czech Republic considered training and education in this field a bare necessity.

In response to a 1998 request submitted by two Czech training institutes, the Foundation for the Assistance to Local Authorities (FALA) and the Institute for Local Administration (ILA), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to finance a bilateral project through the Dutch Matra programme. Both the Czech Ministry of the Interior and the Czech Ministry of Regional Development supported this request.

A consortium of two Dutch companies, VNG-I and Rubiconsort was requested to implement the project, VNG-I being the principal contractor of the project. Rubiconsort is a Dutch organisation, with expertise in management consultancy and training in the field of good governance and issues related to EU-accession. The final project proposal was submitted to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1998 and approved in December 1998. The aim of the project was to strengthen the two training institutes in their capacity to train local and regional government in EU-accession matters. The project was implemented during the period November 15, 1998 until December 31, 2000 (after a postponement of the final date of the project with three months).

#### *ILA and FALA*

The Institute for Local Administration (ILA) is directed by the civil service administrative branch of the Ministry of the Interior. ILA is offering "compulsory courses" for civil servants at the local and regional level. Local administrators are obliged to obtain certain certificates and since in many cases (only) ILA has been accredited to conduct these courses, it has an advantageous position with respect to other training institutes. Gradually this situation changes, since other organisations have obtained more accreditations over the last years. Apart from the "compulsory courses", ILA also offers voluntary courses on specific topics.

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<sup>6</sup> Recently the districts have been abolished and replaced by regions.



The Foundation for the Assistance to Local Authorities (FALA) was founded in 1992 as an independent non-governmental, non-profit organisation by representatives elected in the first independent election after 1989, associated in the Union of Towns and Communities (SMO). It aims at offering training for local and regional authorities and elected representatives of local governments in order to "implement and reinforce sound, sustainable and democratic approaches and good methods of governance". In 2000, it transformed itself into the FALA - Training Centre for Public Administration of the Czech Republic, Public Benefit Organization. FALA is governed by a Board of elected representatives, drawn from both the SMO and Ministries. FALA delivers its services from its headquarters in Prague and 11 regional branches. The total number of staff members on the payroll is 26 persons (February 2003). FALA can also draw from an extensive network of 400 external trainers throughout the country.

In 2001, FALA organised 672 training courses and seminars attended by 21,670 participants. Since its foundation, it has trained over 143,000 people. Over four fifths of FALA's costs are covered by its own activities, the remainder is a state subsidy. The annual budget (2001) is over 24 million CZK (over 700,000 Euro). Since 1995, FALA has also participated in numerous international projects (Phare, Matra, USAID, British council, etc.), including several projects in cooperation with VNG-I. VNG-I and FALA's "natural partnership" has been beneficial to the project.

There are some major differences between FALA and ILA as training institutes. ILA is a rather bureaucratic and supply-driven organisation with its roots in the communistic era. It forms part of the Ministry of the Interior and is funded by this Ministry. Hence it is less dependent on external sources and counts with a more or less guaranteed stock of clients. FALA is an independent, relatively young (post communist) organisation that has to generate most of its income out of the services it provides. ILA has the advantage of offering 'accredited' courses, which ensures continuity in its activities, whereas FALA has to respond flexibly to changing needs from the grassroots level.

#### *The project*

The overall objective of the project "Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic to train local public servants and district officers on issues relevant for EU accession" (further referred to as 'capacity building in the Czech Republic') has been:

*"to prepare local and regional governments in the Czech Republic on the consequences of EU accession which will contribute to the overall objective of the Czech Republic to assume the full *acquis communautaire* in accordance with Agenda 2000 upon entry into the European Union and if possible earlier".*

The specific objective of the project was described in its ToR as:

*"to build up the training and education capacity of ILA and FALA in the field of the consequences of EU accession for local and regional government in the Czech Republic"*

The specific objective was further sub-divided into six secondary objectives:

1. To review and assess the existing short and long term courses of ILA and FALA from the perspective of EU accession requirements and adjust the courses where necessary;
2. To develop, advertise and execute several new ILA and FALA courses which deal with issues relevant for the process of EU accession;
3. To strengthen the functioning of both training institutes in a situation in which training and education for public servants is not highly appreciated;
4. To expose a group of key trainers to practical experiences dealing with EU regulations and EU standards on the local and regional government level both in the Netherlands as well as in countries which recently joined the EU;
5. To provide ILA and FALA with an institutional structure (a database) which enables both organisations to be connected with the flow of information on EU initiatives and decisions and to select the information which need to be assimilated in their courses and seminars;
6. To raise the awareness of local elected politicians on the necessity of preparing for EU accession on the local level and of informing the public in their municipalities on EU membership.

### **3.2 Support to the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania**

One of the two sub-components of the Governance component of the LGRA is the strengthening of ALAT. The objectives for the strengthening of ALAT as formulated in the LGRA were as follows:

- ALAT as an effective coordinating democratic institution for shared interests and values among local authorities;
- ALAT to promote, articulate and safeguard the shared interests and values of local authorities;
- Strengthen the capacity of the ALAT Secretariat to service its members.

Prior to the description of the support to ALAT, the main features of what ALAT is and its strengths and weakness can be summarised as follows:

#### *ALAT*

In December 1984, 99 councils, comprising 80 district and 19 urban councils, established the Association of Local Authorities (ALAT). Currently all 114 local authorities are a member of ALAT. The goals of the Association are (according to Article 3.2 of ALAT's constitution):

- To foster and promote smooth local government development in Tanzania;
- To maintain and further the rights, interests and values of Local Authorities;
- To represent the local government authorities of Tanzania in the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and other international fora.

The specific objectives of ALAT are:

- Provision of a platform for exchanging views and experiences amongst member authorities;
- Provision of advocacy and lobbying on policy and legislative matters likely to affect local authorities;
- Dissemination of information to member authorities;
- Making presentations and proposals to government on behalf of member authorities;

- Provision of services to member authorities such as expert advice and capacity building in the form of training, twinning, etc.;
- Facilitation in the execution of business and operations of the association through revenues accruing from member authorities fees and any other sources.

ALAT's organisational framework consists of:

- The Annual Conference: consisting of all mayors, chairpersons, council directors of member authorities and 21 constituent members of parliament (one from each region);
- The Executive Committee: comprises the chairperson and the vice chairperson, chairpersons representing urban and district member councils, district executive directors and 2 members of Parliament. The executive committee meets quarterly;
- The Secretariat: was established in 1994 and is headed by the Secretary General. It is charged with the responsibility of managing and attending the day-to-day affairs. The secretariat is currently staffed by six persons, of whom two are external SNV experts;
- Regional branches: ALAT has 21 regional branches. Most branches are not very active and meet a few times a year.

Financially, ALAT depends on annual contributions by its members. Although membership fees have increased from 500.000 Tsh in 1998 to 1.5 million Tsh<sup>7</sup> in 2002<sup>8</sup>, the total budget of ALAT has remained relatively low (from 55 million Tsh in 1998 to 163 million Tsh in 2002), in relation to the role ALAT is expected to play by law and by the Local Government Reform Programme.

The LGRA stresses the importance of strengthening ALAT's capacities by stating: "The involvement in the reform of ALAT at the general level, and of councillors and civic groups at the council level, are of key important to success of the reform programme" (LGRA 1996-2000, p.14).

The following activities were to be carried out, according to the LGRA, in order to reach the objectives of the reform:

- To support the leadership and secretariat of ALAT to clearly define its mission, goals and organisational development needs;
- To support ALAT to prepare a strategic plan for the realisation of the above;
- To support ALAT to implement the strategic plan;
- To seek twinning arrangements with similar institutions elsewhere;

Within the framework of the local government reform the importance of ALAT as the representative of local authorities has always been stressed. In the LGRA 1996-2000 the envisaged role for ALAT was described as "helping local authorities to formulate and present their views on the reform and contribute to the design of the framework for LG reform" (p.31). However, it also identifies the "... present weak representation at central government level of the views from the councils, through associations as ALAT..." (p.6). The Action Plan and Budget 1999-2004 mentions that "As an

<sup>7</sup> Currently the membership fee varies from 1 million Tsh for poor and small districts and 1.5 million Tsh for rural areas to 2 million Tsh for urban districts.

<sup>8</sup> Exchange rate in June 2002: 1 € = 900 Tsh (approx.)

important lobby group, ALAT enjoys an advisory role ... and will play a special monitoring role over activities taken place...". Finally, a joint government and donor review of the LGRP (June, 2001) stated that ALAT has "a vital role to play....but the capacity of ALAT's central secretariat is inadequate in view of its potential role in relation to LGRP". The same review further exclaimed that "ALAT should be strengthened ... and measures would be needed to encourage generation of its own revenues".

From the above it is clear that, irrespective of its current capacity, ALAT's potential role in the Local Government Reform Programme is considered vital by both the central government and external donors. The opinion is –most likely- normative and refers to a desirable situation. The external donors support the government of Tanzania in funding the LGRP, but do not provide any funding out of the common basket for the strengthening of ALAT. The argument used by both the central government and the donors (and supported by ALAT) is that the independency from the central government can only be safeguarded if and when there are no financial linkages that may lead to a dependency situation. However, most Tanzanian stakeholders argue that this stand implies a major constraint to ALAT to keep pace with the donor supported LGRP.

#### *The project*

In 1996, the Dutch government, along with several bilateral donors and the European Commission committed itself to providing support to the Government of Tanzania's Local Government Reform Component (LGRC), which was developed as an integral component of the broader Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP). Within this framework, budgetary (earmarked) commitments were made for Netherlands support to (i) Overall Programme Management; and (ii) Support to the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania (ALAT). VNG-I was requested to execute the second part (support to ALAT).

The project "Support to the Association of Local Authorities" started as a one-year contract (first phase), with the option for an extension for another two years (second phase), provided performance during the first phase would be satisfactory. The VNG proposal to that end was submitted to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1997. Actual implementation of the first phase of the project started in July 1997 and, after an extension of 8 months, ended in February 1999. A proposal for the funding the second phase of the project was submitted to the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) in Tanzania in February 1999. The second phase of the project was approved retroactive in November 2000, with as official starting date the 1st July 2000. Actual implementation of the second project started in January 2001 (nearly two years after phase two ended!). During the mission early 2003, the Phase two was still ongoing. It was expected to be finalised on June 30, 2003.

Phase 1 was contracted to the VNG by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and amounted for NLG 435,987. Since the project was delegated to the Royal Netherlands Embassy in April 1998, the contract for the second phase was signed between VNG and the RNE. The second phase amounts NLG 585,124.

Formally, the evaluation comprises only projects that had been effectively and financially finalised by 31/12/2001. Therefore, the results of the second phase of the project have not been assessed. However, since the second phase aims at the same objectives as phase one (although the expected results may differ) the assessment of phase one does take into account activities that have taken place during phase two.

The ToR for the project “Support to the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania” describes the following objectives:

1. To strengthen the institutional framework for ALAT’s operations through appropriate improvements to its planning and revenue collection functions and upgrading of the office infrastructure.
2. To raise the effectiveness of the advocacy and lobbying functions of ALAT.
3. To improve the quality of communications between ALAT and its members.

The project proposal for the first phase of the project identified as core problem ALAT’s limited capacities for service delivery to its members, due to its lack of financial resources. The financial situation was thought to be the result of a poor commitment by its members to participate actively in the Association. The proposal stated that improvement of service delivery by ALAT would convince its members of its potential and therefore would encourage members to contribute, also financially. External support could break the vicious circle of low contributions and poor service delivery.

### **3.3 Strengthening of local government through the South African Local Government Association**

Prior to a description of the project, a brief introduction of SALGA is presented.

#### *SALGA*

In November 1996, SALGA was established with the aim to promote “developmental and co-operative local governance throughout South Africa, in order to deepen democracy and to provide services to meet basic human needs and to promote the transformation of local government”. SALGA is not only a young association, it is also a relatively small organisation, having 30-40 employees on average over the last years, including periods of having a minimum capacity in terms of high management positions. Law determines SALGAs roles and functions in local governance. SALGA has played an important role in the elaboration of the White Paper on Local Government and it represents the local governments in a broad array of Councils, Committees and international fora. Moreover, it guides the transformation of the human resource development policies, the training and labour relations systems within local government and is, as the employer for local government, directly involved in centralised wage negotiations for local government.

#### *The project*

In November 1997, SALGA and VNG signed a Letter of Intent, in which possibilities for a working relationship between both parties were described. Since the signing of the document several meetings between SALGA, VNG and the RNE took place, in which the support for SALGA was more clearly defined. In order to accomplish its mission SALGA was seeking advice and assistance from experienced associations of municipalities, like the VNG to strengthen its own organisational and managerial capacity. SALGA approached the RNE with a request to financially support a co-operation programme between SALGA and VNG.

In collaboration with VNG and the RNE, SALGA started to elaborate a project proposal in 1999, that due to tragic personal circumstances was not finalised until June 2000.

The proposal listed a number of areas where VNG could assist in the capacity building of SALGA. Initially (in 1999) one project was defined in the proposal focussing on the management capacity of SALGA, but after consultation with the RNE, SALGA and VNG incorporated four other sub-projects. The final project "Association of Local Governments Capacity Building Programme" consists of five distinct activities:

- Project 1: Building management skills for sound services and adequate advocacy;
- Project 2: Capacity building for local government councillors for the local government elections;
- Project 3: Capacity building of SALGA and its partners through exposure/training trips to the Netherlands;
- Project 4: Women in local government – Gender;
- Project 5: Youth in local government.

The overall objective of the project was formulated as:

*"to contribute to the strengthening of local government through SALGA: strengthening general management, training councillors, enhancing gender and youth policy capacity in SALGA"*

The five sub-projects within the overall project all have their own objectives:

*Project 1: Building management skills for sound services and adequate advocacy*  
Objective: to build capacity in SALGA to act more effectively in its role as a service provider for its members. This means looking after the interest of municipalities. The focus is entirely on the development of management skills in the SALGA offices.

*Project 2: Capacity building for local government councillors*  
Objective: inform local government councillors about key elements of the local government transition that will encourage transformation

*Project 3: Capacity building through international exposure*  
Objective: Facilitate exposure and study tours to the Netherlands by various role players (stakeholders) to define future areas of co-operation between South Africa and the Netherlands.

*Project 4: Women in Local Government*  
Objective: Enhancing the capacity of the gender unit in SALGA to develop tools and mechanisms to engender local government

*Project 5: Youth in Local Government*  
Objective: Stimulating the development of local youth policies through SALGA by informing local government in South Africa in the most practical way of the necessity of an integrating youth development into overall local government programmes. Large urban areas are a priority target, because the problems in these areas are most severe.

The South African government has selected Local Government as a priority 'sector' for Dutch bilateral support for the period 2000-2004. As part of the bilateral development programme between the Netherlands and South Africa, the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) has financed the above mentioned project by means of

a contract (August 2000) with the South African Local Government Association (SALGA). The Dutch support to the project focuses on technical assistance to be provided by SALGA's Dutch counterpart, the Association of Dutch Municipalities, VNG.

## **4 Administration and implementation**

As indicated above, the three sampled projects do not belong to any specific programme, but have two features in common. Apart from sharing a comparable subject matter, they also share the fact that the VNG(-I) is the contract partner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for either the administration of the project, or for the implementation of it.

### **4.1 Capacity building in the Czech Republic**

The project “Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic to train local public servants and district officers on issues relevant for EU accession” was initially identified by ILA, who approached Rubiconsort in order to submit a project proposal to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that stage, ILA would be the only beneficiary. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Rubiconsort to execute the project in cooperation with VNG-I, the latter having a broader experience in Eastern Europe as far as it concerns the strengthening of local government. VNG-I suggested to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to involve FALA as well. VNG-I had cooperated with FALA in previous assignments.

The project was financed through the bilateral Matra pre-accession programme. VNG-I was the leading contractor in a consortium with Rubiconsort. Project management was mostly carried out by VNG-I on the Dutch side (with Rubiconsort in a secondary role) and by FALA on the Czech side. FALA was directly involved in the management of the project, making use of the project’s budget to that end. So, while in the initial design the main partners were supposed to be Rubiconsort and ILA, in the course of time VNG-I and FALA became the leading partners.

The project was monitored and guided by a Steering Committee composed of representatives appointed by the Czech Ministries of the Interior and Regional Development and by the Czech Unions of Towns and Communities (SMO). The other four members of the steering committee were representatives of the four project partners. The steering committee met four times during the project.

Project management (including reporting) was satisfactory, with a high degree of ownership by FALA. ILA, on the other hand was not able to play the role it was envisaged to, as a result of internal organisational problems

The Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs also monitored the project at a distance. Monitoring consisted of commenting on the project proposal, making recommendations and assessing the progress reports. The RNE has been supportive to the project and has contributed actively to a national seminar. The RNE’s assessment of both the content and the way how its was administered is very positive. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented on various reports and carried out the procedural tasks as contracting party.



## 4.2 Support to the ALAT

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS) financed the project "Support to the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania". The project was part of the overall Dutch "basket fund" support to the Local Government Reform Component of the Civil Service Reform Programme in Tanzania. The project "Support to ALAT", as well as the "Overall Project Management" were the only earmarked commitments within that basket funding. The support to ALAT falls within the Governance component of the LGRP and was identified by the Government of Tanzania.

In preparation of the support to the Local Government Reform Component, VNG IPU undertook a fact finding mission to Tanzania in 1996 and visited institutions involved in local government in Tanzania. Based on the outcome of the mission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered VNG capable of assisting the local government reform process in Tanzania, through a support of ALAT. The mission also produced the draft ToR for the project.

In first instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered the implementation to the VNG IPU as a one-year contract (first phase), with the option of an extension for another two years (second phase), provided a satisfactory performance during the first phase. The VNG IPU submitted a proposal to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1997. Actual implementation of the first phase of the project started in July 1997 and, after an extension with 8 months, ended in February 1999. A proposal for the funding of the second phase was submitted to the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) in Dar es Salaam in February 1999. The second phase was approved retroactively in November 2000, with the official starting date 1st July 2000. Phase two is supposed to end on June 30, 2003.

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being the administrator of the project, performed monitoring of the first phase of the project. After the decentralisation process of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the administrative responsibility was transferred to the RNE.

Both the Ministry and the RNE were directly involved in the formulation process of the project (within the framework of the Local Government Reform support). During the implementation of the project "Support to ALAT" the monitoring by the Ministry was limited to commenting on a single progress report. Actual implementation of the second phase of the project started in January 2001, nearly two years after phase one ended. A rather extended formulation period of the second phase, as well as delays in the approval as a result of the administrative decentralisation of the contractual responsibility over the project from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Headquarters to the Embassy affected negatively the sustainability of the achievements of the first phase.

Throughout the implementation period, VNG steered prominently, a logical result from the fact that the RNE contracted the project to the VNG and not to ALAT. However, the sense of ownership of ALAT over the project remained low. At the start of the second phase a different contracting form, comparable to the one chosen for SALGA (see 4.3) could possibly have contributed to enhance the sense of ownership. However, according to the Royal Netherlands Embassy, at that time there was still insufficient confidence in the ALAT Secretariat's administrative and management capacities to change the implementation modality.

### **4.3 Strengthening of SALGA**

In the case of the strengthening of SALGA project, the contract was signed between the RNE in Pretoria and SALGA. SALGA, on its turn sub-contracted VNG(-I) to implement part of the envisaged project components. From a contractual point of view, the ownership of SALGA over the project was higher than in the cases of ILA/FALA and ALAT.

Since 1997, SALGA has received external assistance by the VNG. In November 1997 SALGA and VNG signed a Letter of Intent, in which the options for a working relationship were described. Since then, several meetings between SALGA, VNG and the RNE took place, in which the support to SALGA was gradually defined. Finally, and in collaboration with VNG IPU and the RNE, SALGA elaborated a project proposal that led to the signing of a contract in August 2000.

The project was directly monitored by the RNE in Pretoria. VNG, although not the direct contract partner of the RNE, conducted its own progress monitoring on the project, since they felt responsible for the continuity and outcome of the project. If progress happened to slow down, VNG(-I) pushed SALGA to utilise the budget available for the various components. Although SALGA was administratively in the drivers' seat, it hardly internalised the project and continued to perceive it as VNG's project. SALGA was unable to fully utilise the resources and to propose specific activities.

Both VNG and the RNE suggested activities to SALGA, but many activities were either not carried out or not even initiated. The budget remained largely under-spent.

The project was too ambitious, given the limited human resources available within SALGA during the project period. While at the time of the elaboration of the project proposal the human capacity seemed to have been higher, the moment the activities started the organisation had lost some of its best resources, while due to political changes and the process of the municipal reorganisation, almost the entire management staff of SALGA has left the organisation.

### **4.4 Aggregated observations on administration**

The description of roles and functions of the various stakeholders in the projects samples, have been summarised in table 4.1

**Table 4.1 Summary roles and functions in the administration of projects sampled**

	<b>Strengthening of training capacities in the Czech Republic</b>	<b>Strengthening of ALAT, Tanzania</b>	<b>Strengthening of SALGA, South Africa</b>
Contract partners	Ministry of Foreign Affairs – VNG, Rubiconsort	Ministry of Foreign Affairs – VNG (1 <sup>st</sup> phase) Royal Netherlands Embassy – VNG (2 <sup>nd</sup> phase)	Royal Netherlands Embassy – SALGA
Role Royal Netherlands Embassy	No administrative role. Provision of general information	First phase: No administrative role 2 <sup>nd</sup> phase: direct administrative control and monitoring, Provision of general information	Direct administrative control and monitoring  Provision of general information
Role VNG (- I)	Provision advisory services, Progress and financial reporting, Monitoring	Provision advisory services, Progress and financial reporting, Monitoring	Provision advisory services (in practice monitored progress)
Role recipient organisation	Provision of information	Provision of information	Progress and financial reporting, Monitoring

It should be noted that no general conclusion can be made based on three cases only. Any conclusion drawn from such a small sample is not valid. Nevertheless some observations can be aggregated that go beyond the level of the individual projects. Hence, the cautious generalisations made here are shallow indeed and should be interpreted for what they are: aggregations based on three cases only.

- In all three projects, VNG-I has come to the front. Regardless of its formal responsibilities and mandate, VNG-I has been the active and ‘steering’ partner in the projects. The role of Rubiconsult in the project in the Czech Republic has been on the professional aspects and hardly on administrative and management matters.
- VNG’s eagerness to keep projects on track resulted in a smooth process in the Czech Republic, but possibly outpaced VNG’s partners in South Africa and Tanzania.
- In the Czech Republic, VNG was brought in at an advanced stage of the project preparation, but both in South Africa and Tanzania, VNG played an important role in the identification and formulation of the projects. And later on, VNG(-I) became the implementing organisation of the projects it had formulated.

## 5 Efficiency

### 5.1 Introduction

Efficiency measures the productivity of the implementation process: how economically (costs, time, efforts) *inputs* have been converted into *outputs*. Efficiency is mainly the concern of the parties that finance and/or deliver the inputs. The more the ownership of the recipient party, the more efficiency becomes the recipient concern. Questions raised are whether the same amount of output could have been produced making use of less input, or –the other way around- whether more output could have been produced using the same inputs.

### 5.2 Capacity building in the Czech Republic

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present an overview of the budget and expenditures of the support to the training institutes in the Czech Republic. The total costs sum to NLG 1.01 million. Well over sixty percent of the expenditures were destined to personnel costs (fees). This is not unusual in labour-intensive capacity building projects. The main inputs have been knowledge and time for the (curriculum and module) development of the various courses; the implementation of the courses; the reviews and adjustment; and the organisation of workshops and seminars. The project management costs required 20 percent of the budget, slightly above international yardsticks for this kind of projects<sup>9</sup>. But, in particular FALA has put great organisational and managerial efforts and spent considerably more time on management than covered by the project budget.

**Table 5.1 Financial Overview project Czech Republic (in NLG)**

Type of expenditure	Budget (revised)	Total expenditures	Difference	Expenditures as percentage of budget
Human Resources	837,172	718,160	119,012	85.8
- Personnel	682,172	623,087	59,085	91.3
- DSA	73,750	43,529	30,221	59.0
- Travel expenses	81,250	51,544	29,706	63.4
Purchases/materials and services	10,000	2,461	7,539	24.6
Operational costs	112,300	103,560	8,740	92.2
Training/courses	69,142	69,142	0	100.0
Preparation	77,000	77,000	0	100.0
Contingencies	55,000	41,659	13,341	75.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,160,614</b>	<b>1,011,982</b>	<b>148,632</b>	<b>87.1</b>

**Table 5.2 Division of fees between VNG-I/Rubiconsort and FALA/ILA (in NLG)**

	Input activities	Project management	Total
VNG-I/Rubiconsort	370,394	101,407	<b>471,801</b>
FALA/ILA	51,538	99,750	<b>151,288</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>421,932</b>	<b>201,157</b>	<b>623,089</b>

<sup>9</sup> For capacity building projects for public administration, funded with World Bank loans, the management and overhead costs do not exceed 13 percent of the total budget.

The project has produced a large volume and variety of output (see for details section 6.2):

- assessment and review of existing course curricula and accreditations;
- development of 10 new courses;
- organisational strengthening of FALA
- 30 trainers trained;
- improved positioning of FALA.

Substantial time input and human efforts were devoted to the management and implementation of the project by all parties involved, except ILA. The project was implemented in a process approach, characterised by a high frequency of activities along the way. The constant flow of inputs delivered by some of the Dutch experts has substantially contributed to sustain the process.

The project was completed within the time envisaged and within the (revised) budget (table 5.1). The smooth project implementation was only incensed by problems related to an internal management crisis in ILA. ILA could not produce all the expected outputs.

It can be concluded that almost all activities were implemented in time, within the budget envisaged, meeting the targets established, and were well managed. Considering the high Czech ownership –also in the management of the project - it is unlikely that the same outputs could have been produced by using less resources or that more output could have been produced using the same resources. The project implementation has been efficient.

### **5.3 Support to the ALAT**

Table 5.3 presents the budget and actual expenditures of the project “Support to ALAT”. The overview refers to the first phase of the project only.

According to the Project Document, the expected output of the project can be subdivided into 8 activity groups, presented in the table 5.3 by the headings 1, 2 and 3. On top of that were the implementation and overhead costs, presented in the table by the heading 4.

**Table 5.3 Financial overview of the project in Tanzania**

Activity	Budget (NLG)	Actual (NLG)	Actual expenditures as percentage of budget	Percentage of total expenditures
<b>1. Advice to ALAT</b>				
1.1 Strategic plan development	51,444	52,453	102.0	12.1
1.2 Financial management	51,444	52,437	102.0	12.1
1.3 Communication/representation	25,722	45,279	176.0	10.4
<b>2. Workshops/study tour</b>				
2.1 in Tanzania	18,202	20,408	112.1	4.7
2.2 in the Netherlands	122,189	122,189	100.0	28.1
<b>3. Training</b>				
3.1 Training needs analysis	28,008	18,156	64.8	4.2
3.2 In country training of secretariat	4,000	0	0.0	0.0
3.3 Internship communication officer	0	22,514	Pm	5.2
<b>4. Project management</b>				
4.1 Home office	33,685	47,280	140.4	10.9
4.2 Management visits	58,812	52,581	89.4	12.1
<b>Contingencies</b>	20,761	1,800	8.7	0.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>414,267</b>	<b>435,097</b>	<b>105.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>

By far, the single highest cost component was a study tour to the Netherlands (28 percent of total costs; comprised mainly by daily subsistence allowances [DSA] and ticket costs). This study tour hardly introduced new elements to ALAT, and dealt with issues that could have been discussed in Tanzania as well. The study tour was not an efficient use of resources. In addition, the training needs assessment could have been done in either the margin of other missions (i.e. management missions) or could have formed part of the Strategic Plan exercise. A separate mission was redundant, considering the very small size of the ALAT Secretariat.

During the first phase of the project, remarkably little use was made of local expertise, even when it would have been rational to do so, for example to count with more country specific knowledge for the elaboration of the Strategic Plan. During the development of the Strategic Plan use was made of local expertise for 30 days. Another 8 days of local expertise was used for the training needs analysis.

The VNG's approach was to make Dutch subject matter specialists available. For each subject a different expert was brought in. There was no accompanying of change management in the sense of a more constant and institutional guidance of ALAT. The project activities were insufficiently placed in a logical sequence in time. A process approach, in combination with a semi-permanent accompaniment and better use of local expertise could have produced more output making use of the same (financial) inputs.

Time-wise, the first phase has hardly been efficient. There was a 2-year period of inactivity between the end of phase one and the start of phase two. Initially the project was scheduled for a three-year period, while at its expiry date it will have lasted twice as long. A delay of about one year can be attributed to internal problems (such as changes in the activity schedule; constraints in human resources in the ALAT secretariat) and the two additional years to external factors, such as the transfer of

administrative responsibility from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Headquarters to the Royal Dutch Embassy. But although part of the delay was caused by external circumstances, ALAT showed little problem solving capacity in order to overcome these factors.

It can be concluded that more output could have been produced with the same budget allocation. The output could have been produced in less time as well. A different implementation approach could have produced more results. A higher feeling of ownership over the project, as well as a more pro-active attitude by ALAT (in particular in solving acute problems) would have contributed positively to the project's efficiency.

#### **5.4 Strengthening of SALGA**

Table 2.1 presented the budget available to the SALGA project, summing to NLG 745,000 for a three-year period. As far as known by the RNE just over half that budget had been spent, indicating the limitations in SALGA's implementation capacity. At the time of the field mission, the RNE had not received any financial overview of the expenditures by project component. This is an indication of the flaws in SALGA's administrative capacities, since SALGA has been unable to produce consolidated data on expenditures. In consequence, no financial data can be presented in this report.

Less than half of the activities envisaged in the Project Document were actually implemented out. The rhythm of activities over time has been slow, illustrated by very long intervals between the activities. Time schedules could not be adhered to and the submission of narrative and financial information has been unsatisfactory throughout the project implementation period. If activities took place, sometimes as rather ad hoc interventions by VNG-I, no follow-up was given by SALGA. The reasons for the unsatisfactory performance can be found in the workload of SALGA. During the implementation period, the organisation was clearly overburdened with tasks. Most of these tasks had to do with the change process in the municipal composition of local Government in South Africa, where the number of municipalities was brought down from 843 to 228. Also new municipal entities came into force. The proper implementation and administration of the project was not among SALGA's first priorities.

It can be concluded that less than half of the envisaged output in terms of quantity of activities was produced, using less than half of the financial input, while time schedules could not be adhered to and that problem-solving capacity has been very modest from the side of SALGA. VNG-I showed a proactive attitude by generating proposals for new activities, but, due to contextual circumstances, the response by SALGA was disappointing. The RNE decided to discontinue funding the project. The committed, but unutilised resources will flow back to the Dutch exchequer.

#### **5.5 Aggregated observations on efficiency**

Assessing efficiency is measuring how economically *inputs* have been converted into *outputs*. This requires taking into consideration the responsibility over that conversion process.

In the Czech case, VNG (in a consortium with Rubiconsort) was contracted by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the two Czech institutions were the recipient parties. Activities were implemented efficiently, as a result of a combination of a high sense of ownership on the Czech side (although not administratively responsible), a process approach by all parties, the efforts and adequate use of networks by qualified Dutch experts and sound project management by both VNG-I and FALA, all contributed to a high efficiency. Less efficient was the strengthening of the training institution ILA, due to the fact that ILA showed little commitment and experienced a serious internal crisis, culminating in the replacement of the top-management.

In Tanzania, the project was formulated by and later contracted out to the VNG. Due to flaws in the design of the first phase; the absence of a change management; the focus on individual project activities instead of a process; and a remarkable lack of use of local expertise, all contributed to a poor efficiency. This was aggravated by the long time interval between the first and second phase of the project. The sense of ownership over the project by ALAT was low.

In South Africa, the project was directly contracted by the RNE to SALGA. VNG-I was contracted by SALGA to implement specific components of the project. While ownership was significantly higher than in Tanzania, SALGA's administrative capacities happened to be modest. As an organisation, SALGA is overburdened caused by –and possibly resulting in- organisational and management deficiencies. The project did not figure high on SALGA's priority list. Efficiency of the project was low.

Efficiency, possibly more than effectiveness, depends on sense of responsibility and management skills. Comparison among the three projects seems to indicate that the contractual form may possibly influence on the sense of ownership, but is not determinant for it. The sense of ownership in the Czech Republic was higher than in the South African project. Management capabilities and sense of responsibility do make a difference on efficiency.

Efficiency does depend on a sound working approach as well. The process approach followed in the Czech Republic resulted in a higher productivity than the rather narrow 'project activity accomplishment' focus adhered to in the ALAT and SALGA projects.





## **6 Effectiveness**

### **6.1 Introduction**

Effectiveness is the positive contribution of the results of project interventions to the achievement of the stated objectives. Assessing effectiveness assumes that the expected results have been unambiguously and realistically defined as to make verification possible. In practice, that is not always the case, in particular not with intangible results. Capacity building in support of local government development does not (always) produce tangible results. On the contrary, results use to be rather indirect and difficult to attribute directly to one specific activity or event. In this evaluation, effectiveness has been based on the verifiable *planned* expected results.

### **6.2 Capacity building in the Czech Republic**

The project document “Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic to train local public servants and district officers on issues relevant for EU accession” contains apart from the overall objective, the definition of a specific and six secondary objectives (see section 3.1). Each of the secondary objectives has been translated into one or more expected results.

In brief, the six secondary objectives were:

1. To review the existing courses of ILA and FALA from the perspective of EU accession requirements;
2. To develop, advertise and execute new ILA and FALA courses;
3. To strengthen the functioning of both training institutes;
4. To expose key trainers to practical experiences dealing with EU regulations and EU standards on the local and regional government;
5. To provide ILA and FALA with an institutional structure (a database) which enables both organisations to be connected with the flow of information on EU initiatives and decisions;
6. To raise the awareness of local politicians on the necessity of preparing for EU accession on the local level.

The extent to which achievements were made toward these secondary objectives is as follows:

#### *Objective one and two: course review and development*

A review and assessment of all existing short and long-term courses of both FALA and ILA was successfully carried out. FALA selected five existing courses for review and assessed from the perspective of the EU accession requirements (NPAA).

Municipal experts of VNG-I and Rubiconsort made recommendations on the basis of excerpts from the course material. Most of these recommendations have been incorporated into existing courses. Not all of the selected ILA courses were characterized by “acquis” related matters and were therefore less relevant from the EU accession perspective. As a result of a major reorganisation within ILA (including the replacement of the management), no indication could be provided by ILA on the extent to which ILA has actually adjusted its courses based on the recommendations made.

Ten new courses were developed within the project:

- One general course on EU-accession;
- Three management courses;
- Six specific courses.

*One new general course* on the implications of EU accession for local governments was developed by a Dutch VNG expert in co-operation with four trainers from FALA and ILA. A train the trainer approach was used for conducting the course to 30 trainers. Both FALA and ILA either upgraded their existing course or incorporated the new course in their programme. The FALA management staff considers the course and the reader “very useful and informative”, while all of the trainers interviewed consider both the content of the course and the ‘train the trainer course’ valuable and of high quality.

The following *three new management courses* were developed:

- Public procurement;
- Project management;
- Crisis management.

All three courses are marketed (in an updated version) by FALA as individual products. In particular the courses on project management and crisis management are very popular among local authorities. The course on public procurement has attracted fewer participants. This is noteworthy, since public procurement rules is one of the few aspects of the NPAA (next to environment) that has a direct impact on the local governments. The ILA’s course catalogue for the year 2003 shows that elements of the three management courses developed are still scheduled in the menu of courses.

Both FALA and ILA have been able to develop *three new specific courses* within the project.

FALA developed the following courses:

- Regional planning;
- Training and employment;
- Social Affairs.

Two out of these three courses are still offered within FALA’s programme and count with a high demand (as expressed by the relatively high number of participants that inscribe for these courses). The course on "Training and Employment" was less successful and taken out of the 2003 programme, due to a lack of demand.

ILA developed the following three courses during the project:

- Energy production and distribution;
- Transport policy;
- Environmental policy.

Although all three courses have been developed into final products, it was unclear whether the courses are actually marketed and conducted by ILA. It is also uncertain to which extent elements of the developed courses have been incorporated in the existing courses.

In sum, the secondary objectives one and two have been largely achieved. According to the trainers and management of the training institutes, the quality of the newly

developed courses is high. FALA highly appreciates the methodological contributions, such as the train the trainers collateral programmes.

The process of interactive course development between the Dutch and the Czech experts was highly appreciated by all participants. The Czech trainers could improve their knowledge and methodological skills in the course of time. Furthermore, demand-drivenness and ownership has been a key feature of the development of the courses and the actual marketing of the course products. A continuous process of development, testing (through pilot trainings), evaluation and adjustment of the courses prior to creating the end-products was assessed effective.

*Objective three and four: strengthening of the institutes and exposure of the trainers*

The project activities have been effective on the functioning of both ILA and FALA. Especially FALA has been able to strengthen its internal organisation and has improved its capacity to develop courses and to market them. Although the effect of this project on the general attitude of local and central government employees towards education and training could not be assessed, there are strong indications of shift in perception. Was training is not always considered favourably and simply an 'obligation' by many civil servants, the increasing demand shows a more positive appreciation and growing recognition.

Both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for Regional Development, as well as civil servants in local governments interviewed perceive a higher quality offered by both institutes. Nevertheless, the financial allocations made to training activities by the local authorities are still modest.

Since FALA lacked a solid financial base and depended more on external funding than ILA (that is fully subsidized by the Ministry of Interior), FALA has put more efforts in exploiting to the maximum the potential of the project. ILA, on the other hand, has not been able to play the leading role that was envisaged. Internal organisational problems (including a complete overhaul of the general management) deviated the energy. ILA was unable to strengthen its internal organisation based on project inputs.

Thirty trainers have participated directly in the project. Most of them still conduct courses improved by or developed by the project (more FALA trainers than ILA trainers). During two visits to the Netherlands and other EU countries, the trainers were exposed both to practical experience, the EU system (visits to Brussels) and institutes for training in public administration. The participants appreciated the visit as useful, balanced and informative. Apart from providing a wider horizon, the trainers interviewed were unable to be more precise on the measurable effects of these visits. Most of them indicated that time had been too short to further elaborate course material with the Dutch experts, based on the experiences of the exposure.

*Objective five: networking*

A VNG expert advised FALA and ILA on a number of subscription options to specific EU websites, as well as the possibility to post a full-time EU information officer within FALA. Neither interviews nor the progress reports revealed to which extent the recommendations had been translated into action. Both FALA and ILA do have access to EU information sources and established information flow systems to their trainers. However, it is uncertain whether this achievement can be attributed to the project.

### *Objective six: raising awareness*

The project has contributed positively to the awareness on EU accession matters among local and regional civil servants. The courses targeted at local and district officers, both during and after the project period. In the meantime, many civil servants have attended these courses. Also it contributed to the general awareness among local politicians. Several national conferences and regional seminars were organised that attracted sizeable numbers of participants (both national and local politicians and policy makers). In particular, the national seminars that marked the start and end of the project received broad media coverage, as a result of the participation of high-ranked officials and politicians.

### *The specific objective*

The specific objective of the project: "to build up the training and education capacity of ILA and FALA in the field of the consequences of EU accession for local and regional government in the Czech Republic" has been achieved, although not in full. The training and organisational capacity of FALA was significantly strengthened. Most of the newly developed courses are still in high demand by the target group. According to their own opinion, the majority of the FALA trainers has improved their training skills.

ILA's training and education capacity has improved, but not to the same extent as FALA. Initially, it was planned that ILA would be the lead beneficiary organisation (counting with support from the Ministry of the Interior) but in the course of time, it was overtaken by events that weakened their ability to successfully exploit the opportunities of the project. Internal re-organisation, a lack of incentives to get the most out of the project and administrative bottlenecks were the main impediments. VNG/Rubiconsort were unable to influence on these factors, although efforts were made to do so.

### *The overall objective*

The overall objective of the project was described as "to prepare local and regional government in the Czech Republic on the consequences of EU accession which will contribute to the overall objective of the Czech Republic to assume the full *acquis communautaire* in accordance with Agenda 2000 upon entry into the European Union and if possible earlier". The higher the level of aggregation, the more difficult it becomes to attribute changes to specific interventions. In general, it can be stated that the project contributed positively to the preparation of the local and regional government on the consequences of EU accession, as many participants from local and regional level have participated in the upgraded and newly developed courses, but the precise effect is impossible to assess, due to the small size of the intervention as compared to the pretensions of the overall objective.

It can be concluded that the project has been effective in achieving (most of) the secondary objectives and of the specific objective. The training and education capacity of ILA (less) and FALA (more) in the field of the consequences of EU accession for local and regional government has been effectively improved. In particular the strengthening of FALA has been successful and hence the project effective.

### 6.3 Support to the ALAT

During the project preparation stage in 1997, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs identified the following strengths and weaknesses of the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania (table 6.1):

**Table 6.1 Strengths and weaknesses of ALAT identified in 1997**

<b>Strengths:</b>	<b>Weaknesses:</b>
<p>ALAT is a body which genuinely represents Local Government interests and can act independently from central government;</p> <p>It is a self-financing and essentially sustainable organisation of some longevity;</p> <p>It has a well established, representative and functional management and organisational structure;</p> <p>It has an operational structure appropriate to its revenue with a modest complement of permanent staff and flexible arrangements to draw in additional skills when necessary;</p> <p>It has a clear mandate and a set of activities and priorities which reflect that mandate-placing emphasis in particular on advocacy and lobbying activities;</p> <p>It has experience and some proven success in advocacy and lobbying.</p>	<p>ALAT suffers from a recurrent revenue base which is insufficient to finance the full set of activities which it aspires to provide and insufficiently stable to provide the basis for long term planning;</p> <p>It has an inadequate office infrastructure to carry out its mandate in full;</p> <p>It is unable to communicate with its members regularly in written form: specifically because it has been unable to maintain a regular newsletter;</p> <p>It has inadequate resources – in terms of information and documentation – to support well-informed and well-focussed lobbying actions;</p> <p>Its secretariat lacks awareness of modern techniques of advocacy and lobbying and need training to strengthen these functions;</p> <p>Its potential to generate income from members is not fully developed.</p>

Based on the above analysis, the Project Document comes to the following objectives:

- To strengthen the institutional framework for ALAT's operations through appropriate improvements to its planning and revenue collection functions and upgrading of the office infrastructure;
- To raise the effectiveness of the advocacy and lobbying functions of ALAT;
- To improve the quality of communications between ALAT and its members.

The activities developed in the project aimed at achieving these objectives were categorised in:

- advisory services to ALAT
- Workshops and study tours
- Training

The effectiveness on each of these categories has been assessed.

### 6.3.1 Advice to ALAT

- Strategic plan development: All parties involved considered the elaboration of a strategic plan the starting point for strengthening ALAT. Drafts for a strategic plan were elaborated and discussed with the stakeholders. The ALAT Secretariat, Executive Committee and later all its members were fully involved in drafting it. In May 1988, it was finalised and approved by the Executive Committee. The strategic plan provided a well-designed framework (categorisation and prioritising for the next five years) for ALAT's strategic course in the short and medium term. It contained a longer term vision on the role ALAT should play in the view of the local authorities. In practice however, and notwithstanding the priorities set, the strategic plan happened to be ambitious. Ambitious, since the financial requirements to implement the components of the strategic plan were beyond ALAT's financial capacity.

Although at the moment of drafting the plan, ALAT had been very ambitious and VNG achieved to put a more realistic perspective, the financial aspects had been insufficiently taken into account. Once approved by the Executive Committee, the Plan was hardly internalised in the ALAT secretariat and not considered as their plan. It remained a product of the project. In the elaboration of the Annual Plans of ALAT, the strategic plan was not taken as a guiding frame, nor as indicative for the ambitions. Nevertheless, it was indicated during interview that the strategic plan did have contributed to noticeable changes in the thinking of decision makers in ALAT and its secretariat. No reviews of the strategic plan were carried out and no adjustments were made to it.

An evaluation of ALAT's performance, funded by the second phase of the project, (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2001) concludes that ALAT's main deficiencies are its lack of organisational vision and strategy; its poor commitment towards its members and that the activities carried out are hardly based on demand. This identification differs from the 1997 one (table 6.1).

During interviews, the ALAT secretariat, the SNV (that provides long term technical assistance under the second phase of the project) and external donors all agree that there is need for a new or updated strategic plan. Obviously, in absence of a strategic plan, it is difficult to ALAT to set its priorities, and to attract external funding. But, ALAT functionaries have participated in various courses on strategic plan development and they do count with permanent management advisors, so one may suppose that ALAT is able - at least - to use the existing strategic plan and able to update it through its consecutive Annual Plans. But this has not happened. The reasons, according to ALAT directors, should be found in the fact that beyond what has been documented as the official strategy of ALAT, there are other strategies that have to do with direct face-to-face diplomacy and the overall strategy to maintain unity within the governmental system. This implies avoiding any potential conflict between the central and local governments. From that background, any new strategic plan should be fully owned by ALAT and should respect both the time path set and priorities identified by ALAT.

- *Financial management:* a weak financial base was (and still is) one of the main weaknesses of ALAT. Within the project, various activities were carried out aimed at providing ALAT with a plan to become financially sustainable. ALAT's Secretariat and Executive Committee discussed the recommendations made by VNG-I, including a renewal of the membership fee-system. The VNG-I proposals triggered a new system, whereby fees are differentiated according to size of the district and increased gradually. Although the change in annual membership fees have resulted in an increase in ALAT revenues (163 million Tsh in 2002), the budget is still too small to fund the human resources required to perform in a satisfactory manner its main functions in terms of advocacy and lobbying, as well as in terms of service provision to its members. So far, ALAT has hardly been in a position to play the watchdog functions on the Local Government Reform Programme, a function that is expected from them by both the Tanzanian authorities and the main donors of the LGRP. Although ALAT's financial position has improved since 1996, its resources are still insufficient to cover its operational costs.

The evaluators interviewed ALAT members and regional executives in five districts/townships. These interviews revealed a higher willingness to pay at the national than at the regional level. Regional ALATs are being criticized (no clear agenda, no meetings or meetings without an agenda, lack of leadership, no secretariat, no central archive, etc). This seem to indicate that although the current structure of ALAT is decentralised and based on a democratic sharing of responsibilities, members do have higher expectations of ALAT's performance at a national than at a regional level.

As a starter for the second phase of the project, a substantial improvement of the financial position of ALAT was envisaged. The phase 2 of the project comprised the services of a part-time financial advisor (SNV). Unfortunately, the ALAT secretariat has insufficiently used these services to further strengthen its financial management capacities.

- *Communication and representation:* in order to better represent the interests of its members, ALAT had to improve the communication with its members. First a communication strategy was developed in order to improve the potential effectiveness of ALAT's lobbying and advocacy activities. VNG-I provided advisory services to ALAT on this communication strategy. This advice resulted in:
  1. the refloating of the ALAT Newsletter, the Jarida la ALAT (which had not be published since 1995), and
  2. training of the skills of the ALAT communication officer.

By producing and distributing a newsletter (mainly to councillors, town directors and heads of departments of the local authorities), ALAT reminds them of being there as their representative organisation. The communication strategy suggested that local authorities themselves would provide a substantial part of the input to the newsletter, so that they became actively involved in ALAT. In many districts persons have been appointed and trained (with external resources) to become communication officers, responsible for linking information stream from and to ALAT. The project provided for the financing of the first four monthly editions of the Jarida. Currently the Jarida is



financed by ALAT's own resources and published on a quarterly basis (issued in 10,000 copies).

Currently, the Jarida is not able to meet the quality standards expected by its members. It is hardly able to channel relevant information to the local authorities, and is not a debating platform where opinions on the local government reform programme and other relevant topics are being interchanged). Interviews with information officers in three districts indicate that these officers perceive their tasks mainly as reporters, rather than analysts. They deal with the factual events, such as seminars or openings of new infrastructure. Information officers are not paid for their contributions, face practical problems in transport and communication with ALAT and are usually too low in hierarchy to be directly involved in policy matters at the local level. Information officers perceive their tasks as 'something extra' and hence of a low priority.

### **6.3.2 Workshops / study tour**

- *Workshop in Tanzania:* a national workshop on “the role of national associations and the development of a strategic plan for ALAT” took place on 26-27 February 1998 in Dar es Salaam. The workshop was well attended by ALAT officials from all ranks, by Ministries and donors (including the RNE) and by VNG-I. The workshop concluded by adopting 10 resolutions in which the representatives stressed the need for capacity building at the local level, as well as the importance that ALAT be involved in the ongoing local government reform process. Since the workshop gathered most directly involved stakeholders and stressed once more the potential role of ALAT in the reform process, the activity was a successful output. However, the effect has been small. First of all, because the message was not new: the importance of ALAT had been stressed repeatedly in government publications, in ministerial speeches and by donors. Secondly, the audience was limited to those who were already familiar with the problems and convinced of the merits of a more solid role for ALAT. Either a more innovative view, or a different audience would potentially have contributed to a higher effectiveness.
- *Study tour and workshop in the Netherlands:* A delegation of 15 Tanzanian officials visited the Netherlands in 1997. The delegation was comprised of the ALAT Executive Committee (8), the ALAT secretariat (3), ALAT think tank members (2); one Member of Parliament and one representative from the Prime Minister's Office. The composition of the team and the programme of the visit were agreed on in advance. The most important topics of the visit concerned the strategic orientations by a SWOT analysis, discussions on financial management and the communication strategy. Participants interviewed coincide in their opinion that this kind of visits imply exposure to new experiences and that these experiences are useful examples for eventual application in Tanzania. Nevertheless, most of the contents of the programme were reiterative: most topics had been discussed quite intensively in Tanzania before (communication, financial sustainability and the potential role of ALAT). The additional discussion of these issues in the Netherlands did not produce remarkable new insights. Taking into consideration that the study visit absorbed 28 percent of the

total budget, the result can be characterised as insufficient in terms of achievement of the project's objectives.

Another observation is that the human resource endowment of the ALAT Secretariat is very small. One of the main complaints of ALAT members is the frequent absence of the management staff, attending meeting and seminars, leaving literally nobody behind to take care for the day-to-day business. The organisation of a study tour in the Netherlands for almost all top officials of ALAT at the same time has definitely contributed to the fluent continuation of daily affairs within ALAT.

### **6.3.3 Training**

- *Human capacity needs analysis:* due to financial constraints ALAT could not provide adequate training to its staff at the secretariat. Based on the strategic plan, VNG-I carried out a human capacity needs assessment of the ALAT secretariat. This mission coincided with a NORAD funded mission by the Norwegian Association of Local Authorities (KS) on training needs of local government councillors. At the time of the mission, the secretariat of ALAT counted four officials only. That made the needs assessment a relatively easy task. The conclusions were predictable: training in basic computer skills for all employees; a training on the organisation of documentation for the research officer of ALAT and a training in public relations for the communications officer. The training of the communication officer has been provided for within the project and itself. This training resulted in an improvement of her skills, applied in her daily work. The other recommendations on training were not implemented, due to lack of funds. As a project component the needs assessment was rather redundant, since ALAT itself could have provided for the assessment and it was parallel to and not incorporated in the strategic plan. And even at such a small scale, the result could not be implemented due to lack of resources for training.
- *In country training of the secretariat:* as a result of the human capacity needs assessment in-country training was to be given to the officials working at the secretariat. Apart from the *training of the communication officer*, no training was provided for within phase 1 of the project. The communication officer/news editor of ALAT followed an internship in the Netherlands for a period of three weeks, that contributed to her skills on publish the newsletter of ALAT and in general communication strategies.

### **6.3.4 Results**

The activities described in the previous paragraph were all carried out during the first phase of the project. The second phase of the project kept the same objectives. Unfortunately there was 2-year period interval of inactivity between both phases, which had a negative impact on the sustainability of the results achieved during the first phase. Phase 2 of the project ends on June 30, 2003. Since activities were still ongoing during the evaluation visit the results cannot be exclusively attributed to the first phase. In some, but not all, aspects, they reflect the combined results of phases 1 and 2.

The main results achieved during the first phase of the project have been:

- VNG has guided and actually elaborated the strategic plan of ALAT. The contents were based on views of ALAT decision makers and approved by the Executive Committee. The strategic plan stresses the importance of providing more and better services to its members and to be the representative entity bringing forward the interest of local authorities (in particular in relation to the ongoing local government reform).

The strategic plan was hardly used as a frame for the elaboration of annual plans or for setting priorities. The plan was disproportionately ambitious as compared to the projected revenue generation. And in practice this income happened to be significantly less. ALAT did not review or adjust the strategic plan according to new circumstances. In 2003, external donors stressed the importance for a new strategic plan. To ALAT this has become a condition to access new external funding. More important is the extent to which an eventual new plan would be able to reflect the real strategies, in stead of 'the ideal situation'. The strategic plan elaborated under the first phase has not been effective in contributing to the project's objectives.

- The advisory services on financial management have been used to establish a new structure for membership fees. This structure has been approved by all members and resulted in a considerable increase of ALAT's revenues. While fees may cover short-time financial requirements, in the medium and long run ALAT will have to improve its services towards its members and generate revenues from service delivery. The advisory services on financial management have been efficient, but not sufficient.
- The communication flows between the secretariat and the members has improved noticeably. First, by the publication of a quarterly newsletter, the Jarida la ALAT and second by an improvement of the communication strategy of ALAT. The content of the ALAT newsletter needs further improvement, as it is mainly a tool for spreading news items of little relevancy. Critical analyses of and (interactive) comments on issues important to local authorities should be the core of the newsletter.
- ALAT members interviewed observed that most Dutch advisors tend to project against the Dutch situation only. This bias could have been avoided by making more use of local expertise. The project focussed too much on the implementation of the individual activities (missions, study visits, seminar) instead of looking for a sound change process.

In sum, it can be concluded that although contributions were made in the achievement of all three objectives, the effectiveness of the first phase of the project has been very modest.

#### **6.4 Strengthening of SALGA**

As indicated in section 3.3, the project to strengthen the South African Local Government Association comprised five different sub-projects, each counting with its own objectives. These sub-projects were:

- Building management skills for sound service delivery and adequate advocacy;
- Capacity building for local government councillors;

- Capacity building through international exposure;
- Women in Local Government;
- Youth in Local Government.

The effectiveness of each of these sub-projects will be discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.

#### **6.4.1 Sub-project 1: Building management skills for sound services and adequate advocacy**

Only few of the envisaged activities took place. Neither the planned needs assessment (SWOT analysis and inventories) was made, nor an activity plan was elaborated by SALGA. With respect to the planned four separate management systems (1) general management system, 2) external communication system, 3) management structure for the policy research work and 4) management of the training and capacity building needs), almost no activities were carried out. SALGA did not draft any document on the management systems. There has been no communication (advisory service on distance) between SALGA and VNG-I concerning the eventual contents of these management systems. Neither final reports were produced; nor internal reviews took place. The planned seminar was not organised. Nevertheless, some activities did take place:

- In January 2001, a SALGA management visit to the Netherlands took place by 4 high-ranked managers. The objective of the visit was the ‘improvement of the skills of top management of SALGA by way of orientation at VNG’s structure, advocacy implementation and information dissemination to its members’ was achieved. The visit was considered a success by both SALGA and VNG-I. The organisation by VNG-I was highly appreciated by SALGA (a variety of relevant topics). Both SALGA and VNG-I reported briefly on the visit. No steps were taken for any follow-up, although VNG-I did contact SALGA several times to organise such a follow-up. But the feedback was scarce. Currently, three out of the four participants do not work with SALGA anymore.
- The January 2002 visit by a Dutch financial expert to SALGA was the first activity that took place after the study visit. So one year had lapsed. SALGA found it difficult to indicate their needs in the area of financial management and could hardly come up with an activity plan or a ToR for the visit. Finally, Saga’s Chief Executive Officer listed a number of areas to pay attention to. The two main areas were 1) examination of the financial viability and sustainability of the organisation and 2) review of the business plan of SALGA. The Dutch expert concluded that the 12 objectives mentioned in Saga’s business plan are too ambitious, and have not been translated into operational plans. The objectives were considered not in line with the constraints in administrative and managerial capacities at SALGA. Once more, no follow-up took place on these observations.
- Installation of a databank at SALGA. A databank was installed, but the mission was not able to verify its operations. The comments made during interviews on the operations of the databank were contradictory.

It can be concluded that only few of the planned activities actually took place, and that the sustainability of these few activities has been low. In general, no follow-up activities were initiated and the advisory services provided by VNG-I did not trigger

any significant change in either the organisational structure of SALGA or its financial operations. In fact, at the moment the project was designed and proposed to the RNE for funding, the existing human resource endowment at SALGA exceeded the capacity during the implementation period of the project, since many key stakeholders have left SALGA due to the recent municipal reorganisation.

#### **6.4.2 Sub-project 2: Capacity building for local government councillors**

After the local government elections of December 5, 2000, it happened to be hard to organise workshops for councillors. SALGA redefined the sub-project and proposed the RNE to focus on 'the role of mayors and speakers'. The RNE approved the amendment in the project. Nine workshops at provincial level and one workshop at national level were held. Directly involved stakeholders consider all ten workshops successful and effective.

Although it is impossible to verify ex post the effect of these workshops on the quality of the daily performance of mayors and speakers in the municipalities, there is no doubt that the workshops have contributed to a better understanding of these functions. Since local government is a relatively new phenomenon in South Africa and its structure and organisation have been extremely volatile over the last year, elected politicians are not always familiar with the mandate and functions of the positions in which they were elected. The workshops intended to bridge part of that knowledge gap. Participants interviewed indicate that these workshops have been the only kind of training they had received in relation to their functions within local government. Despite the fact that the initial target group of 700-1000 councillors not all participated in the workshops, the sub-project is considered to have been effective.

#### **6.4.3 Sub-project 3: Capacity building through international exposure**

SALGA is not only an Association of Local Authorities, comparable to the Dutch VNG, by law it also represents the interests of the local governments as employer viz. a viz. the municipal civil servants. The Solidarity project is aimed at ensuring a harmonious co-operation between SALGA as an employer and the employees (united in the labour union IMATU), on matters of mutual interest.

The sub-project 3 was embedded as a single activity within the Solidarity project and comprised the following activities:

- A workshop was held in Pretoria with all stakeholders directly involved (SALGA, Samwu, Imatu, DPLG, DWAF) in order to prepare for a study tour to the Netherlands;
- A study tour to the Netherlands with the aim to focus on alternative service delivery models within local government. Core topic of the visit was privatisation, in particular "public-private partnerships" as a service delivery model. Water, transport and electricity were among the sectors that were discussed.

Co-operation and ongoing communication between different key players in the field of service delivery is of critical importance to SALGA. The sub project has been effective in the sense that it did create new options for co-operation between SALGA and various stakeholders. This sub-project 3 triggered two new projects, currently funded by the RNE: one project with IHE and one project with the labour unions. SALGA's role in these two projects is minor, but it has acted as an intermediary

It can be concluded that although the mission to the Netherlands was considered successful by its participants, the contribution to the strengthening of SALGA has been negligible. No dissemination workshops were held, as mentioned in the project proposal. No plan was elaborated to provide a follow up to the recommendations and proposals laid down in the report on the study tour. The effectiveness has been low.

#### **6.4.4 Sub-project 4: Women in Local Government**

For this component, an extensive ToR was written in close collaboration between the Gender desk at SALGA and VNG-I. Also the RNE was directly involved. The ToR mentioned the following objectives for the sub-project:

- To elaborate a practical implementation plan for the SALGA gender policy on how to improve the position of women in local government in South Africa.
- To provide a follow-up to the Municipal Management Training Programme (MMTP) of the GSO “Women in Local Government” (2000);
- To make arrangements for further advice at distance on developing the gender policy of SALGA;
- To make arrangements for a collective follow up (by means of a MMTP) at the end of 2001 in South Africa.

Early 2001, the VNG-I expert on gender visited South Africa and assessed the strengths and weaknesses of SALGA’s gender policy, its organisation and its external communication with the municipalities in the field of gender issues. The visit produced clear recommendations to SALGA on how to develop a gender policy framework. After the visit VNG-I provided advisory services at a distance. This activity was linked to the results of the MMTP on Women in Local Government in 2000 and the preparation of a next MMTP on Gender.

The joint elaboration of the ToR, the visit of the VNG-I expert, the report and recommendations produced, and ‘long distance’ input by the gender expert have been effective. However, after the main person at SALGA’s gender desk had passed away, and other key officials that had participated in this activity had left SALGA, gender seemed to have lost its priority within SALGA. This is evidenced by the fact that the year 2000 policy document ‘Developing a comprehensive gender policy for SALGA’ was never completed. And never implemented. Currently (late 2002) there is no gender desk within SALGA anymore.

It can be concluded that the objective of this sub-project “enhancing the capacity of the gender unit in SALGA to develop tools and mechanisms to engender local government” has not been reached, despite the sound inputs by both VNG-I as well as the SALGA gender desk at the time.

#### **6.4.5 Sub-project 5: Youth in Local Government**

Practically none of the planned activities in this sub-project took place. There was no research carried out on good practices on youth in South Africa. No ToR was written by SALGA. The only activity that did take place was a study tour to the Netherlands by eight South African municipal delegates, the youth commission of SALGA, some NGO’s and two SALGA representatives, including the youth officer of SALGA. The programme of the visit was organised by VNG-I. Participants interviewed expressed their appreciation for the quality of both the organisation and the contents of the tour.

However, after the visit to the Netherlands no dissemination took place of the experiences. A planner seminar discuss the outcomes of the working visit was not organised. The Youth Policy has always been weak and is currently non-existent (November 2002). The SALGA youth officer of SALGA that participated in the visit is no longer active in SALGA.

The sub-project has not been effective in contributing to its objective: “stimulating the development of local youth policies through SALGA by informing local government in South Africa”. Most of the planned activities were not carried out.

#### **6.4.6 Results**

The overall conclusion of the Strengthening of SALGA project is that many activities were never implemented. In other words, the output of the project remained well below the planned output. On those activities not implemented, no effects can be expected. In the case the output was produced, such as with the various study tours, the results of these tours were not translated in policies, new activities or organisational changes. In fact, with few exemptions, no follow-up took place. The activities implemented remained rather ad hoc and were not placed in either a process or a consistent activity frame. A high turnover of SALGA officials, an unexpected external factor, had a negative impact on the sustainability of the activities and sub-projects (i.e. gender desk).

Overall, the effectiveness has been assessed as low. The following factors played a role in the fact that outcomes remained below the expected results:

- The design of the project was over-ambitious. It was insufficiently adapted to the short-term requirements of a young organisation. The objective “strengthening of local governance through SALGA” has been translated into too many separate sub-projects, each counting with its own objectives. SALGA’s structure was insufficiently developed to maintain coherence among such a variety of project components. Not all components focused on the core issue of capacity building, but deviated attention to the subject matters of “gender” and “youth policies”, issues that are relevant, but were brought in too early into the volatile organisational structure of SALGA.
- The turnover of SALGA officials has been extremely high during the period 1999-2002, having a negative impact on continuity and institutional memory. Early 2001, the management capacity of SALGA had reached a critical minimum. With the swift and massive transformation of local governance in South Africa, that comprises new tasks to SALGA, the organisation could simply not cope with the requirements. Under such circumstances, little attention was paid to the implementation of external projects.
- SALGA structure has not matured yet and has been revised several times. This affected negatively the match between SALGA’s organisational structure and the subject matters included in the project.
- Since SALGA had the administrative power over the project and had contracted VNG-I, the options to the latter to enforce continuity in the various sub-projects was rather limited. Nevertheless, VNG-I made many efforts to ‘push’ SALGA in the implementation of the various project components.

## 6.5 Aggregated observations on effectiveness

Chapter 2 provided a brief description of the general context aspects of the three projects. Success or failure of an activity (input) is not determined only by its own design and effectiveness, but also by the specific environment in which it is implemented.

All three projects, although dealing with support to local government development, are placed in a national context. The projects were embedded in the general political, administrative and financial processes of local government development in the three countries. There is some similarity in these environmental factors of the three countries involved. In the Czech Republic, in Tanzania and in South Africa, local government development is still in somewhere in a volatile change process. During this process structures, mandates and functions are being amended frequently. In South Africa this process has been very volatile and the composition, size and mandates of local government changed dramatically. Also in Tanzania swings were made between complete abolition of local governments to 'decentralisation within unity of powers', but spread out over a longer time period. In the Czech Republic, the transition path from a centrally administered society towards 'self government' at the local level has not reached its point of equilibrium yet.

In none of the three countries there is a well-settled and mature system of distribution of powers and functions between the central government and the local government. Only in the case of South Africa, the context factors seemed to have negatively impacted on the effectiveness of the project. The changes of the municipal system, including the demarcation of municipalities was changed during the project implementation period. This change process absorbed the attention from SALGA policymakers, while its officials changed as a result of the new composition of local government in the country. In the Czech Republic the context factor of the future accession to the European Union has been a motivating factor.

A second group of factors is composed by the financial and economic context of local government. The resources made available and the capacities to generate own income in order to implement the local policies are of importance to both the autonomy and service delivering capacity of local government. This also applies to the institutes and associations supported by the three projects.

Although the specific circumstances are different, there is a clear distinction between the Czech Republic and South Africa on the one hand and Tanzania on the other. Without neglecting all the financial constraints of FALA, ILA and SALGA, at least basic financial conditions were in place to operate the training institutes and the association. That is not the case in Tanzania, where the financial constraints impeded the normal day-to-day operations of the association. And this financial constraint had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the project.

In addition to the above-mentioned 'environmental' factors, there are so-called receptivity factors, determined by:

- The organisation of the recipient structure (can the activity be embedded into the recipient's organisational structure?).
- The expectations regarding the eventual effectiveness of the activity (does the activity 'match' the expectations?);



The main differences between the three projects, as described in this chapter, are found in the receptivity factors.


First, the formal administrative responsibility over the projects does not seem to have been a determinant factor for effectiveness. In the Czech Republic the administration rested with VNG-I, and FALA achieved to exploit the options and opportunities very well. In the South African project, SALGA was the administratively responsible organisation, but this feature did not result into a higher effectiveness of the project. Most likely, more output could have been produced with a different administrative structure. It remains uncertain whether a higher output would have been internalised within SALGA. In the case of the ALAT project in Tanzania, administrative responsibility by ALAT over the project could have increased ALAT's ownership, although the lack of propoitive capacities would –most likely- not have ensures a higher output and more effectiveness.

As far as could be learnt from these three projects, the formal administrative responsibility has not been the most determinant factor explaining the effectiveness of the projects.

The second set of receptiveness factors refer to the match between expectations of the recipients and the supply of activities. In the Czech project, in particular FALA encountered a perfect match between its own expectations and the opportunities of the project. In the case of SALGA the expectations that existed at the moment of the design of the project were overtaken by events. The activities of the project happen to score low on SALGA's current priorities. In the case of ALAT, the receptiveness is more complex and there seems to be a certain distance between the priorities set in the project and the day-to-day strategies followed by ALAT.

The impact of the context factors on effectiveness can be visualised as follows:

**Graph 6.1: Context – receptivity model**





## **7 Relevance**

### **7.1 Introduction**

Relevance is the degree to which the rationale and objectives of an activity are –or remain- pertinent, significant and worthwhile, in relation to the identified priority needs and concerns. Usually, relevance is meant to be an overall assessment of whether interventions are in support of the donor and partner policies, as well as with local needs and priorities:

- relevant viz. a viz. the problems perceived;
- relevant viz. a viz. the recipient policies;
- relevant viz. a viz. the donors' policies.

In practice, this implies that *relevance* is judged by the consistency with policies, needs and priorities. The interventions are supposed to adhere to the conditions set by the policies, so most projects will be relevant compared to the donor's policies. Since the recipient usually makes requests, the same applies to the consistency with the recipient's policies.

### **7.2 Capacity building in the Czech Republic**

The relevance of the project is high, since it scores positively on the three categories:

- the project was relevant with respect to the stated problem of lack of training capacities and knowledge in the field of EU accession and local government. Moreover, the need for the project emerged directly from the local and regional authorities themselves (a survey was conducted among local governments, prior to the formulation of the project);
- the project was relevant with respect to the Czech Republic's candidacy for EU-accession and hence the policy to fully incorporate local and district level governments in that process. Since 1998, it has been the explicit policy of the Ministry of the Interior to strengthen the training facilities for local government civil servants. Knowledge on EU related matters and the implications for European legislation for local authorities is among the highest policy priorities of the Czech government. The project has also been relevant in enabling FALA, the training institute originating from the local authorities themselves and operating within the private sector, to strengthen itself nationwide in accordance to the general policy of the Czech Republic to operate more in public-private arrangements.
- The project has been relevant from the Dutch policy perspective. The project fitted well within the wider objectives of the Dutch Matra programme, in particular within the theme "good governance", which focuses on the strengthening of public institutions in view of EU accession.

### 7.3 Support to the ALAT

The relevance of the project is high, since it scores positively on the three categories:

- The relevance of the ALAT project was high with respect to the problems identified. Within the framework of the local government reform the importance of ALAT as the representative of local authorities has always been stressed. In the LGRA 1996-2000 the envisaged role for ALAT was described as “helping local authorities to formulate and present their views on the reform and contribute to the design of the framework for LG reform” (p.31). However it also identifies the “... present weak representation at central government level of the views from the councils, through associations as ALAT...” (p.6). The Action Plan and Budget 1999-2004 mentions that “as an important lobby group, ALAT enjoys an advisory role ... and will play a special monitoring role over activities taken place...”.
- The project is relevant with respect to the central government’s local government reform programme and the Policy on local government (1999). The central government stresses the need to count with an organisation representing local authorities. The potential role of ALAT in the LGRP is one of an independent representative of local authorities capable of participating actively in the decentralisation process.
- There is a consensus among donors that ALAT’s role would be to provide the necessary checks and balances in the LGR process, but that it is still unable to perform that task satisfactorily. This role goes beyond the role envisaged by the Tanzanian government and ALAT itself. Strengthening of ALAT fits in the Dutch policy of support to the Local Government Reform Programme. A joint government and donor review of the LGRP (June, 2001) stated that ALAT has “a vital role to play.... but the capacity of ALAT’s central secretariat is inadequate in view of its potential role in relation to LGRP”. It further states that “ALAT should be strengthened ... and measures would be needed to encourage generation of its own revenues”. Nevertheless, there are some observations to be made here. While ALAT is supposed to be a key element for a successful implementation of the LGRP, donors agreed that ALAT should not receive central government subvention in order to maintain its independency (no resources are being made available from the LGRP basket). In consequence, it remains an open question on how ALAT could keep track with the pace of the developments in the LGRP

In sum, the relevance of supporting ALAT is high. Not supporting ALAT would lead to a situation in which ALAT is not able to keep up with the process of local government development and would stay behind as a (potential) key player in that process.

## **7.4 Strengthening of SALGA**

The relevance of the project Strengthening of SALGA is less than in the Czech Republic and Tanzania. The reason can be found in the fact that the match with the own policies and priorities of SALGA is less than in the other countries.

- the relevance with respect to the identified problems is less than could be expected. This is due to the fact that the project has been taken over by events. At the moment of its formulation, a sound analysis was carried out of the main bottlenecks, and the project components do address these problems. However, the process of reorganisation of the municipalities in South Africa set new conditions and requirements to SALGA. So, with respect to the current main problems of the organisation, the match of the kind of activities with SALGA's main current problems is modest only.
- The relevance with respect to the South African policies is high. SALGA is the legally recognised entity that represents the interests and the voice of the local governments in South Africa. However, relevance differs among the five sub-projects, where sub-project 1 (Building management skills for sound services and adequate advocacy) and sub-project 2 (Capacity building for local government councillors) are considered relevant, as they focus on the strengthening of SALGA's managerial and organisational capacity. Due to an over-ambitious design that did not match of an organisation in a change process, the project comprised subject matters that either did not pertain to the priorities of SALGA, or lost that priority in the course of time. The sub-projects 4 (Women in Local Government) and 5 (Youth in Local Government) are currently perceived by SALGA as relevant to the Dutch policies only.
- The relevance with respect to the policies of the Dutch government is high. The project fits in the general Dutch policies on support to local governance development for South Africa. Local governance is one of the sectors supported by the Dutch bilateral aid programme with South Africa.

## **7.5 Aggregated observations on relevance**

Relevance of the three projects has been high in relation to the identified needs, concerns and bottlenecks. In the course of the project implementation, some of those needs have changed over time, as is the case of SALGA. The project in the Czech Republic has been very relevant in the context of EU accession, as well as the Czech policies to train civil servants at local and regional level. The project in Tanzania is relevant, as far as ALAT is considered to play a more important role in the Local Government Reform Process than it actually does. The Tanzanian government and donors agree that ALAT needs to be strengthened in order to be able to perform its envisaged tasks.



## 8 Conclusions

This component of the overall evaluation of municipal international cooperation aimed at assessing the contributions made by independent projects to the strengthening of support institutions to local governance in developing and EU-accession countries.

During the period 1997-2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (co)-financed 31 independent projects, that were either administered by or executed by VNG. These projects differ widely in their objectives, the countries in which they are implemented as well as the extent to which VNG was responsible for the implementation. After various sampling efforts, only three projects remained in the sample for in-country evaluation:

1. Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic to train local public servants and district officers on issues relevant for EU accession;
2. Support to the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania;
3. Strengthening of local government through the South African Local Government Association;

This sample is too small to draw any significant conclusion beyond the level of the individual project. Nevertheless, some aggregation were made for illustrative purposes only.

- In all three projects, VNG-I has come to the front. Disregarding its formal responsibilities, VNG-I has been the active and ‘steering’ partner in the projects.
- This eagerness to keep projects on track resulted in a smooth process in the Czech Republic, but possibly outpaced VNG’s partners in South Africa and Tanzania.
- In the Czech Republic, VNG was brought in at an advanced stage of the project preparation, but both in South Africa and Tanzania, VNG played an important role in the identification and formulation of the projects. And later on, VNG became the implementing organisation.

### *Efficiency*

For the project “Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic to train local public servants and district officers on issues relevant for EU accession”, VNG-I (in a consortium with Rubiconsort) was directly contracted by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where two Czech training institutions (FALA and ILA) were the recipient parties. Activities in this project were implemented efficiently, as a result of a combination of high ownership on the Czech side, a process oriented approach by all parties, the input and use of a broad network of qualified Dutch experts involved in the project and efficient project management by VNG and FALA. Less efficient was the strengthening of the training institution ILA, due to the fact that this organisation showed less commitment to the project and faced an internal organisational crisis.

In Tanzania, efficiency of the project “Strengthening of local government through the South African Local Government Association” was low, largely as a result of the design of the first phase of the project. Lack of ownership over the project by ALAT and less efficient instruments used by VNG(-I) produced less output than could have been produced. The implementation of the project was focussed on the inputs (by



means of missions by Dutch experts, workshop in the Netherlands) instead of the expected outputs. VNG(-I) did not apply a change management process. Delays in the project implementation were considerable.

In South Africa, the project “Strengthening of local government through the South African Local Government Association” was contracted directly to SALGA, where VNG was sub-contracted to execute specific components of the project. Due to a number of organisational deficiencies on SALGA’s part, the project did not produce the expected output. Only half of the budget was spent, and less than half of the envisaged project outputs were produced. Efficiency of the project was low.

Comparison among the three projects seems to indicate that the contractual form may possibly influence the sense of ownership, but this was definitely not been a determinant factor. The sense of ownership in the Czech Republic was higher than in the South African project, notwithstanding the fact that in the Czech Republic FALA had no formal contractual or administrative responsibility at all over the project. Efficiency does depend on a sound working approach. The process approach pursued in the Czech Republic resulted in a higher productivity than the rather narrow ‘project activity accomplishment’ approach applied in the ALAT and SALGA projects

#### *Effectiveness*

The overall conclusion on project “Building up the capacity in the Czech Republic” is that it has been highly effective in achieving the overall objective “to build up the training and education capacity of ILA and FALA in the field of the consequences of EU accession for local and regional government in the Czech Republic”.

With respect to the project “Support to ALAT” it can be concluded that the first phase of this project has been less effective than envisaged. However, some positive contributions were made to the achievement of the three objectives of the project.

The conclusion with respect to the project “Strengthening of SALGA” is that the project’s performance has been below expectations and the effectiveness has been modest. In none of the five separate sub-projects the objectives were achieved.

All three projects, although dealing with support to local government development, have been implemented at a national level. They were embedded within the general political, administrative and financial processes of local government development in each country. In the Czech Republic, in Tanzania and in South Africa, local government development is still in the middle of a change process, where structures, mandates and functions are being amended frequently. In South Africa this process is volatile and in both that country and Tanzania the composition, size and mandates of local government have been changed recently. In the Czech Republic, the transition path from a centrally administered society towards decentralisation is steadier, but has not yet reached its point of equilibrium. In none of the three countries there is a situation of a well-settled and mature system of distribution of powers and functions between the central government and the local government (as exists in the Netherlands).

Only in the case of South Africa, the context factors seemed to have negatively impacted on the effectiveness of the project. In the Czech Republic the context factor of the future accession to the European Union has been a positively motivating factor.

A second group of factors is composed by the financial and economic context of local government. Although the specific circumstances are different, there is a clear

distinction between the Czech Republic and South Africa on the one hand and Tanzania on the other. In the case of the first two, at least basic financial conditions were in place to operate. That is not the case in Tanzania, where the financial constraints impeded the normal day-to-day operations of the association. And this financial constraint had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the project.

In addition there are so-called receptivity factors. Here the differences are more noticeable. First, the formal administrative responsibility over the project does not seem to have been a determining factor for effectiveness. In the Czech Republic, the administration rested with VNG-I, and FALA achieved to exploit the opportunities very well. In the South African project, SALGA was the administratively responsible organisation, but this did not result into a higher effectiveness. In the case of the ALAT project in Tanzania, administrative responsibility by ALAT over the project could have increased ALAT's ownership, although the lack of propositive capacities would – most likely- not have ensured a higher output and more effectiveness. The formal administrative responsibility has not been the most determinant factor explaining the effectiveness of the projects.

In the Czech project, in particular FALA encountered a perfect match between its own expectations and the opportunities offered by the project. In the case of SALGA the expectations that existed at the moment of the design of the project were overtaken by events. The activities of the project happen to score low on SALGA's current priorities. In the case of ALAT, the receptiveness is more complex and there seems to be a certain distance between the priorities set in the project and the day-to-day strategies followed by ALAT.

#### *Relevance*

Relevance of each of the three projects is high in relation to the identified priority needs and concerns within the context of each project. The project in the Czech Republic is relevant with respect to the EU accession and the importance of training of civil servants. The project in Tanzania is relevant, as ALAT is perceived to play an important role in the Local Government Reform Process, while in South Africa relevance is high since SALGA by law represents local authorities. Nevertheless in South Africa not all components were relevant viz a viz the main problems identified and the current priorities set by SALGA.

## Annex A: Overview of independent projects (selected projects are highlighted)

	<i>Title of the project</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Budget (NLG)</i>
1	Assistance to the Reconstruction of Palestinian Local Government	Palestinian territory	4.020.430
2	Strengthening Local Government and Citizens Participation Albania	Albania	2.587.900
3	Governance and Democracy project UNDP "Strengthening the Local Governments I"	Moldova	1.500.000
4	Governance and Democracy project UNDP "Strengthening the Local Governments II"	Moldova	1.431.167
<b>5</b>	<b>Civil Service Reform Programme / Local Government Reform (incl. Support to ALAT)</b>	<b>Tanzania</b>	<b>1.411.471</b>
6	Governance and Democracy project Local Government Support	Moldova	1.362.452
7	Urban Environmental Sanitation Project – Training	Ghana	917.031
8	Social Housing Foundation	South-Africa	578.836
<b>9</b>	<b>Building up Capacity in Czech Republic to train public servants on EU-accession</b>	<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>460.000</b>
10	Strengthening Local Government and Citizens Participation Albania	Albania	414.000
11	Support to the Decentralisation and Good Governance Programme in Cyangugu	Rwanda	267.863
12	The European dimension of Local Government Policy in Estonia	Estonia	250.549
<b>13</b>	<b>Capacity Building Programme South African Association of Local Governments</b>	<b>South-Africa</b>	<b>240.629</b>
14	Congress Municipal International Cooperation	Netherlands	195.000
15	Support mission within the Decentralisation and Good Governance Programme	Rwanda	144.399
16	Preparation of establishing Habitat-office at VNG	Netherlands	140.900
17	Local Government Communication	Latvia	125.396
18	Support to the Task Force of Mayors on the Promotion of Local Democratic Government	Ukraine	124.011
19	Foundation of a Platform for Local and Decentralised development in Cape Verde	Cape Verde	70.136
20	Congress "25 years Municipal International Cooperation"	Netherlands	69.497
21	Municipal International Cooperation Database Phase I: Feasibility Study	Netherlands	58.548
22	Decentralisation: support mission BMG/VNG	Burkina Faso	56.832
23	Fact Finding Mission Local Governance VNG	Angola	52.029
24	Block Fund for Decentralisation and Good Governance Programme: Cyangugu pilot	Rwanda	42.537
25	Creation of an Information and Consultancy Centre on Social Protection in Zhytomir	Ukraine	34.067
26	Support Mission VNG in behalf of Integrated District Development Programme: Cyangugu	Rwanda	29.807
27	Block Fund for Rural Development - Association of Rural District Councils	Zimbabwe	21.205
28	POF '98 / VNG Formulation mission Shibam & Zabid / Preservation of Historic Cities	Yemen	15.939
29	Block Fund for Decentralisation and Good Governance Programme: Cyangugu pilot	Rwanda	9.696
30	Support to the Policy Fund DSI 1997 - Participation Evaluation of GSO Programme by DHV	Zimbabwe, Namibia, South-Africa	7.523
31	Missions VNG in behalf of Development of Local Government (Kosovo)	Yugoslavia	4.569

## Annex B: Persons and institutions contacted

List of interviewed persons in the Czech Republic, Tanzania and South Africa (in alphabetical order by country):

Czech Republic	
Bednarova, M. Mrs	Director FALA
Dohnal, F.	Chairman of the Vysocina Region council and executive vice chairman SMO
Jech, J.	Executive vice chairman SMO
Jelinkova, Mrs	Human Resources Department, Ministry of the Interior
Jourova, V. Mrs	Director of the Department for Regional Development, Vysocina region
Knip, P.	Director VNG International
Lambarts, M.	Second secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy
Ledvinka, R.	1 <sup>st</sup> Director manager ILA
Marek, J.	Director Department for Public Administrative Reform, Ministry of the Interior
Petru, E. Mrs	Director Human Resources Department, Ministry of the Interior
Pistelakova, Z. Mrs	Consultant / trainer FALA
Roos, K.	Advisor FALA
Soudek, T.	Consultant / trainer FALA
Sticha, P.	Head of the directors department, ILA
Svec, D.	Consultant / trainer FALA
Voldanova, J. Mrs	Senior project manager FALA

<b>Tanzania</b>	
Hertogs, E.-J.	Project leader, VNG International
Kabagire, A.L.R.	Programme Manager LGRP President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Governance
Kabeja	Municipal Town Director, Songea
Kangwa, P.	ex-District Commissioner Same, ex NGO Pamoja, Moshi
Kimaro, C.T.	Research and Development Officer, ALAT
Kwiluhya, M.P.Z. mw	Town Director, Dodoma
Liviga, A.J.	Local Government Expert, Royal Netherlands Embassy
Makwaya, I. Mrs	News Editor, ALAT
Mapunda, G. Mrs	Junior information expert, ALAT/SNV
Mchomvu	Regional Commissioner, Same
Mfoka, D.	Vice Permanent Secretary. President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Governance
Munisi, E.A.	District Executive Director. Monduli
Musingi, R.	Director Regional Coordination President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Governance
Nchimbi, B.R	Secretary General. ALAT
Noordholland de Jong, J.	Senior Program Officer. SNV
Nyheliga, D.	Pahi Ward Executive Officer, Kondoa
O'Hea, M.	Organisation and Management Advisor. ALAT/SNV
Rwechungura, A.	Project Officer. Royal Netherlands Embassy
Tempelman, G.J	Head International Co-operation. Councillor, Royal Netherlands Embassy Dar es Salaam
Tholen, P.	First Secretary rural development Royal Netherlands Embassy Dar es Salaam

Ulaya, M.	District Commissioner, Kondoia
Wiggers, A.	Deputy Director. VNG International
<b>South Africa</b>	
Botha, R.	Director Research, Department of Provincial and Local Government
Buis, H.	GSO coordinator. VNG International
Eechoud, van Y. Mrs	Policy Officer Development Cooperation Royal Netherlands Embassy, Pretoria
Malefetse, N.M. Mrs	Deputy director: capacity building and coordinator donor policy. Department of Provincial and Local Government
Marivate, D.	Principal planner, Research: Department of Provincial and Local Government
Mettler, J.	Manager Intergovernmental Relations, South African Local Government Association
Mkhatschwa, S.	Chairperson SALGA
Molefakgotha, E.P., mw	Nation Council of African Women, Emfuleni (Lekoa Vaal)
Ndoni, B.	Deputy Mayor, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Uitenhage
Ramphele, W.	Deputy Director Capacity building, Policy and Coordination, Department Provincial and Local Government
Simelane, B.	Project manager. SALGA
Thabane, T.J.S.	Executive Mayor, Emfuleni Local Municipality (Lekoa Vaal)

# **Evaluatie Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking Onderzoek in Nederland**

## **Werkrapport**

In het kader van het IOB onderzoek naar Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking

SEOR BV, Rotterdam  
Ecorys-NEI, Rotterdam

September, 2003

## VOORAF

Voor u ligt een werkrapport dat onderdeel uitmaakt van de evaluatie naar de bijdragen van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken aan Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking. Dit werkrapport brengt verslag uit van de uitkomsten van onderzoeksactiviteiten die uitgevoerd zijn in Nederland.

De totale evaluatie -waarvan dit rapport onderdeel uitmaakt- betreft de analyse en beoordeling van de beleidsrelevantie, doeltreffendheid en doelmatigheid van de door het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (BZ) gefinancierde activiteiten op het gebied van Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking, die middels de Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) beheerd en/of uitgevoerd zijn en waarvoor VNG de contractpartner van BZ was gedurende de periode 1997-2001 (ToR, 2002:1).

De evaluatie wordt uitgevoerd door de Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie (IOB) van BZ. De IOB heeft de associatie SEOR BV – Ecorys NEI gecontracteerd voor het uitvoeren van delen van de evaluatie. De beleidsanalyse wordt door IOB zelf verricht.

Het merendeel van de activiteiten waarover dit werkrapport verslag uitbrengt is uitgevoerd vóór aanvang van veldbezoeken aan de in de Terms of Reference (ToR) geselecteerde vijf landen (Zuid-Afrika, Tanzania, Nicaragua, Polen en Tsjechië) en diende mede als voorbereiding op deze bezoeken.

Het opstellen, de verzending en de verwerking van de enquête aan Nederlandse gemeenten is uitgevoerd gedurende de periode juni 2002 – februari 2003. Dossieronderzoek is uitgevoerd gedurende de periode juli – december 2002, terwijl interviews met Nederlandse gemeenten hebben plaatsgevonden gedurende de periode september 2002 – januari 2003. Analyse van evaluatierapporten heeft plaats gehad op het moment dat deze werden aangetroffen. De systematisering daarvan vond plaats in april 2003.

***Disclaimer:*** De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud van dit rapport rust exclusief bij SEOR BV en Ecorys-NEI. De bevindingen en meningen die in dit rapport verwoord zijn, worden niet noodzakelijkerwijs gedeeld door hetzij de IOB, hetzij andere departementen van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

SEOR BV en Ecorys-NEI bedanken de Nederlandse gemeenten voor hun bereidwilligheid te reageren op de toegezonden enquête, en deze in veel gevallen van aanvullende informatie te voorzien. Tevens danken wij hen voor de betoonde gastvrijheid en openhartigheid gedurende – veelal uitgebreide- interviews. Ook bedanken wij de directie en medewerkers VNG International voor hun inspanningen meer dan 150 dossiers toegankelijk te maken en andere informatie uit het archief te achterhalen.



## **AFKORTINGEN**

BZ	Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken
COS	Commissie Ontwikkelings Samenwerking
CUGA	Cursus Uitzending Gemeente Ambtenaar
EU	Europese Unie
GI	Gemeente Initiatieven
GI (M)	Gemeente Initiatieven (Matra)
GIS	Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking
GSO	Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden
GST	Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Toetredingslanden
IOB	Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie
IPU	International Project Unit (voorganger VNG International)
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PFO	Programma Financiering Overeenkomst
LBSNN	Landelijk Beraad Stedenbanden Nederland - Nicaragua
Matra	Maatschappelijke Transformatie
MMTP	Municipal Management Training Programme
NPAA	National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (Communautaire)
PUGA	Programma Uitzending Gemeente-Ambtenaren
SNV	Nederlandse Ontwikkelingsorganisatie
STAGE	Stage Lokaal Bestuur Ontwikkelingslanden
ToR	Terms of Reference
VNG	Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten
VNG-I	Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten International

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# 1 INLEIDING

## 1.1 De programma's

Het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (BZ) zet middelen in teneinde de versterking van democratisch lokaal bestuur te bevorderen in zowel ontwikkelingslanden als toetredingslanden (toetredingslanden) middels gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking. Deze bestaan uit een aantal financieringsprogramma's (subsidierelingen), alsmede zelfstandige projecten.

Het financieringsprogramma Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden (GSO) staat open voor alle ontwikkelingslanden, alsmede voor een aantal landen waarmee Nederland een bijzondere relatie onderhoudt (zoals Marokko). Onder *ontwikkelingslanden* worden verstaan de landen die als zodanig gedefinieerd zijn door het Development Assistance Committee van de Organisatie van Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (Overeenkomst BZ-VNG 20-03-1998, annex II). Die lijst is dus niet beperkt tot de landen waarmee de Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking hetzij een structurele samenwerkingsrelatie onderhoudt, hetzij een thematische bijdrage levert aan de verbetering van lokaal bestuur.

Onder *pre-accessielanden* (of toetredingslanden) worden verstaan die landen die formeel toegang tot de Europese Unie hebben aangevraagd en als zodanig zijn erkend door de Europese Commissie. Het financieringsprogramma Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Toetredingslanden (GST) biedt de mogelijkheid projecten gericht op kennisoverdracht uit te voeren met de lokale overheden van kandidaat lidstaten uit Midden- en Oost-Europa: Polen, Hongarije, Tsjechië, Slowakije, Estland, Letland, Litouwen, Roemenië, Bulgarije en Slovenië (Overeenkomst BZ-VNG 19-09-98). In 2001 zijn daar Turkije en Kroatië aan toegevoegd. Het omvat dus niet alle per 2004 toetredende lidstaten (zoals Cyprus en Malta) of kandidaat lidstaten voor toetreding op een later moment.

*Lokaal bestuur* omvat - behalve gemeenten- ook provincies, waterschappen, nutsbedrijven en hun organisaties (Diverse Overeenkomsten BZ-VNG) voor zover het de Nederlandse partner betreft. In de toelichtingen bij de Overeenkomsten tussen BZ en de VNG wordt gerefereerd aan subsidies en directe financiering van activiteiten ter verbetering van het *lokale openbare bestuur* in ontwikkelingslanden en toetredende lidstaten van de Europese Unie. Wat verstaan moet worden onder lokaal bestuur in het partnerland is niet als zodanig gedefinieerd in de GSO beschikkingen terwijl in de GST overeenkomst bepaald wordt dat lokaal bestuur datgene is dat in het ontvangende land als zodanig beschouwd wordt.

De *overheid* omvat zowel de politieke gezagsdragers als het ambtelijk apparaat. Het openbaar bestuur (op lokaal niveau) kent dus een politiek en een ambtelijk echelon, aangevuld met semi-overheidsinstellingen. Het *maatschappelijk middenveld* omvat particuliere organisaties met en zonder publieke taken, maar zonder winst oogmerk, zoals bonden, verenigingen en stichtingen.

De Overeenkomsten BZ-VNG spreken over "deskundighedsopbouw middels personele uitwisseling" op lokaal niveau. Het karakteristieke van de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking is dat het uitgaat van de voordelen van het 'collega tot collega' paradigma, zoals dat ook bestaat in b.v. de 'boer tot boer' landbouwvoorlichting.

In de Overeenkomsten tussen BZ en de VNG (Doelstellingen en Beleidskader) wordt impliciet verondersteld dat kennisoverdracht door personele uitwisseling (kennis en

kunde), alsmede financiële middelen voor de realisering van tastbare activiteiten (Gemeente Initiatieven) bijdragen aan capaciteitsversterking. En dat de verbetering van de *performance* (b.v. het leveren van diensten) van het lokaal bestuur voortvloeit uit capaciteitsversterking (tweede subdoelstelling van het Programma GSO).

De ingezette instrumenten van de Programma's GSO en GST zijn toegespitst op deskundigheidsopbouw ('capability') middels personele uitwisseling. Voor capaciteitsopbouw ('capacity') zijn ook financiële middelen, interactievermogen en motivatie bepalend. De activiteiten, ondersteund door het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, omvatten eveneens bevordering van interactie (samenhangend met personele uitwisseling, stedenband, netwerken), alsmede het ter beschikking stellen van financiële middelen (alleen in het geval van het GSO programma). Dat laatste betreft slechts een kleine bijdrage aan het totaal van middelen dat aan een ontvangende gemeente (of ander bestuursorgaan) ter beschikking staat. De toewijzing van financiële middelen wordt vooral gezien als functioneel voor het inhoud geven aan de interactie tussen de partners in het samenwerkingsverband.

Kenmerk van de zelfstandige projecten is dat deze worden beheerd, dan wel uitgevoerd (of beiden) door de VNG. Deze hoeven echter niet noodzakelijkerwijs de samenwerking tussen gemeenten in Nederland en elders te bevorderen. De meeste zelfstandige projecten ondersteunen de opbouw van koepelorganisaties, dan wel netwerken (met name associaties van gemeenten).

## **1.2 De plaats van de Nederlandse componenten in het onderzoek**

Aan de opstelling van de ToR is een vooronderzoek voorafgegaan. Dit vooronderzoek – gebaseerd op dossier-, en data base (MIDAS) onderzoek heeft een overzicht opgeleverd van de uitgevoerde projecten (binnen de programma's) per land van uitvoering en per jaar.

De ToR (4.2.2) zetten uiteen hoe op basis van dat vooronderzoek een selectie is gemaakt van landen waarin nader veldstudie zal worden verricht. Een steekproef op basis van geografische kenmerken komt voort vanuit de overweging dat het een serie gemeentelijke activiteiten binnen eenzelfde, en dus vergelijkbare, context plaatst. Bovendien spelen praktische motieven een rol. In de sampling methode is niet gestreefd naar statistische representativiteit, maar naar een praktische 'match' tussen de doeleinden van de evaluatie en de beschikbare menselijke en financiële middelen. De in de ToR geselecteerde landen voor onderzoek zijn: Polen en Tsjechië (GST – landen) en Nicaragua, Tanzania en Zuid-Afrika (GSO landen). Deze selectie was gebaseerd op:

Voor wat betreft het GSO programma:

- duur van de samenwerking: minstens twee jaar,
- omvang van de GSO subsidie: minimaal 25.000 NLG,
- aantal uitgevoerde projecten/activiteiten: minimaal twee,
- diversiteit in de modaliteiten: minimaal twee modaliteiten.

Voor wat betreft het GST programma:

- aantal keer dat is samengewerkt: minimaal twee keer,
- omvang van de GST subsidie: minimaal 25.000 NLG,
- diversiteit in de modaliteiten: minimaal twee modaliteiten.

Daarnaast zijn voor wat betreft het GST programma alle samenwerkingsverbanden geselecteerd waar een Gemeentelijk Initiatief Matra heeft plaatsgevonden<sup>1</sup>

Het evaluatieonderzoek omvat zowel componenten die in Nederland uitgevoerd zijn, als componenten die in ieder van de geselecteerde landen zijn gerealiseerd. De volgende onderzoeksmethoden en -technieken zijn daarbij gehanteerd:

- bureaustudie (literatuurstudie, evaluaties),
- dossierstudie van de individuele activiteiten,
- beleidanalyse (IOB),
- enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten en andere overheden en bestuursorganen,
- interviews met coördinatoren en/of ambtenaren bij Nederlandse gemeenten, alsmede met direct betrokken maatschappelijke organisaties,
- interviews met betrekking tot toewijzing, organisatie en beheer (gemeenten, VNG en BZ),
- veldstudies in vijf landen
- interviews betrokken gemeenten / instellingen / koepelorganisaties
- interviews betrokken politiek verantwoordelijken en ambtelijke functionarissen / maatschappelijke organisaties
- case studies en projectbezoek.

Een overzicht van de samenstellende onderzoeksonderdelen is als volgt weer te geven:

---

<sup>1</sup> Zie voor de omschrijving van de diverse instrumenten (PUGA, STAGE, GI, MMTP) de ToR. De reden hiervoor is dat het een volume van samenwerkingsverbanden oplevert dat per land vergelijkbaar is met het GSO programma.

**Tabel 1.1: Onderzoekcomponenten**

Component	Plaats van onderzoek	Vorm	Bijzonderheden
Voorbereiding en ondersteuning	Nederland	Bureau onderzoek	Literatuur studie Dossier onderzoek
Beleidsanalyse	Nederland en vijf partnerlanden	Bureau onderzoek Interviews met beleidsmakers	Positionering van GIS in OS beleid. (Uit te voeren door IOB)
Onderzoek Nederlandse gemeenten (en instellingen) <i>Algemeen Aansturing en coördinatie</i>  <i>Betrokken functionarissen</i>	Nederland Nederland en Ambassades partnerlanden Nederland	Enquête Enquête Interviews  Interviews	Doelmatigheid, doeltreffendheid BZ, VNG-I en gemeenten  Politiek verantwoordelijken en uitvoerende functionarissen van lokale bestuursorganen
<b>Onderzoek in vijf landen</b> Context  <i>Betrokken gemeenten/ instellingen</i>  <i>Betrokken projecten en functionarissen</i>	Nederland en partnerlanden  Partnerlanden  Partnerlanden	Desk studie NL en lokaal  Observatie Interviews  Observatie Interviews	Beleid ontvangend land, gemeente. Relatief belang van GIS Procedures, doelmatigheid, doeltreffendheid en doelgerichtheid doeltreffendheid en doelgerichtheid
Zelfstandige projecten	Nederland, Tsjechië, Tanzania en Zuid-Afrika	Dossier studie NL en lokaal Interviews	Project niveau, geen programma niveau. Doelmatigheid, doeltreffendheid en doelgerichtheid
Kleine Plaatselijke Activiteiten Nicaragua	Nederland	Interviews Dossier studie NL	In Nicaragua is geen specifiek onderzoek gedaan naar het KPA programma, wel in de context van GSO projecten.
Analyse en Rapportage		Dossiers Evaluatierapporten	Deelrapporten: - onderzoek Nederlandse gemeenten - GST - GSO - Zelfstandige projecten

### 1.3 Rapportage over de in Nederland uitgevoerde componenten

De volgende onderzoeksinstrumenten worden in deze rapportage nader besproken:

- Enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten (hoofdstuk 3),
- Dossieronderzoek (hoofdstuk 4),
- Interviews in Nederlandse gemeenten en VNG (hoofdstuk 5),
- Bestudering van evaluatierapporten (hoofdstuk 6).

#### *Enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten*

Een schriftelijke enquête is gehouden onder Nederlandse gemeenten teneinde een beeld te krijgen van de toegankelijkheid van de programma's GSO en GST voor de doelgroep (de gemeenten), alsmede het relatieve belang daarvan in het totaal van de financieringsopties die gemeenten en andere bestuursorganen ter beschikking staan. Tevens is gezocht naar het relatieve belang van de subsidies ter beschikking gesteld door BZ voor het aanknopen, dan wel handhaven van banden met gemeenten of andere lokale bestuursorganen in ontwikkelings- of toetredingslanden.

De enquête is uitgevoerd onder alle Nederlandse gemeenten die in de periode 1997-2001 één of meerdere malen gebruik hebben gemaakt van GSO en/of GST middelen. In totaal betrof dit 147 (bestaande) gemeenten (154 gemeenten voor gemeentelijke herindeling). Ook is deze vragenlijst gestuurd naar een groep van 54 gemeenten die géén gebruik hebben gemaakt van de GSO en/of GST programma's gedurende de aangegeven periode. Deze controlegroep is 'ad random' gekozen, maar wel evenredig verdeeld naar grootte gebaseerd op inwonertal<sup>2</sup>. Bij verzending van de enquête is gebruik gemaakt van adressen handmatig aangeleverd door VNG International<sup>3</sup>. Om de respons te verhogen zijn rappel telefoongesprekken gevoerd met gemeenten die niet binnen drie weken reageerden. In een aantal gevallen moest de enquête opnieuw gestuurd worden als gevolg van het feit dat de adres en of contactpersoon gegevens niet meer actueel bleken. De uiteindelijke respons op alle enquêtes bedroeg 54 procent. De resultaten van de enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten worden besproken in hoofdstuk 3.

#### *Dossieronderzoek*

Teneinde inhoudelijke informatie omtrent de uitgevoerde activiteiten te verzamelen is een dossieronderzoek uitgevoerd bij VNG International (VNG-I). Dossieronderzoek omvatte, naast een aantal algemene dossiers over de programma's, een studie van 157 dossiers betreffende alle uitgevoerde activiteiten in de vijf geselecteerde landen (Polen, Tsjechië, Tanzania, Nicaragua en Zuid Afrika) gedurende de periode van studie (1997-2001). Voor de studie van de dossiers is gebruik gemaakt van een registratie checklist en een beoordelingsformulier. De doelen van de dossierstudie waren de volgende:

- het aanvullen van de informatie verkregen op basis van de financiële verantwoording en projectkenschetsen van de VNG-I aan het BZ (met name op inhoudelijk vlak);
- het verkrijgen van praktische informatie, zoals namen van contactpersonen en contactadressen bij Nederlandse gemeenten en bij lagere overheden in het buitenland;
- het op systematische wijze verzamelen van gegevens met betrekking tot de beheerscapaciteit van de VNG-I voor wat betreft het GSO en GST programma (o.a. behandeling aanvragen, opstellen contracten, afhandeling eindrapportages en projectmonitoring).

De resultaten van het dossieronderzoek worden besproken in hoofdstuk 4.

#### *Interviews in Nederlandse gemeenten en VNG*

Algemeen oriënterende gesprekken zijn gevoerd met VNG-I. Deze gesprekken dienden om een beeld te vormen van de programma's GST en GSO, de wijze waarop VNG-I aanvragen van Nederlandse gemeenten behandelt, de rol van de Adviescommissies bij projectaanvragen, de wijze van beoordeling door de VNG-I, alsmede de beoordeling van doeltreffendheid van de programma's door VNG-I.

In aanvulling op, en ter verdieping van, de enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten zijn gesprekken gevoerd met beleidsmakende en coördinerende ambtenaren, politiek verantwoordelijke bestuurders en direct betrokken vertegenwoordigers van maatschappelijke organisaties binnen de Nederlandse gemeenten. Voor deze gesprekken is gebruik gemaakt van gestructureerde vragenlijsten.

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<sup>2</sup> Inwonersaantallen per juni 2002 op basis van gegevens van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.

<sup>3</sup> De Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten kon geen adressenbestand digitaal aanleveren. Het bestand bleek niet 'up to date' te zijn.

Het aantal gemeenten (in ruime zin) in Nederland dat gedurende de periode 1997-2001 betrokken is geweest bij de programma's GSO en/of GST bedraagt 154 (per juni 2002 is dit aantal als gevolg van gemeentelijke herindelingen gereduceerd tot 147; zie Annex 1). Voor de interviews is gekozen voor een gerichte selectie van gemeenten, gebaseerd op de samenwerkingsverbanden in de vijf geselecteerde landen. Dat betreft 44 Nederlandse gemeenten, waarvan er 29 zijn bezocht. In twee gevallen werden er telefonische interviews zijn afgenomen. Een overzicht van bezochte gemeenten is gegeven in Annex 2. Binnen deze gemeenten hebben interviews met meerdere betrokkenen plaatsgevonden.

Doel van de gesprekken was het verkrijgen van een beeld van het (financiële) belang van GSO- en GST regelingen voor het aangaan van, of handhaven van, internationale gemeentelijke contacten. Tevens kon een inzicht worden verkregen in de begeleiding van de gemeenten door VNG-I, de gehanteerde aanvraagprocedures en beoordelingscriteria, de organisatie en management, en de verwachtingen ten aanzien van de resultaten van internationale gemeentelijke samenwerking.

De resultaten van de interviews onder Nederlandse gemeenten worden verder besproken in hoofdstuk 5.

#### *Bestudering van evaluatierapporten*

Onderdeel van de bureaustudie vormt een beoordeling van bestaande evaluaties.

Doel van deze analyse was tweeledig:

- het beoordelen van de inzet van –alsmede de kwaliteit van - het instrument "evaluatie" als onderdeel van de beheerscapaciteit van de VNG-I en/of BZ voor de programma's GSO en GST,
- het verkrijgen van een inzicht in de oordelen van eerdere evaluaties van programma's gericht op gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking.) en in hoeverre deze evaluaties geleid hebben tot aanpassingen in de programma's en/of de uitvoering daarvan.

De resultaten van de analyse van de evaluatierapporten worden besproken in hoofdstuk 6.

Tenslotte geeft hoofdstuk 7 een overzicht van de belangrijkste uitkomsten van het onderzoek in Nederland.

Vooraf aan deze hoofdstukken wordt eerst een inzicht gepresenteerd in de gemeentelijke internationale relaties en de plaats van de GSO en GST programma's daarin.



## 2 GEMEENTELIJKE INTERNATIONALE SAMENWERKING

### 2.1 Stedenbanden

Activiteiten in het kader van GSO en GST kunnen uitgevoerd worden zonder dat er sprake is van een structurele band tussen de gemeente in Nederland en de lokale overheid in het partnerland. In dat geval is sprake van een project gebaseerde relatie. Een voorbeeld daarvan is de ondersteuning die de consultancy afdeling van de Rotterdamse reinigingsdienst Roteb verleent aan de afdeling Publieke Gezondheid in Dodoma, Tanzania.

Echter in vrijwel alle gevallen is het gebruik van de GSO en GST middelen door een Nederlandse gemeente gerelateerd aan min of meer structurele banden met een gemeente elders. Die band kan verschillende vormen van intensiteit hebben:

- Bij zuster gemeentes (“twinning”) is doorgaans sprake van een formele overeenkomst en wordt er naar gestreefd de samenwerking maatschappijbeeld (publieke sector, private sector en maatschappelijk middenveld) op te zetten. Deze banden hebben soms een historische achtergrond (“Hanzesteden” in Europa) zijn van onbepaalde duur, en zijn in principe gebaseerd op gelijkheid en reciprociteit.
- Bij vriendschapsrelaties is eveneens sprake van een formele overeenkomst, maar deze kan van bepaalde duur zijn. Hoewel er veelal naar gestreefd wordt de relatie maatschappijbreed op te zetten, kan door bepaalde omstandigheden de interesse van een van de sectoren minder zijn. De relatie tussen de partners kan een mate van ongelijkheid hebben die reciprociteit wel nastrevenswaardig, maar niet altijd realistisch maakt. Dit gebeurt b.v. in relaties die gebaseerd zijn op solidariteit (Nicaragua),
- Bij netwerkrelaties is geen sprake van een één op één relatie, maar van onderlinge contacten binnen een bepaald kader, waarbinnen de partners elkaar ondersteunen. Dit is b.v. het geval met het Sustainable Cities initiatief van het Milieu Programma van de Verenigde Naties, UNEP,
- Bij thematische relaties is geen sprake van een maatschappijbreed contact, maar is dit beperkt tot bij voorbeeld samenwerking op het gebied van scheepvaart en handel.

Onder een stedenband wordt door de VNG-I en de Commissie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking COS<sup>4</sup> verstaan: zowel een geformaliseerde band, een vriendschapsband of een projectmatige samenwerking tussen een Nederlandse en een buitenlandse gemeente of regio. Dit kan uitgaan van de Nederlandse gemeente of van het particulier initiatief uit deze gemeente, mits dit initiatief structureel is en door de gemeente wordt ondersteund. De karakterisering van de stedenband naar vorm en intensiteit is hierboven geschetst. Stedenbanden kunnen ook onderscheiden worden naar organisatievorm:

- De stedenband kan in zijn geheel door medewerkers van een gemeente worden onderhouden,
- Een samenwerkingsverband –veelal in de vorm van een stedenbandstichting<sup>5</sup>- tussen gemeente en het particulier initiatief, waarbij deze stichting doorgaans gesubsidieerd wordt door de gemeente,
- Een particuliere stichting of vereniging, waarin de gemeente slechts participeert in bepaalde projecten of slechts een adviserende of

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<sup>4</sup> Bron: [www.stedenbanden.nl](http://www.stedenbanden.nl)

<sup>5</sup> Een gemeentelijke of particuliere stichting op het gebied van ontwikkelingsamenwerking hoeft niet beperkt te zijn tot één of meerdere stedenbanden (b.v. Mondiaalten).

ondersteunende rol heeft. Gemeentelijke subsidie voor zo'n stichting kan worden verleend, maar het hoeft niet,

- Een adviescommissie van de gemeenteraad vormt het bestuur van de stedenband.

De gezamenlijke website van COS en VNG International geeft een overzicht van de activiteiten die door Nederlandse gemeenten worden ondernomen op het gebied van Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking (GIS). Het is niet zo dat iedere gemeente in Nederland internationale contacten onderhoudt middels stedenbanden. Er zijn 251 gemeenten (en dat is ongeveer de helft van alle Nederlandse gemeenten) die tezamen 438 stedenbanden onderhouden<sup>6</sup>.

- 33 procent van de gemeenten werkt samen met een gemeente in het buitenland,
- 17 procent steunt een project in het buitenland,
- 28 procent geeft subsidie aan een vereniging of stichting,
- 23 procent steunt alleen voorlichting- en bewustwordingsactiviteiten.

De inbedding van internationale samenwerking binnen de gemeente is heterogeen:

- 37 procent is ingebed in de gemeentelijke organisatie,
- 26 procent is ondergebracht bij een aparte vereniging of stichting,
- 22 procent loopt via particuliere initiatieven, en
- 11 procent op andere wijze ingebed.

Binnen de Nederlandse gemeenten kan de organisatie rondom de stedenband(-en) met één (of meer) zustersteden complexe vormen aannemen. Naarmate er meer contacten zijn groeit de noodzaak tot coördinatie, zowel aan de Nederlandse zijde als aan de zijde van de partner. Daarmee neemt het aantal organisatievormen toe en ontstaan naast de horizontale contacten ook verticale contacten. Verticale contacten zijn die bij voorbeeld middels landenplatforms (b.v. Marokko platform) en het Landelijk Beraad Stedenbanden Nederland-Nicaragua (LBSNN).

Tabel 2.1 geeft een overzicht van het aantal gemeenten in Nederland dat internationale contacten (stedenbanden) heeft met gemeenten in het buitenland (volgens gegevens van COS/VNG International). Die stedenbanden kunnen met partners waar ook ter wereld onderhouden worden.

Tabel 2.2 presenteert het aantal gemeenten (per provincie) dat in de periode 1997-2001 gebruik heeft gemaakt van GSO en/of GST subsidies en derhalve onderwerp van deze evaluatie zijn. Hierbij moet het volgende worden opmerkt:

1. Het totaal aantal gemeenten in Nederland verschilt enigszins ten gevolge van het herindelingsproces in Nederland. De bronnen (COS/VNG International en CBS) rapporteren niet op hetzelfde moment in de tijd.
2. Het aantal Nederlandse gemeenten dat Stedenbanden onderhoudt met gemeenten in het buitenland (tabel 2.1) is inclusief die stedenbanden die ook worden onderhouden met gemeenten in landen die buiten de doelgroepen van de GSO en GST programma's vallen (echter exclusief stedenbanden met gemeenten in West-Europa).
3. Gemeenten die banden onderhouden met partners in landen die in aanmerking komen voor GSO dan wel GST subsidie hoeven daar niet noodzakelijkerwijs gebruik van te maken. Dat kan bij voorbeeld indien in de

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<sup>6</sup> Exclusief 399 banden die met Europese steden worden onderhouden.

samenwerkingsovereenkomst tussen de partners niet voorzien is in een element dat bijdraagt aan de versterking van lokaal bestuur.

**Tabel 2.1**      **Overzicht van stedenbanden in Nederland<sup>7</sup>**

Provincie	Aantal gemeenten	Aantal gemeenten met stedenbanden	procent gemeenten met stedenbanden	Aantal stedenbanden
Groningen	23	12	52	18
Friesland	30	13	43	16
Drenthe	12	10	83	22
Overijssel	26	25	96	52
Flevoland	5	3	60	6
Gelderland	71	35	49	54
Utrecht	35	21	60	34
Noord-Holland	66	29	44	44
Zuid-Holland	95	37	39	88
Zeeland	17	13	76	15
Noord-Brabant	70	33	47	60
Limburg	47	20	43	29
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>438</b>

Bron: COS/VNG International, 2002

**Tabel 2.2**      **Overzicht van GSO/GST gemeenten<sup>8</sup> in Nederland**

Provincie	Aantal gemeenten (5)	Waarvan GSO/GST (6)	procent gemeenten met GSO/GST (7)	procent gemeenten met GST/GSO uit de groep gemeenten met stedenbanden
Groningen	25	9	36	75
Friesland	31	9	29	69
Drenthe	12	7	58	70
Overijssel	26	7	27	28
Flevoland	6	3	50	100
Gelderland	71	16	23	46
Utrecht	33	12	36	57
Noord-Holland	65	17	26	59
Zuid-Holland	92	21	23	57
Zeeland	17	5	29	38
Noord-Brabant	70	17	24	52
Limburg	48	3	6	15
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>50</b>

Bron: CBS en database GSO/GST Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (IOB)

Uit tabel 2.1 en 2.2 kan geconcludeerd worden dat van alle gemeenten in Nederland ongeveer de helft stedenbanden onderhoudt met één of meerdere gemeenten in landen buiten West-Europa. Verder heeft ongeveer een kwart van alle Nederlandse

<sup>7</sup> Exclusief stedenbanden met gemeenten in West-Europa.

<sup>8</sup> In dit overzicht worden alleen "echte" gemeenten vermeld. Daarnaast hebben 21 andere lokale bestuursorganen gebruik gemaakt van GSO en/of GST in de periode 1997-2001. Er is een klein verschil in het totaal (126 i.v.m. 129) tussen de diverse bronnen.

gemeenten in de periode 1997-2001 één of meerdere malen gebruik gemaakt van GSO en/of GST subsidiemiddelen. Van alle gemeenten die contacten onderhouden met gemeenten die in aanmerking komen voor GSO dan wel GST subsidies, maakt precies de helft gebruik van die mogelijkheden.

Tabel 2.3 geeft tenslotte een overzicht van het aantal stedenbanden dat Nederlandse gemeenten hebben, onderverdeeld naar regio, waarin de partnergemeenten zich bevinden.

**Tabel 2.3      Overzicht van aantal stedenbanden van Nederlandse gemeenten per regio**

<b>Regio</b>	<b>Aantal stedenbanden</b>
West-Europa	399
Midden- en Oost Europa	285
VS/Canada/Australië	13
Azië	28
Afrika	65
Latijns Amerika	24
China/Japan/Zuid-Korea	12
Turkije/Israël/Palestina	11
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>837</b>

Bron: VNG/COS website

## **2.2            Bepalende factoren: grootte en politiek draagvlak**

Uit publicaties van VNG-I, alsmede uit interviews met Nederlandse gemeenten werd voorafgaande aan het veldonderzoek geconcludeerd dat twee factoren van fundamenteel belang waren voor de Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking: grootte en politiek draagvlak.

### *Inwonertal*

In het algemeen hebben grotere gemeenten met meer dan 100.000 inwoners meer capaciteit en financiële mogelijkheden voor een internationaal beleid en gemeentelijke activiteiten dan kleinere gemeenten. Grotere gemeenten onderhouden vaak meerdere stedenbanden in diverse landen. De allergrootste gemeenten in Nederland met meer dan 250.000 inwoners (o.a. Amsterdam, Utrecht) hebben 'full-time' coördinatoren voor buitenlands beleid in dienst of hebben zelfs een hele afdeling binnen hun organisatie (bijv. Eindhoven). Anderen hebben de organisatie van buitenlandse activiteiten gedecentraliseerd naar verschillende afdelingen, zoals de Reinigingsdienst, de GG&GD (Amsterdam).

Middelgrote gemeenten (tussen 25.000 en 100.000 inwoners) beschikken doorgaans wel over coördinatoren voor buitenlands beleid, maar niet 'full-time'. In de meeste gevallen moeten deze personen hun tijd verdelen over twee of meerdere taken binnen de gemeente. Betrokkenheid bij activiteiten in het buitenland is voor deze gemeenten gevoeliger voor de politieke en bestuurlijke belangstelling dan bij de grote gemeenten.

De capaciteit van kleine gemeenten (< 25.000 inwoners) voor internationale activiteiten is beperkt. Betrokken coördinerende ambtenaren hebben per week slechts enkele uren beschikbaar. De activiteiten worden gedragen door zeer enthousiaste betrokkenen binnen de gemeenteorganisatie (bijv. Tholen, Aa en Hunze) of door een zeer actieve stichting (bijv. Loenen).

### *Politiek draagvlak*

Politiek draagvlak is een belangrijke voorwaarde voor het aangaan van, dan wel continueren van internationale activiteiten. Na de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2002 hebben er in veel gemeenten politieke verschuivingen plaatsgevonden die tot gevolg hadden dat het internationaal beleid discussiepunt is geworden.

Het maatschappelijke draagvlak voor internationale samenwerking binnen de gemeente is van belang voor de continuïteit van banden. En het maatschappelijke draagvlak is van invloed op het politieke draagvlak. Stedenbandstichtingen vervullen hierbij een belangrijke rol. De meeste stedenbanden worden gedragen of ondersteund door deze stichtingen. De rol en de taken van de stichting wisselen sterk per gemeente en per stedenband.

Sommige stichtingen hebben een duidelijke voortrekkersrol bij de internationale samenwerking op gemeenteniveau. Veelal zijn stichtingen ontstaan uit 'solidariteitsbewegingen' of uit persoonlijke belangstelling van een aantal personen en hebben vervolgens de gemeente erbij betrokken. Ook het omgekeerde komt voor: de gemeente kan het initiatief genomen hebben en vervolgens wordt het maatschappelijk draagvlak in de loop der tijd ontwikkeld.

Voorbeeld van maatschappelijke activiteiten georganiseerd door stichtingen zijn: uitwisselingen in het onderwijs, gezamenlijke sportactiviteiten, uitwisseling op gebied van cultuur, het verspreiden van informatie en fondsenwerving.

De stichtingsactiviteiten kunnen al dan niet door de gemeente gesubsidieerd worden. De wijze waarop dat plaats vindt varieert van een volledige financiering van de operationele en personele kosten, of een jaarlijkse lumpsum bijdrage tot specifieke projectfinanciering of de frequent voorkomende 'verdubbelingregeling'. In een dergelijke regeling worden de opbrengsten van particuliere actie door de gemeente verdubbeld.

### **3 ENQUÊTE ONDER NEDERLANDSE GEMEENTEN**

#### **3.1 Inleiding en procedure**

In dit hoofdstuk worden de uitkomsten besproken van een schriftelijke enquête die in de zomer en herfst van 2002 is gehouden onder Nederlandse gemeenten<sup>9</sup>. De enquête is uitgevoerd onder alle Nederlandse gemeenten die in de periode 1997 t/m 2001 gebruik hebben gemaakt van financiering middels de programma's Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden (GSO) en/of Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Toetredingslanden (GST)<sup>10</sup>. Daarnaast is een enquête gehouden onder een controlegroep van gemeenten die geen gebruik hebben gemaakt van deze subsidiemogelijkheden. De controlegroep omvat dus zowel gemeenten die geen activiteiten ontwikkelen op het gebied van de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking, als gemeenten die dat wel doen, maar geen gebruik maken van de subsidieregelingen GSO en GST.

De primaire doelstelling van de enquête was het verkrijgen van informatie ter bepaling van het relatieve belang van de financiële middelen ter beschikking gesteld door BZ voor het aanknopen, dan wel handhaven van banden met gemeenten of andere lokale bestuursorganen in ontwikkelings- of toetredingslanden. Tevens werd een beeld verkregen van de toegankelijkheid van de programma's GSO en GST voor de doelgroep.

Vergezeld door een introductiebrief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (IOB) en een begeleidende brief van de VNG-I is aan 201 gemeenten een enquête verstuurd. Ter verhoging van de respons zijn alle gemeenten nagebeeld.

#### **3.2 Responsverantwoording**

In de periode 1997 t/m 2001 hebben 154 gemeenten één of meerdere malen gebruik gemaakt van GSO en/of GST middelen. Het GSO programma, dat langer bestaat dan het GST programma, heeft in deze periode aan 115 gemeenten subsidie verleend, terwijl van het GST programma (dat wordt uitgevoerd sinds 1-9-1998) 91 gemeenten gebruik maakten. Een derde van de GSO/GST gemeenten (52) heeft van beide programma's gebruik gemaakt.

Als gevolg van gemeentelijke herindelingen zijn deze 154 "GSO/GST gemeenten" opgegaan in 147 gemeenten op het moment van verzending van de enquête. Aan al deze gemeenten is een enquête verstuurd. Deze 147 'gemeenten' bestaan dan uit 126 "echte" gemeenten en 21 andere bestuursorganen (provincies, nutsbedrijven, waterschappen en hun overkoepelende organisaties). Aangezien Nederland per juni 2002 bestond uit 496 gemeenten heeft precies één kwart (126 gemeenten) van deze gemeenten gebruik gemaakt van GSO en/of GST middelen in de periode 1997 t/m 2001.

Uit tabel 3.1 valt onder andere te zien dat, op één na, alle "grote"<sup>11</sup> gemeenten (>100.000 inwoners) gebruik hebben gemaakt van GSO en/of GST in de periode

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<sup>9</sup> Onder de term 'gemeenten' worden tevens provincies, nutsbedrijven, waterschappen en hun koepelorganisaties verstaan. Voor activiteiten in toetredingslanden geldt dat het programma GST in 1998 van start ging.

<sup>10</sup> Deze gemeenten worden verder aangeduid als 'GSO/GST gemeenten'.

<sup>11</sup> In deze analyse is de volgende klasse-indeling voor grootte van de gemeenten (inwonersaantallen) gebruikt: kleine gemeenten: 0-25.000 inwoners, middelgroot: 25.000-100.000 inwoners, groot: meer dan 100.000 inwoners

1997 t/m 2001. Onder een overigens veel grotere groep “kleine” (<25.000 inwoners) gemeenten ligt dit percentage slechts op 11 procent. Van alle gemeenten in Nederland heeft 75 procent géén gebruik gemaakt van GSO en/of GST in de periode 1997-2001.

Tabellen 3.1 en 3.2 geven een overzicht van de totale aantallen verstuurd en de bijbehorende respons van zowel GSO/GST gemeenten als gemeenten binnen de controlegroep. De totale respons onder alle gemeenten bedraagt 54 procent, waarbij deze onder de GSO/GST gemeenten (59 procent) iets hoger ligt dan onder de gemeenten binnen de controlegroep<sup>12</sup> (41 procent). De respons onder de kleine GSO/GST gemeenten ligt gemiddeld iets hoger, terwijl die onder niet-gemeenten (andere bestuursorganen) lager dan gemiddeld ligt.

**Tabel 3.1 Respons onder GSO/GST gemeenten: overzicht naar inwonersaantal (per juni 2002) van de gemeente**

Type gemeente	Nederland Totaal	Waarvan GSO/GST	Respons (aantallen)	Respons (procent)
< 25.000	313	34 (11%)	22	65
25.000-100.000	158	68 (43%)	40	59
> 100.000	25	24 (96%)	14	58
Subtotaal	496	126 (25%)	76	60
niet-gemeenten	-	21	10	48
Totaal	-	147	86	59

**Tabel 3.2 Respons onder de controlegroep: overzicht naar grootte (inwonersaantal per juni 2002) van de gemeente**

Type gemeente	Nederland Totaal	waarvan niet GSO/GST	waarvan verstuurd	Respons (aantallen)	Respons (procent)
< 25.000	313	279 (89%)	17	7	41
25.000-100.000	158	90 (57%)	36	15	42
> 100.000	25	1 (4%)	1	0	0
Totaal	496	370 (75%)	54	22	41

Tabel 3.3 geeft een overzicht van verzend- en responsaantallen van de enquête voor de twee groepen gemeenten.

<sup>12</sup> In verband met de kleine aantallen per klasse wordt de controlegroep in het verdere verslag als één categorie weergegeven.

**Tabel 3.3 Respons onder GSO/GST gemeenten, per provincie**

Provincie	Nederland Totaal	waarvan GSO/GST	Respons (aantallen)	Respons (percentage)	
<b>Subtotaal</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>126 (25%)</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>60</b>	
Niet-gemeenten	-	21	10	48	
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>59</b>	
<b>Respons onder de controlegroep, per provincie</b>					
Provincie	Nederland	waarvan niet GSO/GST	waarvan verstuurd	Respons (aantallen)	Respons (percentage)
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>41</b>

### 3.3 Uitkomsten van de enquête

Deze sectie geeft een overzicht van de belangrijkste uitkomsten van de enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten. De vragenlijst was opgebouwd uit een aantal delen:

- Algemene informatie (paragraaf 3.3.1.)
- Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking (GIS) (paragraaf 3.3.2.)
- Activiteiten in het kader van GSO/GST/NEWS programma's (paragraaf 3.3.3.)

#### 3.3.1 Algemene informatie

Allereerst is gevraagd naar de functie van de persoon die de enquête voor GSO/GST gemeenten heeft ingevuld. In afnemende frequentie worden de onderstaande functies aangegeven:

- Beleidsmedewerker, ambtenaar of beleidsadviseur internationale samenwerking/internationale betrekkingen/ mondiaal beleid/jumelages/stedenbanden/externe betrekkingen,
- Beleidsmedewerker, ambtenaar of beleidsadviseur welzijn en/of cultuur/burgerzaken/openbare orde en veiligheid/economische zaken/algemene zaken,
- Medewerker afdeling voorlichting/communicatiemedewerker,
- Wethouder of burgemeester.

In zo'n 25 procent van de GSO/GST gemeenten verwijst de formele functieomschrijving van de betrokken persoon direct naar activiteiten op het gebied van GIS. Voor de controlegroep is dat slechts in twee gemeenten het geval.

Vervolg vragen naar de omschrijving van de rol en functie die de betrokkenen hebben in GIS binnen de gemeente blijkt dat vrijwel alle betrokkenen hier een directe ambtelijke (in enkele gevallen een politiek bestuurlijke) rol hebben, al wordt deze onder de controlegroep veelal minder concreet omschreven (vaak coördinerend en/of ondersteunend op meerdere beleidsterreinen).

Geconcludeerd kan worden dat ten gevolge van het feit dat de enquête verzonden is aan de gemeente, deze ook is beantwoord door de gemeente, ook in de gevallen waar de gemeente in de praktijk (een groot deel van) haar activiteiten op het gebied van internationale samenwerking heeft ondergebracht bij publiek-private samenwerkingsverbanden.



### Coördinatiepunt GIS

Er is gevraagd of er binnen de gemeente of organisatie een coördinatiepunt (ambtelijk, politiek en/of anderzijds) voor samenwerking met gemeenten in het buitenland bestaat. Tabel 3.4 geeft een overzicht van de uitkomsten. Hieruit blijkt dat GSO/GST gemeenten gekenmerkt worden door een hogere mate van ambtelijke coördinatie op dit punt middels ambtenaren en/of speciale afdelingen dan de gemeenten in de controle groep. Coördinatie vanuit een politiek oogpunt van verantwoordelijkheden ligt bij de GSO/GST gemeenten vooral bij wethouders, waar dit bij de controlegroep vaker op het niveau van een burgemeester ligt. Ook hebben GSO/GST gemeenten veel vaker een maatschappelijke organisatie als coördinatiepunt voor GIS (35 procent t.o.v. 9 procent). Het gaat hier veelal om stedenbandstichtingen of maatschappelijke stichtingen voor internationale samenwerking. Tenslotte heeft 27 procent van de gemeenten in de controlegroep aangegeven geen enkel coördinatiepunt te hebben voor GIS. Onder GSO/GST gemeenten is dit slechts 13 procent.

De conclusie kan worden getrokken dat GSO/GST gemeenten in vergelijking met overige gemeenten vaker gekenmerkt worden door een gemeentelijke structuur waarbij GIS een verantwoordelijkheid is van meerdere personen (al dan niet in de vorm van afdelingen) of organisaties, zowel binnen de eigen gemeentelijke organisatie als daarbuiten.

Grote gemeenten houden de coördinatie van GIS-activiteiten vaker in eigen hand middels speciale afdelingen binnen de gemeente of aan speciaal daarvoor aangestelde ambtenaren. Middelgrote gemeenten delegeren vaker naar een maatschappelijke organisatie als coördinatiepunt dan grote gemeenten, wellicht omdat laatstgenoemden binnen de eigen organisatie meer financiële en menselijke capaciteit daarvoor hebben vrij gemaakt.

**Tabel 3.4 Typen coördinatiepunten binnen gemeenten voor GIS**

Coördinatiepunt	GSO/GST gemeenten In procenten (n=86)	Controlegroep in procenten (n=22)
<i>Ambtelijk</i>		
- Speciale afdeling	22	14
- Een ambtenaar	74	59
<i>Politiek</i>		
- Een raadslid	1	0
- De wethouder	33	14
- De burgemeester	45	59
<i>Anders</i>		
- Maatschappelijke organisatie	35	9
- Iemand anders	5	0
<i>Geen</i>	13	27

*NB: Er was meer dan één antwoord mogelijk op de vraag*

Ten aanzien van de besluitvorming binnen de gemeente over de goedkeuring van verzoeken voor steun ingediend door gemeenten in het buitenland kan geconstateerd worden dat dit bij ongeveer de helft van de GSO/GST gemeenten (en in 65 procent van de controlegroep) uitstijgt boven het niveau van de genoemde coördinatiepunten. In deze gevallen worden besluiten genomen door de gemeenteraad, en/of het college van burgemeester en wethouders.

### *Beleid ten aanzien van GIS*

Gemeenten kunnen activiteiten ontwikkelen op het gebied van GIS al dan niet genormeerd door middel van een expliciet beleid (bijvoorbeeld neergelegd in raadsbesluiten) daaromtrent. Tabel 3.5 geeft aan dat GSO/GST gemeenten aanzienlijk vaker een expliciet GIS beleid hebben dan gemeenten uit de controlegroep (64 procent ten opzichte van 35 procent). GSO/GST gemeenten maken meer gebruik van de subsidiemogelijkheden vanuit een bredere gemeentelijke beleidsvisie op internationale samenwerking dan gemeenten die geen gebruik maken van GSO/GST<sup>13</sup>.

Er is ook een aanzienlijke groep gemeenten die ondanks dat er een expliciet beleid is geformuleerd ten aanzien van GIS, geen gebruik maakt van GSO/GST. Tevens maakt één derde van de GSO/GST gemeenten gebruik van deze subsidieregeling zonder dat zij een expliciet beleid hebben geformuleerd omtrent GIS.

**Tabel 3.5 Heeft uw gemeente of organisatie een expliciet beleid aangaande GIS?**

	<b>Ja In procenten</b>	<b>Nee In procenten</b>	<b>Weet ik niet In procenten</b>
<b>GSO/GST gemeenten (n=86)</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>1</b>
< 25.000	48	52	0
25.000-100.000	68	32	0
> 100.000	86	14	0
Niet-gemeenten	50	40	10
<b>Controlegroep (n=22)</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>0</b>

### *Informatie en cursussen*

De VNG-I verspreidt informatie onder Nederlandse gemeenten over GIS en organiseert cursussen voor Nederlandse ambtenaren die uitgezonden worden voor werk in lokale bestuursorganen in het buitenland (CUGA). De gemeenten is gevraagd of zij gebruik maken van deze informatie en cursussen.

**Tabel 3.6 Gebruik van de informatie van de VNG-I met betrekking tot GIS**

	<b>Ja In procenten</b>	<b>Nee In procenten</b>
<b>GSO/GST gemeenten (n=86)</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>37</b>
< 25.000	59	41
25.000-100.000	68	32
> 100.000	72	28
Niet-gemeenten	40	60
<b>Controlegroep (n=22)</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>82</b>

Tabel 3.6 laat zien dat GSO/GST gemeenten veel meer gebruik maken van de door de VNG-I verschaft informatie. Ruim een derde van deze gemeenten maakt er echter geen gebruik van. Opvallend is dat meer grote gemeenten zeggen de

<sup>13</sup> De vraagstelling in de enquête bij de controlegroep maakte het niet mogelijk een onderscheid te maken tussen de gemeenten die helemaal geen activiteiten ontwikkelen op het gebied van GIS en degenen die dat wel doen, maar geen gebruik maken van de GSO/GST regelingen.

informatie van VNG-I te gebruiken dan kleine gemeenten, terwijl verwacht had mogen worden dat juist de grotere gemeenten meer 'kennis in huis' hebben.

Ten aanzien van de cursussen die VNG-I organiseert (tabel 3.7) geeft 38 procent van de GSO/GST gemeenten aan dat zij hier gebruik van maakt (dan wel gemaakt heeft). Bij slechts een klein deel van de gemeenten is het cursusaanbod niet bekend. Opvallend is dat de helft van de controlegroep bekend met het cursusaanbod, maar er geen gebruik van maakt.

**Tabel 3.7 Gebruik van cursussen die door VNG-I worden georganiseerd (CUGAs)**

Grootte gemeente	Deelname (in procenten)	Bekend, geen deelname (in procenten)	Niet bekend (in procenten)
GSO/GST gemeenten (n=86)	38	48	14
< 25.000	23	59	18
25.000-100.000	45	47	8
> 100.000	50	43	7
Niet-gemeenten	30	30	40
Controlegroep (n=22)	0	50	50

### 3.3.2 Activiteiten op het gebied van Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking

Middels de enquête is geïnventariseerd of gemeenten structurele samenwerkingsovereenkomsten (stedenbanden) hebben met gemeenten in het buitenland. Van de GSO/GST gemeenten gaf bijna 60 procent aan dat zij banden hebben met gemeenten in toetredingslanden en bijna 40 procent met gemeenten in ontwikkelingslanden (zie tabel 3.8). Ongeveer een kwart van de GSO/GST gemeenten gaf aan dat zij *geen* structurele samenwerkingsovereenkomsten heeft, tegenover de helft van alle gemeenten in de controlegroep. Daar waar gemeenten in de controlegroep weinig (Polen: 3 gemeenten, Slowakije: 1 gemeente, Soedan: 1 gemeente) stedenband relaties onderhouden met gemeenten in zowel ontwikkelings- als toetredingslanden, geven zij daarentegen aan meer dan GSO/GST gemeenten structurele relaties te onderhouden met gemeenten in OECD landen.

Relatief veel kleine gemeenten (bijna 60 procent) die wel gebruik gemaakt hebben van GSO en/of GST in de periode 1997 t/m 2001 geven aan geen stedenband met hetzij gemeenten uit ontwikkelingslanden, hetzij toetredingslanden te hebben. Bij grotere gemeenten ligt dit heel anders (namelijk 0 procent).

**Tabel 3.9 Structurele samenwerkingsovereenkomsten van Nederlandse gemeenten met gemeenten in het buitenland**

Type gemeente	Toetredings-landen In procent	Ontwikkelings-landen In procent	OECD landen In procent	Elders In procent	Geen In procent
GSO/GST gemeenten (n=86)	59	39	25	11	24
< 25.000	32	14	5	5	59
25.000- 100.000	68	35	28	13	15
> 100.000	86	79	43	14	0
<i>Niet-gemeenten</i>	44	56	33	11	11
Controlegroep (n=22)	18	5	32	0	50

NB: Er was meer dan één antwoord mogelijk op de vraag

Een inventarisatie van de buitenlandse gemeenten waarmee Nederlandse GSO/GST gemeenten banden onderhouden, leert dat er voor wat betreft toetredingslanden een grote concentratie van banden is met gemeenten in Polen (19 Nederlandse gemeenten) en Tsjechië (14). Verder bestaan structurele samenwerkingsverbanden met gemeenten in Roemenië (7), Hongarije (4), Estland, Slowakije, Turkije (ieder 3), Litouwen (2) en Bulgarije (1). Banden met lokale overheden in ontwikkelingslanden concentreren zich in Nicaragua (9 Nederlandse gemeenten) en Zuid-Afrika (7). Verder bestaan er stedenbanden met gemeenten in China (5), Kameroen (2), Tanzania (2) en 11 andere landen (1). De concentratie in de landen Polen, Tsjechië, Nicaragua en Zuid-Afrika wekt geen verbazing. Het gebruik van GSO/GST subsidies was immers criterium voor het verzenden van de enquête, dus de concentraties in het gebruik van de subsidie zullen in hoge mate overeenkomen met de concentratie van de landen waarin de respondenten actief zijn. Voor een overzicht van alle contacten wordt verwezen naar Annex 1.

Geanalyseerd is of gemeenten op andere wijze dan via stedenbanden actief zijn op het gebied van samenwerking met lokale bestuursorganen in ontwikkelingslanden, dan wel toetredingslanden. En of deze samenwerking ook plaatsvindt op het gebied van bestuurlijke versterking. Van de GSO/GST gemeenten zijn er 36 die naast de stedenbanden ook op andere wijze actief zijn op dit gebied (waarvan 22 gemeenten in ontwikkelingslanden en 14 gemeenten in toetredingslanden). Dat kan b.v. op basis van specifieke projecten, of in het kader van netwerkrelaties, waarbij geen één op één verhouding bestaat. Binnen de controlegroep vinden geen activiteiten plaats met lokale bestuursorganen buiten de stedenbanden om.

Indien gemeenten geheel niet structureel samenwerken met lokale bestuursorganen in ontwikkelingslanden, dan wel toetredingslanden, is gevraagd naar de redenen daarvoor. Box 1 geeft een overzicht van de redenen waarom niet structureel (d.w.z. meer dan incidenteel) samengewerkt wordt met lokale overheden in GSO of GST landen.

**Box 1: Redenen om niet structureel samen te werken met lokale overheden/bestuursorganen in ontwikkelingslanden dan wel toetredingslanden**

**GSO/GST gemeenten**

**Geen belangstelling, geen kerntaak, geen beleid**

- Ontbreken van belangstelling daarvoor en geen initiatieven in de Raad, ofwel een expliciet Raadsbesluit om geen banden aan te gaan, danwel ontwikkelingssamenwerking niet actief vorm te geven
- Gemeentelijk beleid is nog in ontwikkeling
- Geen kernactiviteit van de gemeente / provincie
- Gemeente heeft gekozen voor een minimale invulling van dit soort projecten

**Taak particulier initiatief**

- Gemeenteraad wil geen langdurig samenwerkingsverband op gemeentelijk niveau. Particuliere initiatieven worden door de gemeente wel ondersteund
- Politiek draagvlak is gering. Noord-Zuid relaties overlaten aan COS
- De uitwisseling dient tussen bevolkingsgroepen plaats te vinden

**Financiële en tijdsbeperking**

- Ondersteuning is stopgezet vanwege tijdsgebrek
- Geen tijd en financiën beschikbaar
- De bestaande stedenbanden worden voldoende geacht. Aantal banden beperken

**Controlegroep**

- Geen kernprioriteit van gemeente
- Geen beleid ontwikkeld
- Geen politiek draagvlak
- Als gevolg van bezuinigingen zijn deze activiteiten geschrapt
- Raadsbesluit om geen jumelage-achtige banden meer aan te gaan
- Is tot op heden geen issue geweest binnen de gemeente
- Er konden hier geen tijd en middelen voor worden vrijgemaakt
- Stedenband verhaal staat nog in de kinderschoenen; momenteel worden de mogelijkheden voor een stedenband bekeken

Prioriteit wordt gegeven aan relatie met gemeenten in Europa

*Gemeentelijk budget voor GIS*

Bij gemeenten die activiteiten ontplooiën op het gebied van GIS is gevraagd naar de reservering voor internationale activiteiten op de gemeentebegroting (zie tabel 3.9). Een ruime meerderheid van de GSO/GST gemeenten (71 procent) en de controlegroep (67 procent) gaf aan dat er jaarlijks allocaties voor GIS worden gemaakt op de gemeentebegroting. Middelgrote gemeenten hebben relatief vaker een budget voor GIS dan kleine gemeenten en grote gemeenten<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> In de mogelijkheid dat grote gemeenten soms geen expliciete allocaties hebben voor gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking, maar hier wel actief op zijn, was niet voorzien bij het opstellen van de enquête. Gedurende de interviews met de betrokken gemeenten werd duidelijk dat de allocaties voor GIS opgenomen zijn in de deelbegrotingen van afdelingen (b.v. maatschappelijk welzijn), danwel volledig zijn gedecentraliseerd naar de gemeentelijke diensten (bv GG&GD en Reiniging in Amsterdam).

**Tabel 3.10 Allocaties op de gemeentebegroting voor GIS**

Type gemeente	Ja In procenten	Nee In procenten	Weet ik niet In procenten
<b>GSO/GST gemeenten (n=76)</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>7</b>
< 25.000	65	29	6
25.000-100.000	83	14	3
> 100.000	62	38	0
Niet-gemeenten	50	20	30
<b>Controlegroep (n=9)</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>0</b>

Het bedrag dat gereserveerd wordt door Nederlandse gemeenten op de begroting bedraagt voor GSO/GST gemeenten gemiddeld €55,826 en voor gemeenten uit de controlegroep €9,475 (dit laatste bedrag is gebaseerd op slechts 6 gemeenten en geeft derhalve geen representatief beeld). De absolute bedragen lopen ver uiteen en zijn gerelateerd aan het inwonertal van de gemeenten (zie tabel 3.10). Er is daarom ook gekeken is naar het gemiddelde bedrag per inwoner. Gemiddeld wordt €0.59 uitgegeven aan GIS voor alle gemeenten. Dit bedrag komt redelijk overeen met de €0,45 per inwoner die aangegeven staat op de website van de Nederlandse stedenbanden<sup>15</sup>. Grote gemeenten geven ongeveer twee keer zoveel uit aan GIS (€1.02) dan kleine en middelgrote Nederlandse gemeenten. Echter ook binnen de groep grote gemeenten varieert dit bedrag: van €0.12 tot €2.96 per inwoner.

De vraagstelling liet niet toe een inzicht te krijgen van de gedecentraliseerde allocaties bij grote gemeenten. Uit de interviews die na deze enquête gehouden zijn bleek bovendien dat voor de grote steden Amsterdam, Rotterdam en Den Haag factoren een rol spelen die niet gelden voor andere steden, zoals het “wereldwijd in de belangstelling staan” hetzij als hoofdstad, hetzij als grote havenstad, hetzij als politieke hoofdstad en zetel van het Internationale Hof van Justitie. Daardoor komen er veel buitenlandse missies en daarmee veel verzoeken tot samenwerking.

**Tabel 3.11 Allocaties op de gemeentebegroting voor GIS**

Type gemeente	Gemiddeld bedrag (€)	Gemiddeld bedrag per inwoner (€)
GSO/GST gemeenten (n=56)	55,826	0.59
< 25.000 (n=12)	8,469	0.58
25.000-100.000 (n=30)	26,319	0.47
> 100.000 (n=8)	228,950	1.02
Niet-gemeenten (n=6)	67,248	-
Controlegroep (n=6)	9,475	0.32

De gemeenten geven verder aan dat de bedragen zoals genoemd in tabel 3.10 veelal inclusief kosten voor draagvlakverbreding zijn (67 procent van de gemeenten) en kosten voor maatschappelijke ondersteuning (64 procent). Tijdbesteding door ambtenaren wordt door 38 procent van de gemeenten aangegeven als zijnde een kostenpost die is inbegrepen; overheadkosten worden door een kwart van de gemeenten genoemd.

Gelet op de factoren die gelden voor de grote steden, alsmede de middelen die ingezet worden voor gemeentelijke samenwerking en die niet als zodanig op de begroting staan vermeld (en die dus ook niet tot uiting komen in tabel 3.10), kan

<sup>15</sup> [www.stedenbanden.nl](http://www.stedenbanden.nl)

gesteld worden dat gemiddeld gemeenten meer middelen inzetten dan dat de begrotingsbudgetten daarvoor jaarlijks vrijmaken.

Extrapolerend op basis van de gemiddelde reservering voor gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking en de 251 gemeenten die “iets” op dat gebied doen, kan worden ingeschat dat alle Nederlandse gemeenten bij elkaar € 14 miljoen per jaar uitgeven aan internationale contacten.

**Tabel 3.11 Extrapolatie uitgaven Nederlandse gemeenten aan Internationale contacten**

Categorie		Aantal	Gemiddelde (in €)	Extrapolatie (in €)
<25.000	GST/GSO	34	8,469	287,946
25.000 – 100.000	GST/GSO	68	26,319	1,789,692
> 100.000	GST/GSO	25	228,950	5,723,750
Lokaal Bestuur, Niet gemeenten		42	67,248	2,824,416
Overige gemeenten		370	9,475	3,505,750
Totaal				14,131,553

*Eigen bijdrage van gemeenten aan projecten of activiteiten die mede door GSO/GST gesteund worden*

Vooruitlopend op het onderdeel dat betrekking heeft op activiteiten die specifiek in het kader van GSO/GST zijn uitgevoerd, wordt een overzicht gegeven van de gemiddelde eigen bijdrage van gemeenten aan projecten en activiteiten die ook GSO/GST ondersteuning ontvangen (tabel 3.12). GSO en GST zijn co-financieringsprogramma's, waarbij een eigen bijdrage van de gemeenten wordt vereist.

**Tabel 3.12 Gemiddelde eigen bijdrage van gemeenten aan projecten of activiteiten met GSO/GST steun**

Grootte gemeente	0-25 procent	25-50 procent	50-75 procent	75-100 procent	Weet niet procent	Nvt procent
<b>GSO/GST gemeenten (n=65)</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>
< 25.000	60	7	0	0	13	20
25.000-100.000	20	30	20	7	10	13
> 100.000	38	23	23	0	8	8
Niet-gemeenten	43	29	0	14	14	0

NB De controlegroep is hier buiten beschouwing gelaten: deze hebben immers geen GSO en/of GST activiteiten uitgevoerd

Ongeveer een derde van alle GSO/GST gemeenten geeft aan dat de eigen bijdrage tussen 0 en 25 procent ligt. Ruim de helft van de gemeenten levert een eigen bijdrage tot 50 procent van de totale projectkosten. Kleine gemeenten leveren gemiddeld een kleinere eigen bijdrage dan grote gemeenten. Voor alle gemeenten geldt dat deze cofinanciering veelal uit niet-subsidiabele tijdsbesteding door ambtenaren bestaat (77 procent van de gemeenten geeft dit aan). Minder vaak, maar

nog steeds in de helft van de gevallen, heeft de eigen bijdrage betrekking op kosten voor de directe uitvoering van het project, evenals op kosten die worden uitgegeven in het kader van draagvlakverbreding.

### 3.3.3 Activiteiten in het kader van GSO/GST/NEWS programma's

Bij het opstellen van de vragenlijst was nog onduidelijk in hoeverre het in 2001 afgesloten programma NEWS van invloed zou zijn op de respondenten, temeer daar de scheidslijnen tussen de programma's GSO en NEWS (met name in het geval van Nicaragua) en GST en NEWS (met name in het geval van Tsjechië) smal zijn en niet bij voorbaat verondersteld mocht worden dat deze scheidslijnen ook bij de respondenten bekend waren.

#### *In contact met GSO/GST/NEWS*

De gemeenten is gevraagd op welke manier zij in contact zijn gekomen met GSO, GST en/of NEWS. Veruit de meerderheid (73 procent) van de gemeenten geeft aan dat dit via de VNG-I is gebeurd. Kleine gemeenten komen iets vaker dan andere gemeenten in contact met GSO/GST en/of NEWS door inspanningen via de eigen gemeente (24 procent ten opzichte van 12 procent gemiddeld).

#### *Afwijzing van aanvragen*

Projectaanvragen voor gebruik van de subsidies worden ingediend door de Nederlandse gemeente. Aanvragen worden beoordeeld door de VNG-I, al dan niet na advies van de Projecten Advies Commissie. In de praktijk komt afwijzing niet veel voor. Negen gemeenten geven aan dat zij één of meerdere projectaanvragen hebben ingediend in de periode 1997-2001 die zijn afgewezen door de VNG-I. Het betrof hier aanvragen voor zowel GSO als GST subsidie. Box 2 geeft een overzicht van de redenen van afwijzing volgens de aanvragende gemeenten.

#### **Box 2: Redenen voor afwijzing van subsidieaanvragen ingediend door gemeenten**

- Het aangevraagde subsidiebedrag was te hoog (1x)
- Het voorstel voldeed niet aan de criteria van de subsidieregelingen, namelijk: (5x, waarvan 1x geen toelichting)
  - o het ging om een kennismakingsbezoek
  - o rol van provinciale besturen te gering
  - o toeristisch beleid geen prioriteit
  - o verhouding werk derden tot eigen werk scheef
- De voorgestelde activiteit (GST) voldeed niet aan het Nationale Programma voor de adoptie van het Acquis Communautaire (2x)
- Anders, namelijk: (3x)
  - o Het budgetplafond was bereikt
  - o Op dat moment teveel aanvragen in verhouding tot beschikbare gelden
  - o De uitvoering van de activiteit moest plaatsvinden binnen de termijn die staat voor het nemen van het subsidiebesluit

#### *Geen gebruik van BZ-subsidies*

Om een beeld te krijgen van de bekendheid van gemeenten met de subsidies van BZ gericht op stimulering van GIS, is ter controle aan de GSO/GST gemeenten gevraagd of zij wellicht helemaal geen projecten hebben uitgevoerd waarvoor subsidie van BZ werd aangevraagd. Opvallend is dat 18 gemeenten bevestigend op deze vraag hebben geantwoord, ondanks het feit dat zij in de periode 1997-2001 wel degelijk gebruik hebben gemaakt van GSO en/of GST middelen.



De interpretatie van dit gegeven is lastig. Mogelijk was de persoon die de vragenlijst heeft ingevuld bekendheid niet volledig op de hoogte van de GSO en/of GST activiteiten in het verleden. Het kan echter ook iets zeggen over de herkenbaarheid van het GSO/GST programma in het geheel van activiteiten waar een gemeente bij betrokken is geweest, dan wel de herkenbaarheid van BZ als subsidieverstrekker achter de VNG-I als beheerder. Illustratief is dan de reden(en) die de gemeente aanvoert voor het feit dat (ze denken dat) er geen projecten met subsidie van BZ zijn uitgevoerd. Tabel 3.13 geeft een overzicht van die aangevoerde redenen:

**Tabel 3.13 Redenen waarom gemeenten denken geen projecten met subsidies van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken te hebben uitgevoerd.**

Antwoordcategorie	Aantal gemeenten
Onvoldoende capaciteit voor het uitvoeren van dergelijke projecten	6
Onvoldoende eigen financiële middelen voor het uitvoeren van dergelijke projecten	9
Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking is geen prioriteit van de gemeente	6
Anders, namelijk ...	4

NB. Andere antwoordcategorieën werden niet genoemd.

De meeste gemeenten die denken geen gebruik gemaakt te hebben van GST en/of GSO fondsen geven aan daarvoor onvoldoende capaciteit dan wel financiële middelen te hebben om dit soort projecten uit te voeren (vijf gemeenten noemen een combinatie van deze twee antwoorden). Voor andere gemeenten is GIS geen prioriteit. Twee gemeenten geven verder aan dat hun projecten niet in aanmerking kwamen voor GSO/GST financiering (hoewel dit feitelijk wel het geval was), één gemeente zegt dat het te klein is om dit soort projecten uit te voeren, één gemeente noemt de instabiele politieke situatie in het ontwikkelingsland en tenslotte voert één gemeente een gemeentelijke herindeling aan als reden om geen gebruik te maken van de door BZ beschikbaar gestelde subsidiegelden.

In interviews na de enquête is teruggekomen op de beantwoording van de bovenstaande vraag. Niet alle gemeenten bleken bekend te zijn met het feit dat het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken de financier is van de programma's GSO en GST (enkele gemeenten beschouwen dit als programma's van de VNG-I). Anderen, –en dat geldt met name het programma GST- doen alleen aanvragen wanneer dat zo uitkomt. Het doen van een aanvraag is dan een 'meevaller' die verder niet van invloed is op de contacten die onderhouden worden. Zo'n incidentele meevaller is snel weer vergeten.

#### *Additionaliteit van de programma's*

Een deel van de vragen in de enquête had betrekking op de plaats die het GSO/GST/NEWS programma heeft binnen het geheel van activiteiten op het gebied van gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking. Het gaat hier dan vooral om vragen met betrekking tot de additionaliteit van de programma's. Allereerst blijkt dat op de vraag of de GSO/GST/NEWS subsidie heeft geleid tot het aanknopen van banden met een gemeente of een ander lokaal bestuursorgaan waarmee voor de periode 1997-2001 geen structureel samenwerkingsverband bestond, een kwart van de gemeenten positief antwoordt (tabel 3.14). Het GSO/GST/NEWS programma heeft voor 15 Nederlandse gemeenten gefungeerd als een 'trigger' voor het aanknopen van structurele banden. De vraagstelling in de enquête laat niet toe daarbij

onderscheid te maken naar structurele banden op het gebied van gemeentelijke capaciteitsversterking en overige samenwerking.

**Tabel 3.14 GSO/GST/NEWS als ‘trigger’ voor structurele samenwerkingsverbanden, 1997-2001**

Type gemeente	Ja In procent	Nee In procent
GSO/GST gemeenten (n=63)	24	76
< 25.000	29	71
25.000-100.000	26	74
> 100.000	27	73
Niet-gemeenten	0	100

Daartegen over zijn er 10 gemeenten die aangeven dat zij in de periode 1997-2001 een structureel samenwerkingsverband onderhielden (onder andere gefinancierd via GSO/GST/NEWS), waarmee de contacten na 2001 zijn verbroken. Box 3 geeft een overzicht van de redenen waarom deze samenwerking is verbroken. De redenen zijn divers van aard en de oorzaken liggen zowel aan de Nederlandse kant als aan de kant van het partnerland.

**Box 3 Redenen voor beëindiging structureel samenwerkingsverband**

- Verdwijnen van politiek draagvlak in Nederland,
- Vanwege de politieke situatie in land partnergemeenten (bv Zimbabwe),
- Als gevolg van gemeenteraadsverkiezingen kwamen andere personen in de gemeenteraad,
- Te weinig draagvlak bij de betrokken personen in de partnergemeente (GSO). Persoonlijke contacten moeten aan beide zijden bij meerdere personen verankerd zijn,
- Wegvallen van een overkoepelende projectstructuur,
- Gebrekkige communicatie middelen, en verdwijnen SNV medewerker die contact onderhield met de partnergemeente,
- De twinning overeenkomst werd niet verlengd door de Gemeenteraad,
- Bezuinigingen, overheveling van het project naar een andere organisatie.

Behalve dat de programma's van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken bijgedragen kunnen hebben in het aangaan van nieuwe contacten, kunnen ze ook een rol vervuld hebben voor het in stand houden van bestaande contacten met gemeenten in ontwikkelingslanden of toetredingslanden. Tabel 3.15 en 3.16 geven de antwoorden op beide vragen. Uit de respons blijkt dat voor wat betreft het *aangaan van nieuwe contacten* de gemeenten verdeeld antwoorden voor wat betreft het belang dat ze aan deze programma's hechten. Een derde van de GSO/GST gemeenten geeft aan dat er zonder de subsidie van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken geen nieuwe contacten tot stand zouden zijn gekomen. Echter ook ruim een derde van de gemeenten geeft aan dat de subsidie hierop niet van invloed is geweest. Kleine gemeenten zijn duidelijk uitgesprokener in de beantwoording van deze vraag. De grote gemeenten geven aan wel belang te hechten aan subsidies voor het aangaan van nieuwe contacten, maar dat de rol van subsidie hierin niet bepalend is.

**Tabel 3.15 Het relatieve belang van GSO en GST voor het aangaan van nieuwe contacten (vanaf 1997)**

<b>Antwoordcategorie</b>	<b>Totaal (n=64) In procent</b>	<b>0- 25.000 in procent</b>	<b>25.000- 100.000 in procent</b>	<b>&gt;100.000 in procent</b>	<b>Niet gemeenten In procent</b>
Zonder deze subsidie zouden er geen nieuwe contacten tot stand zijn gekomen	34	31	34	27	50
De subsidie is wel van invloed, maar niet bepalend voor het tot stand komen van nieuwe contacten	28	6	34	46	25
De subsidie is daarop niet van invloed	38	63	32	27	25

Voor wat betreft het *in stand houden van bestaande contacten* met gemeenten in ontwikkelingslanden en/of toetredingslanden geeft bijna de helft van alle GSO/GST gemeenten aan dat zonder deze subsidie de contacten zouden verminderen en mogelijk zouden verdwijnen. Slechts 20 procent geeft aan dat de subsidie hierop niet van invloed is, waaronder relatief veel kleine gemeenten. Voor middelgrote gemeenten is de subsidie van groter belang.

**Tabel 3.16 Het relatieve belang van GSO en GST voor het in stand houden van contacten (vanaf 1997)**

<b>Antwoordcategorie</b>	<b>Totaal (n=66) In procent</b>	<b>0- 25.000 in procent</b>	<b>25.000- 100.000 in procent</b>	<b>&gt;100.00 0 in procent</b>	<b>Niet gemeenten In procent</b>
Zonder deze subsidie zouden de contacten verminderen en mogelijk verdwijnen	44	38	41	38	75
De subsidie is wel van invloed, maar niet bepalend voor het in stand houden van contacten	36	25	41	54	12
De subsidie is daarop niet van invloed	20	37	18	8	13

De vraagstelling in de enquête laat niet toe na te gaan in hoeverre de subsidies van invloed zijn geweest op het in stand houden van specifieke contacten op het gebied van de versterking van lokaal bestuur. In interviews met gemeenten is nader op deze vraag ingegaan. Daaruit blijkt dat de subsidie niet zozeer van invloed is op het handhaven van de contacten op zich, maar wel op de aard van de contacten. De subsidies blijken een wervende kracht te hebben, met name bij grote gemeenten, op de verbreding van de activiteiten naar de versterking van de capaciteiten van het lokaal bestuur. Dat uit zich in het betrekken van meerdere gemeentelijke diensten per samenwerkingsovereenkomst.

Geconcludeerd kan worden dat kleine gemeenten veel vaker dan grotere gemeenten zeggen dat financieringsprogramma's van BZ gericht op ondersteuning van

gemeentelijke initiatieven niet van invloed zijn op zowel het aangaan van nieuwe contacten als het in stand houden van bestaande contacten. Grotere gemeenten blijken gevoeliger voor het subsidieaanbod en later hun inzet daar mede van afhangen. Kleine gemeenten maken een keus, hebben een kleiner programma en zijn dan ook minder variabel in hun aanbod.

### *Eigen belang*

Gelet op het feit dat structurele samenwerkingsverbanden uitgaan van het principe van reciprociteit en dus berusten op een wederzijds belang, is gevraagd naar het belang van GIS voor de *eigen gemeente*. Tabel 3.17 presenteert de antwoorden op deze vraag.

**Tabel 3.17 Het eigen belang van GIS**

<b>Antwoordcategorie (meer dan één antwoord mogelijk)</b>	<b>Totaal (n=66) In procent</b>	<b>0-25.000 in procent</b>	<b>25-100.000 in procent</b>	<b>&gt;100.000 in procent</b>	<b>Niet gemeenten In procent</b>
Vooral een economisch belang	11	8	13	8	14
Vooral een sociaal, maatschappelijk en/of cultureel belang	68	50	75	67	71
Vooral een educatief en/of bewustwordingsbelang	70	67	75	67	57
Een ander belang	20	20	11	42	50

Voor de meeste gemeenten geldt dat zij veruit het meeste belang hechten aan de educatieve - en/of bewustwordingsaspecten (70 procent), dan wel aan het sociaal, maatschappelijk en/of cultureel belang (68 procent) van de banden met gemeenten in het buitenland. Economische belangen spelen slechts voor een klein gedeelte (11 procent) een rol. Andere belangen die worden aangegeven (door 20 procent van de gemeenten), veelal in combinatie met antwoorden uit de andere categorieën, staan hieronder vermeld in box 4.

#### **Box 4: Belang voor de eigen gemeente**

- Medeverantwoordelijkheid voor de ontwikkeling van een gemeenschap die nog niet alle verworvenheden kent van lokale democratie zoals die in ons land functioneert.
- Bestuurlijk ondersteunen van activiteiten van Nederlandse NGO's.
- Concreet op zoek naar wat de eigen inwoners van het buitenland kunnen leren, bijv. vergroting participatie van jongeren.
- Plattelandsontwikkeling en recreatie.
- Vormgeven van Europese samenwerking op gemeentelijk niveau; bevorderen van de integratie tussen Midden - en West-Europa; ondersteunen Europese eenwording.
- Een ideëel belang in het kader van ontwikkelingssamenwerking en solidariteit
- Bevorderen van de integratie van andere culturen in de Nederlandse samenleving.
- Horizonverbreding en het vergroten van werkplezier bij deelnemende ambtenaren; een verrijking van de eigen organisatie door het creëren van interessante functies, waardoor personeel kan worden behouden; een extra dimensie in het werk van de ambtenaren.

## **4 DOSSIERONDERZOEK GSO, GST EN ‘ZELFSTANDIGE PROJECTEN’**

### **4.1 Doel van dossieronderzoek**

De ToR presenteert gegevens omtrent het aantal activiteiten binnen de programma's GSO en GST, en noemt de te bestuderen zelfstandige projecten. Deze gegevens zijn gebaseerd op het centrale projectregistratiesysteem van BZ, het MIDAS, alsmede op financiële verantwoordingen afgelegd door de Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten aan het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Deze gegevens bleken als input voor de veldstudies onvoldoende voor wat betreft inhoudelijke en organisatorische gegevens. Voor de programma's GST en GSO is daarom dossierstudie verricht bij VNG-I. Ook voor wat betreft de zelfstandige projecten is dossierstudie verricht teneinde een inzicht te krijgen in de inhoud van de in de ToR geselecteerde projecten.

#### *Dossier studie zelfstandige projecten*

De ToR (4.2.2) vermeldt de te evalueren zelfstandige projecten. Dit betreft één project in Nicaragua, één in Tanzania, twee projecten in Tsjechië en één project in Polen. Nader onderzoek leerde dat één project in Tsjechië, alsmede het project in Polen foutief geregistreerd staan in het MIDAS systeem. Ten onrechte waren deze activiteiten toegedicht aan de VNG-I als contractpartner.

In het Plan van Aanpak werd een voorstel gedaan voor de herziening van de te evalueren 'zelfstandige projecten'. Daarbij was gekozen voor een pakket zelfstandige projecten die –op basis van de toen ter beschikking staande gegevens- gerelateerd konden worden aan het onderwerp van de evaluatie: gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking. De optie om middels een alternatieve keuze van landen voor veldstudie tot een betere dekking van de zelfstandige projecten te komen leverde binnen de financiële mogelijkheden geen positief resultaat op.

Dossierstudie op een later moment leidde opnieuw tot vragen omtrent de evalueerbaarheid in het kader van de evaluatie van GIS. Het project in Nicaragua bleek een feasibility studie te betreffen voor het al dan niet opzetten van een database in Nederland (en niet in Nicaragua). De studie werd afgerond met een negatief advies. VNG-I of haar voorganger, de Internationale Projecten Unit, bleek niet bij deze activiteit betrokken te zijn geweest.

Dossieronderzoek betreffende de projecten die in Nederland zijn uitgevoerd (waaronder een tweetal congressen) leerde dat de evalueerbaarheid van deze activiteiten binnen de gestelde tijds-, en financiële grenzen gering was. De IOB besloot om het aantal te bestuderen projecten te beperken. Tabel 4.1 presenteert de zelfstandige projecten die geëvalueerd zijn.

**Tabel 4.1 Overzicht geselecteerde Zelfstandige Projecten 1997 t/m 2001**

<b>Titel</b>	<b>Land van uitvoering</b>	<b>Beherende org.</b>	<b>Uitvoerende org.</b>	<b>Bijdrage BZ (NLG)</b>
Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) / Local Government Reform	Tanzania	DGIS	VNG-I	1.411.471
Building up capacity in Czech Rep. To train public servants on EU-accession	Tsjechië	VNG-I	VNG-I ILA FALA	460.000
Strengthening of local government through SALGA (South African Local Government Association)	Zuid-Afrika	SALGA	SALGA VNG-I	240.629

### **Doelen dossierstudie GST en GSO**

De doelen van de dossierstudie van de activiteiten uitgevoerd onder de programma's GST en GSO waren als volgt:

- het verkrijgen van praktische informatie, zoals contactadressen bij Nederlandse gemeenten en bij lagere overheden in het buitenland,
- het aanvullen van de informatie verkregen op basis van de financiële verantwoording van VNG-I aan BZ, met name op inhoudelijk gebied (generatie van de vraag, financiële gegevens, kwaliteit van de rapportage),
- het op systematische wijze verzamelen van gegevens als indicatoren voor de beheerscapaciteit van de VNG-I over de programma's GST en GSO (o.a. behandeling aanvragen, contracten, rapportage, monitoring).

Aanvankelijk was de dossierstudie tevens bedoeld om een eerste oordeel te kunnen vormen omtrent de doelmatigheid en doeltreffendheid van de gesubsidieerde activiteiten. Echter, door de enorme verscheidenheid aan thema's, landen, modaliteiten en betrokken organisaties bleek dat niet op consistente wijze mogelijk te zijn. De in de dossiers aanwezige informatie staat zo'n analyse niet toe. Veel van de dossiers gaan voornamelijk om procedurele zaken (selectie van mensen, administratieve vereisten, programma's) en bevatten weinig inhoudelijke informatie. De inhoudelijke beschrijvingen in de contracten zijn veelal kort, terwijl de eindrapportages door de direct betrokkenen uiteen lopen in kwaliteit en een inhoudelijke systematisering in de weg staan. Dat geldt minder voor de GI en GIM, waaraan in de dossiers meer aandacht besteed wordt aan de inhoud van de projecten.

De procedure van dossierstudie was als volgt:

- Bij VNG International zijn de dossiers aangevraagd omtrent alle activiteiten in de vijf geselecteerde landen over de periode 1997 –2002,
- VNG International heeft deze dossiers toegankelijk gemaakt op basis van hun registratiesysteem,
- Een vaste registratielijst is door de onderzoekers opgezet in Excel. Aan de hand van deze registratielijst zijn gedurende de periode juli – december 2002 (vrijwel) alle aanwezige dossiers gesystematiseerd,
- Bestudering vond land voor land plaats, in overeenstemming met de volgorde van de af te leggen veldbezoeken,
- Kopieën zijn gemaakt van relevant geachte informatie, zoals contracten, financiële overzichten en missieverslagen.

## 4.2 Universum en verdeling over de subprogramma's

Het universum van de dossierstudie was bepaald door de IOB in de ToR en betreft alle binnen de gestelde criteria vallende activiteiten in Polen, Tsjechië, Zuid-Afrika, Nicaragua en Tanzania. Er is gestreefd naar volledige dekking. In het geval van Nicaragua kon volledige dekking niet helemaal worden gerealiseerd. Een twaalfstal dossiers kon niet worden bestudeerd. Het betreft hier activiteiten die in het veld niet geëvalueerd zouden gaan worden.

De relatie tussen de geselecteerde activiteiten en de dossierstudie is als volgt samengevat:

**Tabel 4.2 Programma GST**

	Polen	Tsjechië	Totaal
Aantal activiteiten tussen aanvrager en partner*	30	26	56
Aantal verschillende betrokken Nederlandse gemeenten/overheden (excl. VNG-I)	12	12	24
Aantal verschillende betrokken gemeenten/overheden in GST land	11	13	24
Aantal dossiers gesystematiseerd**	24	22	46
Aantal dossiers niet aanwezig	1 foutief in lijst		
Beschikbaarheid dossiers in percentage van voorgenomen onderzoek	100%	100%	100%

\* = Activiteiten tussen aanvrager en partner: deelname aan MMTP gerekend als aparte activiteit

\*\* = Bij MMTP voor meerdere gemeenten is er een enkel dossier.

**Tabel 4.3 Programma GSO**

	Zuid Afrika	Nicaragua	Tanzania	Totaal
Aantal activiteiten tussen aanvrager en partner*	62	87	39	188
Aantal verschillende betrokken Nederlandse gemeenten/overheden (excl. VNG-I)	13	14	11	38
Aantal betrokken gemeenten/overheden in GSO land	13	16	9	38
Aantal dossiers gesystematiseerd**	40	70	14	124
Aantal dossiers niet aanwezig		5		5
Aantal dossiers niet bestudeerd		12		12
Beschikbaarheid dossiers in percentage van voorgenomen onderzoek	100%	80%	100%	88%

\* = Activiteiten tussen aanvrager en partner: deelname aan MMTP gerekend als aparte activiteit

\*\* = Bij MMTP meerdere gemeenten een enkel dossier.

Aan de cursussen MMTP nemen doorgaans verschillende gemeenten deel. Dat kan binnen hetzelfde land zijn, maar dat kan ook regionaal of mondiaal zijn, indien het thema algemeen van aard is (bij voorbeeld afvalverwerking). In sommige gevallen worden binnen dan wel naast MMTPs aparte contracten afgesloten met deelnemende gemeenten voor gekoppelde STAGEs voor deelnemers uit hun

partnergemeente. In bijzondere gevallen zijn ook andere constructies gebruikt, zoals het koppelen van PUGAs aan een MMTP in het buitenland (Nicaragua).

Uitgesplitst naar uitvoeringsmodaliteit, zijn de volgende activiteiten gesystematiseerd:

**Tabel 4.4 Dossierstudie naar uitvoeringsmodaliteit**

	<b>PUGA</b>	<b>STAGE</b>	<b>GI (M)</b>	<b>MMTP</b>	<b>Algemene Activiteit</b>	<b>Totaal</b>
GST	14	8	5	19		46
GSO	54	10	17	39	4	124
Totaal	68	18	22	58	4	170

De 170 bestudeerde activiteiten staan geregistreerd in 157 verschillende dossiers.

### **4.3 Karakteristieken van de activiteiten**

Dossierstudie laat toe een aantal karakteristieken van de ondernomen activiteiten af te leiden, zoals doelstelling, duur, aantal betrokken partners en de kosten.

#### *Formulering doelstellingen*

Van de bestudeerde dossiers bevatten driekwart (76 procent) van de activiteiten een beschrijving van de doelstelling. In een kwart van de gevallen is slechts sprake van de vermelding van een activiteit (bijv. deelname aan een seminar of cursus). In veel gevallen is er in de aanvragen en beoordelingen nauwelijks onderscheid te maken tussen doelstelling en activiteiten.

Bij de Gemeente Initiatieven (GI en GIM) is in alle gevallen een herkenbare doelstelling geformuleerd.

#### *Vele beleidsterreinen*

Activiteiten vinden plaats op een veelheid van thematische beleidsterreinen. De VNG-International onderscheidt 33 verschillende categorieën daarin. De IOB heeft in haar database deze beleidsterreinen gebundeld tot 13. De activiteiten waarvan de dossiers zijn onderzocht bleken de volgende beleidsterreinen te ondersteunen:



**Tabel 4.5**      **Beleidssterreinen**

		GST	GSO	Totaal
A	Burgerzaken / Interne organisatie lokale overheid	3	9	12
B	Voorlichting & Communicatie	4	2	6
C	Economische Zaken / Werkgelegenheid / Arbeidsmarktbeleid	5	3	8
D	Financiën / Accountancy / Belastingen		2	2
E	Volksgesondheid / Welzijn / Sociale Zaken	3	6	9
F	Volkshuisvesting / Ruimtelijke Ordening	2	37	39
G	Milieu / Natuur & Landschap	2	20	22
H	Onderwijs / Training / Cultuur		4	4
I	Verkeer / Vervoer			
J	Veiligheid / Openbare Orde		1	1
K	Europese Zaken	10		10
L	Nuts voorzieningen		3	3
M	Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking in brede zin (VNG-D)		14	14
N	Niet gespecificeerd	13	14	27
	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>157</b>

De concentratie in de thematische werkvelden volkshuisvesting en ruimtelijke ordening, alsmede milieu natuur en landschap heeft te maken met thematische concentratie in zowel Nicaragua als Zuid Afrika. In Nicaragua is/was Strategische Planning een rode draad door het programma, terwijl in Zuid-Afrika ruimtelijke ordening en sociale woningbouw centraal staan. Opvallender dan de thematische concentratie zijn de themavelden die weinig voorkomen in de geselecteerde landen. Financiën en Belastingen, alsmede Verkeer en Vervoer en Openbare orde zijn kerntaken van lokale overheden die in de geselecteerde landen niet of nauwelijks aan de orde komen in de samenwerking.

In de interviews met de Nederlandse gemeenten werd als reden voor de geringe belangstelling voor dergelijke kerntaken van gemeenten aangegeven dat de belangstelling van het maatschappelijk middenveld voor dergelijke taken nihil is.

Dat breedte van het aantal beleidssterreinen wordt ook geïllustreerd door de thematische onderwerpen van de MMTPs in de sample (zie box 5):

**Box 5: Thematische onderwerpen van de MMTPs in de sample**

- European Union and Local Government
- Gemeentesecretarissen uit Toetredende landen
- Integrated Development Planning (twee cursussen)
- Integrated Development Planning and Community Development
- Strategische Planning
- Women in Local Government
- Tanzania Rural Development
- Werkgelegenheid
- Communicatie in de Publieke sector
- Afval management
- Local Agenda 21 (milieu)
- Training Local Governance
- Citizen Participation

### *Korte duur, lange intervals*

Zowel GSO als GST activiteiten worden gekenmerkt door hun korte –soms zeer korte – duur. Dat is gekoppeld aan een relatieve lange doorlooptijd voor de GI en GIM activiteiten. Een gemiddelde PUGA naar een GST land duurt slechts vier dagen; een STAGE vanuit een GST land naar Nederland precies een week. In het GST programma is de standaardduur van een MMTP ongeveer twee weken.

De gemiddelde duur van activiteiten in het GSO programma is iets langer. Ten dele wordt dat verklaard door de reisdagen, maar er wordt doorgaans ook iets langer in de partnergemeente verbleven. De inspanning was immers groter om er te komen. De gemiddelde duur van een PUGA in het GSO programma is bijna 18 dagen, van een STAGE 14 dagen. Ook MMTPs duren iets langer, ook al omdat vaak –na afloop van de formele cursus van een week- niet één week, maar twee weken verbleven wordt in de partnergemeente.

De gemiddelde duur van gemeentelijke initiatieven (GI en GIM) kan vanuit de dossiers slechts bepaald worden voor wat betreft de doorlooptijd. Die doorlooptijd varieert enorm. In het geval van een GIM is de duur tussen de 6 en 12 maanden; in het geval van GSO tussen 1 maand en de drie jaar en vier maanden.

Dat betekent niet dat gedurende de gehele periode de activiteiten permanent plaats vinden. Doorgaans bestaan zowel de GIM als de GI uit een aantal aan elkaar gekoppelde PUGAs en STAGES, die met ruime intervals plaats vinden. Bij GSO is binnen een GI een investeringscomponent (b.v. de bouw van een lokaal) mogelijk, die soms geruime tijd vergt. Bij GST is een dergelijke investeringscomponent niet aanwezig en bestaat de GIM volledig uit kennisuitwisseling en overdracht. Binnen het kader van een GI en een GIM vinden doorgaans twee tot drie activiteiten per jaar plaats met een gemiddelde duur van een week (GIM) tot twee en een halve week (GSO). “Long-term” uitzendingen van deskundigen komen voor in het kader van Gis (Zuid-Afrika), maar worden dan doorgaans niet volledig uit GSO gelden gefinancierd.

### *Meerdere partners zijn betrokken*

Hoewel doorgaans –maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs- de activiteiten plaats vinden binnen het kader van een stedenband zijn ook andere lokale overheidsinstanties dan gemeenten betrokken bij het programma. Dat geldt zowel aan de Nederlandse zijde (b.v. provincies) als aan ‘gene’ zijde.

Opgemerkt dient te worden dat in de Beschikking tussen het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en de VNG-I voor wat betreft de GST gedefinieerd is wat verstaan moet worden onder een gemeentelijke overheid (“elke bestuurlijke eenheid die als zodanig door het betrokken land is aangewezen”)<sup>16</sup>, maar dat een soortgelijke definitie niet is vastgelegd voor wat betreft het GSO programma. Door de ruime definiëring in de GST Beschikking en door het ontbreken van een definitie in de GSO Overeenkomst, zou theoretisch een zeer breed scala van mogelijkheden open staan voor de GST en GSO landen voor dat wat verstaan zou moeten worden als ‘lokale overheid’.

De dossiers wijzen echter in een andere richting. De meeste activiteiten vinden plaats binnen de relatie tussen twee gemeenten en/of de koepelorganisaties daarvan. Aan Nederlandse zijde was 21 maal (16 procent) de aanvragende partner geen gemeente (maar in 13 gevallen de VNG-I zelf als organisator van MMTPs), terwijl in het buitenland in slechts 11 gevallen (7 procent) was de partner geen gemeente of koepelorganisatie van gemeenten was. Dat houdt niet in dat er niet

<sup>16</sup> Beschikking tot Subsidieverlening van 19 September 1998 nr SC/98/13-DEU98i0093

meerdere partners betrokken kunnen zijn bij de activiteiten. Dat kunnen bij voorbeeld waterleidingbedrijven zijn, niet-gouvernementele organisaties of woningbouwcorporaties, maar de contacten lopen dan via de gemeentelijke relaties. In de praktijk is de betrokkenheid van niet – gemeentelijke instanties aan Nederlandse zijde groter. Dat geldt met name de deelname van Stedenband Stichtingen in PUGAs en de betrokkenheid van semi-gemeentelijke zelfstandige bedrijven (bij voorbeeld aan gemeentelijke instellingen gerelateerde consultancy en dienstverlenende bedrijven, zoals op het gebied van ruimtelijke ordening en afvalmanagement).

*Doelbereik en resultaten volgens de aanvragende gemeente*

Voor zover mogelijk is geregistreerd in hoeverre de in het aanvraagformulier vermelde doelstellingen bereikt waren volgens de eindrapportage van de aanvragende gemeente.

In de registratie is geen gebruik gemaakt van de door de VNG-I geregistreerde 'resultaten' zoals vermeld in de projectkenschetsen<sup>17</sup>. Registratie bleek in de praktijk moeizaam. Immers, in de aanvraag werd in een kwart van de gevallen geen onderscheid gemaakt tussen doelstellingen en activiteiten. De activiteit (b.v. "deelname aan seminar") werd dan als doelstelling vermeld. Een tweede complicatie is de mate van abstractie of het aggregatieniveau waarin de doelstellingen verwoord zijn door de aanvragende gemeente (b.v. als doelstelling 'economische groei'). In die gevallen is een uitspraak over het doelbereik niet mogelijk. Tenzij de rapporterende gemeente hierover stellige uitspraken doet, hetzij in positieve, hetzij in negatieve zin, zijn de antwoorden op doelbereik in dergelijke gevallen geregistreerd als 'niet te beoordelen'. Een derde complicatie is de wijze waarop gemeenten rapporteren. In een beperkt aantal gevallen was er geen eindrapportage aanwezig in het dossier; bij anderen bleek de eindrapportage weinig te melden omtrent de in de aanvraag genoemde doelstellingen (zie paragraaf 4.5).

Van de 157 dossiers kon in 85 gevallen (54 procent) het doelbereik geregistreerd worden. De onderscheiden categorieën bij registratie en de daarbij behorende frequentie in de registratie waren als volgt:

**Tabel 4.6 Doelbereik volgens opgave van aanvragende gemeente**

	aantal	percentage
Totaal aantal registraties van doelbereik	85	100
Doel geheel gerealiseerd	31	36.5
Doel niet gerealiseerd	4	5
Doel gedeeltelijk bereikt	15	17.5
Doelbereik niet te beoordelen	35	41

Wat opvalt, is het lage aantal gevallen waarin de aanvragende gemeente van mening is dat de doelstellingen niet bereikt zijn, of dat er onvoldoende resultaten geboekt zijn. Vanuit de dossiers valt het doelbereik niet goed te beoordelen, hetzij omdat de informatie dat niet toelaat, hetzij omdat de doelstellingen niet (goed) geformuleerd zijn.


<sup>17</sup> De projectkenschetsen weerspiegelen de problemen van registratie op 'output' en 'effect'. Terwijl de 'output' (resultaat) doorgaans wel door VNG-I geregistreerd wordt, blijft het veld 'effect' veelal leeg.

### Uitgaven

Voor de activiteiten in het GST programma waarvan de dossiers bestudeerd zijn hebben de betreffende gemeenten subsidieaanvragen gedaan voor een totaal van NLG 2,038.500. Het totale bedrag dat uitgegeven is bedraagt ongeveer NLG 20,000 minder. Bij zowel STAGE als PUGA is het bedrag dat aan gemeenten wordt uitbetaald wordt gemiddeld 81 procent van het aangevraagde budget. De verschillen worden verklaard door de veelal iets lager uitvallende reiskosten en het niet gebruiken van de post 'onvoorzien'. De kosten van GIMs blijken iets over het budget heen te gaan (gemiddeld 2 procent overschrijding).


Binnen de groep geselecteerde activiteiten uit het GST programma bleken de MMTPs iets meer dan de helft van de uitgaven voor zich op te eisen: 58.2 procent, gevolgd door de GIMs met 24.9 procent, de PUGAs met 12.8 procent en de STAGES met 3.8 procent.

**Figuur 4.1 GST uitgaven per modaliteit**



Bij de activiteiten binnen het GSO programma kon op basis van de gegevens in de dossiers niet gewerkt worden met werkelijke uitgaven, omdat die niet altijd in de bestudeerde dossiers terug te vinden waren. Voor activiteiten in het GSO programma is als proxy voor de uitgaven uitgegaan van de in de contracten toegekende bedragen. Het totale toegekende bedrag bedroeg NLG 3,959,022. De verdeling tussen de modaliteiten blijkt anders te zijn dan bij het GST programma: 41.5 procent naar GIs, 16.2 procent naar MMTPs, 5.5 procent naar Algemene Activiteiten, 31.2 procent naar PUGAs en 5.6 procent naar STAGES. Opgemerkt dient te worden dat hier de landenkeuze van invloed is. In Nicaragua en Zuid Afrika zijn relatief veel –en ook grotere- GIs in vergelijking met andere GSO landen.

**Figuur 4.2 GSO uitgaven per modaliteit**




Nederlandse gemeenten die een ambtenaar uitzenden kunnen daarvoor tegemoet gekomen worden in de derving van salariskosten. Dit is tot een maximum van NLG 400 per dag. Er is sprake van die tegemoetkoming in de modaliteiten PUGA en GI (M).

In de onderzochte activiteiten van het programma GST maken salariskosten 24 procent uit van de totale werkelijke uitgaven aan PUGAs en GIMs. In het geval van GSO maken salariskosten 33.2 procent uit van de in de contracten toegezegde bijdragen voor PUGAs en GIs.

Hoewel de plaats waar uitgaven gedaan worden niet indicatief is voor de plaats waar de voordelen van een activiteit terecht komen, is het opvallend dat ruim 70 procent van alle uitgaven van de modaliteiten PUGA, STAGE en GI (M) in Nederland gedaan worden<sup>18</sup>. Bij GST (69 procent, op basis van werkelijke uitgaven) ligt dat lager dan bij GSO (72 procent, op basis van budgets). De uitgaven van de modaliteiten Algemene Activiteit en MMTPs zijn hierbij niet meegerekend.

<sup>18</sup> Verondersteld is dat bij PUGA voorbereidingskosten, reiskosten en tegemoetkomingen in de salariskosten in Nederland plaatsvinden. De verblijfskosten en 'overige uitgaven' elders. Bij STAGE wordt verondersteld dat de reiskosten 'elders' gemaakt worden en de verblijfskosten en 'overige uitgaven' in Nederland.

**Figuur 4.3 Meer dan 70 procent van de uitgaven vindt in Nederland plaats**



#### **4.4 Dossiers als indicatie van de beheerscapaciteit**

Beheerscapaciteit valt niet uitsluitend te bepalen op basis van dossierstudie van activiteiten. De dossiers en de systematiek daarin zijn echter wel een indicator van beheersfuncties. Tijdens de dossierstudie is een registratie gemaakt van:

- algehele indruk van de dossiers,
- compleetheid van dossiers (aanvraagformulier, contract, eindrapportage, financiële eindrapportage, openstaande zaken),
- procesgang (vergelijking data van aanvraag uit partnergemeenten, de Nederlandse gemeente, het contract en de uitvoering van de activiteiten).

##### *Algehele indruk van de dossiers*

VNG-I heeft een externe kwaliteitsbeoordeling op basis van de NEN-EN-ISO 9001 normen sinds 2000. De dossiers van de activiteiten zijn op deze normativiteit gebaseerd, maar het is de evaluatoren onbekend of daar door de externe beoordelaars op getoetst wordt.

De dossiers hebben een systematische opbouw, zijn voorzien van een schutblad met een checklist van de inhoud. Tevens zijn vrijwel alle dossiers voorzien van een korte projectkenschets. Deze kenschets is ook opgenomen in het geautomatiseerde projectregistratiesysteem van de VNG-I (GEIS).

Dossiers maken geen duidelijk onderscheid tussen administratief procedurele en inhoudelijke zaken. Voor een deel zijn de financiële dossiers gescheiden van de overige informatie, maar lopen ook weer in elkaar over.

De dossiers zijn redelijk compleet. Er wordt zorg voor gedragen dat aan procedurele verplichtingen wordt voldaan. Zo bevat bijna 90 procent van de dossiers de vereiste aanvraag door de ontvangende partner (in het geval van PUGA, STAGE en GI (M)). Contracten waren afwezig in 15 procent van de dossiers, maar in 18 gevallen werd er wel naar verwezen (de contracten bestaan in die gevallen waarschijnlijk wel, maar bevonden zich dan elders, bij voorbeeld in het financiële archief). In 6 gevallen kan gesteld worden dat er geen contract in het dossier was en er ook geen verwijzingen daarnaar waren.

Naast de procedurele en administratieve informatie is al dan niet inhoudelijke informatie in de dossiers aanwezig. Dat hangt vooral af van het type activiteit. In het merendeel van de GI en GIM is inhoudelijke informatie aanwezig. Bij de andere activiteiten wordt de inhoud van de activiteiten veelal alleen kort omschreven in het contract en kan afgeleid worden uit de eindrapportages. Doordat eindrapportage pas in latere jaren een format ging volgens, is kwaliteit van de inhoudelijke aspecten van de activiteiten nauwelijks te systematiseren op basis van dossieronderzoek.

Eindrapportage was aanwezig in 101 van de 157 dossiers (64 procent), maar een financiële rapportage was veelvuldig afwezig in de bestudeerde dossiers. Slechts in 53 van de 157 dossiers was er een (kopie van) de financiële eindafrekening.

In slechts drie gevallen bleken er onopgeloste 'openstaande' problemen te bestaan in dossiers die klaarblijkelijk waren afgesloten. Het ging daarbij om financiële bewijsstukken die door de aanvragende gemeente niet waren overlegd.

### *Procesgang*

De ratio van het proces is dat een activiteit op gang wordt gezet door de partnergemeente. Die komt met een idee of verzoek en richt dat aan de Nederlandse gemeente. Deze gemeente 'vertaalt' dat verzoek in een concrete activiteit, waarvoor een subsidie aangevraagd kan worden. Die aanvraag wordt gericht aan de VNG-I middels een specifiek daartoe ontworpen formulier. Eenmaal ontvangen door VNG-I worden grotere of innovatieve aanvragen eerst aan de GSO-, dan wel de GST-Projecten Advies Commissie voorgelegd. In deze gevallen neemt het besluit maximaal drie maanden in beslag. Over aanvragen van geringere financiële omvang neemt de VNG-I zelf een besluit. Dat besluit kan snel genomen zijn, in principe direct na ontvangst van de aanvraag. Na goedkeuring wordt een contract afgesloten tussen de aanvrager en VNG-I. Vervolgens kan de activiteit uitgevoerd worden.

De praktijk kan afwijken van de theorie. Uit de dossiers is niet af te leiden in hoeverre daar een verzoek van de partnergemeente aan vooraf ging. De aanvraag van de partnergemeente zit doorgaans wel in het dossier, maar de datum daarvan is niet vergelijkbaar met de datum van aanvraag door de Nederlandse gemeente. De datering van de aanvraagformulieren toont wel aan (zoals verwacht) dat de aanvraag vooraf gaat aan de activiteit. Slechts in 6 gevallen (3 GST en 3 GSO) bleek de activiteit al te zijn afgerond (einddatum) voor de datum van het aanvraagformulier.

Het moment van goedkeuring van de aanvraag door VNG-I is niet in de dossiers te achterhalen. De weerslag van de goedkeuring is het contract. In ongeveer dertig procent van de onderzochte dossiers (6 GST en 38 GSO) bleek de uitvoering van de activiteit reeds te zijn afgerond (einddatum) voordat het contract was opgesteld. Dit geldt met name voor de PUGAs in het GSO programma.

Zoals gesteld volgt de aanvraag van de partner in het buitenland (vooral in GSO programma) in veel gevallen achteraf. Deze aanvragen maken een gedicteerde indruk en lijken slechts bestemd om aan de administratieve verplichting te voldoen.

Zoals vermeld, zijn de meeste activiteiten van korte duur. Het heeft dan weinig zin te rapporteren over de voortgang. Voortgangsrapportage is alleen zinvol bij GIs en GIMs die een lange doorlooptijd hebben. In bijna de helft van de dossiers van GIs en GIMs zijn voortgangsrapportages aangetroffen.

**Tabel 4.7 Voortgangsrapportage GI en GIM**

	<b>Aantal GI (M)</b>	<b>Voortgangsrapportage in dossier</b>	<b>Voortgangsrapportage niet in dossier</b>	<b>onbekend</b>
GST	5	2	3	-
GSO	17	10	4	3
Totaal	22	12	7	3

Als een activiteit is afgerond, dient de aanvragende gemeente in Nederland een eindrapportage te overleggen. De betrokken projectmedewerker van VNG-I kan daar vervolgens een kort commentaar op leveren. Financiële afrekening vindt plaats na presentatie van de eindrapportage.

Na afloop van iedere MMTPs voert de VNG-I een interne evaluatie uit met de deelnemers. In sommige gevallen ook met de organisatoren en andere deelnemende partijen. Daarvan zijn samenvattende verslagen in de dossiers opgenomen.

Interne reviews worden door VNG-I uitgevoerd. De resultaten daarvan worden slechts bij uitzondering toegevoegd aan de project dossiers. Aparte rapportage –los van de dossiers- heeft plaatsgevonden van reviews van activiteiten op het gebied van sociale woningbouw in Zuid-Afrika en van activiteiten in Nicaragua.

In geen enkel dossier wordt verwezen naar externe evaluaties.

#### **4.5 Eindrapportage**

Na afloop van een activiteit rapporteert de aanvrager van de GSO dan wel de GST subsidie aan de VNG-I omtrent de uitgevoerde activiteiten. De vorm en inhoud, alsmede het taalgebruik van deze rapportages was aanvankelijk vrij. In de loop der tijd heeft de VNG-I een specifiek formaat geïntroduceerd en dringt bij de gemeenten op aan dat de rapportage niet slechts als een administratieve verplichting gezien moeten worden, maar ook als instrument ter informatie van derden, voor interne leerprocessen en voor communicatie met de partnergemeente. Recentelijk wordt aanbevolen het verslag te presenteren in één van de wereldtalen, zodat de informatie toegankelijk wordt voor de partnergemeente. In de onderzochte dossiers waren 31 rapportages in het VNG-I formaat geschreven. Op het moment van dossieronderzoek was geen goede inschatting te maken van het percentage gemeenten dat bij eindrapportage dit format hanteert. Het is –vanuit het argument van laagdrempeligheid van het programma- geen verplichting het format te hanteren.

Ad random zijn 30 rapportages geselecteerd en geanalyseerd: 8 rapportages van GST activiteiten en 22 rapportages van GSO activiteiten. Het betreft hier uitsluitend rapportages PUGA en GI (M).

In deze analyse is gekeken naar taalgebruik, doelstellingen en activiteiten, procesgang en opmerkingen omtrent efficiëntie, effectiviteit en duurzaamheid. De resultaten van die analyse zijn als volgt samen te vatten:



**Tabel 4.8 Eindrapportages PUGAs en GI (M)**

<b>Programma</b>		<b>GST</b>	<b>GSO</b>	<b>Totaal</b>
Rapportage	PUGA	6	16	22
	GIM/GI	2	6	8
	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>30</b>
Verslag in Nederlandse taal	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>25</b>
Verslag type 'dagboek'	<b>Totaal</b>	-	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>
Bevat doelstellingen activiteit	PUGA	5	10	15
	GI(M)	2	6	8
	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>23</b>
Bevat resultaten	PUGA	5	12	17
	GI (M)	2	6	8
	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>25</b>
Bevat aanbevelingen	Totaal	4	14	18
Bevat afspraken in de tijd	PUGA	2	7	9
	GI (M)	1	3	4
	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>
Bevat kritiek ten aanzien van eigen functioneren	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Bevat opmerking omtrent de efficiency	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
Bevat opmerking omtrent de effectiviteit	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>
Bevat opmerking omtrent de duurzaamheid	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>
Bevat meningen van de partnergemeente/ organisatie	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>

De inventarisatie van de eindrapportages leidt tot de opmerking dat rapportages in het geval van de GI (M)s een professionele indruk maken. In het geval van de PUGAs is dat minder. In veel gevallen zijn het meer reisverslagen dan een zakelijke weergave van doelstellingen, activiteiten, afspraken en meningen.

Vrijwel alle rapportages ademen een 'alles is goed en succesvol' sfeer. Vooral de GSO PUGAs gericht op projectformulering en monitoring zijn weinig kritisch ten opzichte van zichzelf. In het algemeen is er weinig aandacht voor aspecten als efficiëntie en duurzaamheid. Een hardnekkige zwakheid blijktbaar, want ook de GSO evaluatie van 1997 stelde reeds dat niet ieder rapport 'wervend hoeft te zijn voor de achterban' (DHV, 1997:14).

Rapportage is gericht op de Nederlandse doelgroep en situatie, d.w.z. rapportage richt zich naar de eigen organisatie, naar VNG-I, naar de Stedenband Stichtingen of het College van Burgemeester en Wethouders. Uitzondering op die tendens zijn de meer technische verslagen omtrent specifieke GI(M)s. Deze verslagen zijn ook frequenter geschreven in een internationale taal (Engels, Spaans).

De dominante taal in de eindrapportages is het Nederlands. In de rapportages is opmerkelijk weinig ruimte ingericht voor meningen of commentaren van de partnergemeente of organisatie. Rapportages zijn geschreven door de Nederlandse partner en slechts zelden door beide partners. Er is geen systeem waarbij de partnergemeente de eindrapportage van commentaar voorziet, of eventueel mede ondertekent.

Uit de rapportages blijkt tevens dat het moment van uitvoering van de activiteit vooral afgestemd is op de Nederlandse behoefte, alsmede de beschikbaarheid van de Nederlandse partner.

Uit de rapportages blijkt dat doorgaans geen mijlpalen in de tijd vastgesteld worden, waardoor de gezamenlijk te ondernemen activiteiten een 'open ended' karakter hebben.

#### **4.6 Enkele conclusies op basis van het dossieronderzoek**

De bestudering van meer dan 150 dossiers leiden tot een aantal algemene constatering, die als volgt kunnen worden samengevat:

- Zowel het programma GSO als het programma GST is sterk gericht op de Nederlandse gemeente en omstandigheden. Procedures zijn ingericht naar de mogelijkheden en behoeften van de Nederlandse partner. Er zijn geen procedures en regels die refereren naar de partner in het buitenland. In het geval van GSO is zelfs de partner in het buitenland niet nader omschreven.
- Onder capaciteitsversterking wordt hetzij de directe overdracht van Nederlandse kennis verstaan, hetzij de 'exposure' aan de Nederlandse situatie. Er wordt geen ruimte gemaakt (financieel of inhoudelijk) voor inzet van lokale of regionale expertise of kennisuitwisseling tussen partnergemeenten in het buitenland. De in 1998 geïntroduceerde modaliteit Algemene Activiteit in het programma GSO biedt in principe die mogelijkheid wel. In de bestudeerde dossiers zijn daarvan slechts twee voorbeelden aangetroffen.
- Terwijl partners vanuit het buitenland gescreend worden op hun geschiktheid om deel te nemen aan MMTPs of STAGEs (vooral GSO)<sup>19</sup>, vindt geen kwalitatieve toetsing plaats van functionarissen die ingezet worden voor b.v. de PUGAs. Er wordt per definitie vanuit gegaan dat de aanvragende gemeente hier het beste oordeel over heeft en handelt vanuit de eigen verantwoordelijkheid. Het volgen van b.v. de Cursus Uitzending Gemeente Ambtenaren is niet verplicht.
- Veel van de correspondentie in de dossiers gaat over procedurele en financiële zaken. De correspondentie over inhoudelijke aspecten van de ondernomen activiteiten is uiterst beperkt. Wel wordt er in het geval van GIs en GIMs soms gewezen op de relatie tot het door de VNG-I uitgestippelde beleid, verwoord in de Jaarplannen.
- VNG-I is een zorgvuldige beheerder van de fondsen. Veel correspondentie is gewijd aan discussies over de financiële afrekening en de regelgeving daaromtrent. VNG-I maakt de indruk daarbij zuinig en strikt om te gaan met de middelen.
- VNG-I is een bekwaam organisator van MMTPs. Deze cursussen worden zorgvuldig voorbereid, er worden draaiboeken samengesteld en er is een systeem van selectie van deelnemers. De logistiek is perfect verzorgd. De MMTPs worden geëvalueerd en de resultaten daarvan worden meegenomen naar volgende MMTPs. Uit de interne evaluaties blijkt een hoge mate van tevredenheid van de deelnemers. De inhoudelijke kant van de MMTPs lijken

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<sup>19</sup> Dit was een aanbeveling van de evaluatie van het GSO programma, DHV, 1997.

minder kwaliteit te hebben dan de organisatie. De evaluatoren meten zich niet aan over ieder onderwerp een oordeel te kunnen vellen. Daar waar dat wel gepretendeerd wordt, oordelen de evaluatoren dat de inhoud te sterk gebaseerd is op de westerse context en er nauwelijks gebruik gemaakt van de kennis vanuit de ontwikkelingssamenwerking, b.v. van kennis toegankelijk via de websites van de Wereld Bank.



## 5 INTERVIEWS MET NEDERLANDSE GEMEENTEN

### 5.1 Populatie en sample

Naast de enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten en het dossieronderzoek die in de voorgaande hoofdstukken besproken zijn, zijn interviews gehouden met bestuurlijk verantwoordelijken en met ambtelijke coördinatoren in gemeenten (in ruime zin), alsmede met vertegenwoordigers van maatschappelijke organisaties betrokken bij de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking. Tevens zijn interviews gehouden met ambtenaren en functionarissen van openbare bestuursorganen en maatschappelijke organisaties die in het kader van GIS zijn uitgezonden middels subsidies van de programma's GSO en GST.

De interviews zijn gehouden in aanvulling op, en ter verdieping van, de enquête besproken in hoofdstuk 3. Voor deze gesprekken is gebruik gemaakt van gestructureerde vragenlijsten.

Doel van deze gesprekken was om een beeld te krijgen van het belang van de GSO- en GST- regelingen binnen het beleid ten aanzien van internationale contacten, zoals dat door de gemeente of organisatie gevoerd wordt. Tevens wordt inzicht verkregen in gehanteerde aanvraagprocedures en beoordelingscriteria; de organisatie en management en de verwachtingen ten aanzien van de resultaten van internationale samenwerking.

Van de 44 gemeenten en openbare bestuursinstellingen die in de periode 1997-2001 gebruik gemaakt hebben van GSO dan wel GST subsidies voor hun contacten in Nicaragua, Tanzania, Zuid-Afrika, Polen en Tsjechië, zijn er 29 bezocht en 2 telefonisch geïnterviewd. Tevens zijn interviews gehouden met VNG-I over de activiteiten in de diverse landen. De totale lijst van gemeenten is gepresenteerd in box 6.

#### **Box 6: Geselecteerde gemeenten, openbare bestuursinstellingen in Nederland en VNG-I**

Aa en Hunze, Aalten, Alkmaar, Alphen aan den Rijn, Amersfoort, Amsterdam, Arnhem, Assen, Baarn, Bergen op Zoom, Beuningen, Culemborg, Delft, Den Haag, Deurne, Dordrecht, Driebergen, Eindhoven, Enschede, Gennep, Groningen, Hoorn, Leiden, Lingewaal, Loenen, Maartensdijk, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Provincie Zuid-Holland, Provincie Gelderland, Purmerend, Rheden, Rijswijk, Rotterdam, Stadskanaal, Tholen, Tilburg, Utrecht, Vlaardingen, Vlissingen, VNG, Waalre, Westerveld en Zoetermeer.

Tabel 5.1 presenteert de geïnterviewde gemeenten (in ruime zin) gegroepeerd naar land (een gemeente kan partners hebben in meerdere landen) en is het aantal activiteiten waarvoor subsidie is aangevraagd (inclusief MMTPs en Algemene Activiteiten) vermeld.

**Tabel 5.1 Overzicht van geïnterviewde gemeenten, gegroepeerd naar partners per land**

Zuid-Afrika	Proj.	Tanzania	Proj.	Nicaragua	Proj.	Polen	Proj.	Tsjechië	Proj.
Alkmaar	4	Aa en Hunze	6	Amsterdam	10	Amsterdam	1	Amersfoort	3
Alphen a/d Rijn	3	Aalten	4	Delft	6	Assen	2	Baarn	2
Arnhem	6	Beuningen	5	Den Haag	7	Bergen op Zoom	2	Driebergen	1
Culemborg	6	Hoorn	5	Dordrecht	8	Beuningen	3	Rijsenburg	1
Delft	6	Lingewaal	4	Eindhoven	8	Den Haag	3	Groningen	2
Den Haag	1	Loenen	2	Gennep	2	Deurne	2	Hoorn	2
Eindhoven	7	Prov. Gelderland	1	Groningen	4	Eindhoven	1	Holland	1
Enschede	2	Rotterdam	2	Leiden	4	Groningen	2	Purmerend	2
Leiden	10	Tilburg	5	Maastricht	3	Leiden	4	Rheden	1
Rotterdam	6	VNG-I	3	Nijmegen	9	Maartensdijk	2	Utrecht	2
Stadskanaal/ Emmen	1			Rijswijk	3	Prov. Gelderland	4	Vlaardingen	4
Tilburg	2			Tilburg	3	Tholen	2	VNG	1
Vlissingen	3			Utrecht	14	VNG-I	2	Waalre	2
VNG	5			VNG-I	3			Westerveld	2
				Zoetermeer	3				
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>62</b>		<b>37</b>		<b>87</b>		<b>30</b>		<b>26</b>

De gemeenten die geïnterviewd zijn kunnen tevens contacten onderhouden met landen die in aanmerking komen voor GSO dan wel GST subsidie, maar die niet behoren tot de groep van vijf geselecteerde landen. De informatie verstrekt door deze gemeenten is dan niet uitsluitend bepaald door de ervaringen opgedaan met activiteiten in de vijf geselecteerde landen, maar ook op ervaringen elders. Met name grote gemeenten hebben meerdere partners in het buitenland waarmee contacten worden onderhouden. Gedurende interviews is gerefereerd aan 23 landen waarvoor GSO subsidies en 8 landen waarvoor GST fondsen waren aangevraagd.

De interviews zijn gehouden met zowel politiek verantwoordelijken, zoals burgemeesters en wethouders, als ambtelijke coördinatoren. Tevens zijn functionarissen van maatschappelijke organisaties ondervraagd (b.v. vertegenwoordigers van Stedenband Stichtingen), alsmede ambtenaren en andere functionarissen die in het kader van PUGA een bezoek hadden gebracht aan één of meerdere van de vijf geselecteerde landen.

## 5.2 Bevindingen interviews

### 5.2.1 Inputs en financieel belang van de subsidie

De inputs voor GSO en GST activiteiten betreffen vooral kosten voor het inzetten van expertise en de reis- en verblijfskosten. De subsidies voor PUGAs, STAGEs en GIMs vergoeden een deel van de inzet van de ambtenaren van de Nederlandse gemeenten (NLG 400 per dag) en de reis- en verblijfskosten. In geval van GI projecten kunnen ook investeringskosten, terwijl in het geval van GIM ook inhuur van externe expertise onderdeel zijn van de activiteit. Bij MMTPs worden alle kosten in de eerste week training in Den Haag geheel vergoed door de VNG-I. De tweede week betreft doorgaans een stage periode in de zuster gemeente, waarvoor de verblijfskosten van de bezoeker worden vergoed.

De programma's GSO en GST zijn subsidieregelingen. Als subsidieregeling wordt er een bijdrage van de Nederlandse gemeente verondersteld. De VNG-I aanvraagformulieren GSO en GST vereisen niet dat deze bijdrage expliciet gemaakt wordt. In de praktijk wordt als 'eigen bijdrage' van de gemeente gerekend:

- het niet vergoede deel van de salariskosten,
- voorbereiding en rapportagetijd,
- overhead e.d.,
- in het geval van GI en GIM wordt er vanuit gegaan dat de gemeente minimaal 50 procent van de werkelijke kosten draagt,
- kosten van activiteiten gericht op draagvlakverbreding.

Het meest frequent worden door de gemeenten (N = 29) de volgende bijdragen genoemd:

**Tabel 5.2 Bijdrage van de gemeenten aan GSO en GST activiteiten**

Aard van bijdrage van gemeenten	Genoemd door gemeenten In procent
Tijdbesteding door ambtenaren	37
Overheadkosten	22
Kosten voor draagvlakverbreding	66
Maatschappelijke ondersteuning (m.n. operationele kosten Stedenbandstichtingen)	63

De direct betrokken Nederlandse ambtenaren krijgen voor hun bijdrage aan PUGAs en GI (M)'s een salaristegemoetkoming. Functionarissen van bij voorbeeld Stedenbandstichtingen krijgen voor hun inspanningen die tegemoetkoming niet. Voor hen worden reis, verblijfs-, en voorbereidingskosten vergoed. Evenmin is er een tegemoetkoming in salariskosten voor Nederlandse politieke ambtsdragers, buitenlandse bestuurders of buitenlandse ambtenaren. De meningen over de toereikendheid van de salaristegemoetkoming lopen per gemeente uiteen. Afhankelijk van het niveau van de ambtenaar bedragen de werkelijke salariskosten drie tot vijf maal zoveel<sup>20</sup>. De vergoeding wordt voldoende geacht voor de coördinatoren internationale samenwerking omdat het hier onderdeel is van het takenpakket van de betreffende ambtenaar. Echter, in geval er beroep gedaan wordt op expertise van andere diensten binnen het gemeentelijk apparaat, wordt de vergoeding als onvoldoende ervaren.

Onderstaande tabel geeft een overzicht van de inputs

<sup>20</sup> In de verzelfstandigde diensten van b.v. de gemeenten Rotterdam en Amsterdam wordt gewerkt op basis van tarieven van ongeveer NLG 1,500 (€700) per dag.

**Tabel 5.3      Overzicht mogelijke inputs per GSO, GST instrument**

Activiteit	Input	Opmerkingen
MMTP	Doorgaans één week gezamenlijke training in Den Haag (soms in partnerland) Eén week training/stage bij de (partner)gemeente	Aantal deelnemers 15-20. Kosten centraal door VNG-I gedragen. Aparte contracten met zuster gemeenten voor verblijfs-, en vertaalkosten bezoekers
PUGA	Missie van één of meerdere personen van Nederlandse gemeente naar de partnergemeente	Tegemoetkoming salariskosten ambtenaar. Kosten cursus, voorbereiding, verzekeringskosten, reis- en verblijfskosten, vertaalkosten
STAGE	Verblijf/stage van één of meerdere personen van de partnergemeente aan bij de Nederlandse gemeente	Reis en verblijfskosten van partner, incl verzekeringskosten en vertaalkosten
GI (M)	Meerdere PUGAs en/of combinaties met STAGEs Een investering in de vorm van bijvoorbeeld externe inhuur van expertise	Bij GI maximaal 50 procent van de werkelijke kosten, inclusief investering. Bij GIM maximaal 40 procent van het gesubsidieerde deel naar externe expertise. Er is een plafond per GI (M) Er is een plafond per Nederlandse gemeente en er is een indicatief plafond voor Nicaragua. Bij GST worden accountantskosten vergoed

Gevraagd is naar de eigen financiële bijdrage van de gemeenten in de kosten die GIS met zich meebrengt. Slechts een zestal gemeenten (25 procent) geeft aan zelf meer dan 40 procent van de kosten te dragen.

**Tabel 5.4      Eigen bijdrage gemeente**

Bijdrage in kosten	> 80%	60-80	40-60	20-40	<20	onbekend	N=
Aantal respondenten	1	2	3	4	8	7	24

De geïnterviewde gemeenten geven aan de GSO en GST subsidies belangrijk te vinden voor de continuïteit van de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking. Slechts drie gemeenten geven aan dat niet belangrijk te vinden. De GSO en GST subsidies worden daarbij toegankelijk geacht en in ruime meerderheid positief gewaardeerd.



**Tabel 5.5 Financieel belang en toegankelijkheid van de GSO en GST subsidies**

		<b>Totaal aantal respondenten</b>
Aantal gemeenten dat meent dat GSO/GST financieel belangrijk zijn	20	23
Aantal gemeenten dat meent dat GSO/GST financieel niet belangrijk zijn	3	23
Aantal gemeenten dat meent dat GSO/GST een toegankelijke subsidie is	20	21
Aantal gemeenten dat meent dat GSO/GST onvoldoende toegankelijk is	1	21
Aantal gemeenten dat GSO/GST positief waardeert	19	24
Aantal gemeenten dat GSO/GST negatief waardeert	2	24
Aantal gemeenten dat GSO/GST neutraal waardeert of geen mening heeft	3	24

Opvallend is dat de tweede doelstelling van GSO, zijnde de draagvlakverbreding geen eigen subsidieerbare inputs kent. Eén van de redenen was dat gemeenten subsidies konden betrekken voor draagvlakactiviteiten in Nederland middels een vierjarenafpraak (1998-2002) tussen de NCDO en VNG. In het kader van dit VNG-NCDO fonds werden vijf gemeenten geselecteerd om aan verbreding van –en de inbedding van – voorlichtingsactiviteiten op lokaal niveau te werken. De VNG had in 2001 6 aanvragen ontvangen, waarvan er vijf werden gehonoreerd. De totaal beschikbare fondsen waren slechts NLG 55.000. Dit subsidiemechanisme is op basis van en een tussentijdse evaluatie eind 2001 herzien<sup>21</sup>.

Indien de hoeveelheid middelen in de GSO en GST programma's aanzienlijk zou groeien, dan zouden de gemeenten er de voorkeur aan geven hun programma's te verdiepen. Dat wil zeggen, hetzij meer activiteiten opzetten met dezelfde partner in het buitenland (10 van de 24 respondenten), hetzij grotere activiteiten te ontwikkelen (13 van de 24). Slechts één gemeente gaf aan te overwegen banden met meer gemeenten in het buitenland aan te gaan. De meest genoemde reden voor een hoger bedrag per activiteit is de eigen beperking in menskracht voor de formulering en monitoring van projecten. Verder acht men de nu ter beschikking staande middelen voor het inhuren van externe expertise te gering.

Na de Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van maart 2002 zijn verschuivingen opgetreden in het politieke krachtenveld. Gedurende de interviews is gevraagd naar de eventuele invloed daarvan op de gemeentelijke inspanningen op internationaal gebied. En in hoeverre dat dan weer van invloed zou kunnen zijn op de interesse voor de programma's GSO en GST.

Ruim 80 procent van de gemeenten geeft aan dat er van bezuinigingen of verzaaiing (nog) geen sprake is. Slechts vier gemeenten noemen een verbodskeling of verzaaiing met betrekking tot GIS reeds te merken. Wel is het afnemen van politieke steun een zorg voor de toekomst. Er worden een aantal redenen aangegeven waarom men denkt dat er wel een veranderingsproces gestart is, maar

<sup>21</sup> De gereserveerde middelen voor 2002 zijn door de VNG aangewend om nieuwe financieringsmodellen uit te werken voor wat betreft het versterken van het draagvlak voor internationale samenwerking op lokaal en regionaal niveau.

nog geen (definitieve) vorm heeft gekregen. Opmerkingen die daarnaar verwijzen zijn:

- Door plaatselijk belang partij is de aandacht voor internationale samenwerking verminderd. De nieuwe beleidsnota zal zich richten op het economisch belang van internationale contacten,
- Herijking is nodig. Een veel sterkere band tussen de bevolking en gemeente is wenselijk en daarbij staat handhaving van de huidige contacten niet voorop (2 gemeenten);
- Verzadiging treedt op voor wat betreft de landen waar de bevolking niets mee heeft. Er is een tendens om meer aandacht te geven aan landen van herkomst van de allochtone bevolking (drie gemeenten);
- Er is bewust gezocht naar methoden om het politiek draagvlak te verankeren en niet te laten verminderen. Die verankering is gevonden in het laten dragen van specifieke verantwoordelijkheid voor een stedenband door een raadslid of wethouder (twee gemeenten).

De obstakels waarmee de gemeenten zich geconfronteerd ziet om GIS goed uit te voeren kunnen van velerlei aard zijn. Dat zijn niet alleen de politieke obstakels, maar vooral de beperkingen van praktische aard. Vier van de zestien respondenten (25 procent) gaf aan helemaal geen beperkingen te kennen, terwijl een even groot aantal de financiën, dan wel de menskracht als belangrijkste belemmering aangaf. Anderen refereerden aan organisatorische problemen en gebrek aan belangstelling van leidinggevenden en/of het politiek echelon.

**Tabel 5.6 Door gemeenten aangegeven belangrijkste beperkingen en obstakels**

<b>Personele capaciteit</b>	<b>Financiële capaciteit</b>	<b>Anders</b>	<b>geen</b>	<b>N =</b>
4 Kader ontbreekt	4 VNG-I hanteert limiet per gemeente en project Kosten externe experts	. moeizame interne organisatie met verschillende geldstromen (woningbouwcorporatie) . gebrek politieke belangstelling (2) . minder enthousiaste directeur . gebrek aan centrale aansturing en coördinatie	4	16

### 5.2.2 Vraag of aanbodsturing

Omdat de Nederlandse partner degene is die de subsidie dient aan te vragen bij de VNG-I en de financiële en administratieve verantwoordelijkheid daarover draagt, is niet bij voorbaat duidelijk of de vraag naar een activiteit vanuit de buitenlandse partnergemeente gegenereerd is.

In het geval van de MMTPs worden de onderwerpen bepaald na overleg met diverse partners, zowel in Nederland als in het buitenland. VNG-I bepaalt uiteindelijk en stelt vast. De partners uit de gemeenten in het buitenland hebben dan de keuze of ze wel of niet deelnemen aan een bepaalde MMTP.

Gemeenten geven aan dat de onderwerpen van MMTPs in onderling overleg bepaald zijn en bij voorkeur passen binnen de hoofdthema's die voor een bepaald land gekozen zijn (als dat van toepassing is).

Ook voor wat betreft de overige activiteiten die in aanmerking komen voor GSO en GST subsidies wordt door de Nederlandse gemeente gekeken in hoeverre die passen binnen de stedenbandovereenkomst (als die aanwezig is) en in hoeverre de Nederlandse gemeente zinvolle kennis op die thema's kan aanleveren.

Gevraagd naar het oordeel van de Nederlandse gemeente of activiteiten vraag-, dan wel aanbod gestuurd zijn, antwoordt de helft (13 van de 25 respondenten) dat die in onderling overleg tot stand komen. Twintig procent acht de activiteiten volledig aanbod gestuurd en 30 procent (7 van de 25) volledig vraaggestuurd.

### **5.2.3 Van aanvraag tot evaluatie**

#### *Projectbeoordeling en aanvraag*

Projectbeoordeling binnen de gemeente en het verzorgen van de aanvraag is in 74 procent van de gevallen de verantwoordelijkheid van de coördinerende ambtenaar. In de kleinere gemeenten worden de projectvoorstellen in vrijwel alle gevallen eerst ter goedkeuring voorgelegd aan het College van Burgemeester en Wethouders. Maar dit is niet alleen het geval voor de kleine gemeenten; in een grotere gemeente zoals Arnhem worden grotere en meerjarige projecten ook eerst aan het College voorgelegd.

De afweging om wel of niet een aanvraag bij de VNG-I in te dienen wordt veelal al gemaakt bij de projectidentificatie. Zesentwintig van de éénendertig gemeenten hebben vragen daaromtrent beantwoord. De overigen verwezen naar andere instanties en ambtenaren en stelden daarvoor niet verantwoordelijk te zijn.

Bij zeven gemeenten is de mogelijkheid om subsidie te verkrijgen voorwaarde om verder op een project in te gaan. Ook grotere en 'ervaren' gemeenten kijken veelal eerst naar de mate waarin subsidie verkregen kan worden. Enkele van die gemeenten hebben te maken met limieten. De mate van subsidieerbaarheid wordt dan ook als eerste genoemd door zes grote gemeenten.

Een te verwachten antwoord zou zijn dat men denkt aan subsidie wanneer het onderwerp om lokaal bestuur gaat. Dat argument wordt echter slechts door vier steden genoemd.

Twee gemeenten gaven aan in alle gevallen altijd eerst advies te vragen aan de VNG-I, terwijl maar drie gemeenten aangeven zich helemaal niet door de mogelijkheid van subsidie te laten leiden, maar strikt door hun eigen beleid.

Voor het programma GST wordt verwacht dat de activiteiten een bijdrage leveren aan de implementatie van het Acquis Communautaire op het niveau van het lokaal bestuur. De vraag is gesteld of de Nederlandse gemeenten daar over kunnen oordelen, b.v. omdat ze kennis genomen hadden van de Nationale Programma's voor de Adoptie van het Acquis (NPAA).

Van de 15 respondenten op deze vraag, gaven er 5 aan er van uit te gaan dat hun partner op de hoogte is, dus dat niet nogmaals een toetsing in Nederland nodig is. Vlaardingen en Beuningen gaven aan het advies van VNG-I daaromtrent altijd af te wachten. De gemeente Dordrecht gaf aan goed op de hoogte te zijn van het NPAA voor Bulgarije, maar niet voor de andere landen, terwijl de Provincie Gelderland aangaf goede kennis in huis te hebben omtrent de acquis op het gebied van milieu en waterhuishouding. Den Haag, Eindhoven en Utrecht toetsen marginaal, terwijl Assen nog nimmer gehoord had van het acquis.

Na de formulering wordt de aanvraag ingediend bij VNG-I. Op de vraag of er door de gemeente projectaanvragen ingediend zijn in de periode 1997-2001 die zijn afgewezen antwoordt 13 procent bevestigend. De redenen voor afwijzing zijn voornamelijk dat niet voldaan wordt aan de procedurele criteria (vergelijk ook met 3.10).

**Tabel 5.7 Redenen voor afwijzing van aanvraag door (meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)**

	<b>reden In procent</b>
Het aangevraagde subsidiebedrag was te hoog	11
Het voorstel voldeed niet aan de VNG-I format	0
Het voorstel voldeed niet aan de subsidie criteria	56
Het voorstel voldeed niet aan het Acquis criterium (GST)	25
Anders (o.a. limiet overschreden)	38

#### *Projectuitvoering en monitoring*

De activiteiten die worden ondernomen door de gemeenten en de bijbehorende planning worden vermeld in het aanvraagformulier, terwijl ook in het contract tussen de VNG-I en de Nederlandse gemeente de belangrijkste activiteiten in het kort worden vermeld.

Het aanvraagformulier bevat tevens een paragraaf 'indicatoren'. Dossierstudie laat zien dat in deze paragraaf zelden indicatoren genoemd worden. Uit de gesprekken met de gemeenten blijkt dat gemeenten het lastig vinden om indicatoren te formuleren voor de korte, soms heel korte activiteiten, maar het wel een noodzaak vinden voor de activiteiten met een lange doorlooptijd (GIs en de GIMs).

De monitoring van de projecten door de Nederlandse gemeente bestaat voornamelijk uit het bijhouden van de activiteiten op basis van de planning. Gevraagd naar het tijdspad en budgetbewaking gaven slechts 19 respondenten antwoord en verwezen daarbij veelal naar anderen:

- De stichting moet dat doen (vijf gemeenten),
- Dat is de verantwoordelijkheid van de coördinerende ambtenaar (zes gemeenten),
- Iedere dienst is zelf verantwoordelijk (drie gemeenten),
- Persoonlijke betrokkenheid garandeert dat de activiteiten zoals voorzien verlopen (twee gemeenten),
- Er is geen harde bewaking (vier gemeenten),
- Voortgangsmonitoring alleen op basis van jaarplannen e.d. en niet per activiteit (7 gemeenten).

Hoewel 11 (van de 19) gemeenten aangeven voor monitoring wel indicatoren van te voren te hebben opgesteld, verklaren slechts vier die dan ook in de praktijk te gebruiken. Die indicatoren zijn opgesteld hetzij in onderling overleg met de partner, hetzij maken deel uit van de projectplannen, hetzij zijn verwoord in het Aanvraagformulier.

**Tabel 5.8 Gebruik indicatoren voor monitoring**

Indicatoren ex-ante	ja	Nee	Op basis van
	11	8	Afspraken met partner Projectplan Subsidie-aanvraag
Gebruikt bij monitoring	ja	Nee	
	4	3	Aantallen woningen in Zuid-Afrika (Culemborg)

*Projectafroding en evaluatie*

De projectafroding bestaat uit het inleveren van de eindrapportage en de declaratie bij de VNG-I. Over de hanteerbaarheid van de verplichte format voor eindrapportage lopen de meningen uiteen. De meeste gemeenten erkennen het belang van de rapportage maar stellen dat het voor de coördinatoren relatief veel tijd vergt. De bijdrage van de partnergemeente aan de eindrapportage wordt als teleurstellend ervaren.

Gevraagd is in hoeverre gemeenten zelf evaluaties doen (hetzij reviews, hetzij ex-post) van een serie activiteiten en/of audits uitvoeren of laten uitvoeren. Hoewel 23 gemeenten ingegaan zijn op deze vraag, werd veelal verwezen naar andere actoren, zoals de Stedenband Stichting. Ongeveer de helft van de gemeenten geeft aan wel op enigerlei wijze te evalueren, bij voorbeeld op basis van Jaarplannen of vijf-jaren plannen. Slechts in een enkel geval heeft een specifieke evaluatie plaatsgevonden van het totaal van activiteiten op het gebied van internationale samenwerking (Hoorn) dan wel een descriptieve analyse (Groningen).

Bij beoordeling tegen Jaarplannen vindt een terugkoppeling plaats naar B&W, maar over het algemeen bestaat de indruk van de evaluatoren dat terugkoppeling slechts mondjesmaat plaatsvindt.

**Tabel 5.9 Evaluatie en auditing door de gemeente**

Geen evaluatie	Geen auditing	Geen terugkoppeling	N =
5	5	5	9
Wel evaluatie	Wel auditing	Wel terugkoppeling	
12	1	2	14

**5.2.4 Doelmatigheid**

De gemeenten en Stedenbandstichtingen is gevraagd hoe zij met doelmatigheid omgaan en met name in hoeverre en op welke wijze kwaliteit beoordeeld wordt.

Tweeëntwintig respondenten gingen in op de vraag omtrent inhoudelijke kwaliteitswaarborgen.

Opvallend is dat slechts een gemeente (Loenen) antwoordde dat kwaliteit een gemeenschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid was, die gemeenschappelijk bewaakt wordt door een 'linkage committee'. Vier gemeenten stelden dat er helemaal geen kwaliteitsbeoordeling was, of dat de activiteiten nog zo nieuw zijn dat daar nog geen reden voor is. Een drietal gemeenten vindt de kwaliteitsbeoordeling meer een verantwoordelijkheid van de VNG-I, terwijl vijf gemeenten die verantwoordelijkheid neerleggen bij de Stedenband Stichting.

Om over inhoud te kunnen oordelen zijn mensen nodig die daartoe in staat zijn. Een drietal gemeenten geeft aan die kennis nauwelijks te bezitten, terwijl vijf anderen juist aangeven dat de eigen expertise kwaliteit garandeert. De PUGAs leveren een mogelijkheid om zelf ter plekke een oordeel te vormen.

De vraag hoe de gemeente nu de baten tegen de kosten afwegen werd door de helft van de gemeenten (16) beantwoord en leidde tot discussie op verschillend niveau. De vraag was gericht op de kosten en baten per activiteit, maar werd veelal beantwoord vanuit het perspectief van de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking in zijn algemeenheid.

Drie gemeente gaven aan niet systematisch naar kosten en baten te kijken, terwijl nog eens vier stelden dat op ad hoc basis te doen. De meeste gemeenten gaven aan alleen op kosten te bewaken op basis van de eigen begroting dan wel Jaarplan.

Vijf ambtelijke coördinatoren gaven aan kosten en baten niet interessant te vinden, omdat de beslissingen omtrent financiële bijdragen aan activiteiten in het buitenland bestuurlijke beslissingen zijn. Het zijn de bestuurders die de kosten en baten tegen elkaar afwegen op politieke gronden.

### **5.2.5 Doeltreffendheid, neveneffecten en duurzaamheid**

De doeltreffendheid (effectiviteit) is de mate waarin de inputs –via de outputs hebben bijgedragen aan de realisatie van de verwachte resultaten. In deze paragraaf is de doeltreffendheid beschreven vanuit het perspectief van de Nederlandse gemeente, en hoe die de bereikte resultaten en neveneffecten waarderen.

Eén van de mogelijke effecten van de GSO en GST subsidies is dat de contacten leiden tot het aanknopen van banden met een gemeente of een ander bestuursorgaan waarmee nog geen samenwerkingsverband bestond. Het bestendigen en structureel maken van deze banden is géén expliciete doelstelling van het GSO programma, maar speelt als het ware op de achtergrond mee. Het is ook geen doelstelling van het GST programma. Daar is het eerder andersom, namelijk dat de activiteiten uitgevoerd worden binnen het kader van bestaande banden.

Theoretisch gezien is het aangaan dan wel bevestigen van stedenbanden dan ook geen effect, maar een neveneffect van de programma's GSO en GST.

Tijdens de interviews gaven de respondenten aan dat de meeste stedenbanden historisch gegroeid zijn. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn:

- Stedenbanden die ontstaan zijn uit solidariteitsacties vanuit de bevolking (Nicaragua) of specifieke stellingname van de Nederlandse gemeente (Zuid-Afrika);
- Stedenbanden die ontstaan zijn vanuit bestaande contacten, bijvoorbeeld tussen universiteiten of havens;
- Stedenbanden die zijn ontstaan vanuit cultureel historische banden (Zuid-Afrika);
- Stedenbanden die ontstaan zijn uit samenwerking met andere ontwikkelingsorganisaties (bijvoorbeeld SNV).

Drie grote gemeenten zijn nogal stellig in hun mening dat geen enkele band voortkomt uit de programma's GSO en GST. Het betreft hier wel gemeenten die moeite hebben met het afhouden van potentieel geïnteresseerde partners in het

buitenland. Voor een viertal gemeenten geldt dat ze wel contacten zijn aangegaan op initiatief van de VNG-I binnen het GSO programma, maar die vervolgens niet hebben doorgezet. Uit de groep van 24 respondenten op de vraag welke contacten zijn voortkomen uit de GSO / GST programma's worden 7 relaties genoemd. Daarvan zijn er vijf in de 'sample – landen'. Van deze vijf zijn er vervolgens maar twee doorgezet.

Wel is GSO en GST van belang voor de continuïteit. Van de 45 contacten die de 24 respondenten onderhouden in de vijf 'sample landen', bleek ongeveer de helft (21) van de gevallen de continuïteit mede gewaarborgd door de GSO en GST programma's.

**Tabel 5.10 Contacten gestart of gecontinueerd dankzij GSO/GST**

	<b>Totaal nu</b>	<b>Waarvan gestart</b>	<b>Waarvan gecontinueerd</b>	<b>N = 24</b>
Polen	11		4	
Tsjechië	7	1	2	
Zuid-Afrika	11	1	8	
Tanzania	6	3	2	
Nicaragua	10		5	
Andere GSO/GST		2	4	

#### *Waardering van activiteiten*

Alle geïnterviewde gemeenten hebben aangegeven het GSO en GST nuttige programma's te vinden.

Grotere en meer ervaren gemeenten geven aan dat het GSO en GST programma's vooral geschikt zijn als 'startersprogramma'. Voor verdieping en professionalisering van de samenwerkingsrelaties zijn andere programma's nodig. Hiervoor zijn echter weinig mogelijkheden beschikbaar. Voor de GST landen kunnen gemeentelijke activiteiten verder worden verdiept via MATRA en EU programma's. De EU programma's worden door de gemeenten als administratief ontoegankelijk gezien. Voor GSO landen zijn geen 'opvolgprogramma's' beschikbaar.

#### *Bereikte resultaten*

Waardering staat niet gelijk aan het bereiken van resultaten. In de perceptie van de meeste gemeenten worden resultaten vooral afgemeten aan het in gang houden van het samenwerkingsproces. Het bereiken van resultaten is volgens de gemeenten afhankelijk van:

- de frequentie van contacten tussen de partners,
- de goede persoonlijke relaties binnen de stedenband,
- het bestuurlijke en politieke draagvlak bij de partnergemeente,
- de 'bestuurlijke en politieke' belang van het onderwerp,
- de duur van de projecten.

Gemeenten doen nauwelijks onderzoek naar de doeltreffendheid van de samenwerking, en nog minder op het specifieke gebied van de versterking van capaciteitsopbouw op het gebied van lokaal bestuur. Van de 22 gemeenten die op vragen hieromtrent antwoordden, bleken er vier eigen onderzoek gedaan te hebben naar de effecten van de activiteiten bij de partnergemeente.

Gevraagd naar de redenen waarom er niet specifiek naar de resultaten van de activiteiten gekeken wordt, werden de volgende antwoorden gegeven:

- De gemeente is wel betrokken bij losse activiteiten, maar niet bij een concreet programma.
- Het schiet het doel voorbij. Het gaat in de eerste plaats om solidariteit.
- De resultaten zijn zonder onderzoek ook wel bekend. Door personeelwisseling bij de partnergemeente was er helemaal geen capaciteitsopbouw.
- Er liggen plannen dat te gaan doen (drie gemeenten).
- Er is niemand die dat vraagt: het gemeentebestuur niet en de VNG-I niet.
- Dat is een taak voor de VNG-I (drie gemeenten).
- Dat doet de LBSNN op nationaal niveau.

In vier gevallen zijn er wel specifieke onderzoeken gedaan naar resultaten:

- Amersfoort – Liberec,
- Amsterdam – Managua en Beira,
- Nijmegen – Masaya,
- Tilburg – Lekoa Vaal.

Ingaande op de resultaten van deze studies, blijken er een aantal gemeenschappelijke noemers te zijn:

- De resultaten zijn sterk afhankelijk van continuïteit en intensiteit in de contacten.
- Er is veel nadruk op ondersteuning door de Nederlandse gemeenten op het gebied van planning. Echter, omdat de Nederlandse gemeente geen invloed heeft op de middelen en het organisatorisch management is er weinig tot geen kijk op de uitvoering (Amsterdam, Nijmegen, Tilburg).
- Politieke besluitvorming verloopt volgens een andere rationaliteit dan in Nederland (Amsterdam, Nijmegen).
- De doelstellingen zijn bij lange na niet gehaald (Amsterdam, Nijmegen, Tilburg).

#### *Neveneffecten*

GSO en GST activiteiten staan zelden op zichzelf. Het merendeel speelt zich af binnen de context van een stedenband. Er kunnen allerlei effecten optreden in bredere zin. Deze worden hier 'neveneffecten' genoemd. Het is moeilijk om onderscheid te maken tussen nevenactiviteiten voortkomen uit GSO en GST activiteiten en andersom. In veel gevallen is de GSO of GST activiteit zelf een neveneffect van andere activiteiten binnen de stedenband.

Vaak genoemde neveneffecten zijn:

- effecten op het gebied van de handel,
- de betrokkenheid van het bedrijfsleven, al dan niet middels de Kamers van Koophandel,
- de betrokkenheid Nederlandse organisaties (bijvoorbeeld milieuorganisaties, onderwijsorganisaties, woningbouwcorporaties),
- het opbouwen van netwerken.

Aan de gemeenten is gevraagd waar deze neveneffecten uit bestaan voor de eigen gemeente en voor de partnergemeente. De neveneffecten voor de partnergemeenten worden veelal in abstracte termen beschreven zoals:

- De 'poort naar het westen' ,
- Toename van het vertrouwen van de bevolking in de overheid,
- Netwerkopbouw,
- Mogelijkheden om EU subsidies aan te vragen.



Eenentwintig gemeenten gaven aan wat hun inziens de neveneffecten zijn voor de eigen gemeente. Zes gemeenten gaven aan dat er neveneffecten waren op het gebied van de handel en elf gemeenten refereerden naar initiatieven van de private sector. Het is opvallend dat in de helft van de gemeenten gewezen wordt op economische neveneffecten en belangen. In de enquête kwam dat minder sterk naar voren.

De antwoorden voor wat betreft de neveneffecten voor de eigen gemeente zijn minder abstract dan voor wat betreft de partnergemeente. In veel gevallen gaat het om een andere type contacten, die voor beide partners effecten hebben. Deze zijn als volgt samen te vatten:

**Tabel 5.11 Neveneffecten en spin-offs voor de Nederlandse gemeente**

Handelsrelaties	ja	N = 21
	6	Kamer van Koophandel (3 gemeenten) Handelsmissie en presentaties (4 gemeenten)
Initiatieven private sector	11	Rollator-bedrijf (Driebergen) DAF, Philips en KPMG (Eindhoven) Tsjechen in bloemenbedrijf (Hoorn) DHV heeft kantoor in Liberec (Amersfoort) Initiatieven Bouwfonds (Amersfoort) Vestiging schaatspakkenfabriek in Polen (Assen) Schoenenbedrijf Scapino vestigt in Polen ABN AMRO financiering voor Poolse gemeente (Hoorn) Bedrijfscontacten in Brno (Utrecht)
Anders	17	Draagvlak onder bevolking (8 gemeenten) Cultuur (o.a. festivals) (7 gemeenten) Betrokkenheid onderwijs (6 gemeenten) Betrokkenheid woningbouwcorporaties (3 gemeenten) Sport en Toerisme (3 gemeenten) Uitwisseling verpleegkundigen Contacten milieuorganisaties Samenwerking Noorderdierenpark en Dierenpark Poznan Uitwisseling brandweer (2 gemeenten)

#### *Duurzaamheid van de contacten*

Ondanks de verschuivende politieke situatie in de gemeenten, zijn vrijwel alle gemeenten van plan de samenwerking te continueren met hun huidige partners. Van de 26 gemeenten die daarop een antwoord gaven, stellen 25 door te gaan met de huidige partners. Drieëntwintig daarvan hebben daarvoor reeds een budget gereserveerd.

#### **5.2.6 Relevantie**

De relevantie van de GSO en GST gesubsidieerde activiteiten voor gemeenten kan worden afgemeten naar het beleid dat gemeenten hebben ten aanzien van de stedenbanden in het algemeen en ten aanzien van de versterking van de capaciteit op het gebied van lokaal bestuur bij de partnersteden in het bijzonder.

Gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking wordt niet als een kerntaak van de gemeente gezien, maar de geïnterviewde gemeenten geven wel aan dat gemeenten een specifieke bijdrage kunnen leveren.

De vraag is gesteld in hoeverre de gemeente een expliciet beleid heeft aangaande de samenwerking met gemeenten in het buitenland en of dat verwoord is in een beleidsdocument. Vierentwintig gemeenten beantwoordden deze vraag, waaruit bleek dat precies de helft wel en de andere helft geen specifiek beleid heeft voor wat betreft de samenwerking met ontwikkelingslanden. Dat cijfer komt redelijk overeen met de uitkomst van de enquête (60 procent wel een beleid). Opvallend is dat slechts een derde aangeeft een beleid te hebben voor zover dat de samenwerking met toetredende landen betreft.

**Tabel 5.12 Is er een beleid?**

<b>Voor samenwerking met ontwikkelingslanden</b>		
Geen beleid	Wel beleid	Wat is beleid N = 24
12	12	Gemeente als voortrekker; daarna overdracht aan maatschappelijk middenveld Kleinschalige projecten op gebied van onderwijs, gezondheidszorg en drinkwatervoorziening Maakt onderdeel uit van jaarlijkse begroting Stimuleren van contacten met ontwikkelingslanden Intergemeentelijke contacten gericht op capacity-building Specifieke stedenbandnotitie (4 gemeenten) Mogelijk uitbreiding naar landen van herkomst
<b>Voor samenwerking met toetredingslanden</b>		
Geen beleid	Wel beleid	Wat is beleid N = 21
14	7	Verantwoordelijkheid Stichtingen Alleen project met geestelijk gehandicapten (Aalten) Strategisch Plan met 120 potentiële projecten (Amersfoort) Good governance, duurzame ontwikkeling en milieu (Dordrecht) Jaarlijkse begroting (vier gemeenten) Specifieke stedenbandnotitie (2 gemeenten) Beleid specifiek per land (Provincie Gelderland)

### 5.2.7 Rol van de VNG-I

De rol van de VNG-I wordt hier bekeken vanuit het perspectief van de gemeenten. Tachtig procent van de geïnterviewde gemeenten hebben aangegeven dat VNG-I de juiste organisatie is om de GSO en GST programma's te beheren. De VNG-I wordt als toegankelijk en behulpzaam gekenschetst. Slechts één gemeente is van mening dat VNG-I haar rol als intermediair niet aankan.

Tien van de zestien gemeenten die op de vraag antwoordden was van mening dat de VNG-I de procedures strikt toepast en transparant handelt. Wel stellen tien gemeenten dat de aanvrager nog wel eens geduld moet hebben, omdat de Advies Commissies slechts drie tot vier maal per jaar bijeenkomt. Met name voor deelname aan bepaalde gebeurtenissen die vastliggen in de tijd is dat een belemmering.

Enkele gemeenten die (nog) weinig ervaring hebben met internationale samenwerking hebben laten weten behoefte te hebben aan meer ondersteuning dan een CUGA, maar begrijpen dat binnen de huidige opzet die ondersteuning niet of nauwelijks gegeven kan worden.

VNG-I wordt gezien als een bekwaam organisator van de MMTPs. Naast de waardering als organisator en manager van de GSO en GST fondsen, wordt kritiek geuit op de inhoudelijke kennis van de VNG-I. Met namen de specifieke landenkennis wordt nogal eens te gering geacht (vijf gemeenten). Een aantal losse commentaren met betrekking tot het beheer van de programma's wordt hieronder weergegeven:

- VNG-I heeft te veel invloed op de Advies Commissie,
- VNG-I coördineert te weinig in Nederland. Er wordt te weinig gedaan aan het opzetten van platforms,
- De regionale samenwerking wordt groter. Wijk bij Duurstede, Amersfoort en Leersum hebben met Driebergen besloten samen te werken voor wat betreft de relaties met partnersteden in dezelfde regio in Tsjechië. De VNG-I zou hier meer in kunnen sturen,
- EU fondsen zijn moeilijk toegankelijk. Wel kan door gemeenten toegang gevonden worden tot Matra fondsen. De VNG-I zou meer kunnen bemiddelen,
- VNG-I hanteert een misleidend jargon. Het spreken van 'peer to peer' en 'spiegelorganisaties' dekt de lading niet,
- VNG-I medewerkers zijn jong en onervaren,
- Kosten van VNG-I te hoog, immers nu een commercieel bedrijf,
- VNG-I heeft een zwalkend beleid. Het is onduidelijk wat nu nagestreefd wordt. Dat wekt verwarring bij de gebruikers van de programma's.

#### **5.2.8 Het kenmerkende van GIS en de programma's GST en GSO**

De vraag naar het karakteristieke van de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking gaf een breed scala van antwoorden, waaronder:

- De kennis van gemeenten sluit goed aan bij de behoeften van opbouw van lokaal bestuur in ontwikkelingslanden,
- Specifieke en toegespitste kennis kan daarbij worden ingezet. Er is zelfs een 'subsidiekenner' voor Europese regelingen,
- De collega tot collega benadering is een voordeel en bestuurlijke ervaring telt. Dat levert maatwerk op (7 gemeenten),
- De korte lijnen, de mogelijkheden tot intensieve advisering en de herkenning van vergelijkbare problemen,
- Maar: gemeenten zijn niet de instellingen om de grote problemen van die landen op te lossen (3 gemeenten),
- En: de relaties zijn vooral gericht op ambtenaren (NGOs staan wat in de zijlijn),
- De vriendschapsband komt continuïteit en verhoogde interactie te goede, maar verhult professionele en zakelijke noodzaak,
- Het motief is de mondiale bewustwording onder de eigen bevolking. Dit is een taak van de lokale overheid. Ten aanzien van het bereiken van significante veranderingen in ontwikkelingslanden is de rol van de gemeente minder.

Over het algemeen worden GSO en GST wel werkzaam geacht om de Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking te ondersteunen, maar bij toch blijken gemeenten nogal wat kritiek te hebben. Vooral het GST programma wordt beschouwd als weinig toegespitst op de eigen doelstelling en te veel geënt op het GSO model. Kritieken betreffen de goedkeuringsprocedure door de VNG-I, die hetzelfde traject volgen als die voor GSO, terwijl gemeenten denken dat een 'fast lane' procedure op zijn plaats zou zijn voor de GST aanvragen. Immers, de contacten zijn dichterbij, directer en sneller zijn. Verder kent GST geen

mogelijkheden om informatie uit te wisselen tussen gemeenten in Nederland en zijn de opties om specialisten in te huren beperkt.

Het wordt betreurd dat het VNG-NCDO draagvlakprogramma in 2002 is veranderd. Hoewel dat programma slechts aan vijf Nederlandse gemeenten gelden verstrekte voor draagvlakactiviteiten, zijn er nu in het geheel geen middelen meer om de GSO draagvlakdoelstelling te instrumentaliseren.

Interessant is de opmerking van de gemeente Amsterdam, die stelde dat de bereidwilligheid van diensten die in een proces van verzelfstandiging verkeren om aan internationale relaties te doen afneemt. Immers: bij privatisering of andersoortige verzelfstandiging wordt er naar interne financiële performance gekeken en drukken 'cadeautjes' in de vorm van tijd op de rentabiliteit. Daarvoor is het van groot belang dat de subsidies (op de salarissen) blijven bestaan, anders zouden met name de technische diensten zoals ruimtelijke ordening afhaken.

- De GSO en GST programma's staan wel open voor andere bestuursorganen dan gemeenten, maar zijn daar weinig op toegespitst. Een specifiek programma voor provincies en hun COS-sen zou welkom zijn (Provincie Gelderland),
- Effectief gebruik van subsidies vereist coördinatie op een hoger niveau dan de project per project beoordeling. De programma's honoreren losse initiatieven in plaats van consistente programma's en processen,
- De subsidie 'pusht' de focus op bestuurlijke capaciteitsversterking. Dat wordt door de gemeenten steeds meer overgenomen. Maar de vraag is of dat wenselijk is binnen het kader van een stedenband (3 gemeenten),
- GST is een premie op reizen. Bij STAGE worden voorbereidingskosten niet vergoed en eigen uren ook niet. Als de plaats van samenwerking dichtbij ligt, is het eenvoudiger gewoon de auto te pakken,
- GST leent zich niet voor inhuren externen. Externe expertise mag in GST 40 procent van het subsidiedeel bedragen. Maar de overige projectkosten zijn veelal nihil, want het gaat alleen om reiskosten en die zijn naar de meeste GST landen laag. Het subsidiedeel is maar 20 procent van de werkelijke projectkosten. Het is niet de moeite waard daar een projectaanvraag voor in te dienen (3 gemeenten),
- GSO is startersprogramma, maar biedt geen mogelijkheden voor doorgroei naar professionalisering van de samenwerking (5 gemeenten).

### **5.3 Interviews met VNG-International en het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken**

Naast interviews met de Nederlandse gemeenten zijn diverse gesprekken gevoerd met de financier van de programma's GST en GSO, het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en de beheerder, de VNG-I. Deze gesprekken hebben plaats gevonden op diverse beheerslagen. Aangezien de beleidanalyse door IOB werd uitgevoerd, richtten de gesprekken zich vooral op uitvoerende en beheersmatige aspecten, zoals:

- informatie omtrent de financiële kant van de programma's, de auditing en andere controlemechanismen
- praktische informatie omtrent projecten en gemeenten,
- de personele inzet en de tijdsinspanning van VNG-I
- de rollen van de diverse actoren, incl de Advies Commissie.

Alle gesprekken zijn gevoerd aan de hand van vooropgestelde gespreksgidsen.

## 6 ANALYSE EVALUATIERAPPORTEN

### 6.1 Doel analyse evaluatierapporten

Als onderdeel van de bureaustudie is een analyse gemaakt van evaluatierapporten betreffende de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking<sup>22</sup>.

Het doel van de analyse van evaluatierapporten was tweeledig:

- Een analyse van de inzet van evaluaties ter verbetering van de inhoud en het beheer van de programma's en instrumenten ter ondersteuning van gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking,
- het verzamelen van evaluatieve waarderingen door derden betreffende de programma's en projecten ter ondersteuning van de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking.

Vanuit het beheer van de programma's zijn er twee niveaus van verantwoordelijkheid. Het eerste niveau is die van de directe 'manager' van de GSO en GST programma's: VNG International. VNG-I dient vanuit management perspectief de programma's te bewaken, de ingezette instrumenten te toetsen en te meten in hoeverre de activiteiten effectief en doelmatig zijn.

Een tweede niveau is dat van BZ als budgethouder verantwoordelijk voor de inzet van de programma's en de daarbij behorende middelen. Voor BZ zijn niet alleen de effectiviteit en doelmatigheidsvragen van belang, maar vooral ook de relevantie van de programma's.

Terwijl op het eerste niveau vooral directe monitoring en interne evaluatie de management relevante informatie dienen te produceren voor permanente bijsturing, zal op het tweede niveau meer gewerkt worden met globalere externe evaluaties. Opvalt dat de meest recente globale evaluatie van het GSO programma van 1997 dateert<sup>23</sup> en dat nog geen externe evaluatie heeft plaats gevonden van het GST programma.

Gedurende de bureaustudie zijn ook evaluaties verzameld omtrent andere programma's ter ondersteuning van GIS. Deze informatie zou als 'benchmark' voor de door de VNG-I uitgevoerde programma's kunnen dienen. Echter, er zijn methodologische bedenkingen bij 'benchmarking' en bovendien bleek het aantal programma's dat gedecentraliseerde samenwerking op internationaal niveau ondersteunt beperkt. Met de programma's GSO en GST vergelijkbare ondersteuningsmechanismen worden gefinancierd door de Europese Unie (het jumelage-fonds), de USAID, en de overheden van Canada, Zweden en Noorwegen. Er is voor gekozen in de hierna te presenteren lijst van evaluatiestudies slechts één buitenlands rapport nader te beschouwen, omdat het hier gemeenten in Zuid-Afrika betreft, die ook banden onderhouden met Nederlandse gemeenten die gebruik gemaakt hebben van het GSO programma. Bovendien gaat het voor een gedeelte om dezelfde activiteiten (Integrated Development Planning).

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<sup>22</sup> Voor analyse is gebruik gemaakt van een formulier, opgenomen als annex 11 bij het Plan van Aanpak.

<sup>23</sup> DHV Consultants. Evaluatie Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden. October 1997.

## 6.2 Overzicht van de geanalyseerde rapporten

Er is niet gestreefd naar volledigheid. Criterium voor het beschouwen van een rapport als een 'evaluatie' is geweest, wanneer het rapport als zodanig gekarakteriseerd wordt in hetzij de titel, de ondertitel of de inleiding van de betreffende rapporten.

Als afbakening in de tijd is de periode 1997-2002 genomen. Een tweede afbakening was dat de thema's of programma's die onderwerp van evaluatie waren direct gerelateerd moesten zijn aan de programma's GSO en GST en/of hun instrumenten, dan wel activiteiten uitgevoerd in het kader van de GIS binnen één van de vijf geselecteerde landen. Tabel 6.1 presenteert de rapporten die nader geanalyseerd zijn:

**Tabel 6.1 Evaluatierapporten**

Titel evaluatierapport	Uitgevoerd door	In opdracht van	Datum rapport
Programma Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden. Evaluatiemissie Nicaragua	M. van Haersma Buma; Mw B den Boer	VNG-I	Augustus 2001
Programma Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden. Evaluatiemissie Zuid Afrika	N.Schoof, H.Buis	VNG-I	Juni 2002
Evaluatie Municipal Management Training Programme (MMTP)	NEI Macro en Sector Beleid	BZ en VNG-I	Januari 2001
Evaluatie KPA Nicaragua	DHV Consultants	BZ	October 1997
Evaluatie Gemeentelijke Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden	DHV Consultants	BZ	October 1997
Samenwerkingsprojecten in Nicaragua	Landelijk Beraad Stedenbanden Nederland Nicaragua (LBSNN)	LBSNN	December 2001
Review / Appraisal of Partnership Programmes, Sweden and South Africa	O.Mihlund, Mrs M van der Molen	Sida	October 2002
Programma MITCH, Stedenbanden Nederland Nicaragua 1998-2001	LBSNN	Samenwerkende Hulp Organisaties	Juli 2001

Deze evaluaties kunnen als volgt gekarakteriseerd worden

	Programma evaluatie	Instrument evaluatie	Landen-inzet evaluatie
Externe evaluatie	1	2	1
Interne evaluatie	1	1	2

Hoewel bovennoemde rapporten het woord 'evaluatie' gebruiken ter karakterisering van de inhoud, geldt voor enkele studies dat, methodologisch gezien, het meer 'reviews', analyses of reflecties zijn dan evaluaties. Zo zijn twee interne evaluaties uitgevoerd door VNG-I (Zuid Afrika en Nicaragua) 'reviews', terwijl het rapport van LBSNN betreffende de KPA projecten een identificatie van 'best practices' is. De rapportage van de activiteiten van de Nederlandse steden in het kader van de Mitch operaties in Nicaragua is een 'evaluatieve' rapportage.

In alle rapporten was de afbakening van het onderwerp van studie en de doelstelling van de evaluatie/ rapportage omschreven. Terwijl de evaluatieve rapportage omtrent de Mitch activiteiten in eerste instantie was ingegeven door contractuele verplichtingen, zijn alle rapporten nadrukkelijk geschreven vanuit het perspectief om de kwaliteit van de in te zetten middelen, instrumenten en het daarbij behorende beheer, te verbeteren.

Niet van alle studies is de ToR bekend en slechts in enkele rapporten wordt de keuze van de onderzoeksmethoden gerelateerd aan de ToR. De onderzoeksmethoden die gebruikt zijn in de diverse studies zijn weergegeven in tabel 6.2:

**Tabel 6.2 Gebruikte onderzoeksmethoden**

Evaluatie	Deskstudie + interviews NL	Onderzoek in buitenland	Enquêtes of andere methoden
GSO Nicaragua-VNG-I	Ja	3 gemeenten	
GSO Zd Afrika –VNG-I	Ja	3 gemeenten	
MMTP –NEI	Ja	Nee	Enquête
KPA-DHV	Ja	Nee	
GSO –DHV	Ja	3 landen, 8 gemeenten	
Nicaragua-LBSNN	Ja	11 gemeenten	
Zd Afrika-Sida	Ja	2 gemeenten	
Mitch- LBSNN	Ja	Nee	Inclusief audit

In haar evaluaties past IOB drie hoofdcriteria van beoordeling toe: doeltreffendheid, doelmatigheid en relevantie. Deze criteria zijn maar gedeeltelijk terug te vinden in de onderzochte evaluatiestudies, waarbij er meer aandacht blijkt te zijn voor de doeltreffendheid dan voor doelmatigheid en relevantie

**Tabel 6.3 Toepassing evaluatiecriteria**

Evaluatie	Doeltreffendheid	Doelmatigheid	Relevantie
GSO Nicaragua-VNG-I	Ja	Nee	Ja
GSO Zd Afrika –VNG-I	Ja	Gedeeltelijk	Nee
MMTP –NEI	Ja	Ja	Ja
KPA-DHV	Ja	Gedeeltelijk	Ja
GSO –DHV	Ja	Ja	Ja
Nicaragua-LBSNN	Per sector	Per sector	Nee
Zd Afrika-Sida	Per gemeente	Nee	Ja
Mitch- LBSNN	Per activiteit	Per activiteit	Nee

Van ieder van de evaluaties is geregistreerd in hoeverre er gebruik gemaakt is van verifieerbare indicatoren om de doeltreffendheid en doelmatigheid te beoordelen. De mate waarin dat praktisch mogelijk is niet in iedere studie gelijk. Tevens is nagegaan in hoeverre een sterke – zwakte analyse dan wel benchmarking deel uitmaakte van de evaluatie (tabel 6.4) .

Ieder van de evaluaties is beoordeeld voor wat betreft de toegepaste onderzoeksmethode en de technisch inhoudelijke zaken. Voor de onderzoeksmethodologie is gekeken of de toegepaste methode het meest logisch is gelet op de onderzoeksvraag. Daarbij is rekening gehouden met de factoren geld en tijd, indien bekend. Vervolgens is beoordeeld of de conclusies en aanbevelingen antwoord geven op de in de ToR gestelde vragen, dan wel op de onderzoeksvraag,

gelet ook op de gehanteerde methode. Deze beoordeling is subjectief en heeft slechts indicatieve waarde.

**Tabel 6.4 Gebruikmaking van verifieerbare indicatoren en analyse technieken**

Evaluatie	Doeltreffendheid Indicatoren	Doelmatigheid Indicatoren	SWOT analyse	benchmarking
GSO Nicaragua-VNG-I	Gedeeltelijk	Nee	gedeeltelijk	nee
GSO Zd Afrika –VNG-I	Nee	Geen	Nee	nee
MMTP –NEI	Ja	Nee	gedeeltelijk	nee
KPA-DHV	Ja	Nee	Gedeeltelijk	Nee
GSO –DHV	Ja	Ja	Ja	Nee
Nicaragua-LBSNN	Gedeeltelijk	Nee	Gedeeltelijk	Nee
Zd Afrika-Sida	Gedeeltelijk	Nee	nee	Nee
Mitch- LBSNN	Nee	Nee	Nee	Gedeeltelijk, vergelijking noodhulp via nationale kanalen

Wat opvalt is dat alle evaluaties van een voldoende technische en inhoudelijke kwaliteit zijn. Vrijwel zonder uitzondering tonen de rapporten kennis van zaken te hebben. Methodologisch zijn vooral de interne evaluaties niet sterk. Dat is wellicht een direct gevolg van het feit dat de twee interne GSO evaluaties (VNG-I) in zeer korte tijd verricht zijn, waarbij telkens één evaluator lid was van de Adviescommissie en de ander de verantwoordelijke medewerker bij VNG.

In deze twee evaluaties was er sprake van een mismatch tussen de evaluatieve vragen en de beschikbare tijd. De methode van onderzoek beperkte zich vervolgens tot open interviews met sleutelinformanten. De daaruit volgende conclusies en direct daaraan verbonden aanbevelingen maken een ‘executive’ indruk, maar niet dat zij zijn gebaseerd op de kennis opgedaan tijdens de evaluaties.

De studies zijn subjectief gewaardeerd in de categorieën voldoende – matig – onvoldoende – slecht (zie tabel 6.5).

De pretenties van de interne evaluaties zijn hoog. Zo presenteert de LBSNN ‘best practices’ in maar liefst zes sectoren, gebaseerd op 11 onderzochte projecten van het KPA programma. Het is daarbij onduidelijk op grond waarvan deze 11 projecten zijn geselecteerd en in hoeverre zij karakteristiek of juist succesvolle voorbeelden zijn voor andere activiteiten uit het programma.

De logica van de projectcyclus stelt dat de resultaten van evaluaties terug gevoerd worden naar de planning en uitvoering daarvan en daarmee ten goede komen aan de kwaliteit van de programma’s en activiteiten. In die gevallen waar de opdrachtgever dezelfde is als de uitvoerder van de evaluatie mag verwacht worden dat het leerproces gevolgen heeft voor de uitvoering. Niet in alle gevallen is bekend in hoeverre de resultaten van de evaluaties vertaald zijn in aanpassingen in hetzij de uitvoering, hetzij het beheer van het programma. Voor zover bekend uit dossieronderzoek is dat vrijwel altijd het geval (tabel 6.6).



Er kan gesteld worden dat –ongeacht de kwaliteit van de evaluaties- deze wel in alle gevallen die bekend zijn, gediend hebben tot nadere reflectie en een rol hebben gespeeld in een leerproces naar verbetering van de uitvoeringskant van de activiteiten.

**Tabel 6.5 Waardering**

Evaluatie	Evaluatie methodologische kwaliteit	Inhoudelijk technische kwaliteit	Conclusies en aanbevelingen
GSO Nicaragua-VNG-I	onvoldoende	Matig	Onvoldoende. Conclusies en aanbevelingen t.a.v. Strategische Planning gebaseerd op onvoldoende kennis. Aanbevelingen niet realistisch. Aanbevelingen wel verrassend en vernieuwend
GSO Zd Afrika –VNG-I	Te ambitieus in relatie tot de tijd	Voldoende	Conclusies slaan slechts terzijde op de vragen in de ToR. Vraagstelling breed en ambitieus; conclusies specifiek
MMTP –NEI	Voldoende	Voldoende	Conclusies beperkt. Aanbevelingen praktisch van aard; weinig vernieuwend
KPA-DHV	goed	Voldoende	Conclusies voldoende
GSO –DHV	goed	Voldoende	Conclusies voldoende en verhelderende aanbevelingen
Nicaragua-LBSNN	Slecht. Onduidelijk hoe op basis van 11 projecten een oordeel geveld kan worden van 'best practices' in zes sectoren	Voldoende (presentatie)	Voldoende
Zd Afrika-Sida	Voldoende	Voldoende	Conclusies onduidelijk en aanbevelingen weinig verrassend; vooral procedureel
Mitch- LBSNN	Onvoldoende	Voldoende	Onvoldoende. Geen causaal verband tussen de bevinden en de getrokken conclusies

**Tabel 6.6 Sturing en Feedback**

Evaluatie	Begeleiding door opdrachtgever tijdens evaluatie uitvoering	Opdrachtgever / uitvoerder geeft gehoor aan aanbevelingen
GSO Nicaragua-VNG-I	Opdrachtgever = uitvoerder	Ja, opdrachtgever = uitvoerder + Adviescommissie
GSO Zd Afrika –VNG-I	Opdrachtgever = uitvoerder	Ja, opdrachtgever = uitvoerder + Adviescommissie
MMTP –NEI	Begeleiding in traject	Ja
KPA-DHV	Onbekend	Ja
GSO –DHV	onbekend	Ja
Nicaragua-LBSNN	Opdrachtgever = uitvoerder	Opdrachtgever = uitvoerder
Zd Afrika-Sida	onbekend	onbekend
Mitch- LBSNN	Onbekend	Onbekend

### 6.3 Selectie van evaluatieve bevindingen

Ieder van de evaluatierapporten komt tot bepaalde bevindingen. Enkele opvallende evaluatieve bevindingen zijn opgenomen in tabel 6.7. Deze dienen slechts als illustratie en voor reflectie.

**Tabel 6.7 Selectie van bevindingen uit evaluatierapporten**

<b>Bevinding</b>	<b>Bron</b>
De uitgangspunten van het GSO programma zijn vernieuwend, de doelstellingen worden breed gedeeld door gemeenten in Nederland en in ontwikkelingslanden; het beheer van de middelen verloopt rustig en degelijk en de resultaten wijzen in de verwachte richting.	DHV, 1997
De tijdsfactor is cruciaal in een partnership: er is tijd voor nodig dat relaties volwassen en beklijfbaar worden. De kwaliteit en het enthousiasme van leidinggevende personen binnen een stedenband is de sleutel tot succes. Juist het tijdelement betreft meer mensen en verbreedt de basis voor een langdurige relatie. Echter, de directe betrokkenheid van mensen bij de programma blijft beperkt tot een relatief kleine groep van direct betrokkenen. Sociale verbondenheid dient gekoppeld te zijn aan belang: democratie, maar ook gewin.	Sida, 2002
De activiteiten kenmerkten zich door een gebrek aan zakelijke instelling naast de vriendschappelijke relatie: geen voortgangsindicatoren, geen afrekening op effectiviteit, geen mijlpalen in de tijd. Daardoor is doeltreffendheid veelal niet meetbaar.	Sida, 2002
Het MMTP past binnen de GSO doelstelling ter versterking van het lokaal bestuur in ontwikkelingslanden. Het wordt door alle partijen gezien als een waardevolle aanvulling op de andere modaliteiten. Echter, over de specifieke rol die MMTP heeft binnen het totale GSO programma bestaat geen eenduidigheid. Doordat het MMTP geïnitieerd en georganiseerd wordt door de VNG-I werkt deze modaliteit drempelverlagend, vooral voor kleinere gemeenten in Nederland. Hierdoor kunnen veel gemeenten in Nederland meedoen en zou het draagvlak voor internationale samenwerking vergroot worden. Echter, MMTPs geven zelden aanleiding tot het stimuleren en het opbouwen van structurele samenwerkingsrelaties tussen Nederlandse gemeenten en gemeenten in ontwikkelingslanden.	NEI, 2001
Het programma GSO heeft bijgedragen aan veranderingen in het denken en doen over volkshuisvesting en ruimtelijke ordening in Zuid-Afrika	VNG-I, 2001
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking is geen kerntaak voor gemeenten. Dat impliceert dat hetzij de coördinerende ambtenaren zwaar belast zijn, hetzij taken 'uitbesteed' worden aan particuliere organisaties, waarbij de 'feeling' van het gemeentelijk apparaat minder wordt. Betrokkenheid van bestuurders lijkt nogal een persoonsgebonden zaak	DHV, 1997
Het hebben van (sectoriele) beleidsnota's levert een enorm voordeel op. Strategische plannen per gemeente ontbreken veelal. Het zijn deze plannen die het raamwerk verschaffen waarbinnen projecten onderlinge coherentie krijgen.	LBSNN, 2001
Vrijwel elke donor die actief is in de ondersteuning van gemeenten in Nicaragua heeft activiteiten op het gebied van Strategische Planning en ieder doet dat op zijn eigen manier. Nicaraguaanse gemeenten geven aan dat de Plannen in sommige gevallen zo omvattend zijn dat de uitvoerbaarheid daarvan moeilijk is. Een inzet van Nederlandse gemeenten bij het formuleren van Strategische plannen binnen GSO is niet vanzelfsprekend.	VNG-I, 2001
Het huidige beheermodel van KPA-Nicaragua is gebaseerd op de samenwerking en taakverdeling van de VNG-I en het LBSNN en is tot stand gekomen op verzoek van de Minister van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Hiermee maakte de Minister een uitzondering voor Nicaragua in de zin dat hij de NCDO verzocht heeft 'de rest' van KPA over te nemen van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (DGIS). De VNG-I is geen intermediair tussen het Ministerie en de NCDO, terwijl het dat wel is tussen het Ministerie en de LBSNN.	DHV, 1997

## 7 SAMENVATTING EN CONCLUSIES

### *Algemeen*

De middelen die het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken inzet teneinde de versterking van democratisch lokaal bestuur te bevorderen in zowel ontwikkelingslanden als toetredingslanden bestaan uit een aantal financieringsprogramma's (subsidieregelingen), alsmede het financieren van zelfstandige projecten. De financieringsregelingen bevorderen deskundigheidsopbouw en het doen van kleine investeringen middels samenwerking tussen gemeenten (in brede zin) in Nederland en elders.

In het Plan van Aanpak van de Evaluatie van de subsidies aan de Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking is de onderzoeksmethode uiteengezet. De volgende onderzoeksinstrumenten worden in deze rapportage nader besproken:

- Enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten
- Dossieronderzoek
- Interviews in Nederlandse gemeenten
- Interviews Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten International
- Bestudering van evaluatierapporten.

### *Uitkomsten enquête*

Een schriftelijke enquête is gehouden onder alle Nederlandse gemeenten die in de periode 1997 t/m 2001 gebruik hebben gemaakt van financiering middels de programma's GSO en/of GST. Daarnaast is een enquête gehouden onder een controlegroep van gemeenten die geen gebruik hebben gemaakt van deze subsidiemogelijkheden. De totale respons onder alle gemeenten bedroeg 54 procent, waarbij deze onder de GSO/GST gemeenten (59 procent) iets hoger ligt dan onder de gemeenten binnen de controlegroep (41 procent).

In de periode 1997 t/m 2001 hebben 154 gemeenten één of meerdere malen gebruik gemaakt van GSO en/of GST middelen. Het GSO programma heeft in deze periode aan 115 gemeenten subsidie verleent, het GST programma aan 91 gemeenten. Een derde van de GSO/GST gemeenten (52) heeft van beide programma's gebruik gemaakt. Precies één kwart van de Nederlandse gemeenten heeft gebruik gemaakt van GSO en/of GST middelen in de periode 1997 t/m 2001. Daarbij waren, op één na, alle "grote" gemeenten (>100.000 inwoners). Van de "kleine" gemeenten (<25.000 inwoners) heeft slechts 11 procent gebruik gemaakt van de GSO of GST middelen.

### *De coördinatie van gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking*

GSO/GST gemeenten worden in vergelijking met overige gemeenten vaker gekenmerkt door een gemeentelijke structuur waarbij GIS een verantwoordelijkheid is van meerdere personen (al dan niet in de vorm van afdelingen) of organisaties, zowel binnen de eigen gemeentelijke organisatie als in de vorm van een maatschappelijke organisatie. Ook blijkt dat grote gemeenten de coördinatie van GIS vaker overlaten aan speciale afdelingen binnen de gemeente of aan speciaal daarvoor aangestelde ambtenaren dan kleinere gemeenten.

### *Beleid ten aanzien van GIS*

GSO/GST gemeenten hebben vaker een bredere gemeentelijke visie op internationale samenwerking dan gemeenten die geen gebruik maken van GSO/GST. Daarnaast is er ook een aanzienlijke groep gemeenten die wel een

beleidsvisie hebben geformuleerd ten aanzien van GIS, maar geen gebruik maken van GSO/GST.

#### *Informatie en cursussen*

GSO/GST gemeenten maken meer gebruik van de door de VNG-I verschaft informatie op het gebied van GIS dan de controlegroep. Ruim een derde van de GSO/GST gemeenten maakt er echter geen gebruik van. Ten aanzien van de cursussen die VNG-I organiseert geeft 38 procent van de GSO/GST gemeenten aan dat zij hiervan gebruik maakt. Bij slechts een klein deel van de GSO/GST gemeenten is het cursusaanbod niet bekend. Ondanks dat de helft van de controlegroep wel bekend is met het cursusaanbod, maakt niemand er gebruik van.

#### *Structurele samenwerkingsovereenkomsten (stedenbanden)*

Van de GSO/GST gemeenten gaf bijna 60 procent aan dat zij structurele banden (stedenbanden) onderhoudt met gemeenten in toetredingslanden en bijna 40 procent met gemeenten in ontwikkelingslanden. Ongeveer een kwart van de GSO/GST gemeenten gaf aan dat zij helemaal geen stedenbanden heeft, tegenover de helft van alle gemeenten binnen de controlegroep. Ondanks het feit dat meer gemeenten gebruik hebben gemaakt van GSO dan van GST (115 tegenover 91) hebben meer gemeenten stedenbanden met toetredingslanden dan met ontwikkelingslanden.

Voor wat betreft toetredingslanden ligt er een grote concentratie van stedenbanden in Polen en Tsjechië. Stedenbanden met ontwikkelingslanden concentreren zich in Nicaragua en Zuid-Afrika.

Van de GSO/GST gemeenten hebben 18 gemeenten (21 procent) aangegeven in zijn geheel niet samen te werken met lokale bestuursorganen, ondanks het feit dat zij in de periode 1997-2001 één of meerdere activiteiten hebben gefinancierd met GSO/GST middelen. De argumenten daarvoor zijn te categoriseren in vier groepen:

- gemeenten geven geen politieke prioriteit aan gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking,
- gemeenten kunnen onvoldoende geld en tijd vrijmaken voor GIS,
- gemeenten hebben reeds voldoende bestaande stedenbanden met andere gemeenten (verzadiging),
- gemeentelijk beleid ten aanzien van GIS moet nog ontwikkeld worden.

#### *Gemeentelijk budget voor GIS*

Een meerderheid van de gemeenten (71 procent van de GSO/GST gemeenten) en de controlegroep (67 procent) geeft aan dat er geld voor GIS is gereserveerd op de gemeentebegroting. Middelgrote gemeenten hebben relatief vaker een budget voor GIS opgenomen. Het bedrag dat gereserveerd wordt door Nederlandse gemeenten op de begroting bedraagt voor GSO/GST gemeenten gemiddeld € 55,826. Gemiddeld per inwoner wordt € 0.59 uitgegeven aan GIS voor alle GSO/GST gemeenten. Grote gemeenten geven ongeveer twee keer zoveel uit aan GIS (€ 1.02 per inwoner) dan kleine en middelgrote Nederlandse gemeenten.

#### *Eigen bijdrage gemeenten aan GSO/GST activiteiten*

Ongeveer een derde van alle GSO/GST gemeenten geeft aan dat de eigen bijdrage tussen 0 en 25 procent van de projectkosten ligt. Ruim de helft van de gemeenten levert een eigen bijdrage tot 50 procent van de totale projectkosten.

#### *Additionaliteit van de programma's*

Op de vraag of de subsidies hebben geleid tot het aanknopen van banden met een gemeente of een ander lokaal bestuursorgaan antwoordde bijna een kwart van de gemeenten dat dit het geval is. In interviews kan dat verder worden gedetailleerd.

Het gaat daarbij veelal niet zo zeer om het leggen van contacten tussen steden (-die bestonden er veelal al-) maar juist om de aandacht die binnen zo'n relatie besteed wordt aan lokaal bestuur.

Voor wat betreft het in stand houden van bestaande contacten met gemeenten in ontwikkelingslanden en/of toetredingslanden geeft bijna de helft van alle GSO/GST gemeenten aan dat zonder deze subsidie de contacten zouden verminderen en mogelijk zouden verdwijnen. Ook in de rechtstreekse interviews met gemeenten gaf ongeveer de helft aan dat de subsidies van invloed waren op de continuïteit van de relaties. Slechts 20 procent geeft aan dat de subsidie hierop niet van invloed is, waaronder relatief veel kleine gemeenten.

Voor de meeste gemeenten geldt dat zij het meeste belang hechten aan de educatieve - en/of bewustwordingsaspecten (70 procent), dan wel aan het sociaal, maatschappelijk en/of cultureel belang (68 procent) van banden met gemeenten in het buitenland. Economische belangen spelen slechts voor een klein gedeelte (11 procent) van de gemeenten een rol. In de rechtstreekse interviews bleek het economisch belang wat zwaarder te wegen dan wat uit de enquête naar voren komt.

#### *Dossierstudie*

Teneinde inhoudelijke informatie omtrent de uitgevoerde activiteiten te verzamelen is een dossieronderzoek uitgevoerd bij VNG International, waarbij 157 dossiers zijn bestudeerd met gebruik van een registratie checklist en een beoordelingsformulier.

Driekwart (76 procent) van de dossiers beschrijven een specifieke doelstelling. In een kwart van de gevallen is slechts sprake van de vermelding van een activiteit (b.v. deelname aan een seminar). Bij de Gemeente Initiatieven (GI en GIM) is in alle gevallen een herkenbare doelstelling geformuleerd.

Activiteiten vinden plaats op een veelheid van thematische beleidsterreinen. De concentratie in de thematische werkvelden volkshuisvesting en ruimtelijke ordening, alsmede milieu natuur en landschap heeft te maken met de concentratie op die werkterreinen in Nicaragua en Zuid-Afrika. Opvallend is dat thema's als Financiën en Belastingen, alsmede Verkeer en Vervoer en Openbare Orde niet of nauwelijks aan de orde komen in de samenwerking.

Zowel GSO als GST activiteiten worden gekenmerkt door hun korte –soms zeer korte – duur. Dat is gekoppeld aan een relatieve lange doorlooptijd voor de GI en GIM activiteiten.

Hoewel doorgaans –maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs- de activiteiten plaats vinden binnen het kader van een stedenband of een daaraan gerelateerde relatie, zijn ook andere lokale overheidsinstanties dan gemeenten betrokken bij het programma. Dat geldt zowel aan de Nederlandse zijde (b.v. provincies) als aan 'gene' zijde. Aan Nederlandse zijde was in 16 procent van de gevallen de aanvrager van de subsidie geen gemeente, terwijl in het buitenland in slechts 7 procent de partner geen gemeente of koepelorganisatie van gemeenten was. Niettemin is het aantal partners dat niet direct het gemeentelijk apparaat betreft en dat betrokken is bij de gezamenlijke activiteiten, groot.

In het GST programma bleken de MMTPs iets meer dan de helft van de uitgaven voor zich op te eisen: 58.2 procent, gevolgd door de GIMs met 24.9 procent, de PUGAs met 12.8 procent en de STAGEs met 3.8 procent. De verdeling tussen de modaliteiten blijkt anders te zijn bij het GSO programma: 41.5 procent naar GIs, 16.2 procent voor MMTPs, 5.5 procent naar Algemene Activiteiten, 31.2 procent naar

PUGAs en 5.6 procent naar STAGEs. Ook hier is de landenkeuze van invloed. In Nicaragua en Zuid-Afrika zijn relatief veel –en ook grotere- GIs in vergelijking met andere GSO landen.

In de onderzochte activiteiten van het programma GST maken salariskosten 24 procent uit van de totale werkelijke uitgaven aan PUGAs en GIMs. In het geval van GSO maken salariskosten 33.2 procent uit van de in de contracten toegezegde bijdragen voor PUGAs en GIs.

In 54 procent kon het doelbereik geregistreerd worden. Opvalt is het geringe aantal gevallen waarin de aanvragende gemeente zelf van mening is dat de doelstellingen niet bereikt zijn, of dat er onvoldoende resultaten geboekt zijn. Wat het meest voorkomt is dat het doelbereik niet te beoordelen valt, hetzij omdat de informatie dat niet toelaat, hetzij omdat de doelstellingen niet geformuleerd zijn, hetzij omdat de op een dusdanig niveau van aggregatie geformuleerd zijn dat uitspraken daarover onmogelijk zijn.

Vrijwel alle rapportages ademen een ‘alles is goed en succesvol’ sfeer. Vooral de GSO PUGAs gericht op projectformulering en monitoring zijn weinig kritisch ten opzichte van zichzelf.

Zowel het programma GSO als het programma GST is sterk gericht op de Nederlandse gemeente en omstandigheden. Procedures zijn ingericht naar de mogelijkheden en behoeften van de Nederlandse partner

Het merendeel van de correspondentie in de dossiers gaat over procedurele en financiële zaken. De correspondentie over inhoudelijke aspecten van de ondernomen activiteiten is beperkt. Uit de correspondentie blijkt dat VNG-I een zorgvuldige beheerder van de fondsen is, die zuinig en strikt omgaat met de middelen.

Binnen de dossierstudie is een inventarisatie gemaakt van 30 eindrapportages. De inventarisatie leidt tot de opmerking dat rapportages in het geval van de GI (M)s een professionele indruk maken. In het geval van de PUGAs is dat minder. In veel gevallen zijn het meer reisverslagen dan een zakelijke weergave van doelstellingen, activiteiten, afspraken en meningen.

De rapportage is gericht op de Nederlandse doelgroep en situatie, d.w.z. rapportage richt zich naar VNG-I, naar de Stedenband Stichtingen of het College van Burgemeester en Wethouders. Uitzondering op die algemene tendens zijn de technische verslagen omtrent specifieke GI(M)s. Deze verslagen zijn ook vaker geschreven in een internationale taal. Uit de rapportages blijkt dat doorgaans geen mijlpalen in de tijd vastgesteld worden, waardoor de activiteiten een ‘open ended’ karakter hebben.

#### *Interviews in Nederlandse gemeenten*

In aanvulling op, en ter verdieping van, de enquête onder Nederlandse gemeenten zijn gesprekken gevoerd met beleidsmakende en coördinerende ambtenaren, politiek verantwoordelijke bestuurders en direct betrokken vertegenwoordigers van maatschappelijke organisaties binnen de Nederlandse gemeenten.

Er zijn 29 gemeenten bezocht en een tweetal telefonisch geïnterviewd. Binnen deze gemeenten hebben interviews met meerdere betrokken plaatsgevonden. Gevraagd is naar de eigen bijdrage van de gemeenten in de kosten die Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking met zich meebrengt. Slechts een zestal gemeenten (25 procent) geeft aan zelf meer dan 40 procent van de kosten te dragen.

De geïnterviewde gemeenten geven aan de GSO en GST subsidies belangrijk te vinden voor de continuïteit van de gemeentelijke internationale samenwerking. Slechts drie gemeenten geven aan dat niet belangrijk te vinden.

De GSO en GST subsidies worden toegankelijk geacht en in zijn algemeenheid positief gewaardeerd. Indien de hoeveelheid middelen in de GSO en GST programma's aanzienlijk zou groeien, dan zouden de gemeenten er de voorkeur aan geven hun programma's te verdiepen. Dat wil zeggen, hetzij meer activiteiten opzetten met dezelfde partner in het buitenland (10 van de 24), hetzij grotere activiteiten te ontwikkelen (13 van de 24). Slechts één gemeente gaf aan te overwegen banden met meer gemeenten in het buitenland aan te gaan.

Er is de gemeenten gevraagd die belangrijkste obstakels voor GIS nader te specificeren. Vier van de zestien respondenten (25 procent) gaf aan helemaal geen beperkingen te kennen, terwijl een even groot deel de financiën, dan wel de menskracht als belangrijkste obstakel aangaf. Anderen refereerden aan organisatorische problemen en gebrek aan belangstelling van leidinggevenden en/of het politiek echelon. Gebrek aan financiën is dus in slechts 25 procent van de gevallen de grootste belemmering.

Wel is bij een aantal gemeenten is de mogelijkheid om subsidie te verkrijgen voorwaarde om verder op een project in te gaan. Ook grotere en 'ervaren' gemeenten kijken veelal eerst naar de mate waarin subsidie verkregen kan worden.

Slechts één gemeente (Loenen aan de Vecht) stelde dat de doelmatigheid (en de doeltreffendheid) van de activiteiten in het kader van de stedenband een gemeenschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid is, die gemeenschappelijk bewaakt wordt door een 'linkage committee'.

Vier gemeenten stelden dat er geen beoordeling op doelmatigheid en doeltreffendheid plaats vindt, of dat de activiteiten nog zo nieuw zijn dat daar nog geen reden voor is. Een drietal gemeenten vindt de beoordeling van de inhoudelijke kwaliteit (doeltreffendheid en doelgerichtheid) een verantwoordelijkheid van de VNG-I, waarbij de doelmatigheid slechts afgemeten wordt aan het ter beschikking staande budget. Vijf gemeenten leggen die beoordeling neer bij de Stedenband Stichting.

Om over conceptuele inhoud te kunnen oordelen zijn mensen nodig die daartoe in staat zijn. Een aantal gemeenten geeft aan die kwaliteiten nauwelijks in huis te hebben, terwijl anderen juist aangeven dat de eigen expertise doelmatigheid en doeltreffendheid garandeert.

Eén van de potentiële effecten van de GSO en GST subsidies is dat ze leiden tot contacten met een gemeente of een ander bestuursorgaan waarmee voor de periode 1997-2001 geen samenwerkingsverband bestond. Het bestendigen en structureel maken van deze banden is géén expliciete doelstelling van het GSO programma, maar is op de achtergrond aanwezig. Het is ook geen doelstelling van het GST programma.

Drie grote gemeenten zijn van mening dat geen enkele band voortkomt uit de programma's GSO en GST. Voor tien anderen geldt dat ze wel contacten zijn aangegaan binnen het GSO programma, maar die vervolgens niet hebben doorgezet.

Wel is GSO en GST van belang voor de continuïteit. Van de 45 contacten die de 24 respondenten onderhouden in de vijf 'sample landen', bleek ongeveer de helft (21)

van de gevallen de continuïteit mede gewaarborgd te zijn door de GSO en GST programma's.

Gemeenten doen nauwelijks onderzoek naar de effecten van de samenwerking, en nog minder op het gebied van de versterking van capaciteitsopbouw bij lokaal bestuur. Van de 22 gemeenten die op vragen hieromtrent antwoordden, bleken er vier eigen onderzoek gedaan te hebben naar de effecten van de activiteiten bij de partnergemeente. Opgemerkt moet worden dan in 2001 gestart werd (afgerond in 2002) met een traject ter bepaling van performance indicatoren<sup>24</sup>.

GSO en GST activiteiten staan zelden op zichzelf. Het merendeel speelt zich af binnen de context van een stedenband. De neveneffecten voor de partnergemeenten worden veelal in abstracte termen genoemd zoals:

- De 'poort naar het westen',
- Toename vertrouwen in de overheid,
- Netwerkopbouw,
- Mogelijkheden EU subsidies aan te vragen.

Eenentwintig gemeenten gaven aan wat hun inziens de neveneffecten zijn voor de eigen gemeente. Zes gemeenten gaven aan dat er neveneffecten waren op het gebied van de handel en elf gemeenten refereerden aan initiatieven van de private sector. Het merendeel refereert aan culturele en draagvlakeffecten.

Tachtig procent van de geïnterviewde gemeenten geeft aan dat VNG-I de juiste organisatie is om de GSO en GST programma's te beheren. Enkele gemeenten die (nog) weinig ervaring hebben met internationale samenwerking hebben laten weten behoefte te hebben aan meer ondersteuning.

VNG-I wordt gezien als een bekwaam organisator van de MMTPs. Naast de waardering als organisator en manager van de GSO en GST fondsen, wordt kritiek geuit op de beperkte specifieke landenkennis. Tevens overheerst de mening dat VNG-I meer initiatieven zou kunnen ontplooiën voor wat betreft coördinatie (landenplatforms e.d.) in Nederland.

Over het algemeen achten de Nederlandse gemeenten GSO en GST werkzame instrumenten ter ondersteuning van Gemeentelijke Internationale Samenwerking. Toch hebben gemeenten veel kritiek. Vooral het GST programma wordt beschouwd als weinig toegespitst op haar eigen doelstellingen en te veel geënt op het GSO model.

Er is een vrij algemene kritiek dat geen subsidies kunnen worden verkregen voor draagvlakactiviteiten, terwijl dat wel een doelstelling van het GSO programma is. Ook NCDO fondsen zijn hiervoor inmiddels niet meer beschikbaar.

#### *Evaluatierapporten*

Onderdeel van de bureaustudie vormde een beoordeling van bestaande evaluaties. Er zijn 8 evaluatierapporten gesystematiseerd.

Alle evaluaties zijn van een voldoende technische kwaliteit zijn. Methodologisch zijn vooral de interne evaluaties niet overtuigend. Bij deze interne evaluaties was telkens

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<sup>24</sup> Pavien Beelaerst, Cornélie van Waegeningh (2002). Verslag van het VNG International traject "Benoemen Resultaten GSO activiteiten". Ontwerp van een Resultatenhuis.



één evaluator lid van de Adviescommissie en de ander de verantwoordelijke medewerker bij VNG-I.

Monitoring en evaluatie als instrumenten voor beheer van de programma's worden relatief weinig ingezet door zowel de VNG-I (reviews) als het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (meest recente evaluatie van GSO dateert van 1997).

## ANNEX 1

### Overzicht aanvragende Nederlandse gemeenten GSO + GST 1997 t/m 2001

Gesorteerd op alfabetische volgorde.

Aanvrager (Nederland)	Land partner
Aa en Hunze	Tanzania
Aalten	Tanzania
Albrandswaard	Zambia
Alkmaar	Zuid-Afrika, Hongarije
Almere	Ghana
Alphen aan den Rijn	Zuid-Afrika
Amersfoort	Ghana, Tsjechië
Amstelveen	Peru, Zuid-Afrika
Amsterdam	Cuba, Ecuador, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Suriname, Polen
Apeldoorn	Moldavië, Bulgarije
Arnhem	Bolivia, Botswana, Chili, Polen, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ZdAfrika
Assen	Namibië, Zuid-Afrika, Polen
Baarn	Tsjechië
Bergambacht	Benin
Bergen op Zoom	Polen
Beuningen	Tanzania, Polen
Beverwijk	Swaziland, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Zuid-Afrika, Polen, Roemenie, Tsjechië
Binnenmaas	Letland
Boxtel	Bulgarije
Breda	Bulgarije, Polen
Coevorden	Bulgarije
Cuijk	Tsjechië
Culemborg	Zuid-Afrika
Dalfsen	Letland
De Marne	Benin
De Ronde Venen	Tsjechië
Delden	Hongarije
Delft	Nicaragua, Zuid-Afrika
Delfzijl	Ghana
Den Bosch	Roemenië
Den Haag	Albanië, Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Zuid-Afrika, Polen
Deurne	Kameroen, Polen
Deventer	Peru, Zimbabwe, Roemenië
Doetinchem	Nicaragua, Tsjechië
Dongen	Tanzania
Dordrecht	Kameroen, Kenia, Nicaragua, Bulgarije, Slowakije
Driebergen	Tsjechië
Driebergen-Rijsenburg	Tsjechië
Ede	Kenia, Tanzania, Zambia, Bulgarije, Tsjechië
Eindhoven	Nicaragua, Soedan, Turkije, Zuid-Afrika, Polen
Emmen	Ghana, Palestijnse Gebieden, Zuid-Afrika
Enkhuisen	Zuid-Afrika
Enschede	Indonesië, Kenia, Nicaragua, Zuid-Afrika, Letland

Etten-Leur	Zuid-Afrika, Litouwen
Gaasterlân-Sleat	Polen
Gendt	Kenia
Gennep	Nicaragua, Slowakije
Goes	Litouwen
Gouda	Nicaragua
Groningen	Nicaragua, Palestijnse Geb, Zuid-Afrika, Estland, Polen, Tsjechië
Haarlem	Zimbabwe, Bulgarije
Haarlemmermeer	Filippijnen
Heerhugowaard	Zuid-Afrika
Heino	Letland
Hengelo	Letland
Het Bildt	Litouwen
Heusden	Zambia
Hoogezand-Sappemeer	Zuid-Afrika
Hoorn	Tanzania, Tsjechië
Kampen	Hongarije
Leek	Marokko, Roemenië
Leeuwarden	Zambia
Leeuwarderadeel	Benin
Leiden	Egypte, Nicaragua, Zuid-Afrika, Polen
Leidschendam	Polen
Lelystad	Albanië, Slovenië
Lingewaal	Tanzania
Loenen	Tanzania
Maarssen	Namibië
Maartensdijk	Polen
Maassluis	Hongarije
Maastricht	Nicaragua, Turkije
Marum	Bulgarije
Menterwolde	Zuid-Afrika
Meppel	Tsjechië
Middelburg	Zuid-Afrika
Middenveld	Benin
Moerdijk	Polen
Monster	Tanzania
Naaldwijk	Albanië
Nieuwegein	Namibië, Polen
Nijmegen	Nicaragua, Peru, Zuid-Afrika, Tsjechië
Noordoostpolder	Uganda
Obdam	Albanië
Oisterwijk	Uganda
Ooststellingwerf	Nederlandse Antillen, Uganda, Zambia, Letland
Oostzaan	Zuid-Afrika
Opsterland	Zimbabwe, Zuid-Afrika
Purmerend	Tsjechië
Putten	Roemenië
Raalte	Albanië
Renkum	Zambia
Rheden	Tsjechië
Ridderkerk	Benin

Rijswijk	Nicaragua
Rotterdam (GSO)	Ghana, Kaap Verden, Peru, Suriname, Tanzania, Zd-Afrika
Rotterdam (GST)	Bulgarije, Polen, Roemenië
Schijndel	Letland
Schouwen-Duiveland	Slowakije
Sint-Michiëlsgestel	Polen
Skasterlan	Roemenië
Smallingerland	Namibië
Soest	Peru
Stadskanaal	Zuid-Afrika
Stadskanaal/Emmen	Zuid-Afrika
Tholen	Polen
Tilburg	Nicaragua, Peru, Tanzania, Zuid-Afrika, Polen
Uitgeest	Bulgarije
Utrecht	Albanië, Nicaragua, Tsjechië
Valkenburg	Roemenië
Veendam	Botswana, Zambia
Velsen	Sri Lanka
Vianen	Benin, Roemenië
Vlaardingen	Zambia, Tsjechië
Vlissingen	Indonesië, Zuid-Afrika
Voorburg	Tsjechië
Vught	Filippijnen
Waalre	Tsjechië
Waddinxveen	Tsjechië
Wateringen	Tanzania
Weert	Kaapverdise Eilanden
Westerveld	Tsjechië
Wieringen	Benin
Wieringermeer	Benin
Winschoten	Ghana
Winsum	Benin, Zuid-Afrika
Wisch	Benin
Wunseradiel	Tsjechië
Zaanstad	Zuid-Afrika
Zeist	Tsjechië
Zoetermeer	Ghana, Nicaragua, Slowakije
Zutphen	Estland
Zwijndrecht	Slovenië
<b>Totaal aantal NL gemeenten</b>	<b>129</b>
Aquanet	Bulgarije, Roemenië
BJ Zuid-Holland Zuid	Moldavië
COGAS (Centraal Overijsselse Nutsbedrijven)	Bolivia
COS-sen	Tanzania
Duinwaterleidingbedrijf Zuid-Holland (DZH)	Egypte, Roemenië
Energiebedrijf Noord West	Zimbabwe
Gemeentewaterleidingen Amsterdam	Egypte, Indonesië, Mozambique, Suriname
Hoogheemraadschap van Rijnland	Egypte, Roemenië
NOVIB	Tanzania
Provincie Drenthe	Zuid-Afrika, Roemenië

Provincie Gelderland	Tanzania, Polen
Provincie Groningen	Zuid-Afrika
Provincie Limburg	Hongarije
Provincie Noord-Brabant	Polen
Provincie Utrecht	Hongarije, Tsjechië
Provincie Zuid-Holland	Tsjechië
Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven	Peru
SNV	Botswana
Uitwaterende Sluizen	Indonesië
VNG-I (GSO)	Albanië, Benin, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zuid-Afrika
VNG-I (GST)	Bulgarije, Polen
Waterleiding Maatschappij Overijssel (WMO)	Suriname
Waterleidingbedrijf Noord-Holland	Indonesië, Roemenië
Waterschap Friesland	Nepal
Watertransportmaatschappij Rijn	Indonesië
Woningbedrijf Den Haag	Zuid-Afrika
<b>Totaal aantal niet-gemeenten</b>	<b>25</b>

## ANNEX 2 OVERZICHT GEÏNTERVIEWDE GEMEENTEN

Gemeente/Provincie	GSO partnerlanden	GST partnerlanden
Aa en Hunze	Tanzania	
Aalten	Tanzania	Polen
Alkmaar	Zuid Afrika	Hongarije
Amsterdam	Cuba, Ecuador, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Suriname	Polen, Moldavië, Bulgarije
Alphen aan den Rijn	Zuid Afrika	
Amersfoort	Ghana	Tsjechië
Arnhem	Bolivia, Botswana, Chili, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Zuid Afrika	Polen
Assen	Namibië, Zuid Afrika	Polen
Beuningen	Tanzania	Polen
Culemborg	Zuid Afrika	
Delft	Zuid Afrika, Nicaragua	Polen
Den Haag	Albanië, Burkina Faso, Zuid Afrika, Nicaragua, Pakistan	Polen
Driebergen		Tsjechië
Dordrecht	Kameroen, Kenia, Zuid Afrika, Nicaragua	Bulgarije, Slowakije
Eindhoven	Soedan, Turkije, Zuid Afrika, Nicaragua	Polen
Provincie Gelderland	Tanzania	Polen
Groningen	Nicaragua, Palestijnse Gebieden, Zuid Afrika	Polen, Tsjechië, Estland
Hoorn	Tanzania	Tsjechië
Leiden	Egypte, Zuid Afrika, Nicaragua	Polen
Lingewaal	Tanzania	
Loenen	Tanzania	
Maastricht	Nicaragua, Turkije	
Nijmegen	Nicaragua, Peru, Zuid Afrika	Tsjechië
Rijswijk	Nicaragua	Tsjechië
Rotterdam	Ghana, Kaap Verden, Peru, Suriname, Zuid Afrika, Tanzania	Polen, Bulgarije, Roemenië
Tholen		Polen
Tilburg	Zuid Afrika, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Peru	Polen
Utrecht	Albanië, Nicaragua	Tsjechië
Vlaardingen	Zambia	Tsjechië