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FOOD AID AND DEVELOPMENT

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NETHERLANDS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

FOOD AID AND DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation of Dutch food aid with special reference to sub-Saharan Africa; 1980–1989

Operations Review Unit (IOV), June 1991

Photographs: Ron Giling; World Food Programme.

Preface

In the minds of many, food aid is associated with emergency situations; often, however, it is meant to serve purposes other than to bring relief in case of disaster. For example, food aid may be offered to finance projects or to support economic recovery programmes. In fact, this is the more common objective of food aid. The present report evaluates food aid as developmental instrument. The findings refer primarily to sub-Saharan Africa, the region where field research was conducted for this evaluation.

This report is an extended summary of a version previously published in Dutch (January 1991). The order of presentation is similar to that of the main report. Following a description of the objectives of the evaluation in chapter 1, various relevant background details relating to international food aid flows are examined in chapter 2. Chapter 3 deals with two international organisations of major importance to the Netherlands: the World Food Programme (WFP) and the European Community (EC). Chapter 4 discusses the Dutch food aid policy and its implementation. Chapter 5 sketches the food problems in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s. In chapter 6 a summary is given of the findings of the evaluation carried out in five countries. Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the effectiveness and efficiency of food aid. The prospects of food aid in the 1990s are examined in chapter 9. Chapter 10 discusses some policy options of Dutch food aid for the 1990s.

The evaluation report was carried out under the auspices of the Operations Review Unit (IOV in Dutch). The IOV is an independent unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for evaluating Dutch development aid. Appendix 1 includes a more detailed description of the IOV.

Many people were involved in the realization of this evaluation report. The field studies were contracted out to universities and research institutes. I would like to thank everyone involved for his or her contribution.

Director IOV

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The central issue of this evaluation report is food aid as a development instrument. Food aid is often associated with emergency situations, but more commonly it is provided for purposes other than the alleviation of acute hunger. For instance, food aid may be provided as a form of programme assistance, or to finance projects. An example of food aid as a means of project assistance are the so-called food-for-work activities, whereby labour is rewarded with food rations. Food aid provided as programme assistance usually includes products (such as wheat) of which there is a structural deficit, and which the recipient country has to import in order to meet its needs. In general, these food aid commodities are sold on the local market. Food aid as programme assistance can be viewed as a form of balance of payments or budget support.

The evaluation concentrated on sub-Saharan Africa. Field studies were carried out in four countries: Mali, Senegal, Sudan and Zambia. A desk study was conducted on food aid to Mozambique.

Implementation

Dutch food aid amounted to some Dfl. 2,500 million in the 1980–1989 period, or about 6% of total Official Development Assistance (ODA). Towards the end of the 1980s food aid decreased to about 4.5% of ODA.

Food aid is provided in three main forms, the distribution of which was as follows: almost half the assistance consisted of project food aid provided for specific development projects—mainly food-for-work activities and supplementary feeding schemes; one third was emergency food aid; and one quarter was programme food aid provided for market sales.

About 50% of Dutch food aid went to sub-Saharan Africa; main recipients were Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan. Some 25% of food aid was allocated to Asia while 20% went to Latin America.

Wheat and rice, dairy products, and canned food were by far the most important food commodities. One sixth of the food aid supplies consisted of local or regional purchases of coarse grains (maize and sorghum). Non-food items,

including for example means of transport, were also a major expenditure (one quarter).

Two thirds of the Dutch food aid was channelled through international organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the European Community (EC). One fifth was provided via non-governmental organizations, while only 15% was supplied directly by the Dutch government.

Targeting

The main issues of the evaluation report were the poverty focus of food aid, effects on local food production and the influence on food market policies especially in connection with liberalization of the grain market.

The study indicates that food aid offered in the form of programme assistance (such as wheat) goes mainly to the more privileged in urban areas.

Food aid distributed in the context of food-for-work projects appeared to go to poverty-stricken groups. These projects often involve women, mostly because of the self-targeting effect of this form of payment. The problem of leakages, i.e. situations in which commodities do not reach the intended beneficiaries, was reported in a number of cases (Mali, Senegal). The extent was relatively limited. Mismanagement seemed more frequent when allocations were made through government channels than via NGO's. Indirect leakages were a more general phenomenon. Reports frequently mentioned that, due to the exotic character of food aid products, the commodities were resold.

It is very difficult to target emergency aid at specific groups. This is why in emergency situations food aid often has a geographic destination (area-targeting). The field evaluations revealed that emergency aid reached the intended areas (Mali, Zambia), although distribution was severely hampered in countries plagued by war and civil unrest, as in Mozambique and Sudan. One main problem is inadequate security. Another is the political and/or military manipulation by local authorities of relief operations to areas where the opposition is strongly represented. Intensive monitoring of relief operations by donors, as in Operation Lifeline I in Sudan, can significantly improve targeting. These operations are usually expensive and limited in coverage. In principle it is recommended to delegate the responsibility for emergency operations to the local government.

Food production

The major threat of food aid to food production is that it causes imported cereals (wheat and rice) to displace traditional coarse grains (sorghum, millet and maize) in local eating patterns. A major part of grain food aid consists of wheat, whereas coarse grains constitute the staple diet in sub-Saharan Africa. Food aid and cheap

imports of dumped cereals at overvalued exchange rates enable local authorities to offer these grains on the market at very low prices. Consequently, in Sudan, for example, the local meal of sorghum (kisra) has gradually disappeared from the urban centres to be replaced by bread, which costs only a third of the price of kisra. The main problem with wheat and rice is that, in most African countries, they are very expensive or even impossible to produce. Coarse grains, on the other hand, are much more resistant to the unreliable climatological conditions of sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, donors show a clear preference for rice and wheat in agricultural investment programmes and research.

The food market

One of the conclusions of this study is that the impact of food aid as an instrument to support policy reforms, in particular the curtailment of government interference in the grain market, is doubtful. One exception is Mali. In the other countries that were studied, food aid enabled the local authorities to pursue their existing policies of subsidization. The clearest example of this was Sudan where, instead of stimulating a restructuring of the grain market, large-scale supplies of wheat delayed measures to introduce necessary reforms.

In point of fact, it is highly paradoxical to use food aid consisting of subsidized commodities as a means to liberalize local food markets. Donor countries thus 'force' recipient countries to implement reform measures they themselves are not willing to take.

Tied aid

Despite the fact that Dutch food aid is *de jure* untied, *de facto* a considerable part (nearly three fifths) comes from the Netherlands. This is all the more remarkable because Dutch products often fail to correspond to local eating patterns. However, the sharpest criticism was levelled at food aid distributed through international organizations, in particular the EC. Although the EC food aid programme has been formally dissociated from the Community's agricultural policy since 1986, in practice it is used to dispose of surpluses (wheat and dairy products). This criticism also applies to Dutch food aid distributed via the WFP, half of which consists of canned food and dairy products from the Netherlands.

In contrast, the findings relating to food aid distributed bilaterally and through non-governmental organizations are much more favourable. Most of the supplies are purchased locally or in the region, so-called triangular transactions. The advantage of these food aid supplies is that they are more appropriate to traditional consumption patterns and help stimulate local food production. Furthermore, triangular purchases are often much more cost-effective and can be supplied more

rapidly. This applies in particular to those triangular transactions which became an accepted modality of food aid (Southern Africa).

Emergency aid

The findings for food aid provided in the context of emergency assistance are generally more positive. Even so, efficiency could be greatly improved, especially since many emergency aid operations involve predictable rather than acute food deficits. In more than four fifths of the emergency aid operations, the famine was the result of protracted periods of drought or civil unrest and war. In many cases, both the donors and the authorities in the recipient countries postponed action until people in the afflicted areas were faced with the immediate threat of starvation. Storage and distribution capacities of most African countries are not suited to large-scale emergency aid operations. The study concludes that in many instances a more gradual supply is preferable and would in fact be possible in many cases.

Conclusions

In many cases, food aid, especially programme food aid, does not reach the most vulnerable groups. Food aid tends to change traditional eating habits, acts as a disincentive to local food production and therefore leads to greater dependency of food aid recipients on donors. Partly as a result of subsidized food imports this distortion accelerates substitution of domestic produce by imports. The markets for locally produced traditional foods have consequently been compressed. These cheap inputs, combined with local policies such as overvalued exchange rates, have also reduced the incentive to process traditional foods in ways which render them more acceptable to urban and high-income households. Local coarse grains, because of discriminatory pricing policies, seem to lose in competition with imported grains.

In view of the minimal effectiveness and efficiency of food aid as a development instrument, the IOV recommends that it be subject to a critical review. This applies particularly to the food-for-work approach of the WFP and NGOs. If development is the main objective, a project should be approved only if it has passed a cost-efficiency analysis. The study concludes that in many cases financial aid would have been a better way of achieving the goals. The Dutch government should therefore urge the EC to substitute a significant part of food aid, supplied almost exclusively at present in the form of European agricultural surpluses, by financial assistance.

Part One CONTEXT

1. Methodology

1.1 Introduction

Food aid is one of the oldest—and most controversial—programmes of Dutch development aid. On the one hand, food aid is viewed as a moral obligation to assist starving people. On the other, there are signs that food aid may cause disincentive effects, especially to local food production.

Consequently, a need has existed for some time in both the Dutch Parliament and the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGIS) for a comprehensive evaluation of Dutch food aid. Food aid comprises a significant component of Dutch development aid. In the past ten years, it amounted to an average of Dfl. 250 million a year or approximately 6% of Dutch ODA.

There have been various evaluation reports on food aid in the past. These studies dealt with individual food aid transactions or certain aspects of food aid supplies. No overall study about the efficiency and impact of Dutch food aid has been undertaken previously. At the end of 1987 Parliament requested that the Operations Review Unit (IOV) of DGIS carry out a comprehensive evaluation of Dutch food aid.

1.2 Objectives

This study focuses on three issues basic to Dutch food aid policy over the past ten years.

a. *Food aid and food security*

Since the mid-1980s, food security has played a central role in the Dutch food aid policy. According to the World Bank definition (1986), food security implies access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy life. Food insecurity is defined as lack of access to sufficient food. Two conditions must be met to ensure food security. First, adequate food supplies must be available. Secondly, the food must be accessible. In this food security concept, employment and purchasing power are as critical as production. Within the Dutch food aid policy, food security is viewed as a proxy for alleviating poverty. In this context,

the main focus of the evaluation study is: To what degree does food aid reach the most poverty-stricken or food-insecure groups?

b. *Food aid and food self-sufficiency*

In the beginning of the 1980s, Dutch aid policy in the food sector emphasized attainment of nutritional self-sufficiency. A few years later this stance was adjusted to incorporate the idea of an appropriate balance between local food production, commercial crops and food imports, taking into account the specific circumstances of the country in question. For sub-Saharan Africa, however, self-sufficiency in staple foods remains one of the main objectives of Dutch development cooperation. This is justified by the comparative advantage of many African countries in food production. A widespread criticism of food aid is that it has acted as a disincentive to local food production by depressing food prices and discourages domestic food production. Some argue that food aid creates dependence on non-traditional products and leads to increased demand for imports of these products. Poor timing of food aid supplies can also distort local production cycles.

c. *Food aid and the food market*

During the 1980s Dutch aid policy stressed the importance of the private sector's role in food marketing. On the whole, food marketing is done most effectively by the private sector. However, to prevent abuse of monopoly situations the public sector should intervene when the private sector fails. Furthermore, the government should contain the market by preventing excessive price fluctuations that harm both small producers and consumers. The main issue in this connection is: Does food aid stimulate liberalization in the agricultural sector, or does it enable the authorities to delay major reform measures? Some argue that food aid provides recipient countries with increased resources, thereby reducing pressure to undertake necessary macro-economic adjustments such as lowering the exchange rates.

1.3 Scope of the study

For analytical purposes food aid is usually grouped into three categories.

Programme food aid. This is provided on grant or concessional loan terms. It helps fill the gap in normal years between demand and supply from domestic production and commercial imports. It represents the largest part of food aid supplies and is provided almost exclusively on a bilateral, government-to-government basis. Programme food aid is meant for sale on the markets.

Project food aid. Food provided as grant. It is designated for specific groups of beneficiaries and for specified development objectives in recipient countries. Examples of project food aid are: supplementary feeding projects involving pregnant and nursing women and pre-school children; institutional feeding projects such as primary schools; food-for-work projects. Project food aid is usually channelled through multilateral and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Emergency food aid. The third form of food aid helps to cover various types of urgent and temporary food needs. Emergencies may arise as a result of sudden natural disasters such as floods. They may be caused by man-made disasters such as war and civil unrest creating refugees and displaced people. Emergencies may be occasioned by acute shortfalls in food production due to drought. Emergency food aid is provided bilaterally and multilaterally. NGOs play a major role in emergency relief operations as well. Almost all emergency food aid is given free of charge.

The focal point of this study was food aid provided for development in the form of programme and project assistance. Emergency aid was considered *ad hoc* only.

The nutritional effectiveness of food aid is not investigated.

The study concerned food aid provided bilaterally as well as food aid supplied through multilateral organizations and NGOs. Dutch support for food aid provided through EC was subject of the study as well.

The evaluation comprised an extensive review of the entire Dutch food aid throughout the 1980s. In addition, a comparative study was conducted into food aid supplies of other donors. It is important to place Dutch food aid in a broader context because, in many cases, its impact cannot be isolated from total food aid flows to recipient countries, especially since a large part is channelled through international organizations.

Field research was restricted to sub-Saharan Africa, mainly because the Dutch food aid policy has been concentrated on this area. Five countries were selected for closer study. Field evaluations took place in four countries: Mali, Senegal, Sudan and Zambia, while an extensive desk study was conducted on Mozambique.

A number of considerations were taken into account in the selection of these countries: the volume and type of Dutch food aid supplied; ecological variety; differences in food self-sufficiency levels and the policies pursued in this respect; opportunity to conduct research.

1.4 Approach

The evaluation study was divided into four separate phases, including a preliminary study, a desk study, field research and a review of existing evaluation reports and literature (see appendix 2).

In the first phase, a preliminary study was conducted to define the central issues of the evaluation and the approach. Many key informants were interviewed, including DGIS staff, experts from the WFP, FAO, IFAD, and the Institute of Development Studies (University of Sussex).

The desk study focused on policy development, organization and the implementation of Dutch food aid, food aid policies of other donors and the food sector policies of Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan and Zambia.

Field research was subsequently carried out in each of these countries, except Mozambique. The field research comprised two parts: a study at a micro-regional level (local/district/province), which was contracted out; and a study carried out by the IOV itself to verify the findings of the micro-regional studies and to determine their relation with the recipient country's macro policy.

For the micro-regional field studies in Mali, Sudan and Zambia, the IOV engaged Dutch research institutes familiar with rural development and food production. These included the Department of Social Geography of the University of Utrecht, the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, and the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam. The Senegal field study was undertaken by the Agricultural University of Wageningen. Two or three micro-regions were selected from each country to gain insight into the effectiveness of food aid in relation to food security, food self-sufficiency and the grain market.

Finally, food aid evaluation studies carried out by other donors and relevant literature were appraised in order to verify the findings against those of others.

Field research took place from halfway 1988 to early 1989. In that season harvests were relatively good in most of Africa. The data in our study cover the 1980–1989 period as a whole so that the findings are relevant for a longer, more representative period.

A reference group supervised the study from the outset (see appendix 2).

1.5 Criteria for evaluation

The findings of the studies conducted in the five countries were verified on the basis of two criteria: the effectiveness and the efficiency of food aid.

Effectiveness of food aid

To assess the effectiveness of food aid the survey concentrated on the effects of food aid on the food-insecure, on domestic food production and on the local food market.

A preliminary question is whether the food aid provided was additional or substitutional for the recipient country. Food aid is considered additional if the recipient country would not have increased its food supply by other means. The

supply is said to be substitutional if it would have been obtained anyway, for example through commercial imports.

In case of substitution caution should be exercised in making causal links between food aid and the effects observed. After all, the effect would have been the same had there been no food aid. However, food aid frees additional resources with which other activities can be financed. One should therefore take into account the development effect of the marginal project—i.e. the project which, given the priorities of the recipient country, was last to be considered for financial aid from the total available resources. In practice, the marginal project is unknown. In these cases, a macro-analysis of the development policy of the recipient country is the best approach.

Efficiency of food aid

This analysis compares alternative ways of realizing objectives, and indicates which one will accomplish the objective at the least cost.

In this context were examined the modalities of distribution (such as monetization, food-for-work and targeting), the modalities of implementation (i.e. the organizations through which food aid is channelled: international organizations, NGOs and bilateral agencies), and the modalities of acquisition (commodity composition of food aid supplies and location of procurement).

Finally, food aid efficiency was reviewed in terms of additionality and substitution from the donor point of view. Food aid was considered to be additional if it created extra aid flows next to the regular development budget. In other cases, cash is converted by donors into food aid, partly to fulfil their obligations as signatories to the FAC and to international food aid agencies. In the latter case, the cost-effectiveness of food aid must be compared with that of financial aid.

2. The international context

2.1 Origins and development of food aid

International food aid began in the period after the Second World War. Initially, it consisted of supplies from the United States to Europe. The group of recipient countries was soon expanded to include developing countries. During the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the United States was by far the most important food aid donor, accounting for approximately 90% of total food aid flows. The role of the US became less dominant once the first Food Aid Convention (FAC) was signed in 1967, by which donors agreed on the scope and composition of food aid. The year 1967 also marks the beginning of EC food aid. Compared with the situation in the mid-1960s, food aid is currently provided by a much larger number of donors. The US continues to account for more than half of all supplies, followed by the EC and its member states with about one third. Of the EC total circa two thirds is under Community programmes and one third bilateral from EC member countries. Other major bilateral food aid donors are Australia, Canada and Japan.

The 1974 World Food Aid Conference led to significant increases in food aid. Since 1975, food aid flows have been reasonably stable, at around US$ 3,000 million annually. In relative terms, however, they have been declining for some time. The share of food aid in the total ODA flow fell in the 1980s from almost 10% to around 7%. During the first half of the 1970s, this share was nearly 20%.

TABLE 1 VOLUME OF FOOD AID, 1980-1989
US$ 1,000 millions

	'80	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85	'86	'87	'88	'89
Total ODA	27.3	25.5	27.8	27.6	28.7	29.4	36.7	41.4	48.1	46.7
Food aid	2.6	2.9	2.5	2.5	3.0	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.8	3.1
% ODA	9.6	11.5	8.9	9.2	10.4	10.6	8.0	6.9	7.9	6.6

Source: DAC, Development Cooperation reports

The financial conditions under which food aid is provided have improved considerably. At the end of the 1970s two fifths of the food aid was still being provided against (soft) loans; by the end of the 1980s this had dropped to 15%. This decline is mainly related to the changed position of the US, the only donor to provide large-scale food aid loans.

It was estimated at the end of the 1980s that, based on a basic metabolic rate (BMR) of 1.4, some 500 million people in developing countries (excluding China) could be classified as undernourished. This is one fifth of the world population. In sub-Saharan Africa, about 150 million people, or one third of the population, fell into this category.

The dependence of developing countries on cereal imports (both commercial and food aid) is considerable. Overall cereal imports amount to about 10% of developing countries' cereal consumption and this ratio is growing by over 3% annually. The share of food aid in total food imports to developing countries is around 12%. This share is declining compared to between one fifth and one fourth in the early 1970s. But there are considerable regional differences. North Africa and the Near East have the highest import dependence: one out of three kilogrammes consumed is imported.

For a large number of developing countries food aid remains a very important source of imported supplies. This applies in particular to countries whose commercial import capacity is limited owing to a weak export and foreign debt position, a combination rendering them highly dependent on food aid. For over 40 developing countries the share of cereal food aid in total cereal imports exceeds 40%. In sub-Saharan Africa the dependence on food aid is highest.

2.2 Overview of international food aid flows

Cereals have dominated the various food aid programmes. Wheat took pride of place with a share of approximately 75%. In the past ten years, the average amount of cereal food aid was about 10 million tonnes per year. Considerable differences exist between the years, mainly due to unforeseeable emergency situations.

In addition to cereals, a growing range of other products is being included in the food aid programmes of the various donors. Of the total volume of food aid shipped, about 10% are products other than grains. Because these non-grain products (for example dairy products) are considerably more expensive per unit weight, their share is significantly larger in financial terms, namely one third of the total value of food aid. The general trend has been towards a rising share of non-grain food aid in the past decade.

It is interesting to note the great differences in product composition of the individual donors' food aid programmes, especially in view of the fact that each claims that supplies are based on demand from the developing countries.

There has been an evident shift in grain food aid from Asia to Africa. In the 1970s more than half went to Asia. At present about half goes to Africa and the Middle East, while only one third goes to Asia. A major part of this aid for Africa was directed to the region south of the Sahara. In mid-1980 no less than 40% of all world grain food aid was intended for sub-Saharan Africa. In the second half of the 1980s this share declined to around 25%, due to improved weather conditions.

TABLE 2 CEREAL FOOD AID BY REGIONS AND INCOME GROUPS, 1984/85-1988/89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1 million

	'84-'85	'85-'86	'86-'87	'87-'88	'88-'89
Total	**12.4**	**10.9**	**12.5**	**13.6**	**11.1**
of which: Africa and Middle East	*7.8*	*6.3*	*6.7*	*7.0*	*5.1*
Asia and Pacific	*3.2*	*3.0*	*4.0*	*4.3*	*3.6*
Latin America and Caribbean	*1.4*	*1.6*	*1.8*	*2.3*	*2.4*
Low-income/ food-deficit countries	**11.3**	**10.0**	**11.1**	**11.7**	**9.0**
Least developed countries	**5.5**	**4.8**	**4.5**	**4.9**	**4.0**
Sub-Saharan Africa	**5.0**	**3.9**	**3.3**	**3.8**	**3.0**

Source: WFP, *Food aid review*, 1990.

Donors provide food aid through three channels: bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The division among the three channels is roughly as follows: bilateral 65%, multilateral 20% and NGOs 15%.

Great differences exist among donors with regard to the degree in which these channels are used. More than two thirds of the food aid from France, Italy, Japan, the US and the EC is provided bilaterally. Australia, Canada and the Scandinavian countries make their food aid available predominantly through multilateral channels.

A wide range of multilateral organizations is involved in various aspects of food aid distribution. By far the most important is the WFP. Its share in international food aid rose rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s and stabilized in the 1980s. Currently its share is one fifth.

The number of NGOs involved in food aid operations is considerable. They play a particularly important role in emergency aid operations, especially for the US and the EC. The two largest NGOs for food aid are the Committee for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Euronaid, an umbrella organization of the European NGOs, plays a major role in food aid from the EC.

TABLE 3 CEREAL FOOD AID BY CATEGORY, 1984/85-1988/89
percentages

	'84/'85	'85/'86	'86/'87	'87/'88	'88/'89
Programme aid	53	46	57	60	51
Project aid	22	24	22	22	28
Emergency aid	25	30	21	18	21
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: WFP, *Food aid review*, 1990.

World-wide more than half the food aid is programme aid while one fifth comprises emergency aid. Project aid accounts for about a quarter. Great differences appear

to exist among the individual regions with regard to the role of the various types of aid. Programme aid dominates in Latin America and the Middle East with respectively 70% and 80%, while in Asia, next to programme aid (40%) project aid forms a substantial food aid flow (35%). In sub-Saharan Africa emergency aid is the most important food aid category, followed by programme aid.

Programme aid is provided virtually exclusively on a bilateral basis. All programmed food aid is monetized, that is, the food commodities provided are sold on domestic markets. Project food aid is provided mainly through multilateral channels, primarily the WFP, and to a lesser extent through NGOs. About one third of project aid is provided to feed vulnerable groups while the remainder is basically intended to support food-for-work projects.

Emergency aid shows very large fluctuations. From 1984 to 1985 it doubled from 1.5 million to 3.2 million tonnes, but declined a few years later to 2.5 million tonnes. It is mainly channelled through multilateral organizations and NGOs. Almost half was intended for refugees and displaced persons in countries plagued by war (e.g. Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan). The remainder was especially intended for countries whose crops had failed due to protracted periods of drought.

Because food aid is generally tied, with regard to both product and origin, the majority still originates from the donor country. Donors are increasingly being urged to give priority to regional or local food purchases.

World-wide, triangular purchases accounted for an average of 5% of grain food aid in the first half of the 1980s, and almost 10% by the end of the decade. The phenomenon of triangular purchasing is virtually unknown in the case of non-grain products. About two thirds of the volume of cereal commodities financed through triangular transactions and local purchases are coarse grains. Rice accounts for about one quarter of the total whereas the volume of wheat is relatively small.

Up till now triangular transactions appear to occur predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa; this region accounts for more than two thirds of all these transactions.

About three quarters of all triangular transactions and local purchases have been financed by EC (and its member states) and Japan. Remarkable is the very low percentage of triangular operations within the US food aid flow, namely less than 1%.

World Food Programme

FOOD AID WORKS

FOR·THE·FUTURE

3. International organizations

The two major international organizations through which the Netherlands channels food aid are the WFP and the EC. In this chapter we describe the policy, organization, procedures, and budget of each of these organizations, and review a number of characteristics of the food aid flows channelled through them.

3.1 The World Food Programme

Policy

The WFP was founded in 1963 by the FAO and the UN as a multilateral food aid organization. The idea behind the establishment of the WFP was that it would complement bilateral programmes, in particular those of the largest food donor, the United States. The greater part of bilateral food aid was provided on a government-to-government basis for sale on local markets. By contrast, the WFP would provide additional food aid to be distributed directly to the ultimate beneficiaries in the developing countries. The objectives as reflected in the basic regulations of the organization were developmental and social (humanitarian).

The WFP was the only UN agency mandated to use food aid specifically as a development tool. From time to time other UN agencies, such as the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO), have been involved in food relief campaigns in response to acute hunger and malnutrition caused by natural phenomena.

The type of activities supported by the WFP can be divided into two categories: project aid and emergency relief. Project aid includes two broad groups, namely a) agricultural and rural development and b) human resource development.

A variety of projects fall under rural development, including agricultural production (food crops, fisheries, forestry, dairy development), land development (soil conservation, irrigation, watershed management, drainage and flood control), rural infrastructure (rural roads, cooperatives, community development), rural settlement (including settlement of refugees) and establishment of food reserves. Most of these projects apply the so-called food-for-work approach.

Human resource development projects consist primarily of feeding vulnerable groups (mothers, infants, pre-school children) and food support for primary and secondary education and training.

Evaluation studies revealed severe shortcomings in the operation of the International Emergency Food Reserve. Emergency aid through IEFR often arrives too late because of complex and bureaucratic donor procedures. Since in general procurement was by tender—after lengthy negotiations—response to identified emergency requests was slow. Usually, therefore, it was easier and faster to obtain food aid for development projects than for emergencies.

The following general guidelines apply to the distribution of the food. Food aid channelled through emergency assistance organizations should be supplied to the target group free of charge. Sometimes the consumers are requested to make a modest contribution to finance the costs of distribution. Food provided for projects is used as food-for-work, or is sold by the project. The proceeds are used to finance specific project activities.

For the past few years, the WFP has had access to a fund (the 'non-food items'), intended for unforeseen expenses. This programme is especially intended to absorb sudden bottlenecks during the implementation of projects. Priority is given to equipment and services directly related to food handling, storage and transport. The Netherlands and Sweden are the main donors under this programme. Requests for non-food items outnumber the available resources. In 1989 they amounted to almost US$ 60 million, while the WFP received but one third of this amount in cash donations and commodities to support these activities.

In addition to the regular contributions, donors are increasingly calling on the WFP to organize on their behalf food purchases, transportation and monitoring of distribution for emergency relief and other food aid operations. The donors involved pay the WFP a fee for these services.

Budget

The WFP's 1989–90 budget was targeted at US$ 1.400 million, of which at least one third was to be in the form of cash or services and the balance in commodities. By the end of 1989, 73 countries had pledged a total of roughly US$ 1,000 million, or slightly more than 70% of the target figure. Of this amount, three quarters was in commodities and only one quarter in cash. The cash portion was therefore well below the one third specified in the WFP's regulations.

In addition to contributions from regular pledges, the WFP also receives special contributions for programmes such as the IEFR, non-food items and protracted refugee projects. Total annual turnover of the WFP, including services to bilateral donors, amounted to more than US$ 1,000 million in 1989.

The WFP's major donors are the United States, Canada and the EC. For the 1989–90 period, their contributions came to US$ 341 million, US$ 277 million and US$ 112 million respectively. In the same period, the Netherlands was the sixth largest donor (US$ 73 million).

TABLE 4 MAJOR DONORS TO WFP BY TYPE OF PLEDGE OR CONTRIBUTION, BIENNIUM 1989-1990
US$ millions

Donors	Regular	IEFR	Non-food items	Protracted refugee projects	Afghanistan relief	Total
United States	200	46	-	57	38	341
Canada	266	8	1	-	2	277
CEC	69	17	2	24	-	112
Finland	62	14	-	10	-	86
Australia	69	2	-	8	3	82
Netherlands	62	2	9	-	-	73
Germany	55	10	-	5	-	70
Denmark	58	4	-	-	-	62
Norway	52	2	2	1	2	59
Sweden	32	19	7	-	-	58
Total*	1020	144	27	116	79	1386

*) Including non-listed countries

Source: WFP, *Food aid review*, 1990.

Implementation

In volume terms, the WFP is the second largest food aid channel in the world. Its operations in 90 countries are managed by 83 country offices. In total, the WFP shipped 2.2 million tonnes of food in 1989. Of this amount, one million tonnes was targeted at projects, 0.7 million tonnes at emergency aid operations, and 0.5 million tonnes was shipped on behalf of bilateral donors. Compared to its development activities the share of WFP's emergency activities and assistance for refugees and displaced people increased steadily in the course of the 1980s.

Some 80% of the food aid shipped by the WFP consisted of grain products. Other important products were oils, fats, dairy products, canned meat and fish, and pulses.

In 1989 about 40% of all WFP aid was intended for sub-Saharan Africa, while approximately one third was directed at Asia. The rest was divided into roughly equal amounts for Latin America and North Africa/Middle East. Almost three quarters of the emergency aid went to sub-Saharan Africa (in particular Malawi and Ethiopia). In the other regions, development-oriented activities dominated heavily. Project activities were spread out over a large number of countries, the most important of which were India and Bangladesh. About half of the WFP aid went to the least developed countries (LLDCs). This percentage is significantly higher now than it was in the past, when WFP projects tended to be concentrated on more developed countries.

In 1989 the WFP provided food aid to more than 15 million people in 24 countries. This consisted of 830,000 tonnes of emergency food valued at US$ 254 million. A major part (70%) of the WFP emergency aid operations was directed

at displaced people and refugees. Almost seven million refugees were reached in 1989. This means that about half the world total of 13 million refugees was supported by the WFP.

One quarter of the WFP emergency aid is intended primarily for countries faced with protracted periods of drought and subsequent crop failures. Only a small part (5%) is intended for emergencies resulting from unpredictable natural disasters such as earthquakes.

At the end of 1989, the WFP assisted almost 300 projects with an aggregate value of US$ 3,500 million. Currently two thirds of the project aid is intended for food-for-work activities and one third for feeding vulnerable groups. In the first few years of the WFP the figures were the other way around, and supplementary feeding projects were by far the most important of the WFP's activities.

About 80% of the resources available within the food-for-work activities go to agricultural production programmes. Only a very modest sum is spent on national food reserves or on market restructuring programmes and price stabilization schemes. The duration of food-for-work projects is normally quite long; almost half the project activities have been going on for more than ten years.

The WFP is the largest purchaser of food aid on a triangular basis; next to purchases financed from its own sources, it also undertakes a great many transactions on behalf of bilateral donors. In total the WFP purchased 466,000 tonnes in 1988 on a triangular basis, of which 400,000 tonnes consisted of grain. Almost one third of the total triangular food purchases was channelled through the WFP. Approximately half of the WFP purchases were obtained from sub-Saharan Africa, in particular Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Forty per cent was derived from Asia, especially Thailand and Pakistan, while the rest mainly came from Argentina.

3.2 The European Community

Policy

The European Community has been engaged in providing food aid since 1967, the year in which the first Food Aid Convention (FAC) was signed.

Within the framework of the FAC, participants annually commit themselves to supply specified minimum amounts of grain. The commitment of the EC (including the member states) in the first Food Aid Convention in 1967 amounted to 1 million tonnes of grain. This gradually increased over the years to 1.67 million tonnes in 1986.

Initially food aid was seen primarily as an instrument for the disposal of agricultural surpluses. It is therefore not surprising that up to 1980 dairy products constituted a significant and even predominant part of the EC food aid. In the course of the 1980s however, food aid has gradually been dissociated from the EC's agricultural policy. The first clear food aid policy was formulated in 1983,

and since the 1986 Framework Regulation food aid has been separated officially from the Common Agricultural Policy.

The EC food aid programme consists of two parts. The first part comprises non-programmable food aid or humanitarian assistance. This takes the form of emergency aid and disaster relief. In the EC's view, emergency aid should remain restricted in scope. Emergency assistance is therefore limited to a period of four months maximum.

Programmable or normal food aid makes up the second part of the programme. A country is eligible for this assistance if faced with a structural food deficit due to inadequate domestic production, and unable to cover the shortage by way of commercial food imports. Normally EC food aid is reserved for the poorest countries.

The bulk of EC food aid is provided for balance of payments and budgetary support, and is sold on the local market. Top priority is given to rural development in the use of the funds generated from these sales. In line with the new Council Guidelines for food aid (1989), free distribution of EC food is desirable when vulnerable groups are identified. However, it should be limited so that it does not disrupt local production or markets or encourage rural depopulation.

In the new Guidelines, the Council reiterated the importance of greater integration between the various forms of food aid to help achieve food self-sufficiency. Since 1980, the EC has adopted a more integrated approach to its food aid policy. In 1981, it launched an initiative aimed at helping a number of pilot countries (Zambia, Mali, Kenya and Rwanda) to define and implement a food strategy. The main ideas resulting from this experience advocate better integration of the various instruments of cooperation to help attain food self-sufficiency. The most important application concerns the integration of project and food aid. The countervalue funds generated from food aid sales are used to complement other resources, intended mainly for rural development activities.

The early food strategy was focused mainly on the supply side of food security. Next to considerations of supply, current EC food security policy is concerned with improved access of vulnerable and poverty-stricken groups to sufficient food, in both the short and medium term. Consequently, more attention has been paid of late to the demand side of food insecurity. One reason for this new emphasis in food security policies was the 1983–84 famine in sub-Saharan Africa.

When a developing country has embarked on a process of economic adjustment food aid can be integrated into that process through the use of funds from food aid sales or through free or subsidized distribution to vulnerable groups or those affected by the adjustment measures. However, implementation of a structural adjustment programme is no prerequisite for receiving food aid.

Other major innovations are: triangular transactions, substitution of food aid by financial aid and multi-annual commitments.

Initially, triangular transactions were a method of providing food aid commodities which were not available on the European market. The rules governing

triangular food aid transactions were liberalized in 1986. Food aid can now be purchased outside of Europe in any situation where this may enhance development objectives. One of the conditions stipulated in the Council Regulation was that such purchases remain in aggregate at a level compatible with the principle that aid should be mobilized on the EC market. There is an unwritten understanding that triangular operations will be limited to a 10% share of the value of the EC's food aid programme (Hay, 1987).

While noting certain difficulties, especially the inadequacy of rural infrastructure, the Council (1989) reiterated the advantages of the increased use of triangular and local purchases in operations involving procurement of food aid commodities in developing countries, particularly in the underpinning of regional food security.

The possibility of replacing food aid by an equivalent financial contribution was introduced in the mid-1980s. These 'substitutions' are provided in cases where it would be counterproductive to continue supplying food aid. This measure was introduced in particular for countries facing marked fluctuations in food production. Substitutions are meant as short-term aid only. It is not considered logical to continue substitution for several years (Huby, 1989), since the projects and programmes financed in this way would subsequently fall under the category of regular financial and technical assistance.

Multi-year programming of food operations to combat structural food deficits can now be carried out as well. However, each multi-year commitment must meet specific criteria and conditions and must be subjected to a detailed mid-term review which may or may not lead to alterations in the initial design.

Organization and procedures

EC food aid is provided in two ways: directly to recipient countries by the EC itself; indirectly through international and non-governmental organizations. Direct food aid is made available primarily in the form of programme aid and sold in the recipient country.

In assessing whether a country is eligible for programme aid, the European Commission bases its considerations on basic food requirements, per capita income and the balance of payments situation. The first priority of countervalue funds should be to benefit rural development, either through budgetary support to institutions and programmes, or by helping to meet local costs of specific projects financed from the EC development budget. However, the funds may also be used to attenuate the social impact of structural adjustment programmes.

Countervalue funds are usually posted on a separate account, managed jointly by both the EC and the recipient country. The EC has been urging the use of world market prices to calculate the countervalue funds.

The WFP is the most important multilateral institution channelling EC food aid. Some 15% of EC support to the WFP is provided in the form of cash, while 85%

is made available in kind. In the EC food basket wheat and dairy products are by far the main items, with dairy products accounting for two thirds of the total value. The EC bases its cash contribution exclusively on transportation costs of the commodities pledged to the WFP. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the EC has regularly called upon the expertise of the WFP to provide services for the purchase, transportation, supervision and monitoring of its direct (bilateral) food aid. Most of these bilateral services were provided for countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

NGOs who wish to become eligible for food aid from the EC food basket must meet a number of requirements: a) their headquarters must be located in an EC member state (there are some exceptions to this rule); b) the NGO's statute must have as a major objective the provision of humanitarian assistance; c) it must have a proven record of success in distributing food aid effectively in developing countries.

Euronaid—an association of fourteen European NGOs involved in food aid programmes—plays an important role in coordinating food aid through NGOs. It was founded in 1980 with two goals: to act as a platform for discussing the most effective ways of helping people in need and to coordinate, execute and control that part of the EC food aid programme which is channelled through NGOs. The Dutch organizations Caritas/Mensen in Nood (People in need) and the Stichting Oecumenische Hulp (Association for inter-church aid) were among the eight NGOs that founded Euronaid. They were later joined by the NOVIB (Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation). NGOs provide food aid for three purposes: to bring relief to victims of conflicts or natural disasters, to feed vulnerable groups, and for development projects (especially food-for-work activities). Food aid through NGOs is allocated in kind, mainly cereals and dairy products.

EC purchasing policy is still characterized by a strong degree of tying. In practice, the widely applauded dissociation of the Community's agricultural and food aid policies does not appear to have resulted in a significantly different purchasing pattern in EC food aid, despite policy changes over the past decade with regard to triangular transactions and substitution. It seems, therefore, that regulations concerning these two alternatives are still too restrictive. An example of this is the unwritten understanding that triangular transactions should not exceed 10% of total EC food aid. Substitution can only be applied on an *ad hoc* basis.

Partly in response to the European Court of Auditors' criticism of the (in)efficiency of EC food aid, regulations concerning its mobilization were changed drastically in 1987. Up to then it was the responsibility of DG VI (agriculture) to mobilize the market intervention bureaus of the member states. Coordination was minimal; consequently, DG VIII (development cooperation) did not receive adequate information. This made it difficult to respond flexibly to appeals for assistance from developing countries and resulted in loss of time. Apart from criticism

of ECU 200 million (or 40%) in the food aid budget. The Commission feels that this should be financed from the export restitution savings on the agricultural budget. The Netherlands was opposed to this view, partly on the grounds that it would reverse the separation of its agricultural and food aid policies. A plea was made for a debate in order to establish priorities in the allocation of food aid and to make the food aid budget more controllable. Programming in products makes the budget unmanageable when prices fluctuate strongly.

The second problem in the EC programming related to how the deficits in the food aid programme itself should be compensated. According to the Netherlands, the continuity of the following types of food aid should be endangered least: a) food aid to support a national food security policy; b) food aid for development; c) food aid for specific emergency situations. The WFP and NGOs should also be spared as much as possible, since otherwise the continuity of their long-range projects and programmes could be seriously jeopardized.

The Commission did not wish to spare the NGOs, however, and, without providing any motivation, assigned priority to supplying the total amount of grain. This meant a 15–40% reduction in support for projects other than grain and milk powder (the programme was fully implemented for both these products in 1989). According to the Commission, the amount that was actually annulled was confined to around 25,000 tonnes (mainly rape oil). Nevertheless, Euronaid subsequently appealed to the Dutch government for support in absorbing the consequences of the EC's 'shock therapy.' It was decided to provide a single partial compensation for the resulting deficits, up to an amount of Dfl. 3 million.

Implementation

The EC programme is comparatively heavily concentrated on sub-Saharan Africa, which receives approximately 40% of total EC aid. The EC is therefore the largest donor in several African countries, especially if the member states' supplies are also taken into account. In addition, approximately 30% of the aid goes to Asia, 20% to the Middle East and North Africa, and 10% to Latin America.

It should be noted that EC food aid is concentrated on a limited number of countries. Two thirds of the EC grain programme is directed at only four recipient countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia and Mozambique. A comparable share of the dairy programme is sent to five countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, India (Operation Flood), Mozambique and Nicaragua. The food aid share in the non-ACP country programme is quite considerable: it constitutes almost half the assistance available for Latin America and Asia. This high share is attributed to the absence of other forms of rapidly available aid for those countries.

Of the EC aid, 35–40% goes to the least developed countries. This group accounts for more than half of the grain aid while the share of non-grains (mostly dairy products) is one fourth. The distribution of food aid over the three main

types is as follows: about 60% of the food aid is provided as programme aid, 30% as project aid and 10% as emergency assistance. Roughly 70% of EC food aid is monetized and the remaining 30% is distributed free of charge to people in need.

The food aid is divided among the three distributing channels more or less according to type. About 60% of the aid is provided directly by the EC itself. This mainly involves programme aid. The remaining 40% is channelled through multilateral and non-governmental organizations. The role of the NGOs in particular has increased strongly during the past few years, and almost one quarter of EC aid is now channelled in this manner. About 15% of the food aid is provided through the WFP.

As stated above, approximately 45% of the food aid consists of grains (mainly wheat) and 35% of dairy products. On average about 15% of the Community's grain supplies between 1987–89 involve local and triangular purchases. No dairy products are purchased outside the EC.

In 1988 and in 1989 the total amount spent on triangular operations was ECU 80 million and ECU 40 million respectively. The actual number of triangular transactions increased from 138 to 200. The main suppliers in 1989 were Zimbabwe (white maize), China (beans) and Argentina (fish and pulses). Most triangular transactions in 1989 were carried out through NGOs (approximately one third in money terms and two thirds of the total number of transactions). About one quarter of the total value of triangular transactions was arranged directly by the EC itself. The share of local and triangular purchases of the EC food aid budget amounted to 7.5% in 1989.

Little use was made of the substitution regulation introduced in 1985. In the first year, an amount of ECU 1.6 million in food aid supplies was converted into financial aid. In 1986, the figure was ECU 10 million and in 1987 ECU 5 million. In 1988, there was no substitution and in 1989 about ECU 3 million of which ECU 2.25 million went to Mali. To summarize, the food aid substituted for financial assistance amounted to about ECU 20 million (an average of less than ECU 5 million per year) for a period of five years. With an annual budget of approximately ECU 500 million, this is not even 1% of the total. In 1990, the available budget for substitution was halved (up to ECU 5 million).

Part Two DUTCH FOOD AID


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4. Policy and implementation

4.1 Food aid policy

Food aid dates back to the beginning of Dutch development cooperation in the mid-1960s. In analysing the Dutch policy, three periods can be distinguished, based on differences in emphasis on the objectives and the procedural methods of the food aid programme, rather than on absolute contrasts. It is interesting to note, however, that in all three periods, food aid is recognized as a potentially disruptive factor for local food production.

In the first period—up to the mid-1970s—the emphasis was on the possible use of agricultural surpluses in developing countries plagued by serious food shortages. During this period, aid was tied to both source and product. Not surprisingly, therefore, dairy products constituted an important part of the aid programme.

During this first period it was assumed that food supplies were incidental and meant to combat temporary food deficits. Humanitarian aspects dominated: food aid was not seen as an instrument for more distant goals. No consideration was given to issues such as whether food aid might contribute to development in the spheres of food self-sufficiency, market liberalization or food security.

Initially, food aid was viewed as a logical means of using Dutch surpluses to meet the shortages in developing countries. Towards the end of the first phase, large-scale use of the food aid instrument began to meet with objections.

During the second period, undernourishment was considered as the result not only of food shortages, but also of inequality. This view drew more attention to the demand side of the food problem. This is one reason why the grain supply share of Dutch food aid expanded during this period at the expense of dairy aid.

Under influence of the gloomy prospects outlined during the World Food Conference (1974), the emphasis continued to remain on food deficits. The conference signalled a rapid increase in food shortages, resulting in the food aid funds being expanded.

In the third period—from the beginning of the 1980s—food aid was increasingly viewed as a development instrument. Next to humanitarian considerations, new goals were formulated, such as balance of payments and budgetary support. During this period, food aid as programme aid was given high priority. The target-oriented character of food aid disappeared into the background and food aid was

now seen as an instrument to achieve more distant goals. In this period, Dutch policy was increasingly geared towards policies of multilateral and international organizations. Concepts proposed by the WFP, the FAO and the World Bank provided an impulse for Dutch policy.

The original, primarily bilateral aid gave way to multilateral aid on the one hand, and aid channelled through NGOs on the other. More contracting out of food aid to the WFP and the NGOs was believed to increase efficiency (through more effective coordination), to avoid disruptions of local food markets and to reach the target groups better.

Different interpretations have been given to the integrated approach to food aid as a development instrument. In the first half of the 1980s, food aid was integrated into food strategies, the main goal being to increase food self-sufficiency levels. The food strategies paid special attention to market liberalization and greater incentives for small farmers.

In the second half of the 1980s the food strategy concept disappeared, mainly because donors were little interested in supporting food strategy measures. Moreover, serious food shortages recurred in the first half of the 1980s in a number of developing countries, which led to renewed emphasis on large-scale food aid supplies. The one-sided nature of the food strategy, with the emphasis on production, was also criticised. After all, undernourishment was not just a problem of supply, but also of purchasing power. The food security concept subsequently began to play an important role. Food security pays attention to both sides of the problem: the amount of food available, and the degree of accessibility to food by different groups in society.

The introduction of structural adjustment programmes further boosted interest in the demand side. The austerity measures implemented within this framework hit the weaker groups of society particularly hard. To mitigate these negative effects for certain groups, there has been pressure to stress the social aspect of restructuring programmes. The result was an adapted approach, the so-called Social Dimension of Adjustment (SDA). Many donors, including the Netherlands, believe that food aid can play a role in the SDA approach. Various possibilities exist for reaching the target groups with food aid, for example by introducing ration systems, food subsidies, etc. There are several practical problems to this approach. The larger the target group, the more difficult it becomes to implement these programmes (from an organizational and financial point of view). In countries where the majority of the population is already living below the poverty line, as in sub-Saharan Africa, it is virtually impossible to provide solutions through target-oriented programmes.

In 'Een wereld van verschil' (A world of difference), a policy document on the Dutch aid policy for the 1990s, it is stated that the food security policy implemented in the 1980s will be continued. Food aid funds should be used flexibly to support this type of policy. In all cases, food aid is weighed against other possible forms of

assistance. These are preferred in cases where the comparative advantage of food aid can not be demonstrated.

4.2 Implementation

Volume

In the 1980–1989 period, Dutch food aid provided through the various programmes amounted to approximately Dfl. 2,500 million. In absolute terms, the value of Dutch food aid during this period was reasonably stable. In relative terms, the share of food aid in the total expenditure of ODA funds declined, from 10% at the end of the 1970s to 4.5% in 1989. In virtually no other DAC country was this relative decrease as sharp as in the Netherlands. The resources were primarily derived from three budgetary categories: the rural development sector programme, the food aid programme for NGOs, and the pledged contribution to the EC food aid programme.

TABLE 6 DUTCH FOOD AID, 1980-1989

	Disbursements Dfl. millions	**% of ODA**
1980	205	6,4
1981	267	7,1
1982	215	5,4
1983	239	7,0
1984	369	9,1
1985	283	7,5
1986	267	6,3
1987	168	4,0
1988	262	6,0
1989	216	4,5

Food aid was also provided on an incidental basis from the regular country programme funds. Between 1985 and 1989, this source was used to finance a total amount of some Dfl. 180 million worth of food supplies. The major recipient countries were India (Dfl. 115 million), Tanzania (Dfl. 30 million), Mozambique (Dfl. 15 million), and Surinam (Dfl. 15 million). The supplies, provided chiefly in the form of programme aid, consisted of such products as cooking oil, sugar and dairy products.

Additionally, food aid was supplied within the framework of the Emergency Aid Programme. Donations via this programme mainly consisted of medicine, clothing and tents. Only 10% was provided in the form of food, amounting to a total of around Dfl. 50–75 million for the 1980–1989 period.

Food aid from the regular country programmes and from the Emergency Aid Programme will not be discussed further.

Organization

Within the Dutch aid budget, three main sources can be distinguished from which food aid is financed on a regular basis: the rural sector programme, the nutritional programme of NGOs and the Dutch contribution to the EC's development budget. In the mid-1970s it was decided to combine all bilateral food aid activities and include them in one budget category. Initially the responsibility for handling food aid was spread over many different bureaus within the DGIS.

In 1985, two new sector programmes for rural and industrial development were set up to promote activities in these fields. This would facilitate an effective response to problems or initiatives for which there was no room in the current programmes. Freedom of choice with regard to the channel used (bilateral or multilateral) should contribute to greater effectiveness as well. The rural development programme consisted of the following sub-programmes: food aid; food aid, agricultural production and food security; rural infrastructure development.

In the first three years (1985–88), food aid was provided under both the food aid sub-programme as well as under the food aid, agricultural production and food security sub-programme. The Dutch food aid policy was aimed at an integrated approach to rural development. The basic principle was to stimulate the integration of project and food aid, more or less in accordance with recommendations of food strategy studies carried out during the first half of the 1980s under the supervision of the EC and with the active support of the Netherlands. For example, countervalue funds resulting from food aid sales were to be used to complement other funds, in particular for rural development activities. Food aid funds could also be made available directly in cash to support projects or programmes linked with food production, food storage and food security.

A separate unit was given the responsibility of supervising and implementing the food aid, food production and food security programme. However, because it had minimal operational capacity, the unit had little opportunity to execute projects under its own management.

– Between 1980 and 1989, more than half of the food aid funds were channelled through the WFP in two different ways: regular pledges and *ad hoc* contributions. The regular pledges increased from Dfl. 55 million in 1980 to Dfl. 66 million in 1990. A sum of Dfl. 73 million was budgeted for 1991. In addition, extra commitments were made on an irregular basis for specific relief operations. In Appendix 3 a detailed review is given of Dutch contributions to WFP in the 1980s, in terms of both money and commodities.

- NGOs play an important role in implementing food aid operations. Their share has increased significantly over the past decade: approximately one fifth of food aid funds were channelled through NGOs at the end of the 1980s.
- The remainder was directly handled by the DGIS. In this context, the Food Supply and Purchase Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture (VIB) played a major supporting role. The DGIS also made frequent use of WFP services for purchasing, transportation and monitoring of the bilateral food aid.

The DGIS has a second food aid programme: the nutrition programme in support of developing activities by non-governmental organizations (VPO). This programme was started in the mid-1970s with the goal of supporting small-scale food and nutritional projects directed at specific target groups—pregnant and nursing women, and children up to the age of five. The VPO budget increased in the 1980–1990 period from Dfl. 15 million a year to Dfl. 28 million. Three intermediaries are used for execution of the VPO programme: Caritas/Mensen in Nood, the Stichting Oecumenische Hulp (SOH) and the NOVIB. The available funds are allocated on the basis of project proposals from these organizations. During the past few years, each organization received approximately one third of the available funds. Since 1989, mini-projects (up to Dfl. 50,000) require no advance approval.

The Netherlands annually channels aid through the EC, part of which is paid to the European Development Fund exclusively reserved for the ACP countries. The other part goes towards the EC Development Budget, under which the EC food aid programme falls. The contribution to the EC food aid programme rose from Dfl. 55 million in 1980 to Dfl. 74 million in 1990, and is budgeted at Dfl. 81 million for 1991.

The European Commission makes proposals regarding implementation to the Food Aid Committee, which consists of representatives from the member states. Decision-making in the committee occurs on the basis of a qualified majority. Due to its relatively small share in the budget, the influence of the Netherlands is limited.

In table 7 a summary is given of the main channels of Dutch food aid during the 1980s.

TABLE 7 DUTCH FOOD AID BY CHANNEL, 1980-1989
percentages

	1980-1984	1985-1989
EC	32	31
WFP	29	35
DGIS bilateral	28	15
NGOs	11	19
	100%	100%

A distinction can be made in Dutch food aid between contributions which the Netherlands is obliged to make in line with (international) agreements, and contributions made on a voluntary basis.

The food aid provided within the framework of both the EC contributions and the Food Aid Convention fall under the category of obligatory contributions. The FAC agreements commit the Netherlands to provide an equivalent of some 50,000 tonnes of grain per year. Part of this (approximately half) is channelled through the WFP; the remainder is provided bilaterally. Since 1982, it has also been possible to include triangular purchases under the FAC commitment.

Financial management

From the end of the 1970s until the mid 1980s, the Food Aid and Food Production sector programmes faced serious disbursement problems. In the 1979–1982 period, the reserved amounts for the food aid programme were consistently higher than the actual expenses. Of the total amount budgeted for this period (approximately Dfl. 300 million), only 60% was used.

During the first half of the 1980s, considerable assistance was provided in response to acute deficits in Africa and Latin America. The financing was facilitated by existing problems of under-utilization of aid funds. The 1983 and 1984 supplementary food aid campaigns for the benefit of sub-Saharan Africa were financed in this way.

In 1985 the funding of the Dutch bilateral aid programme was changed from a system based primarily on commitments to one based on disbursements. A cash ceiling was introduced for the expected expenditure in the current budget year. Undisbursed amounts could therefore no longer be carried over to the next year.

In this context, the 1985 food aid programme was divided into two parts: on the one hand the supply of food aid was emphasized and, on the other, stress was laid on stimulation of food production. It was feared that the pressure of disbursements would lead to the domination of food aid supplies rather than support for food production activities.

Initially, the food production programme did in fact have serious disbursement problems. In 1986 and 1987, part of these funds were therefore used for supplementary food aid campaigns. Since 1987, however, no food aid expenditure has been financed from the food production budget category.

Between 1985 and 1989 the food aid programme was confronted with underdisbursement problems as well. A solution was found in additional commitments to the WFP.

In the 1985–1989 period the share of food aid from both programmes amounted to approximately 65%, which means that 35% was spent on food production activities. The objective was to spend about half on these activities. A shift has occurred since 1987, partly as a result of the decline in demand for emergency food

aid in sub-Saharan Africa, and partly because identification of project activities improved.

Characteristics of food aid flows

Initially—from the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s—Dutch food aid was mainly directed at Asia, in particular India and Indonesia. Thereafter, the African share gradually increased, with the focus in the beginning primarily on the Sahel countries.

TABLE 8 DUTCH FOOD AID BY REGION, 1980-1989
percentages

	1980-1984	1985-1989
Sub-Saharan Africa	45	43
Asia and Pacific	25	28
Latin America and Caribbean	17	21
Middle East and North Africa	13	8
	100%	100%

In the 1980s almost half of Dutch food aid went to sub-Saharan Africa, the remainder going to Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. The major recipient countries of Dutch food aid were Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique and Sudan.

The division of Dutch food aid according to type was as follows: one third emergency aid, almost half project aid and one fifth programme aid (see Table 9).

TABLE 9 DUTCH FOOD AID BY CATEGORY, 1980-1989
percentages

	1980-1984	1985-1989
Programme aid	11	27
Project aid	46	49
Emergency aid	43	24
	100%	100%

Most of Dutch food aid was provided as project assistance. The share of this type of aid has remained reasonably stable over the past ten years. The large scale of project aid is mainly attributable to the channels that were chosen for implementation. A major part of Dutch food aid is channelled through the WFP and the NGOs, organizations that use food aid mainly for supporting project activities.

The share of emergency aid fell sharply in the second half of the 1980s, due in particular to relatively good harvests in sub-Saharan Africa.

Programme aid was increased in line with the Dutch policy to use food aid to support structural adjustment programmes. The amount spent on this type of aid more than doubled in the second half of the 1980s.

Major foods supplied under Dutch food aid in the 1980–1989 period were grain and dairy products. Almost 60% of the food aid budget was allocated to these two categories. Other products, including oils/fats and canned foods (beef/chicken/fish), accounted for one sixth of Dutch food aid. The non-food items category comprised a relatively large share, that is, more than one quarter. These funds were mainly used to supply equipment and technical assistance for improvement of the logistic management of relief operations. Agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seeds, tools) for the upgrading of local production were a second major expenditure item.

TABLE 10 DUTCH FOOD AID BY COMMODITY, 1980-1989
percentages

	1980-1984	1985-1989
Cereals	34	35
Dairy products	31	22
Other food products	14	16
Non-food items	21	27
	100%	100%

In practice, it appears that between 1985 and 1989 almost two thirds of all Dutch food aid was purchased in the Netherlands or other EC member states. Expenditure in the Netherlands was least (one third) in the case of food aid supplied by the DGIS itself. Almost 60% of the bilateral food aid was used for local and triangular food purchases. More than half the Dutch food aid provided through the WFP consisted of products purchased in the Netherlands.

Part Three SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

production of coarse grains is still very low and averages about 25% of the total output (FAO, 1990). Consumption growth of fine grains is primarily—although not exclusively—an urban phenomenon. One third of the population is urban, yet the cities account for about three quarters of the wheat and rice consumption. Increasing urbanization therefore continues to mean growing dependence on imported grains. African farmers have been able to benefit only modestly from the urban market's growth. The cities have been, as it were, torn from the countryside, whereby one of the most dynamic sectors of the African economy—the urban food market—has largely remained out of reach of the country's own agriculture.

FIGURE 1 FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY BY CEREAL TYPE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1981-1989
percentages



Source: FAO, yearbooks of international trade and production yearbooks.

Pricing policies of the local governments is the second factor playing an important role in this distortion between demand and supply. Often governments have kept farm prices (in real terms) artificially low by allowing their exchange rates to become overvalued. Along with price subsidies for imported wheat and rice, this distortion accelerated the substitution of imports for domestic produce. The markets for locally produced traditional foods (such as sorghum, millet, roots and tubers) have consequently been compressed.

With a production volume of around 50–60 million tonnes, grain production in sub-Saharan Africa is still dominated by coarse grains in terms of quantity. Rice production (approximately 8 million tonnes) and wheat (3 to 4 million tonnes) lag far behind.

The question whether local production of current fine grain imports should be encouraged or not is constantly debated by experts and politicians. In sub-Saharan Africa improvement of local rice production depends on irrigation. Irrigation is considered to be of great significance because it substantially increases crop

security and makes possible more than one harvest per year. The amount of irrigated land has expanded significantly in the past few years (more than 4% per year), although it has been limited to a small number of countries. Because of the very high investment costs involved, irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa barely covers 3% of cultivated land. In Asia, for example, this figure is ten times higher.

Local wheat production poses even greater demands. Wheat requires a cool period during the growth season. Climatic conditions render it virtually impossible to produce wheat in places like the Sahel and the area near the Equator. In parts of Eastern and Southern Africa alone attempts are made to offset rising consumption through local production. Efforts to raise self-sufficiency levels of wheat address themselves to the introduction of new varieties, irrigation and a favourable governmental input policy.

To date, donor policies have virtually ignored the experiences of small-scale wheat producers. Consequently, wheat production is reserved for large commercial farmers. Another way of reducing dependency on wheat imports is by making bread from a composite wheat-sorghum flour. Experiments with mixtures of sorghum flour have been marketed successfully in various African countries. But the use of composite flour is a partial solution at best, as substantial imports will still be needed.

It is estimated that in the mid-1980s 140 million people in sub-Saharan Africa (about one third of the population) were severely undernourished, the majority of whom were women and young children. The aggregate number of malnourished has risen gradually over the past decades. In 1969–71 the absolute number of malnourished was about 90 million. By the end of the 1970s this figure stood at 110 million. The situation is not the same from one country to the next. According to the World Bank (1988), more than half of Africa's food-insecure live in one of the following seven countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire. In another (overlapping) group of seven countries, more than 40% of the population is food insecure—in Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. Finally, in 24 sub-Saharan African countries, more than 20% of the population does not have enough to eat.

Prospects for the food situation at the end of this century are very gloomy. The number of food-insecure people in sub-Saharan Africa by the year 2000 is estimated at around 200 million. According to the World Bank (1990), unless production growth trends change radically, the need for food imports will have risen from the current figure of around 13 million tonnes to between 30 and 40 million tonnes by then. In view of its economic prospects, sub-Saharan Africa is not expected to be able to supplement this shortage with commercial purchases. The region's dependence on food aid therefore threatens to rise sharply in the very near future.

5.2 Food sector policy

Partly in view of the ongoing downward trend since 1960 in sub-Saharan Africa's food production, the general consensus is that the causes of this food crisis are primarily structural. Inevitably, incidental factors such as drought (Southern Africa and the Sahel) have also played an important role. These should not be seen, however, as the actual causes of the crisis; they have simply worsened existing problems and made them visible. Climatic factors are relevant in explaining the irregularity of the downward trend, rather than the trend itself. The question arises for parts of sub-Saharan Africa whether periods of drought are not caused by deterioration of the physical environment, evident in, among other things, rapidly expanding soil erosion and desertification. Other incidental factors are civil wars and political unrest (Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique). Is the economic crisis becoming endemic to sub-Saharan Africa?

The major structural factors of the African food crisis are considered to be both the government policy being pursued, and the worsened terms of trade of Africa's major export products. To begin with the latter: most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are virtually exclusively dependent on exports of one or more crops for their foreign exchange income: they must rely on cocoa, coffee, peanuts or sugar. But during the past few years, world market prices for these products have dropped sharply. Moreover, Africa's share of some of these (such as cocoa and coffee) on the world market has narrowed. Owing to this decline in income from commercial crop exports, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are currently experiencing a very serious financial crisis. Many are barely or not at all able to finance even their most vital imports, including agricultural inputs. Present production levels, which are far too low as it is, are therefore under further threat.

The second structural factor mentioned often is government policy. Food production policies in sub-Saharan Africa typically imply considerable interference in market regulation. Food sector policies pursued by sub-Saharan Africa governments are generally pictured as biased towards consumers, especially consumers in urban areas. There is no impulse to expand food production and, in some cases, production is even subjected to negative influences. In particular, the low prices farmers receive for their agricultural products discourages large-scale production for the market, and therefore encourage the continuation of subsistence agriculture. The low priority given by African governments to food cultivation is also indicated by the amount spent on this sector—at present, less than 10% of government budgets.

Finally, another major factor contributing to the food crisis in Africa is population growth. For some time, growth has been considerably higher than food production. Current population growth totals 3% per year, and in some countries is even 4%. Around the year 2020, Africa will have to feed approximately 800 million people—almost twice as many as now. In this context, the claim that Africa has virtually inexhaustible agriculture potential is far too optimistic. According to the

FAO, almost half of the continent is unsuitable for cultivation. Moreover, large regions have to contend with very irregular rainfall. Of the 45 sub-Saharan African countries, it is estimated that at least fourteen have insufficient farming land to feed their current populations (based on existing production methods).

While researchers and policy makers largely agree on the causes of the problem, there is much disagreement about the type of measures that should be taken. Two strategies are advocated. There are those who believe that opening up the market will eventually provide a solution; others are convinced that a certain degree of protectionism is vital to save sub-Saharan Africa's agriculture. The IMF and the World Bank are the main supporters of the first view, and for several years have been urging a return to the market mechanism.

According to these organizations, dominant government positions on food markets have seriously damaged market operations, and at a very high expense. Pressed by the IMF and the World Bank, a large number of sub-Saharan African countries implemented so-called adjustment programmes at the beginning of the 1980s, aimed at deregulation and privatization. Standard measures had to be taken in the food sector, including abolition of subsidies and liberalization of markets for agricultural inputs and outputs. African governments often have monopoly positions in the purchase of harvests and distribution of agricultural inputs.

The state purchasing organizations also keep the prices they pay to farmers systematically too low. Structural reforms desired by the World Bank to stimulate production were directed at raising producer prices for agricultural products. The policy reform package prescribed by the World Bank evinced great confidence in the private sector. The World Bank accused governments of stifling the market, which is why they should reduce their presence. In other words, it blamed internal policies for the African crisis.

The United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is strongly opposed to the World Bank's position. In the ECA's view, the imbalances the World Bank sees as the cause of the crisis are merely symptomatic. According to the ECA, the real causes of stagnating growth in Africa are lack of human and physical capital, a poor infrastructure and an ill-developed private sector. Even if prices were raised, farmers would not be able to increase their production because more fundamental bottlenecks would continue to exist. The measures proposed by the World Bank would have a drastic impact on demand. Adjustment programmes are normally directed at reducing effective short-term demand (of imports and government expenditure, for example). A decline in effective demand would reduce utilisation of production capacity, and therefore production. In the long run, this reduction might be at the expense of economic growth. But the proposed measures would also seriously threaten the purchasing power and food security of specific groups in society. The ECA believes the cutbacks would generally affect the poverty-stricken groups the most.

If these types of constraints are to be overcome, it is considered necessary that the government plays an active role. Africa's markets are still too weak to generate

growth independently. The private sector requires both space and support. In this view, the challenge of the 1990s is not how to reduce the government's role, but how improve it.

In a report published in 1989, the World Bank also appears to have come to this conclusion. The World Bank has significantly changed its views on a number of major points expounded in earlier studies on Africa. In the first place, it has clearly changed its stand on the role of the government during a restructuring process. Whereas in the past the World Bank strongly urged minimal government intervention, a revaluation of state tasks can recently be noticed which shows some overlap with the ECA's alternative programme. The World Bank continues to emphasize the inefficient operations of many state organizations, but it is now also interested in improving efficiency and strengthening the organization, as well as bolstering the necessary human capital.

Secondly, if chronic food security is to be reduced or prevented, it is important that the need for government intervention on the demand side is recognized, in particular for households with low and changing incomes. At present, the World Bank considers the setting up of targeting programmes to improve the food situation of specific groups to be a government task, apparently viewing this as an important area of state care. The World Bank has therefore shown that it has heeded the critical recommendations of organizations such as UNICEF.

5.3 Food aid

Of total food aid flows, the share intended for sub-Saharan Africa has changed dramatically over the past twenty years. In the beginning of the 1960s, less than 1% of grain food aid went to this region. Partly as a result of protracted periods of drought in the Sahel, this share rose in the beginning of the 1970s to about one fifth of total food aid. This percentage increased further during the 1980s to an average 30%. In 1984/85, the share of sub-Saharan Africa peaked at nearly 40%, mainly due to serious food shortages in Southern Africa, Ethiopia, the Sahel and Sudan. But also in terms of domestic food production the share of food aid in sub-Saharan Africa is considerable. This ratio averaged about 7.4% between 1984–88 and has been growing at a rate of over 11% annually during the period 1970–88 (FAO, 1990). Expressed in terms of marketed production, which in sub-Saharan Africa averages about 25% of the total output, food is even more significant in the domestic markets.

The average value of food aid to sub-Saharan Africa during the past decade (1980–1989) is estimated at US$ 1,000 million per year. In volume terms, food aid amounted to between 3 and 4 million tonnes, about 90% of which consisted of grain. In money terms, however, the share of non-grain products was considerably greater, and currently totals one third. Moreover, the share of non-grains has increased in the past few years.

The importance of food aid as compared to commercial food imports has increased as well. Because of sub-Saharan Africa's economic crisis, more and more countries are becoming dependent on food aid for food imports to supplement shortfalls in local production. Although grain food aid only amounted to 15% of total food imports at the beginning of the 1970s, by the end of the 1970s this had risen to 25%, and to almost 40% at the end of the 1980s. The share of non-grain food aid is considerably lower. Less than 10% of non-grain imports, valued at a total of US$ 3,000 million, consists of food aid.

Great differences exist between countries with regard to dependence on food aid. In 1989, almost half of all food aid to sub-Saharan Africa was destined for three countries: Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sudan. In fact, Ethiopia and Mozambique are almost completely dependent on food aid for their import requirements.

The share of food aid in ODA in sub-Saharan Africa dropped significantly between 1984 and 1988 from roughly 12% to 6%. Here too, a number of striking differences exist between the countries however. For some countries, e.g. Angola, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan, the food aid share of total ODA exceeds 15%.

Emergency aid plays a far more important role in sub-Saharan Africa than it does in other regions. Almost 45% of food aid to this area consists of emergency assistance compared with 20% at the beginning of the 1980s. One fifth consists of project aid while about 40% is provided in the form of programme assistance. Between 1985 and 1989, an average of almost three quarters of emergency food went to four countries: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sudan. Programme aid is concentrated in a few countries only. Four countries—Kenya, Mozambique, Sudan and Zambia—received almost 60% of programme cereal food aid. Project cereal food aid was more evenly spread. The two major recipients of project food aid were Ethiopia and Mali.

TABLE 11 MAJOR RECIPIENTS OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CEREAL FOOD AID, 1984/85-1988/89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000 -average

Project aid		Programme aid		Emergency aid	
Ethiopia	105	Sudan	376	Ethiopia	725
Mali	59	Mozambique	303	Sudan	327
Ghana	41	Kenya	104	Somalia	107
Kenya	39	Zambia	76	Mozambique	84
Tanzania	32	Zaïre	56	Niger	67
Total	703		1515		1691
Share of total	39%		60%		77%

Source: WFP/World Bank, Food aid in sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for the 1990s (semi-final draft), 1990.

The division of aid according to channel is roughly as follows: 60% of grain aid is channelled bilaterally, 20% through NGOs, and 20% through multilateral

organizations, in particular the WFP. The division of non-grain food aid over these three channels is one third bilateral, one quarter through NGOs, and two fifths multilateral.

In 1989 the major suppliers of cereal food aid to sub-Saharan Africa were the United States (one third), the EC (one third, including member states) and the WFP (one quarter). In relative terms, the WFP and the EC concentrated heavily on sub-Saharan Africa; 40% and 50%, respectively, of their total food aid contributions was allocated to this region.

FIGURE 2 CEREAL FOOD AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY CATEGORY AND TYPE OF ACTIVITY
1980/81-1988/89 metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1 million



1987-1989 average percentages



Source: -WFP/World Bank, Food aid in sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for the 1990s (semi-final draft), 1990.
-World Bank, *Food aid in sub-Saharan Africa*, 1990

Almost half the food aid in sub-Saharan Africa was resold (monetized), thereby providing countervalue funds. Great differences existed between donors in this respect. For the United States, monetization of food aid was as high as 75%, whereas for the WFP it amounted to only 15%.

TABLE 12 CEREAL TRIANGULAR TRANSACTIONS AND LOCAL PURCHASES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000

	'83-'84	'84-'85	'85-'86	'86-'87	'87-'88	'88-'89
Purchase in regularly exporting countries**	67.2	156.8	169.3	248.5	446.7	210
Purchase in non-regular exporting countries	116.9	75.3	140.1	242.9	193.3	178
Total	184.1	232.1	309.4	491.4	640.0	388
% of total cereal food aid	6	5	7	15	17	15

*) Not including commodity exchange or swap arrangements.
**) Malawi and Zimbabwe

Source: WFP, Interfais database

Triangular and local purchases play a relatively important role in the procurement of food in sub-Saharan Africa. About one sixth of all food aid to the region is provided in this way. The majority (three quarters) of these purchases occur in sub-Saharan Africa itself. This is a fairly recent development. At the beginning of the 1980s, triangular and local purchases accounted for only 5% of food aid supplies.

FIGURE 3 CEREAL FOOD AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY COMMODITY, 1980/81-1988/89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1 million



Source: World Bank, *Food aid in sub-Saharan Africa*, 1990

The bulk of food aid to sub-Saharan Africa consists of commodities produced in donor countries. Wheat is by far the most important product. Between 1985 and 1989, almost 60% of all cereal food aid consisted of wheat. Coarse grains accounted for 30% of the food aid. The relative importance of food aid for the various imported types of cereals shows the opposite. In the past five years, on average one third of food aid consisted of wheat and wheat flour imports and more than half of coarse grain imports. These figures indicate the importance of food aid in relation to commercial commodity trade.

5.4 Dutch food aid

Between 1980 and 1989 almost half of Dutch food aid went to sub-Saharan Africa. The main recipients of Dutch bilateral food aid (excluding food aid channelled through WFP and EC) in this period were Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan. Approximately 70% of Dutch food aid was targeted to these three countries. Other important recipients were Angola, Cape Verde, Zambia and Mali. In the 1980s these seven countries together received more than 90% of Dutch bilateral food aid. Roughly one third of the Dutch food aid to sub-Saharan Africa was provided directly, i.e. on a bilateral basis. Two thirds of Dutch food aid was channelled through international organizations or NGOs. The share of bilateral food aid in sub-Saharan Africa is larger than in the other continents.

In table 13 the distribution is given of Dutch food aid by category. This table shows that almost half of Dutch food aid to sub-Saharan Africa consisted of emergency aid, one third of project aid and one fifth of programme aid. Emergency aid decreased substantially during the 1980s, mainly as a result of better weather conditions. Since the mid-1980s emergency aid was mostly provided for refugees and displaced persons who were forced to leave their homes because of civil war, ethnic conflicts and political instability.

TABLE 13 DUTCH FOOD AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY CATEGORY, 1980-89
percentages

	1980-1984	1985-1989
Programme aid	10	25
Project aid	28	40
Emergency aid	62	35
	100%	100%

About two thirds of Dutch food aid to sub-Saharan Africa consisted of food commodities and one third of non-food items mostly meant to facilitate internal transport. The division among food aid commodities between cereals and non-cereals is more or less equal in money terms. About half of the cereal food aid to

sub-Saharan Africa was course grains and purchased locally or through triangular operations.

In comparison with other food aid donors Dutch food aid shows significant difference on the following aspects:

- Channelling: whereas on average two thirds of food aid is provided on a bilateral basis, Dutch food aid is to a large extent channelled through international organizations and NGOs.
- Category of aid: programme food aid plays a modest role in Dutch food aid to sub-Saharan Africa (20%). Almost half of the total food aid to sub-Saharan Africa is provided in the form of programme aid.
- Composition: about 60% of food aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa consist of fine grains (wheat and rice). In Dutch food aid these grains account for less than one fifth.

6. Country evaluations

6.1 Senegal

The bulk (80–90%) of food aid provided to Senegal during the 1980s was provided as programme aid. The portions of emergency and project aid were relatively small, with project aid accounting for about 10% of total food aid. Very little emergency aid was supplied over the past five years (1985–89), because of satisfactory weather conditions and relatively good harvests. Senegal mainly uses food aid to substitute commercial imports, and thus in support of the balance of payments. It receives approximately 100,000 tonnes of food aid. This is equivalent to about 8% of total consumption needs and 20% of total cereal imports. Food aid evidently plays a relatively important role in providing for Senegal's cereal needs.

The country's main food donors are WFP (one third), the United States (one quarter) and Canada (one quarter). Dutch bilateral food aid between 1980–89 amounted to about Dfl. 20 million. In general, food aid consists of rice and wheat; Dutch bilateral aid consisted mainly of rice.

Since most of this food aid is sold, it has the same effect on domestic grain markets as commercial grain imports. Because food aid in Senegal substitutes commercial imports, there is no sign that it directly depresses prices. No serious complaints have been reported about market disruptions caused by food aid arriving too late.

The indirect effects of large-scale programme aid to Senegal are considered to be of greater significance. First, the existence of abundant and inexpensive grain imports can act as a disincentive for farmers to expand local grain cultivation. Secondly, food aid relieves pressure on the government to take necessary adjustment measures such as price reforms. This passive role is furthered by the fact that food aid forms an important source of government income.

Since Independence, Senegal has seen its grain production drop sharply, from 154 kg per capita in 1960 to 125 kg in 1990. The country currently has a structural cereal deficit of 40%, which is met through commercial imports and food aid. The evaluation mission concluded that liberal supplies of imported grain had a negative effect on the need to achieve food self-sufficiency. In other words, food aid was considered to be a deterrent at the macro level.

The share of project aid in Senegal is small and is becoming even less. The Catholic Relief Service and other NGOs stopped their supplementary feeding

FIGURE 4 CEREAL PRODUCTION, COMMERCIAL IMPORTS AND FOOD AID IN SENEGAL, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



Normal production : 900 000 tonnes
Normal imports : 540 000 tonnes
of which: Structural food aid : *110 000 tonnes*
Population (1990 estimate) : 7.4 million
Share of cereals in total calorie intake : 61 per cent

Source: -FAO, yearbooks of international trade and production yearbooks.
-WFP, *Food aid: Policies and programmes.*

Distribution of cereal food aid by commodity, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



programme because there was no flexibility in the use of food aid, especially in the interchange of cash and commodity assistance.

Food-for-work projects play a modest role in Senegal. The food-for-work projects supported by the WFP appear minimally effective in the long run. Their sustainability was viewed as problematic. Under project food aid relatively large supplies of food were provided over a long period to rural areas with limited absorption capacity, resulting in negative effects on local food production. There was also criticism of the food basket composition, which comprised such exotic items as canned chicken in curry. Other products (for example vegetable oils) were available locally, and at a lower price. Evaluators found that food-for-work activities did in general reach the poorest people.

Until now, the triangular purchases in which Senegal has taken part have been of minor significance. Interregional trade is limited because transport costs are relatively high and there is little political will. World market prices of for example rice are substantially lower than the prices of regionally produced rice. For instance, Mali was unable to sell much of its 1990 cereal surpluses to Senegal. Some triangular arrangements supported by the Dutch government were even cancelled after lengthy price negotiations.

Some 25% of the countervalue funds generated from the programme food aid was deposited in the so-called Fond Commun. Countervalue funds generated by the Dutch food aid went there as well. The functioning of this fund is subject to a great deal of criticism. The fund's results have been disappointing, mainly because there is no real interest, either among the donors or the Senegalese government, for its area of activity—local coarse grains. The government's food production policy and the donor's aid activities both focus primarily on (wet) rice cultivation. The Dutch aid policy shows the same bias. The competitive position of coarse grains is therefore gradually weakening relative to rice.

Senegal's food security policy is, in fact, still primarily a rice policy. Rice has become the staple food in urban areas, and its importance as such is also increasing in various rural areas. The share of rice in local food consumption is estimated at 40%, about three quarters of which is imported. The availability of rice for consumers is very much a political issue in Senegal, both in terms of scarcity and prices. In February 1986, for example, political upheavals forced the Senegalese authorities to lower the price of imported rice from CFAF 160 to CFAF 130 per kg. Donors view higher prices of rice imports as a necessary condition to encourage people to eat more locally grown cereals.

Since in Senegal food deficiency is structural, both its government policy and the aid should be directed at a structural increase of local grain production and self-sufficiency, in particular of coarse grains. In this context, the emphasis should be as much on (micro-)regional effects as on national food security. Only by means of decentralization is it possible to integrate the real cause of lack of access to food—inadequate purchasing power—into the policy.

Because of the lack of attention paid to dry agriculture, it would even be justified to temporarily give a certain amount of preferential treatment to coarse grains.

6.2 Mali

Food aid to Mali became structural during the 1980s. Since 1981 it has been provided within the framework of the Cereals Market Restructuring Project, better known by its French acronym PRMC. The aid is provided primarily to influence Mali's policy towards liberalization of the grain market. Donors are committed to providing food aid—mainly wheat, rice and maize—for several years, regardless of how the country's food situation develops. Between 1985 and 1989, structural food

FIGURE 5 CEREAL PRODUCTION, COMMERCIAL IMPORTS AND FOOD AID IN MALI, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



Normal production : 1 620 000 tonnes
Normal imports : 165 000 tonnes
of which: Structural food aid : *60 000 tonnes*
Population (1990 estimate) : 8.2 million
Share of cereals in total calorie intake : 75 per cent

Source: -FAO, yearbooks of international trade and production yearbooks.
-WFP, *Food aid. Policies and programmes.*

Distribution of cereal food aid by commodity, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



aid to Mali amounted to roughly 60,000 tonnes annually, equivalent to about half of total imports. However, between 1987 and 1990, the country produced an exportable surplus of coarse grains, partly due to very favourable weather conditions. In the same period, Mali became almost self-sufficient in food (cereals), except for wheat.

Mali's major food aid donors are the EC (one third), WFP (one third), Canada (one quarter) and the United States (15%). Dutch bilateral food aid contributions to Mali amounted to slightly more than Dfl. 30 million between 1980 and 1989. About 75% of Dutch food aid was provided within the framework of the PRMC to finance the purchase of locally produced food products (rice, millet and maize) and the supply of agricultural inputs.

self-sufficient. Support to the PRMC will continue to be necessary for some years. For the type of actions under discussion (for example, grain market stabilization programmes and local cereal banks), it would be more effective and efficient to provide financial assistance rather than assistance in kind.

Next to structural food aid, over the past ten years Mali received substantial amounts of emergency food aid, especially during the 1984–85 period. Emergency aid is mainly distributed through the Comité National d'Action d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation (CNAUR) and, to a lesser extent, through NGOs. The evaluation mission was critical of how the free food aid was targeted and distributed. A relatively large percentage benefited the more established groups instead of reaching the poor. This led various NGOs to withdraw from this type of food aid.

About 10–15% of the food aid provided to Mali consists of project aid and is primarily used for food-for-work activities. The project aid is mainly channelled through the WFP and the NGOs. The evaluation mission was in general positive about how the project aid was targeted, but considered the effectiveness and efficiency of food-for-work activities to be low. Two issues were raised in particular. First, the low priority accorded to the activities by the government meant that the technical and financial support provided was inadequate. Secondly, the food supplies were often inappropriate. In several cases, less expensive and more suitable products were available locally.

In view of Mali's surplus production, the number of triangular or local transactions was less than might be expected. This was caused by the fact that Mali only allows exports after a very long and complicated administrative process. An additional complicating factor was that local prices were high in comparison to the cheaper (subsidized) products available on the world market.

The agricultural policies of Mali and its donors are biased, both with regard to region (the south) and product (rice), while no clear agricultural policy has existed for the most ecologically vulnerable zones. In the long term, therefore, initiatives for a production, market and price policy for coarse grains offer inadequate prospects for improved food security. A significant supply response from Mali's coarse grain producers would require considerable investments to improve technology, the input supply system and supporting services.

6.3 Sudan

Some 60% of the food aid provided to Sudan over the past decade (1980–89) has consisted of programme food aid. The balance was made up of emergency aid (around 35%) and project aid (5%). While programme food aid can be considered as a form of balance of payments or budget support, project food aid is mainly provided by the WFP for development projects. Emergency food is basically destined for displaced persons and refugees fleeing from the civil war in the south of the country.

FIGURE 6 CEREAL PRODUCTION, COMMERCIAL IMPORTS AND FOOD AID IN SUDAN, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



Normal production	:	3 740 000 tonnes
Normal imports	:	670 000 tonnes
*of which: **Structural food aid***	:	*570 000 tonnes*
Population (1990 estimate)	:	24.5 million
Share of cereals in total calorie intake	:	51 per cent

Source: -FAO, yearbooks of international trade and production yearbooks.
-WFP, *Food aid: Policies and programmes.*

Distribution of cereal food aid by commodity, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



About 80% of all food aid shipped to Sudan consists of wheat or wheat flour; the remainder are small quantities of other grains, pulses, vegetable oils, and milk powder. During the past decade, Sudan received an average of 350,000 tonnes of programme aid and 150,000 tonnes of emergency food aid per year. Since 1985, food aid flows increased dramatically to an annual average of almost 700,000 tonnes. The proportion of food aid going to emergencies is also growing.

The difference between emergency food aid and structural food aid is not always clear in Sudan. A widely used aid formula is to purchase locally produced sorghum with the countervalue funds from wheat (swap transaction). The sorghum is subsequently used for emergency operations.

Sudan's major food aid donor is the US. About two thirds of all cereal food

aid to Sudan was provided by the US in 1989. Other important food aid donors are the EC (15%) and WFP (10%). Between 1980 and 1989 Dutch bilateral food aid to Sudan amounted to about Dfl. 40 million. Since 1985 Dutch bilateral food aid has consisted almost exclusively of emergency aid for the benefit of refugees. By far the most important food product was wheat. Other items were vegetable oils and dairy products. In a number of cases, the local purchase of sorghum was also financed. Apart from food supplies, a substantial part of the Dutch food aid allocations were used to improve emergency operations. For example, the Dutch government provided technical assistance through a Management and Logistics Team (MALT). In that respect, it meets one of the top priorities for improving food aid operations.

Food aid plays a crucial role in Sudan, both from an economic point of view and in terms of food security. It provides about 80% of total cereal imports and 15% of total cereal consumption. Food aid accounted for approximately one fifth of the value of total development assistance during the 1980s.

The main cereal crops grown and/or consumed in Sudan are sorghum and wheat. Sudan's traditional staple crop is sorghum, which is grown by both large-scale commercial farmers and smallholders. Virtually no government intervention existed in the domestic sorghum market prior to the mid-1980s. Marketing was traditionally primarily in the hands of the private sector and, in principle, prices were liberalized. Government intervened in the market only to build up a cereal buffer stock with a view to stabilizing producer and consumer prices. However, after two consecutive years (1983/4 and 1984/5) of drought led to a very low sorghum production, the government instructed the responsible marketing agency, the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS), to increase the size of the buffer stock of sorghum from the previous 10% to 25% of total annual production. Consequently, ABS purchases increased dramatically since 1986. These interventions seemed to have had hardly any impact on the production planning.

Sorghum production remained subject to sharp annual fluctuations, partly due to drought and partly to producers' price expectations. The 1987/88 drop in sorghum production, for example, was caused more by unpredictable prices than by below-average rainfall.

Wheat production and consumption are closely controlled by the government. Consumer and producer prices are heavily subsidized. The government policy aimed for self-sufficiency in wheat by 1990/91. This would require domestic production at around 900,000 tonnes per year. However, over the past few years, average yearly production has been less than 200,000 tonnes. The goal of the policy is to provide consumers with bread at fixed prices well below normal market levels. The substantial budgetary and economic costs of this policy have been partly financed by sales revenues from food aid. Countervalue funds generated from food aid finance almost 10% of the government budget.

As a result of government pricing policy, wheat-based bread displaced the traditional sorghum-based staple meal (kisra) as the main staple food in urban

centres. The main reason for the changing consumption pattern is the low price for bread. A bread meal is one third the price of a sorghum meal. Secondly, bread is a convenience food with a well-developed retail system and does not require time-consuming preparation as do sorghum and millet products.

In theory wheat subsidies are untargeted, so benefits accrue in proportion to the quantity of bread consumed. If adequate supplies of bread are available, the subsidy does not discriminate between rich and poor. In practice, however, the majority of the wheat was consumed by the more privileged groups in urban centres. Many of the displaced migrants living on the fringes of Khartoum (approximately one million people) continue to consume their staple sorghum. They have limited access to bread owing to the long distance to bakeries and the shortage. Access to bread by the rural people population is even more limited. A recent World Bank study indicates that 75% of the food-insecure live in rural areas. The total number of food-insecure in Sudan in 1989 was estimated at 9 million people, or one third of the population.

The evaluation mission questioned the value of large-scale structural programme aid, which was used primarily to secure wheat consumption in the cities and ultimately benefits the richer groups. In combination with the government's wheat subsidy policy, this aid discouraged sorghum consumption and increased dependence on outside assistance. In 1988/89 for example, the bumper crops of sorghum hardly had any effect on the level of wheat imports. Consequently, in 1990 Sudan ironically received large quantities of wheat aid and exported substantial amounts (500,000 tonnes) of sorghum as animal fodder, mainly to Europe.

Project food aid in Sudan is relatively small. One of the reasons is that the absence of large-scale unemployment in rural areas severely limits the scope for organizing labour-intensive works. The food items supplied under project food aid were frequently criticized by the recipients. Some of the delivered commodities were unknown, did not match existing eating patterns, or were locally available at lower cost. By far the most important food product provided by project aid is wheat and (wheat) flour. According to the evaluation mission, project aid is therefore a type of programme aid in disguise.

For this study two emergency food aid operations were evaluated, the Western Relief Operation (1988) and Operation Lifeline 1 (1989). Whereas Lifeline was generally considered very successful, the impact of the Western Relief Operation was minimal.

The quality of grain delivered to the regions under the Western Relief Operation was much less than planned for: Kordofan received slightly more than half and Darfur about one third. Deliveries also fell far behind schedule. Some of the main reasons for this failure were:

– Overestimation of the needs. This made it more difficult to convince donors of

the need for the relief, which caused delays. The main source of funds for the Western Relief Operation was counterpart funds.
- There were considerable delays in releasing these funds. Very little foreign exchange had been budgeted for this operation by donors.
- There were many problems in purchase of the grain from ABS stocks (quality, underweight bags, prices).
- Delays in release of the grain together with transport difficulties were the two main reasons for the serious slip in the timetable. Transport delays were caused by problems with the contractors and some were external, such as competition with other large contracts being negotiated at the same time and rapidly rising transport costs.

Operation Lifeline I was formally launched in april 1989. The target was to distribute almost 110.000 tonnes of food aid. By september it had achieved most of its objectives. There is a general agreement that most of the food reached the intended beneficiaries. The major donors were the EC (60.000 tonnes) and the US (40.000 tonnes). The prime movers were the NGOs, who transported an estimated 50.000 tonnes, and UN agencies moved 35.000. The bulk consisted of cereal grains.

Generally speaking, the operation succeeded thanks in part to the international attention it mobilized to hold the protagonists to their promises. Lifeline was without doubt an expensive programme. Its high cost reflected the geography of the southern Sudan, the existence of the war, the lateness of the hour, and the intensive monitoring insisted upon by donors. A major criticism levelled at Lifeline was that it showed a clear preference in the implementation of the operation for international over indigenous NGOs. Donors preferred this approach because it would minimize the risk of political and/or military manipulation of the relief assistance. On the other hand, this caused certain suspicions on Sudanese government side. The government looked upon the emergency operation as foreign intervention motivated by Western political interests.

In general, emergency operations in Sudan are severely hampered by political factors. In 1990/91 the military government of Sudan was reluctant to turn to the West for help, while early-warning reports of the FAO indicated in September 1990 that the region would face an almost complete crop failure owing to drought and that millions of people were under threat of starvation.

6.4 Zambia

Zambia's staple food is maize, which accounts for approximately 90% of cereal consumption. Maize production in Zambia shows considerable fluctuation, weather conditions playing a crucial role. Although the country had a substantial maize surplus in the past decade, its food balance is still considered precarious.

About two thirds of the food aid provided to Zambia between 1980–89 was programme aid. The remainder consisted almost exclusively of emergency aid.

FIGURE 7 CEREAL PRODUCTION, COMMERCIAL IMPORTS AND FOOD AID IN ZAMBIA, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



Normal production	:	1 600 000 tonnes
Normal imports	:	100 000 tonnes
of which: Structural food aid	:	*90 000 tonnes*
Population (1990 estimate)	:	8.5 million
Share of cereals in total calorie intake	:	70 per cent

Distribution of cereal food aid by commodity, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



Source: -FAO, yearbooks of international trade and production yearbooks.
-WFP, *Food aid. Policies and programmes.*

The share of project food aid was very limited. Other than some supplementary feeding programmes, there are virtually no project food aid activities in Zambia, mostly because food-for-work seems to be in conflict with Zambia's Constitution.

The bulk of programme aid consisted of wheat and (wheat) flour. Emergency aid was mainly provided in the form of maize. Zambia's main food aid donors are the United States (50%) and Canada (one third). In general, cereal imports, including food aid, play a marginal role in Zambia's food consumption. Only wheat is imported on a more regular basis. However, over the past decade, wheat imports dropped significantly from an average of 150,000 tonnes annually at the beginning of the 1980s to about 50,000 tonnes at the end of the decade. Wheat aid, on the other hand, remained stable at approximately 50,000 tonnes. This means that during the second half of the 1980s, virtually all wheat imports were financed by food aid.

In 1984 Zambia launched a structural adjustment programme with the objective of liberalizing the grain market. One of the measures taken was the abolition of wheat subsidies. Wheat prices subsequently rose sharply, causing bread consumption to decline. When Zambia broke with the IMF and the World Bank in 1986 to start its own economic reform programme, it did not reintroduce wheat subsidies.

Because of the price increase, local wheat production quadrupled from an annual average of 10,000 tonnes to about 40,000 tonnes. Despite these market improvements, local commercial farmers continued to complain about unfair competition caused by wheat aid. They fear that cheap food aid depresses local prices. The same criticism applies to soya oil, which competes with local soya and sunflower production. A recent evaluation report on Canadian wheat aid, carried out by the CIDA, confirmed that wheat aid had in fact caused disruptive market effects. Consequently, Canada significantly reduced wheat aid in 1989 and will eventually abolish it altogether.

No common agreements exist between Zambia and its donors with regard to the countervalue funds generated from food aid. In general, these resources are used for bilateral projects. The disbursement rates of countervalue funds are low. Moreover, the administration of these funds indicates that there are many irregularities. For example, the EC countervalue funds of the 1987 emergency operation, amounting to 17 million kwacha or the equivalent of 20,000 tonnes of maize, remained unaccounted for. Both the effectiveness and the efficiency of countervalue funds are therefore considered to be minimal.

Between 1980–90 total Dutch bilateral food aid to Zambia amounted to some Dfl. 30 million. It mainly involved emergency aid and consisted primarily of white maize purchased in the region. On the whole, experiences with triangular purchases have been positive as to quality, price and speed of delivery.

Together with the EC the Netherlands was actively involved in the emergency food aid operation in the South Province in 1987. The Dutch contribution consisted of maize (locally purchased) and a team of logistics experts who assisted the Zambian government in distributing the emergency food aid. This operation was considered very successful both with respect to timing and targeting.

In 1986 the Netherlands made wheat aid available to support the country's structural adjustment programme. Although the wheat arrived outside the marketing season, the commercial farmers bureau (CFB) made an official protest against this transaction to both the Dutch embassy and the Zambian government.

Transportation and storage problems are major bottlenecks in Zambia, both in food aid distribution and in stimulation of food marketing. Between 1987 and 1989 the Netherlands therefore provided technical support from its food aid budget to improve the country's agricultural distribution and marketing system.

The majority of the donors currently believe that Zambia does not need food aid on a structural basis, and, in the case of wheat aid, it should even be stopped. Development aid should focus primarily on the production side. Zambia has

an excellent agrarian production potential. The country's regular food deficits are attributed to its unsuccessful government policy, in particular its price and marketing policies, and the limited government investments in the agricultural sector. But liberalization of the maize market is not only a matter of economics, but also a political issue. Rising maize prices will especially hit the urban centres. Half of all Zambians live in urban areas. In 1986 a doubling of the maize price under pressure of the IMF and the World Bank to liberalize the marketing system caused severe riots. As a result of this civil unrest Kaunda broke with the IMF and the World Bank and started his own economic reform programme.

In 1988/89 the government launched a revised policy plan to reduce drastically the subsidies on maize over a period of four years. To absorb the negative effects caused by these liberalization measures a subsidy system for the poorer segments in the urban areas will be maintained. The form of food subsidy selected is that of food stamps. A family below a certain income level receives a number of stamps each month, which is equal to one bag of maize meal of 25 kg. Only those who have an official wage income have access to food stamps. The question can therefore be raised whether through this system food will be targeted to the most needy group.

6.5 Mozambique

Over the past decade, food aid was provided to Mozambique primarily in the form of emergency aid. A decade of civil unrest has paralysed the country's production capacity and made it dependent on external aid for 90% of its market and relief needs. Approximately half the population (7.6 million people) are currently dependent to a greater or lesser extent on food aid.

Between 1985 and 1989, cereal food aid supplied to Mozambique amounted to an average of about 400,000 tonnes per year, consisting mainly of maize (50%), wheat (30%) and rice (20%). The FAO estimated actual demand for food aid at 700,000 tonnes of cereals and 200,000 tonnes of non-cereals (1989). Of the total figure of 900,000 tonnes, 25% was destined for free distribution among the country's 2 million refugees, 50% for sale in urban centres and 25% for so-called food banks.

Mozambique's major donors include the United States and the EC, who each supply about one third of the country's food aid. Other important donors are WFP, Australia and Canada. About two thirds of the aid is provided bilaterally. Food aid channelled through the WFP and NGOs is mainly intended for emergency operations. Project food aid, such as food-for-work activities, is limited because of security problems. In 1988 the Ministry of Commerce started a food bank programme with the cooperation of the WFP. The food bank channels food resources through the existing market system to productive, mainly rural sectors that are a priority for the Economic Rehabilitation Programme and which depend on food supplies to attract and retain workers and to ensure adequate levels of productivity.

FIGURE 8 CEREAL PRODUCTION, COMMERCIAL IMPORTS AND FOOD AID IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1980-89
metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



Normal production : 575 000 tonnes
Normal imports : 450 000 tonnes
of which: Structural food aid : *420 000 tonnes*
Population (1990 estimate) : 15.5 million
Share of cereals in total calorie intake : 33 per cent

Source: -FAO, yearbooks of international trade and production yearbooks.
-WFP, *Food aid. Policies and programmes.*

Distribution of cereal food aid by commodity, 1980-89
in metric tonnes grain equivalents x 1000



Food aid pledges received in 1989 covered only about 60% of the cereal requirements and 25% of non-cereal needs. Donors responded considerably better to needs for free distribution than to market demands. There were also pronounced differences between the pledges for the various food aid products. The requirements for wheat and rice were more or less met (wheat 80%; rice 100%), but maize pledges only covered one third of demand. In spite of its importance, logistics was the most seriously under-funded sector, with only 20% of requirements being met.

A WFP study conducted in mid-1989 concluded that insufficient pledges and the late arrival of food aid shipments had posed serious problems for the Mozambique government in meeting the population's basic food requirements.

Difficulties surrounding the internal distribution of food aid have considerably reduced the willingness of donors to provide food aid. Several donors have expressed grave concern about high food aid losses, particularly of maize transported by rail from Zimbabwe or through the ports of Maputo and Beira. A number of investigations into the disappearance of food aid and relief commodities have confirmed substantial losses.

A second area of dispute involves the belief held by a number of donors that the market sector requirements are overestimated and that more domestically produced foods were locally available than originally foreseen, especially cassava.

Because of these doubts, food aid is repeatedly committed on an *ad hoc* basis, causing great fluctuations in the food allocations and aid often arriving too late. The predominant feeling of mistrust has also caused donors to avoid existing local distribution structures altogether. There is a general trend towards privatization of aid and large aid organizations are creating structures parallel to those of the official system. The DPCCN, the government organization in Mozambique responsible for emergency operations, is a body that several international NGOs try to avoid as much as possible. A vicious circle threatens to exist: the weak local structures are accused of malfunctioning and corruption and are therefore ignored as distribution channels. A Norwegian evaluation report (1989) therefore recommends that more institutional support be given to local government structures responsible for food aid distribution.

Protracted civil unrest in Mozambique makes it impossible and even inappropriate to draw a clear line between emergency assistance and rehabilitation assistance. The country has come to the point of a structural emergency situation which is affecting the entire economy and society at large. The seriousness of the situation is indicated by the fact that large-scale emergency operations are a necessary precondition for regular development assistance to function at all. At the same time, the semi-permanent character of the emergency situation requires contributions that go beyond traditional short-term emergency thinking.

One of the current problems is that free distribution of emergency supplies to people displaced or affected by war is beginning to undermine some local markets for domestic producers. Emergency supplies tend to find their way into unofficial circulation where local prices for agricultural products are depressed. Ultimately, this may slow down the recovery of the agricultural sector.

The government has tried to minimize these disincentive effects by monetizing a large part of the food aid. Since 1987 Dutch food aid, too, has been primarily intended for sale. Countervalue funds generated in this way were used to support programmes to alleviate the negative effects of the structural adjustment programme for the most vulnerable groups. The form of food subsidy used by Mozambique to protect the living standards of the poor is a quota or ration system. This ration scheme is however limited in coverage to urban residents who are usually not the poorest. The donor community was very critical about the administration and management of the countervalue funds. The main criticism

was that the funds were not properly collected or accounted for. The fact that monetization occurred primarily through public sector channels (parastatals with a monopoly on grain marketing) had a negative effect on its benefits.

The Netherlands has provided food aid to Mozambique on a large scale since the beginning of the 1980s. Dutch bilateral food aid to Mozambique amounted to a total of almost Dfl. 150 million during this period, and consisted mainly of white maize purchased in Southern Africa, particularly in Malawi and Zimbabwe. Experiences with triangular operations in the region are in general positive both with respect to cost-effectiveness and timeliness of deliveries. In some cases, owing to logistics and security problems, the Netherlands had to purchase food outside the region, for example in Kenya. In the implementation of Dutch triangular transactions the WFP played a vital role. In addition to food aid the Netherlands has also provided considerable logistic support for distribution. With this type of assistance the Netherlands has contributed to one of the main constraints in the implementation of food aid operations in Mozambique.

The Dutch government, together with Sweden and EC, is the main supporter of the food bank. The food bank targets food to workers who have some purchasing power but little access to food because of malfunctioning of the marketing system. The situation had changed markedly by the end of the decade compared with that at the start of the programme (1987) as a result of the implementation of the Economic Rehabilitation Programme. The problem now is lack of purchasing power rather than scarcity of products. Continued support for the food bank should therefore be reconsidered.

Part Four ISSUES IN FOOD AID

7. Effectiveness of food aid

The main issue addressed in this study is the question of what food aid means for the local food sector. In this chapter, the effects are discussed of food aid on the three dimensions of the food sector: food insecurity, food self-sufficiency and the food market. No attempt is made to determine precisely the isolated effect of Dutch food aid. In most cases, the Dutch contributions appear to be inextricably interwoven with total food aid flows to the recipient countries. Before offering an analysis of the effects on the three dimensions of the food sector we investigate the degree of fungibility of food aid (additionality versus substitution).

7.1 Additionality versus substitution

Food aid is considered to be additional when it increases the total food supply to an extent that would otherwise not have occurred. One speaks of substitution when it replaces another food flow, as for example, planned commercial imports. This distinction is particularly important in determining the effectiveness of supplies. If food aid is additional, any effect observed may be attributed to the supply itself. Where food aid substitutes for commercial imports possible disincentive effects cannot be attributed to food aid.

The study concludes that food aid in the form of fine grains (wheat, rice) is in principle intended to substitute commercial imports (balance of payments support), whereas in the form of coarse grains (sorghum, millet, maize) it is normally supplementary. Factors which determine the degree of substitution are the financial position of the recipient country and the political significance of the imported food product. Senegal's rice imports and Sudan's wheat imports play an important role in urban food security such that the governments feel obliged, from a political point of view, to meet these demands. For example, the Sudanese government recently (1990) increased commercial imports of wheat to absorb declining wheat aid. This is particularly remarkable in view of the government's critical financial position caused by the civil war.

As to categories of food aid, it was concluded that, in the countries investigated, emergency and project aid were mainly additional. Programme aid, however, had a substitutional element. The economic situation of most sub-Saharan African countries prevents them however from replacing all programme food aid by commercial

Sudan is a country whose dietary patterns have changed dramatically. In Khartoum heavily subsidized wheat has replaced sorghum-based kisra as the staple food, mainly because kisra is currently three times as expensive as bread.

The great disadvantage of fine grains is that they cannot be produced in most African countries, or, if they can, costs are nearly prohibitive (irrigation). Boosting the production of coarse grains, which are well able to withstand the changeable climatological conditions of Africa, requires considerably less investment.

Nevertheless, donors have a clear preference for fine grains, not only in food aid, but also in providing support for food production. Less than 10% of the aid funds for the agricultural sector is used for the development of coarse grains. The lion's share of donor investments is intended for irrigation agriculture (in particular rice) and export crops. Dutch aid policy shows a similar concentration on the agricultural sector of sub-Saharan Africa.

Ironically, most donors recognize the one-sidedness of their programmes, but try to compensate for this by directing the countervalue funds generated from food aid to the development of coarse grains. In this way, the original transitional character of food aid in relation to self-sufficiency assumes a more permanent role as financier of local food production projects.

Food aid may cause price disruptions when provided in situations where there are adequate local supplies. This was not the case in either Senegal or Mozambique. However, this situation did occur several times in the past years in Mali, Sudan and Zambia. These countries had record harvests between 1986 and 1989. Despite these good harvests, they received food aid in the years of top production. Sudan even received very sizable amounts. In Zambia and Mali the amount was relatively small. In Mali, a number of donors, including the Netherlands, decided to make part of the food aid available in money for the benefit of local food purchases. Decreases were noted in food prices in these three countries. It is difficult to establish, though, to what extent this was caused by the record harvests or by food aid.

Where food aid substitutes for commercial imports that would otherwise have occurred anyway there is little if any disincentive effect. Fine grains are subject to a limited degree of substitution as is indicated in the previous paragraph. This means that a certain amount of these products would have been imported, even without food aid. The policy pursued by the recipient country is therefore equally responsible for the disruptive effect of imported food on local production. It can be questioned as to what extent such policies are affected by the low prices of these products on the world market. However, this issue was outside the scope of this study.

But even when food aid is fungible (substitution) it can distort local food production if it arrives too late. The planning of food aid supplies is therefore crucial in avoiding disruptive effects. Budgeting procedures in donor countries, the EC for example, do not permit sufficient flexibility in food aid from one

year to the next according to need, and so hamper rational planning of food aid shipments. But governments of recipient countries also tend to delay the announcement of pending shortages and the need for imports. The problem here is not food aid as a resource, but the way it is managed by donors and recipients. This sort of distortions were in particular noticed in Mozambique, Sudan and Mali.

7.4 Food aid and food markets

In the course of the 1980s an increasing number of donors became convinced that rising food deficits in sub-Saharan Africa were to a large extent caused by the malfunctioning of the local markets owing to government interventions.

State marketing organizations play an important role in the trading of food in sub-Saharan Africa. In the five countries on which this evaluation was focused this was the case as well. In some countries these organizations even monopolized trade of (certain) food products. The idea behind this is that the government is the appropriate body to compensate for imperfections of the market and to protect certain population segments, in particular those in urban centres.

During the past few years, however, much stress is laid on the importance of far-reaching liberalization of the African markets. In the transition to market liberalization an important role is attributed to food aid. The countervalue funds generated from food aid can help to finance these adjustment measures.

Others argue that food aid enables governments to postpone major policy reforms. In this view, food aid maintains existing structures. The report criticizes the continuation of EC food aid as programme aid in situations where there is a large degree of disagreement with regard to the macro-economic policy, as is the case in Sudan and Senegal.

It is concluded that food aid plays a limited role as an instrument to support policy reforms, in particular with regard to reducing government intervention in the grain market. One exception to this is Mali where, according to donors, food aid was a major factor in the liberalization of the grain market. In Senegal, Sudan and until recently Zambia, food aid (wheat, rice) often enabled the local government to postpone liberalization measures. Food aid mainly consists of products for which the local government wants to maintain subsidies. This normally concerns food for the urban population. It is somewhat paradoxical therefore that liberalization measures in coarse grains are stimulated with countervalue funds, whereas the governments subsidy policy towards imported grains is left untouched or even strengthened by food aid, as is the case in Senegal and Sudan.

In view of the market situation in Africa, the question is whether complete liberalization should be a goal. There certainly seems to be a future role for the government in the marketing of food products. Typical for most countries in

sub-Saharan Africa is that their markets are imperfect and prone to distortions. This is particularly true of situations where harvests fluctuate greatly, where the market is strongly fragmented and the infrastructure is weak. Under these conditions, the question is whether farmers will actually receive better prices for their products, and whether liberalization will lead to production increases.

8. Efficiency of food aid

In analysing the efficiency of food aid the following issues were examined.

a. The modalities of distribution.
   Three approaches can be distinguished: monetization of food aid, food-for-work and targeting.
b. The organization of the food aid operations.
   Food aid is normally channelled in three ways: through international organizations (WFP), through NGOs, or bilaterally.
c. The degree to which the products supplied are appropriate.
   To what extent do the food aid supplies meet the needs and dietary habits of the recipient countries? Procurement conditions play an important role in this context. Special attention will therefore be paid to triangular and local purchases.
d. Food aid as a development instrument.
   To what extent is food aid an efficient way of supporting development activities?

8.1 Modalities of distribution

Food aid is no longer directed exclusively at emergency situations, but over time has come to serve remoter goals. In general, three distribution modalities of food aid can be distinguished: monetization, food-for-work and targeting. These modalities are closely related to the three main types of food aid (programme aid, project aid and emergency aid).

The share of food aid sold on the market is expanding. The countervalue funds obtained in this manner are used to support specific economic restructuring measures, for example the liberalization of the grain market. This application of food aid is also referred to as monetization.

If the objective of food aid is to support rural development activities, the most common modality is the food-for-work approach.

Food aid is targeted when it is primarily intended to combat malnutrition among people with insufficient access to food; in other words, the goal is to aim the food aid as much as possible to a specific target group.

Monetization

One way to improve the efficiency of food aid is to turn it into money, or to monetize the food. The purpose of monetization is to transform food aid into a more flexible resource and eliminate the costs associated with the direct delivery of food. About two thirds of all food aid delivered to the five countries studied was monetized. All programme food aid and about a quarter of the project food aid is sold on the market. In some cases even portions of emergency aid had been monetized.

A number of problems were distinguished in monetization of food aid.

First, how is the amount of countervalue funds to be determined? There is the problem of overvalued exchange rates. In the case of overvalued currencies, the purchaser of the food is indirectly subsidized if the price is not corrected. Most donors do not have a clear policy with regard to maximizing the amount of countervalue funds and take *ad hoc* decisions with regard to the method for calculating these amounts.

A second problem is related to how the priorities are determined with regard to their expenditure. Two options usually exist: the funds can be used to support the government's budget or the money can be allocated to a particular set of programmes or projects. In the first case the danger arises that with these funds the local government is able to delay much-needed reform measures. In the latter case, there is a danger that local priorities are thwarted, which consequently jeopardizes the sustainability of these projects.

Thirdly, how can one assure that the funds will be used properly? Who manages the countervalue funds? And how are these funds controlled? The bulk of the countervalue funds are passed to the government's treasury for undifferentiated or very general development purposes. The evaluation results revealed that budget support through countervalue funds was not limited to those countries where there was a agreement about the agricultural policy such as in Sudan, Zambia and Senegal. Where countervalue funds were reserved for specific project or programme activities, these funds are usually deposited on a special account, jointly managed by the donor and the recipient government.

The results achieved through countervalue funds in the countries investigated are not very satisfactory. In practice, the funds had not been fully collected or accounted for. In some cases they remained dormant for long periods of time. As a result the development impact of these funds was reduced by inflation in the period between deposit and expenditure. Such problems were recorded for Sudan, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia. Mali seems to be an exception.

Food-for-work

The term 'food-for-work' refers to payment of labour with food. Virtually all activities supported within this framework aim at rural development. Normally two main categories are distinguished. In the category of socio-economic infrastructure, food-for-work is used mostly to support the construction of roads and public buildings (schools, clinics). In production-oriented projects, food-for-work is mainly used for such activities as soil improvement, and reafforestation. In most cases the food made available for food-for-work projects originates from the donor country. Only a small part is purchased on the local market.

Food-for-work has a relatively important position in the Dutch food aid programme. This is because the Netherlands channels a large part of its aid through NGOs and the WFP. Food-for-work is important especially in the programme of the WFP.

The food-for-work approach tries to achieve two goals: to contribute to local development processes and to improve the nutritional status of vulnerable groups.

The field findings for food-for-work projects were not unequivocally favourable. There was criticism, for example, of the quality of the executed projects. The self-selecting working of this means of payment tends to attract less-productive and less-motivated labourers. However, an equally important aspect is that projects

supported by food are given a low priority by the local government, with the result that preparation, supervision and follow-up are often inadequate. The quality of the work is therefore often minimal. Most participants in these projects are unemployed and uneducated. If the quality of the work is to be guaranteed, it seems better to make use of skilled labour. But this group seldom belongs among the most needy and is generally not interested in food-for-work.

Another point is whether this form of food aid contributes to better nutrition or whether it is primarily used to obtain additional income. In some cases, the products provided are resold. These are mainly food products which do not complement local eating habits. The food provisions in food-for-work projects largely consist of surplus Western products. The WFP has to rely on products like American wheat and soya oil, Japanese canned fish, Dutch canned chicken, Swedish rape oil, Norwegian dried cod, Canadian milk powder and Italian olive oil. Leakage caused by such sales may however also be the result of the fact that the income-elasticity of demand for food even among very poor households is much lower than earlier believed.

A common criticism of food-for-work projects is that these involve activities that were traditionally carried out by the local community. The field studies show that food-for-work certainly does not foster community spirit.

It should also be pointed out that logistics, including administration, transportation, storage and distribution, is a heavy extra burden to the executing organization. Food-for-work projects are relatively expensive to carry out due to the high distribution costs. The cost-effectiveness is therefore considered unfavourable. Payment with money seems to be considerably more effective and efficient.

The general view is that the majority of food-for-work activities involve insufficient amounts of food to have a major depressive effect on local food prices. Exceptions were found (such as in Senegal) where relatively large quantities of food over a long period of time were provided to small and segmented markets.

In view of the fact that only projects in sub-Saharan Africa were studied, it is difficult to derive a more general conclusion from these observations. To do so would require a broader study. Most of the food-for-work projects are to be found in Asia.

Targeting

To what extent is targeting of food to those who really need it possible in sub-Saharan Africa? Compared to other regions, targeting in sub-Saharan Africa encounters special difficulties: the proportion of the population in need is greater, and often more widely dispersed; administrations are much weaker; and the political constraints on redistribution are severe. In the countries investigated, it was therefore by no means an easy task to reach the most vulnerable groups, especially in the case of a once-only operation. Targeting requires a long-term approach.

As a result, emergency aid, which has an incidental, often temporary character, is less suitable for targeting to specific socio-economic groups. Usually there is not enough time to categorize the affected population properly. Area-targeting is in general considered to be the more appropriate approach in emergency operations.

Another form of targeting is via administered distribution. Examples of this type of targeting are quota or ration schemes or the provision of food stamps. Supplementary feeding programmes are a form of highly targeted ration or in-kind transfer schemes.

Experiences with rationing and supplementary feeding programmes are not altogether positive. In Mali and Senegal the evaluation mission observed that the execution of these types of projects involved various problems. In a number of cases, the organizations through which the aid was channelled (NGOs) even withdrew after some time. Selection of recipients proved difficult at times. Channelling through existing structures inevitably leads to acceptance of local power criteria for distribution. An attempt to avoid these structures results in all sorts of political conflicts. These projects therefore often make extremely heavy administrative demands on the agencies through which food aid is channelled. This partly explains why a large-scale approach of food targeting is virtually impossible.

Another widespread criticism of the supplementary feeding programmes is that they often include products that do not fit in the traditional menu, possibly resulting in nutritional habits which cannot be supplied locally. The major objection, however, is that these programmes do not eliminate the structural cause of malnutrition. For this reason supplementary feeding programmes declined steadily over the past ten years.

Given weak institutional and administrative structures in developing countries, a preferred form of self-targeting is to subsidize an inferior commodity consumed mostly by poor people. This form of targeting is sometimes also referred to as product-targeting. Examples of successful product-targeting were the subsidies on roller meal in Zambia. Roller meal is a less refined type of maize meal. Higher-income consumers buy a much more refined product, known as breakfast meal.

8.2 Modalities of implementation

The World Food Programme

The WFP is playing an increasingly important role in Dutch food aid. More than 60% of Dutch bilateral food aid is currently channelled through the WFP. Two thirds of the regular pledge to WFP is financed in the form of products—the so-called food basket—while one third is in cash. The cash contribution is primarily intended for transport and equipment costs. One third of the food basket consists of dairy products, one third of canned foods, and one third of grain products. The

Dutch grain contribution is made available in cash to finance the purchase of these products through triangular or local transactions.

The evaluation study concluded that the efficiency of the WFP was negatively affected by the fact that a major part of the financing of this organization occurred in the form of food products. As a result, cereals, in particular wheat, were the primary resource at the disposal of the programme. Some donors even supplied the WFP with commodities that would be difficult to provide as bilateral assistance (cheese, fish, etc.). It was therefore difficult to adapt to local circumstances and priorities. A repeated criticism of many food aid projects was that their developmental potential is severely hindered by lack of other complementary forms of assistance. These complementary forms may include equipment, construction materials and spare parts.

Most of the WFP's human resources, especially at country level, are active in the distribution of food aid. Initially, country distribution was expected to be the responsibility of the recipient government. In practice, over time WFP has been drawn increasingly into aspects of in-country distribution. In some cases (Senegal, Sudan) the organization of local distribution was criticized. In general, however, the recipients and donors were satisfied with the way the WFP fulfils this role. The services which the WFP provides to bilateral donors in purchasing and transporting of food aid were highly appreciated as well. The evaluation missions were very positive about the role of WFP in Dutch triangular operations.

The WFP is not normally expected to be involved in the details on project implementation, but rather acts as the supplier of assistance. This means that implementation depends on the operational capacity of local partner organizations. The general regulations further imply that the WFP basically works through governments and their agencies. For that reason WFP-ability to work directly with NGOs has historically been severely restricted. During the last decade there was extensive discussion of and critical attention to the consequences of this indirect role. This was especially relevant for sub-Sahara Africa, where local government structures are weak. It also implies that aid through the WFP in fact supports government policy. This can sometimes create tensions with donors, as was recently the case in Sudan.

At the country level the WFP is organized under the umbrella of the UNDP. In many countries where the WFP has a field presence its offices are located within the UNDP complex. The assumption has been that the FAO and other UN agencies would provide technical support for programme development and evaluation through their various technical divisions. The field offices of WFP have deliberately been kept small and the role of WFP staff is primarily concerned with logistics. In Sudan, Mozambique, and other countries and regions where transport poses special problems, the logistics staff is expanded. In this sense, the WFP is still more of a service agency than a developmental organization.

Evaluations of emergency food aid in the 1980s have shown severe shortcomings of the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR). This facility was established as a stand-by arrangement to respond to emergencies wherever they occurred. The IEFR is administered by the WFP. The IEFR is not a physical reserve on which the WFP can draw without prior notice. The WFP must approach different donors concerning their willingness to participate in a specific emergency operation before calling for their contributions. The result is that it is often not only easier but also faster to obtain commodities from donors for regular development projects than for emergency purposes. A revision of the IEFR is recommended in a joint study by the World Bank and the WFP (1990) to streamline donor administrative and financial procedures to respond quickly to requests for emergency food aid and to establish procedures for borrowing from national and other stocks in afflicted countries.

The European Community

EC food aid is programmed in amounts. By far the most important products are wheat and dairy products. Approximately two thirds of the food aid is delivered directly by the EC to the recipient countries. Bilateral food aid consists mainly of programme food aid. Targeting of food aid to vulnerable groups is to a large extent channelled through NGOs and multilateral organizations.

The main criticism of EC food aid is the large-scale disposal of agricultural surpluses. It is therefore virtually impossible to provide food aid in a flexible manner. Exceptions were Mali and Mozambique where substitution operations and triangular transactions respectively were regularly supported. Use of these two instruments is still limited to about 10% of the total food aid budget. This may explain why in 1989 triangular transactions decreased with about 50% compared to 1988, while harvest results in sub-Saharan Africa and other places were far above average in that period.

The allocation criteria for programme food aid are rather ambivalent. Although in the Council Resolution programme food aid is seen as an instrument to support structural adjustment, the granting of EC food aid is not made conditional on the implementation of an economic reform programme. Over the past five years Sudan received substantial amounts of programme food aid, even when there was a surplus of sorghum; at the same time the donor community and Sudan disagreed strongly on economic policy.

There is a great deal of criticism on the inadequate efficiency of the EC food aid operation caused by complex and time-consuming procedures. Food aid often came much later than was planned. The European Court of Auditors wrote a number of very critical reports about the efficiency of the EC food aid. Their negative findings concerned both the speed of delivery and the quality of the

products. According to the Court of Auditors these negative effects were mostly due to the slow decision-making procedures, the dependence on the common agricultural policy and the fragmented responsibilities over various departments.

In 1987 a reorganization of the food aid mobilization was adopted to improve efficiency. Food aid supervision is no longer left to the intervention bodies in the EC member states. Under the new system the EC is more directly involved in the implementation of the transaction. The impression is that these measures have considerably improved the quality of the food aid deliveries.

The time duration of food aid transactions remains a problem. Evaluation studies of EC food aid deliveries indicate that on average the total elapsed time between request and arrival is more than eighteen months, although there are large variations between countries and type of food aid flows. Emergency operations, for example, take much less time. About two thirds to three quarters of the duration of the transaction was used for decision-making, i.e. before actual mobilization began.

An additional problem is the programming of food aid. Normally the planning is that food aid arrives prior to the next harvest. The agricultural calendar of the recipient country is not taken into account in determining time of arrival. Timing is dependent on endogenous factors within the procedures of the EC.

Countervalue funds play an important role in the EC food aid policy. The integration of food aid with other aid instruments is realized mainly through countervalue funds. These funds are used to complement other EC funding for rural development activities. Problems were reported regularly concerning management of countervalue funds and regarding both collecting and accounting. Where funds were put into a special account disbursement rates were in general low. The European Court of Auditors, too, is very critical in a report, recently published, about the use of countervalue funds generated through programme food aid. The minimal capacity of the EC country delegation limits more active involvement.

Non-governmental organizations

NGOs play an important, often vital, role in international emergency relief operations. In addition, several NGOs employ food in human resource development projects, nutrition, maternity, child health, school feeding and food-for-work projects.

NGOs are considered especially effective in reaching the poor. Their administrative capacity, local experience and high cost-efficiency makes NGOs attractive channels for bilateral donors. In specific circumstances there is even a tendency among donors to privatize food aid and to bypass the official system. This happens when donors fear that the local government will not be impartial towards certain groups due to ethnic/religious/ideological differences. This can bring NGOs in

conflict with the existing local power structures. These conflicts are likely to occur in civil war situations where NGOs may support separationist movements with food (Sudan and Mozambique).

Many NGOs are very critical about food aid and insist on more flexible i.e. triangular or local purchases and the possibility to switch between financial aid and food aid. Some NGOs went so far as to suspend their food programmes (for example, in Mali and Senegal) when it appeared that donors were not prepared to substitute their food basket. These NGOs argued that these food baskets lack the adaptability needed to fit local circumstances.

Dutch food aid channelled through NGOs is completely untied with regard to both source and product. An exception is the EC food aid. EC food aid through NGOs is provided in the form of food baskets. Within the Dutch aid budget there is a special nutrition programme for NGOs, the so-called VPO programme (cf. section 4.2 above). Food aid supplies are only a marginal component of the assistance provided through this programme.

Channelling aid through NGOs has its limitations. The positive results of the NGOs are closely related to the small scale on which they operate. Their regional know-how and local contacts (networks) are of vital importance in this context. Contracting out of large-scale emergency aid to NGOs is therefore not realistic. Enlisting a large number of NGOs may result in parallel structures, which may seriously impede the coordination of food aid. In the case of very large-scale emergency aid, it is therefore virtually impossible to circumvent government channels.

Bilateral aid

The bilateral food aid programme is of minor significance in comparison with the other channels. The Netherlands is not a major grain exporter; consequently, Dutch supplies are less suitable for programme aid. The minimal operational capacity of the DGIS is another factor, as is the desire to intensify donor coordination. This is particularly important for food aid operations in the context of emergency aid actions.

In principle, the Dutch funds are completely untied with regard to both the origin and the nature of the product.

The Dutch bilateral food aid programme appears to have a great degree of flexibility. For example, large-scale local and triangular purchases have been made through the bilateral programme. Non-food expenditures (logistic support) have been financed through it as well.

8.3 Modalities of acquisition

Non-local products, especially fine grains (wheat) and dairy products, dominate food aid flows. Despite the fact that the Dutch food aid programme is essentially untied, Dutch food aid flows do show a bias towards Western products. The Dutch food basket to the WFP is a case in point. This criticism also applies to a great extent to the food aid provided in the framework of the EC.

If the intention is to supply commodities that are more appropriate to traditional consumption habits, then local or regional food purchases will have to be stimulated. Other potential advantages of local or triangular operations are: greater cost-effectiveness* (both commodity and non-commodity costs such as transport costs are reduced); promotion of agricultural development in the recipient country or source economy; stimulation of trade between developing countries.

It should be kept in mind, though, that the composition of food aid flows is determined by several factors. Next to suitability one must take into account factors such as availability (scale and speed), quality and conservation. For example, at the moment that an emergency situation occurs, the most suitable product may not be available, or, if so, not quickly enough.

According to evaluation studies of triangular transactions in sub-Saharan Africa (WFP, 1987; EC, 1988), these operations are constrained by a number of problems, including wide fluctuations in production and lack of accurate information, which make advance planning difficult. In addition, problems of inadequate transport, storage and other logistic facilities, problems in quality control as well as shortcomings in management and administration—all of these preclude the fixing of firm delivery schedules. This is not surprising, as triangular operations in sub-Saharan Africa typically involve occasional suppliers in regions with poorly developed trading networks and transport infrastructure.

Concerning timeliness and costs evaluations yielded mixed results. An EC study about triangular food aid concluded that on the whole these transactions do not make for faster delivery than food aid from Europe. The study indicates that these transactions work best when they involve purchases in land-locked countries (Zambia) or neighbouring countries (Southern Africa). Triangular and local transactions are also considered to be useful (quicker) in the context of emergencies (Zambia).

Although administrative costs were in a number of cases higher than anticipated, the field studies revealed that triangular transactions had been cost-effective in other ways, e.g. in lower commodity costs and reduced transport costs.

* The cost-effectiveness of food aid is sometimes expressed in 'income transfer efficiency' or alpha-value of aid-supplied commodities, which is defined as the unit value of the commodity to the recipient, divided by the unit cost of delivery. Suppose a kilogramme costs 20 cents to buy, 20 cents to ship and 10 cents to distribute at the receiving end, or 50 cents total; and suppose that if an individual in the target group did not receive the food aid he would buy sorghum at 15 per kg. Then the alpha-value is quite low, namely 0.3.

8.4 Financial assistance versus food aid

Many donors do not compare the cost-effectiveness of food aid with other forms of assistance. For donors who link food aid to surplus disposal, food aid is largely additional, that is, an extra aid resource. Under such circumstances it is more or less assumed that 'it is always better to give food aid than to give nothing.' Other donors hold that food aid competes directly with financial aid so that 'a dollar of food aid is a dollar less of financial aid.'

In the Dutch situation food aid can be substituted by other instruments. In the case of Dutch food aid then, it is pertinent to ask whether food aid is the most efficient means of providing assistance or whether other instruments would be more suitable.

The fact that food aid is perishable and bulky and has to be transported to remote places makes it one of the most difficult aid instruments.

In the evaluation study the cost-effectiveness of project food aid was found to be very low. This applies in particular to the food-for-work activities. Cash contributions would have been more efficient for most projects. These high costs have sometimes been considered acceptable because it has been argued that direct food transfers would generate more welfare benefit for malnourished people than cash transfers. But this argument is valid only for those activities where targeting of food aid to vulnerable groups was the primary goal. Moreover, nutritionists and economists continue to debate the effect of providing foodstuffs versus increasing incomes as a means of improving the household-level nutritional status of vulnerable groups. The economic point of view advocating increased incomes has become the more widely accepted approach (CIDA, 1990).

In most emergency situations there is no alternative and the supply of food aid in kind is the most obvious approach. Famines are often seen in terms of acute and more or less uniform 'shortages' of food everywhere in the affected country or countries. But this need not be the case, and in fact the scope for inter-regional food movements is considerable. Large variations in food output between different regions are common in Africa, and marketable surpluses are usually available in or near the famine-affected territory. Local or triangular purchases could therefore be considered as an efficient alternative.

Programme food aid seems more controversial than the other two types.

In general programme aid is considered an efficient way of transferring resources to meet balance of payments and budget support objectives. Programme aid is usually linked to implementation of structural adjustment reforms, whereupon the funds are made available on rather flexible terms.

As the evaluation study noted, however, programme food aid is not always linked to stringent conditionality. EC programme aid food grants, for example,


KALABO - SAMU RIVER TRANSPORT

9. Food aid in the 1990s

9.1 Food shortages

Projections of future food gaps, i.e. the difference between effective demand and domestic supply, depend on assumptions made regarding growth of per capita income, population and agricultural production. These various scenarios are discussed in a report 'Food Aid Projections for the Decade of the 1990s' (National Research Council, 1989). The estimates, based on computer models, predict that food imports in developing countries will expand from 83 million tonnes in 1989/90 to 163 million tonnes or more in the year 2000. The figure of 163 million tonnes is the lowest estimate and is based on a World Bank projection of 'modest growth'.

Table 14 presents three possible scenarios for sub-Saharan Africa based on different assumptions regarding production and per capita consumption growth, while the population growth rate is assumed to be 3% per annum for all three scenarios (World Bank, 1990).

TABLE 14 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FOOD IMPORT SCENARIOS FOR THE YEAR 2000

Imports in millions of metric tonnes	Scenario I	Scenario II	Scenario III
Cereals	17.6	20.0	25.3
Non-cereals	11.7	13.3	14,5
Total	*29.3*	*33.3*	*39.8*
Total food imports (% p.a.)	5.3	6.3	9.2
Assumptions in % p.a.			
Production	2.0	3.0	2.5
Per capita consumption	-0.5	0.5	0.5
Population	3.0	3.0	3.0
Total consumption	2.5	3.5	3.5

Source: WFP/World Bank: Food aid in sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for the 1990s, (semi-final draft), 1990

In the first scenario, per capita production is projected to decline at the same rate as in the recent past. With per capita food production declining at 1% per annum, consumption is also assumed to decline by 0.5% yearly because in

the African context income, food consumption and food production are strongly interdependent. Under these pessimistic and undesirable circumstances, imports would still have to grow at 5.3% per year to reach 18 million tonnes of cereals and 12 million tonnes of non-cereals, making a total of about 30 million tonnes of food imports by the year 2000, compared to about 13 million tonnes in 1987.

These scenarios assume that no abnormal circumstances will occur. For example, protracted periods of drought have not been taken into account.

Recent reports (1990) from the United Nations on the food situation in sub-Saharan Africa forecast that a new famine on the scale of the 1984 food crisis may threaten this continent in the immediate future. This concerns countries like Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Ethiopia and the Sahel (Nigeria, Chad and Burkina Faso) in particular. Next to climatological factors (droughts in the Sahel, Sudan and Ethiopia), a second major cause of the serious food shortages in a number of these countries is the prolonged internal conflicts which minimize agricultural yields.

The prospects are not gloomy for Africa alone; the projections for Asia are equally dismal. Owing in particular to the worsened population/country ratio, it will be difficult to maintain the growth reached in agricultural production during the past decades. According to the report, it is not inconceivable that eventually Asia will again be the most problematic region with regard to food deficits.

9.2 Food aid

Food aid plays a very modest role in the food supply of developing countries (around 1%), but, during the past ten years, it has significantly increased in importance for certain regions, one of which is sub-Saharan Africa. Approximately one third of the food imports and some 6% of food consumption in this region consists of food aid. In some countries, for example, Mozambique, food aid even comprises one quarter of the total food supply. According to many experts, dependence on food aid will increase in the coming years. Due to the severe economic crisis in which most African countries currently find themselves, they will be virtually unable to supplement food deficits with commercial food purchases.

For these reasons, demand for food aid in sub-Saharan Africa is certain to rise dramatically. Based on existing levels of food aid—some 4 million tonnes per year—the need for food aid to meet domestic demand will have at least doubled by the year 2000. More likely however is that the need for food aid will be four times as much.

In most donor countries, food aid is still closely linked with agricultural surpluses. These are caused, to a great extent, by agricultural subsidy policies whereby products are purchased against guaranteed prices. This encourages overproduction. Liberalization of trade in agricultural products would considerably reduce

these surpluses. In view of the extremely difficult progress of the international negotiations on the reduction of agricultural subsidies in connection with the GATT Uruguay Round at the end of 1990, it is highly unlikely that fundamental adjustment measures will be taken, certainly not in the short term and perhaps not even in the middle-long term. The EC in particular has great difficulty in abandoning the agricultural subsidy policy.

It can be assumed that the donor countries will continue to make 'extra' food aid available for some time to come. However, this food aid is not expected to expand significantly. The flow of food has been quite stable during the past ten years, fluctuating in the 1980s at around 10 million tonnes. In relative terms, there has even been a considerable decline. The share of food aid in the ODA has been almost halved in the past fifteen years, from 12.5% in the mid-1970s to almost 7% at the end of the 1980s.

If dependence on food imports is to be reduced, both the recipient countries and the donors will have to give top priority to production of the local coarse grains. Up till now local coarse grains have received relatively little attention by aid donors. The major share of donor aid is intended for improving the production of irrigation crops (rice, wheat and export crops).

from a drought, food shortages can normally be signalled in time via the so-called early-warning systems.

Various studies indicate that the efficiency of emergency aid operations can be improved significantly. Too often, the emergency aid arrives too late. This was one of the main points of criticism in a WFP/World Bank report on the IEFR. Improvement is possible because, in the majority of cases, the food shortage is foreseeable rather than acute. One of the difficulties in this context is that the governments in deficient countries and the donors only react when the population in the affected areas are threatened by starvation. Improvements are possible in particular in the sphere of identification, planning and coordination.

In principle, emergency aid should as much as possible be provided in the form of products that are locally acceptable. In the case of Africa this means that coarse grains should comprise a major component of emergency food aid. Experience has taught that local and triangular purchases can be very effective and efficient ways of supplying emergency food aid (Zambia, Mozambique).

It is recommended that responsibility for emergency aid operations in principle be delegated to the local governments. Multilateral organizations play an important supporting role in coordinating emergency aid. However, in certain circumstances (for example, civil wars), donors have little confidence that the local governments are willing to divide fairly the food aid provided. In that case, the NGOs are considered an alternative. In general, NGOs are seen as an effective channel for reaching the poor. There are also a number of limitations when involving NGOs in emergency operations. For instance, these organizations are poorly equipped to execute large-scale food aid actions. Parallel structures are likely to arise, and these may seriously interfere with proper planning and coordination of the food aid.

APPENDICES



Appendix I. The Operations Review Unit (IOV)

The Operations Review Unit, better known by its Dutch acronym IOV or Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde, was established in 1977. The IOV is responsible for conducting external evaluations of Dutch aid policy. Internal evaluations or mid-term evaluations of projects are the responsibility of the operational units, i.e. the country or programme desks.

The IOV is part of the Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGIS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a completely independent unit which reports directly to the Minister through the Director General. The reports are submitted by the Minister of Development Cooperation to Parliament, and discussed with the Permanent Committee for Development Cooperation with respect to follow-up actions.

Initially, the emphasis was on individual project evaluations. From 1977 up to the mid-1980s the reports were primarily intended for the departmental management. The status of these reports was confidential. During this period about 250 evaluation reports were produced. Gradually a need developed for more general conclusions based on these project findings. In the mid-1980s a number of sector reports were prepared, such as on drinking water, animal husbandry, women in agriculture and rural development, hospital-based health care and primary health care. These reports were made available to the public.

Since then, emphasis has shifted from individual project evaluations to thematic studies. These thematic evaluations are comprehensive; they focus on policies and modalities of implementation and cover entire sectors, themes or programmes. They contain a full review of relevant literature. A comparative study of other donors concerning the same subject matter is usually included.

Duration of these thematic evaluations is one to two years. The studies are carried out under the responsibility of the IOV, with outside experts participating in various phases of the research. Field studies are normally conducted in three to five countries. These country studies are undertaken by a special team of independent external consultants. Increasingly, local institutions or experts are invited to participate in these field missions.

The synthesis report, based on the various field and desk studies, is written by the IOV and published under its responsibility. Three to four such studies are published annually. Examples of recent thematic evaluation studies published by the IOV are: small-scale rural industry, women and industry, support to small-scale

The field survey took place from March to August 1988.

The following food aid supplies were reviewed:
- the annual Dutch contribution to the PRMC of 5,000 tonnes of grain equivalents;
- the 740 tonnes of supplies determined by the UDPM in the Gao region;
- WFP projects (50,000 tonnes over three years) consisting of
  - food-for-work projects (irrigation, grain banks) in Bara, AgDilinta and Intadeni;
  - supplies to government officials;
  - emergency food aid programmes in Bara, AgDilinta, Goutchine and Intadeni.
- credit extension to grain dealers financed by the PRMC;
- the grain bank in Konseguela (CMDT);
- the grain bank in Toupourla (CMDT);
- the grain bank in Basra (CMDT);
- the distribution of 230 tonnes in the Koro Circle by CNAUR;
- Dutch and German support of the SNS (the national food security stock);
- distribution of maize in Temera;
- support of SECAMA in Mopti;
- the ILO grain bank project;
- the Office du Niger grain bank project;
- Projet de Développement Villageois de Segous of IFAD;
- SECAMA grain project in San;
- Médecins de Monde grain bank project in Koro;
- IFAD grain bank project in Koro;
- World Vision seed bank project in Djebock;
- Euro Action grain banks in the Gao region.

Reports published:

E. Harts-Broekhuis, A. de Jong – 'Een graantje meepikken. Aspecten van het Malinese voedselvoorzieningsbeleid' (Aspects of the Malinese food supply policy). Utrecht, 1988.

E. Harts-Broekhuis, A. de Jong - 'Geen koren zonder kaf. Graanvoorziening en voedselveiligheid in Mali in relatie tot voedselhulp' (Grain supplies and food security in Mali in relation to food aid). Utrecht, 1989.

F. Zaal – 'Voorrapport Nederlandse leveranties aan Mali' (Preliminary report on Dutch supplies to Mali. The Hague, 1988.

A. Klaasse Bos et al. – 'Voedselhulp van Nederland aan Mali. Verslag van een IOV missie' (Dutch food aid to Mali. Report of an IOV mission). The Hague, 1989.

Senegal

In Senegal a micro-regional field survey was conducted by the Agricultural University of Wageningen. Field research was carried out in:
a. the Senegal river valley;
b. the northwest of the ground nut basin.
Both areas are structurally deficient.

The field study took place between August and November 1988.

The following food aid supplies were reviewed:
- the Dutch supply of 3,330 tonnes of rice to the Common Fund;
- the WFP's annual contribution of 10,000 tonnes of rice to the Common Fund;
- the conversion projects of local grains financed by the Common Fund;
- the CRS supplementary nutritional project via health centres (15,000 tonnes of food aid per year);
- CRS grain bank projects in Ngass and Thieye-Trhieye;
- the Maison Familiale Rurale grain bank in Pekes;
- the EC contribution of 10,000 tonnes grain equivalent to the Common Fund;
- triangular purchasing of 3,000 tonnes of millet by the WFP for Mauritania;
- emergency aid distribution via CRS (3,000 tonnes);
- CARITAS food-for-work projects (well digging);
- CARITAS school nutrition projects, in cooperation with the WFP;
- food distribution via the World Church Service food-for-work (road construction) and free distribution;
- free distribution by the CSA in the ground nut basin, financed by Germany, Japan and CRS;
- Programme de Protection Nutritionelle et Sanitaire;
- WFP project SEN 2630: food-for-work, in particular irrigation, market gardening, wells, etc.;
- emergency aid via the CSA in the Senegal Valley;
- WFP project 2236 PREVOBINA (financed by the Netherlands): reafforestation carried out by the FAO on a food-for-work basis.

Reports published:
J. Hoogervorst, M. Roelands, A. van Tilburg – 'Senegal. Verslag van een literatuurstudie naar het Senegalese beleid inzake voedselvoorziening' (Report of a literature study on Senegalese food policy). Wageningen, 1988.
A. van Bergen, M. Roelands, A. van Tilburg, R. Warner – 'Voedselhulp in relatie tot de graanvoorziening in ruraal Senegal' (Food aid in relation to grain availability in rural Senegal). Wageningen, 1989.
F. Zaal – 'Voorrapport Nederlandse leveranties aan Senegal' (Preliminary report on Dutch supplies to Senegal). The Hague, 1988.

P. Cornelisse et al. – 'Voedselhulp aan Senegal. Verslag van een IOV missie' (Food aid to Senegal. Report of an IOV mission). The Hague, 1989.

Sudan

In Sudan the field survey on micro-regional level was undertaken by the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. The survey was carried out in:
a. South Darfur (a deficient area)
b. the Gezira Scheme (an irrigation area)
c. White Nile Province (a surplus region)
d. Khartoum, the urban centre.

The field survey took place between November 1988 and January 1989. The following food aid supplies were examined:
– emergency aid in Kombo and Laya Camps in Kosti;
– refugee aid in South Darfur;
– the Western Relief Operation;
– the special public works programme in White Nile Province;
– the restocking the Gumbelt food-for-work project in North Kordofan;
– the Western Savannah Development Corporation in Darfur (World Bank);
– the Jebel Marra rural development project (EC);
– the Kebkabiya smallholders project (Oxfam);
– the Sasakawa Global 2,000 project in Kosti;
– the ABS rural credit programme in Nyala;
– the advisory planning team in Darfur (ODA);
– the U.S. wheat programme (PL 480);
– Operation Lifeline;
– the Dutch supply of 5,000 tonnes of sugar;
– the Dutch logistics support via MALT;
– Operation Rainbow;
– food-for-work programme of the Norwegian Christian Aid in refugee camps;
– food-for-work programme of Save the Children in North Khartoum;
– food-for-work programme for the building of an infrastructure, via the Sudanese Council of Churches;
– the joint nutrition support project (WFP and UNICEF);
– Sudan Eastern Region food security project (food-for-work);
– emergency aid activities of the Islamic African Relief Agencies and the Gash Delta;
– the Degein Village woodlot, Degein plantation and Hadaliya shelterbelt, three agro-forestry projects based on food-for-work.

Reports published:

P. van der Wel, P. Doornbos, F. Raymakers – 'Food security with an urban bias. A study on food aid and food markets in Sudan'. Volume I: Main report. The Hague, 1989.

P. van der Wel, P. Doornbos, F. Raymakers – 'Food security with an urban bias. A study on food aid and food markets in Sudan'. Volume II: Working papers. The Hague, 1989.

F. Zaal – 'Voorrapport Nederlandse leveranties aan Soedan' (Preliminary report on Dutch supplies to Sudan). The Hague, 1988.

M.P. van Dijk et al. – 'Voedselhulp en voedselzekerheid in Soedan. Verslag van een IOV missie' (Food aid and food security in Sudan. Report of an IOV mission). The Hague, 1989.

Zambia

In Zambia the micro-regional field survey was carried out by the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam. The survey took place in:

a. Gwembe district (a deficient area in the South Province);
b. Choma district (a surplus area in the South Province);
c. Senanga district (a shortage area in the West Province);
d. Kaoma district (a surplus area in the West Province).

The field survey took place in November and December 1988.

The following food aid supplies were reviewed:

- the Dutch supply of 5,000 tonnes of maize for an emergency aid operation in the South and West Provinces
- Dutch logistics support of this operation (Logion);
- the Dutch supply of 8,000 tonnes of wheat;
- the Canadian wheat-aid programme;
- the WFP refugee aid in West Senanga;
- the WFP supplementary nutrition programme in Lusaka (together with UNICEF);
- the coupon distribution system;
- the food-for-work training project for agricultural advisers of the WFP.

Reports published:

M. Put – 'Het Zambiaanse beleid inzake de voedselvoorziening. Literatuurstudie' (Zambian policy with regard to food availability. Literature study). Amsterdam, 1988.

K. Hartevelt, M. Put – 'Farmer, could it be a bit more? Micro- and intermediate level constraints affecting food supply in Zambia'. Amsterdam, 1989.
F. Zaal – 'Voorrapport Nederlandse leveranties aan Zambia' (Preliminary report on Dutch supplies to Zambia). Den Haag, 1988.
H. Meilink et al. – 'Voedselhulp en voedselvoorziening in Zambia. Verslag van een IOV missie' (Food aid and food availability in Zambia. Report of an IOV mission. Den Haag, 1989.

Mozambique

No field survey was carried out in Mozambique. Research took place in the form of a desk survey by the State University of Groningen.

Reports published:
M. van Ommeren – Mozambique: Agricultural policy and food availability. The Hague, 1988
F. Zaal – 'Voorrapport Nederlandse leveranties aan Mozambique' (Preliminary report on Dutch supplies to Mozambique. The Hague, 1988.
H. Schoenmakers – 'Mozambique: Voedselhulp in een structurele noodsituatie' (Food aid in a structural emergency situation). Groningen, 1989.

Literature Survey

In the fourth phase of this study, an inventory was made of relevant existing evaluations and literature. No separate report was prepared.

Reference Group

In conformity with IOV working methods, a reference group was established which consisted of the following persons:

Ms H. von Metzsch		DGIS/IOV (Chairperson)
Professor dr P. Cornelisse	–	Department of Economics, University of Rotterdam
Professor dr M. Doornbos	–	Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
Dr A. Klaasse Bos	–	Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam
Professor dr W. Tims	–	Free University, Amsterdam
Mr A. Oomen	–	European Centre for Development Policy and Management, Maastricht

Mr H. Meilink	–	Africa Study Centre, State University Leiden
Ms L. Remmelzwaal	–	Ministry of Agriculture
Mr J. Boer	–	DGIS/Food aid programme
Ms B. Johnson	–	DGIS/Technical Advisory Unit
Mr K. Schouw	–	DGIS/Food aid programme
Mr J. Koster	–	DGIS/IOV (Coordinator)
Mr G. de Groot	–	Development Research Institute, Tilburg (Coordinator)

Mr T. Segaar and Mr A. van der Wiel, both of IOV, were involved in the editing of the final report.

Appendix 3. The Netherlands pledges to WFP

TABLE 15 THE NETHERLANDS PLEDGES TO WFP IN TERMS OF MONEY, 1963–1990*

Biennium	Commodities (US$ 1000)	Cash (US$ 1000)	Total (US$ 1000)	% of total pledges
1963–65	1,600	948	2,548	3.0
1966–68	8,361	2,000	10,361	5.5
1969–70	11,302	2,315	13,618	4.3
1971–72	9,063	3,417	12,480	5.1
1973–74	15,796	6,259	22,055	6.1
1975–76	20,199	9,951	30,150	4.6
1977–78	28,154	13,422	41,577	5.9
1979–80	35,063	17,603	52,667	6.4
1981–82	26,668	14,227	40,896	4.9
1983–84	28,341	13,960	42,296	4.3
1985–86	59,489	15,885	75,375	6.7
1987–88	63,665	24,299	87,965	7.7
1989–90	42,820	21,410	64,230	5.5

*Excluding pledges to IEFR and non-food items.

TABLE 16 THE NETHERLANDS PLEDGES TO WFP IN TERMS OF COMMODITIES, 1980–1990

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Dairy products	5,701	3,201	2,135	2,647	2,260	1,864	4,340	3,308	8,625	3,805	3,353
Vegetable oils	1,030	1,104	2,416	4,696	1,711	1,711	1,433	1,521	1,223	1,344	1,112
Canned meat	2,090	82	–	–		–		50	–	71	–
Canned fish	1,350	1,113	1,875	1,037	1,375	1,127	1,000	860	618	400	420
Canned chicken	–	2,712	2,231	2,852	4,788	4,056	3,370	3,714	2,024	3,157	1,840
Pulses	2,306	2,668	2,291	2,305	2,464	985	151	1,837	1,600	1,166	2,616
Likini Phala*	–	–	–	–	–	–	526	–	–	2,414	2,500
Corn milk	–	–	–	–	–	–	290	1,440	1,600	–	–
Wheat	–		14,531	7,696	500	6,920	73,855	10,016	–	703	–
Wheat flour	–		5,239	6,609	11,871	5,676	1,900	8,570	–	644	–
Rolled oats	–		1,809	–		1,130	2,774	–	540	2,760	2,800
Rice	–		–		–		–		–	4,911	7,258
Coarse grains	–		–		–	36,055	3,205	–	–	9,792	17,705

*Likini Phala is a blended food produced in Malawi in a through Dutch aid supported factory.

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